Access to
intelligence
102. There have been accusations during the
Sandline affair that the intelligence services have been involved,
or complicit, in the supply of arms. These rumours have been fuelled
by connections, real or imaginary, between Sandline's staff and
the services. We thought it was important to investigate those
allegations, as well as to establish what information the intelligence
services passed to the FCO as the story developed. In conducting
their inquiry, Sir Thomas Legg and Sir Robin Ibbs had access to
"all the intelligence reports and assessments....which might
be relevant," amounting in all to 102 reports and assessments.
They concluded that only one report was relevant.[338]
It was natural that we should wish to assure ourselves, and thereby
the House, that the judgement of the Legg report was correct;
that the rumours of misconduct were unjustified, and that the
FCO acted properly on the intelligence it received.
103. We asked the Foreign Secretary in July to allow
us access to relevant intelligence reports and assessments.[339]
This request was refused on the basis that intelligence information
was not normally released to select committees. The Committee
responded by accepting that intelligence reports were not sent
to committees as a matter of routine, but recalling that exceptions
had been made—as in the case of the so-called "Crown
Jewels"—intelligence about the sinking of the Belgrano
during the Falklands war. We commented that we "should not
have to rely on the judgement of others as to the relevance of
these intelligence reports to our inquiry." The Foreign Secretary's
response re-iterated his belief that there was "no reason
to depart from the normal practice that the Committee does not
see intelligence reports." We confirmed our view that "it
is unacceptable to the Committee to be asked to rest on [Sir Thomas
Legg's] judgement of the relevance of intelligence material."
The Foreign Secretary was unwilling to alter his position, commenting
as follows:
"In making the case
for access to the intelligence reports, you draw a parallel with
the "Crown Jewels" paper for the Belgrano inquiry. I
have already given the Committee unprecedented access to official
papers for this inquiry, as I am sure that you recognise. Particularly
in the light of the view which Sir Thomas Legg took of the relevance
of the intelligence reports, I am satisfied that the parallel
with the Belgrano inquiry is not accurate, and that there is no
good case for departing from normal practice."
This sounds very much like a Minister determined
to defend his own position.
104. We also regarded it as important that we should
have the opportunity to examine in oral evidence sessions representatives
of the appropriate intelligence services. The Secretary of State
for Defence allowed the Chief of Defence Intelligence, Vice Admiral
Alan West, to appear before us, and we held a fruitful session
of oral evidence. Because of the classified nature of the information
we received, this evidence is published with the report in a form
which contains many necessary omissions in order to preserve secrecy.
We are grateful to the Secretary of State for Defence and to Vice
Admiral West.
105. We also sought to have a private evidence session
with the Head of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) or "C."[340]
This was refused by the Foreign Secretary, who told us that the
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) set up under the Intelligence
Services Act 1994 was the appropriate committee to examine the
work of the SIS. We in turn pointed out that the ISC, though having
a parliamentary membership, differed fundamentally in character
from a select committee: it reports to the Prime Minister, not
the House, and its membership is chosen by the Executive, not
Parliament. We also pointed out that, when the ISC was established,
the House did not exclude security matters from the ambit of the
relevant departmental committees. As we said, "the House
clearly intended that the statutory Intelligence and Security
Committee and the respective departmental select committees should
provide concurrent oversight mechanisms for the security services."
The Foreign Secretary did not answer these arguments directly,
but told us that he was "clear that C should not give evidence
to the Committee."
106. We then attempted to have an informal briefing
from C, drawing a parallel with informal briefings which are,
we understand, being offered to the Home Affairs Committee by
the Director General of the Security Service. An informal briefing
is less satisfactory than formal evidence, but better than nothing.
Again, this was refused. In making his refusal the Foreign Secretary
drew a distinction between the SIS and the Security Service. In
the case of the latter "there is a certain amount which can
be said openly....without damage to its operational capability."
With SIS "the position....is different." Mr Cook stressed
that SIS was accountable to him, was overseen by the ISC, and
was subject to the work of the independent Commissioner. He told
us that he had "concluded that there is very little which
C could usefully say in an informal briefing of the Foreign Affairs
Committee" and that he "would not therefore wish C to
give this briefing." If, after all, there was very little
which C could say, we find it perverse that he be stopped from
coming to the Committee.
107. We greatly regret that we were not given access
to intelligence material and that we were refused the opportunity
to take evidence from the Director of the SIS. First of all, this
has inhibited our work, which might conceivably have been focussed
differently. We cannot now say that we have had access to all
the sources of information which would have allowed us to come
to unequivocal conclusions. From the point of view of the Government,
we are not able to say that, in the Sandline affair, the SIS has
a clean bill of health. We can neither condemn nor exonerate it.
Nor can we say that FCO officials acted with good judgement or
bad on the intelligence they were sent. The obduracy of the Government
on this matter is inimical to its own best interests. Secondly,
we believe that it is most regrettable that our Committee is apparently
not regarded by the FCO as sufficiently trustworthy to have access
to intelligence material or personnel. Sir Thomas Legg and Sir
Robin Ibbs were so regarded; junior civil servants are so regarded,
but the Members of Parliament charged with the oversight of the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office are not. We respect secrecy and
have the interests of the nation in mind just as much as anyone,
civil servant or current Minister, within government.
108. We note that, in contrast to the reluctance
of the Foreign Secretary in the intelligence field, other Ministers
have been more helpful. The Chief of Defence Intelligence was
able to appear before us and the Home Affairs Committee has been
briefed by the Director General of the Security Service. We acknowledge
that the status of the Chief of Defence Intelligence is different
from the Heads of SIS or the Security Service, and we recognise
that the Security Service is different from SIS (though we are
not persuaded that MI5 is in some sense less secret than MI6,
as Mr Cook appeared to argue).[341]
Nevertheless, the contrast is striking.
109. We assert our right, when the circumstances
warrant it, to take evidence from the SIS when relevant to a specific
inquiry being carried out within our remit from the House. The
SIS is, in our view, an associated public body of the FCO, within
the meaning of paragraph (1) of Standing Order No.152. In this
context, it is worth quoting from a 1983 report from the Liaison
Committee.[342] That
Committee concluded as follows:
"One Government activity
which already falls within the ambit of the departmental select
committees is the work of the security services, and the question
of their accountability to Parliament arises from time to time.
The arguments against a wide parliamentary discussion of these
matters are well known, and have led the committees concerned
to refrain from inquiries in this field. On the other hand expenditure
of public monies on a large scale should not go wholly unexamined,
especially when an examination could be a spur to efficiency.
Nor should it be overlooked that the security services, who are
frequently criticised in the House, have not in the past had any
parliamentary opportunity of putting the record straight. With
such a strong case on each side of the question, one thing is
clear: the House, having given to the committees a wide and unambiguous
duty of overseeing all the functions of the departments, has at
present left them in each case to decide for themselves where
the balance of the argument lies, and so whether or not to inquire
into these matters."
We agree with this view. Although the ISC has come
into existence since 1983, that Committee (which we welcome, and
whose membership we respect) is not an adequate substitute for
the departmental select committees. It is appointed by the Executive
and not the House; it reports to the Prime Minister not the House,
and its secretariat are civil servants, responsible to Government
not Parliament. We note also that the then Foreign Secretary assured
the House that the ISC would not "truncate in any way the
existing responsibilities of existing committees."[343]
Nor does the fact that intelligence can now be debated on the
floor of the House[344]
mean that select committee inquiries are otiose. We shall be asking
the Liaison Committee to examine this whole issue again in view
of its relevance to a number of other departmental Select Committees
and to the Committee of Public Accounts. In the meantime, we
recommend that the Government reflect, in any future inquiry like
that into Sandline, as to the merit of a more mature attitude
towards controlled access for the Foreign Affairs Committee to
appropriate intelligence material and to witnesses from the Secret
Intelligence Service.
329 
