Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report


PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

Dealings with officials

  88. Mr Lloyd has told the House that private military companies which supply, or offer to supply, mercenaries or related military services "could have—and in some cases clearly would have—an adverse impact on the implementation of the Government's foreign policy objectives."[307] To us he was more blunt, claiming that "we do not have truck with mercenaries; we will not have truck with mercenaries."[308] One of Legg's recommendations was that there should be explicit guidance to officials on how to manage relations with these private military companies. The need for such guidance is effectively and best illustrated by the different interpretations placed upon the discussion that took place between Messrs Buckingham and Bowen and FCO officials on 10 December 1997. The significant differences of emphasis reflected in the respective minutes of the company and the Office lead to misunderstandings.[309] To its credit, guidance was issued by the FCO to all its officers in July. These guidelines require officials to:

  • report all contacts they have with private sector companies which provide combat support, military training and similar services (other than the major British arms suppliers).

  • obtain Head of Department or Head of Mission agreement before meeting representatives of these companies; not attend meetings alone and keep full notes (including notes of telephone conversations).

  • check relevant domestic and international legislation before meetings.

  • after meetings, write to those present to set out the issues discussed and matters agreed.

  • not accept compromising hospitality and record all hospitality.[310]

A more detailed version of the guidance is being prepared at present with other interested Departments. Mr Penfold welcomed the guidelines as giving a clearer understanding to officials at home and overseas.[311] Though there is an audible sound of stable doors being bolted, we welcome the guidance, and simply record our surprise and regret that no guidance was in existence previously.

89. We accept that contacts between private military companies and the FCO or MoD can sometimes be beneficial to British interests. In the case of Sandline, both Departments received useful intelligence as a result. Though Mr Spicer claimed that his motives in forwarding information were altruistic,[312] we would expect Sandline, like any other private firm, to have its own business interests firmly in mind. What can cause particular difficulties, however, is a reliance by the personnel of military companies on a network of old friendships and loyalties within the agencies of the State. Mr Spicer, for example, is a former Lieutenant-Colonel in the Scots Guards and one of his colleagues, Mr Rupert Bowen, is a former officer of one of the intelligence services.[313] If people outside government talk the same language and share the same background and social activities as people inside, simple human nature is likely to mean that confidences will be shared and that hand will wash hand. We recommend that the guidance to officials on dealings with private military companies be amended to draw officials' attention to the particular difficulties which can arise when their contacts in private military companies have had previous service with the armed forces or other agencies of central government.

90. We raised with Mr Spicer the possibility of special restriction on the freedom of those who come from government service to operate in the private security field. He saw no restrictions as necessary beyond those which operate under the Official Secrets Act.[314] There are, of course, already restrictions on senior government employees' freedom to switch to comparable private sector work, even if in practice these may amount only to delays in the taking up of appointments. The same conditions apply to former military, diplomatic service, Secret Intelligence Service and home civil service employees, and include, where appropriate, reference to the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments or approval by the appropriate Secretary of State.[315] However, it is difficult to regulate the activities of a former government employee, except where these involve a breach of the criminal law or conduct amounting to a civil wrong, and we see no reason why a person who has acquired expertise in government service, the military or the intelligence field should be subject to special restrictions as compared to a person with expertise in, say, banking regulation.

Regulating private military companies

  91. There is a very plausible argument that private military companies are nothing more than mercenaries and arms-mongers, and that the last thing which a country like Sierra Leone—or any other trouble-spot—needs is the involvement of people like them. However, it is very possible that military operations in sensitive areas like Africa will be increasingly "privatised" as governments become wary about being directly involved. At present, there is no legislative prohibition or regulation which deals with private military companies, and they are therefore, as Legg puts it[316] "entitled to carry on their business within the law and, for that purpose, to have access and support which Departments are there to provide to British citizens and companies." We raised with our government witnesses the possibility of greater legislative control. In early June, Sir John Kerr told us that his Department was "reflecting seriously" upon legislation to deal with private military companies, while Ms Grant thought that there was "a case for more regulation, particularly for more transparency about how these companies operate and are set up."[317] In November, Sir John explained that Whitehall-wide consultation was taking place.[318] This was confirmed by Mr Lloyd in the House.[319] Perhaps anticipating the way the wind is blowing, Mr Spicer was reported in November as backing regulation of private military companies by the Government or the United Nations in order to remove "the shadow hanging over the business"[320]—a matter at which he hinted in evidence to us.[321]

92. One element of this consultation is a review of the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870. This antiquated piece of legislation was passed on the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war and makes it an offence to engage in military or naval service of "a foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with Her Majesty." It is also an offence to "prepare or fit out any naval or military expedition to proceed against the dominions of any friendly state." Embarking on a ship with any of these purposes in mind is an offence—aeroplanes were not around in 1870. Sir John told us that there had never been a successful prosecution under the Act in connection with illegal enlistment or recruitment, and that the standard of proof it required was probably unattainable.[322] While he did not rule out the possibility that the Act would be amended, or new legislation introduced, to deal with enlistment in foreign military forces, he seemed more positive about the possibility of establishing a regulatory structure in co-operation with other countries which would curb mercenary activities based here or in those other countries. We accept that there is a "number of difficult questions....which would need careful work,"[323] but we hope that this will not be an excuse for inaction.

93. There is already a UN Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries of 1989, but the Government regards the definition of mercenary used in the Convention as impossible to use in British courts.[324] We accept that parts of the Convention definition (for example, a "mercenary" is one "motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain") are too vaguely drafted for a court where a conviction must be based on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. This gives strength to our earlier recommendation that the Government needs to do what it can to ensure that drafting of UN documents is improved.[325] Nevertheless, there is no reason why the definitions used in the UN Treaty need to be adopted verbatim. The Treaty has no effect in British law without primary legislation, but the primary legislation does not need to follow the precise words of the Convention. For example, a tighter definition of mercenary could be adopted in British law so allowing ratification of the Convention. However, we accept that there are other problems with the Convention; for example, in its possible application to Gurkhas and in the language used in some of its articles. We also note that only 16 states are party to the Convention, and that the EU states (except Italy), the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Norway are all non-parties. We note that the Government will be discussing with the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries the possibility of amending the Convention. We also accept that amendment will not be easy. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that international effort and common international controls will be more effective than those undertaken unilaterally. We recommend that the Government reconsider seeking to amend the existing UN Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries but, if this cannot be achieved, that the Government take the lead in initiatives in the European Union, Council of Europe or the United Nations aimed at drawing up a new international legal instrument on the activities of mercenaries.

94. We had an opportunity to meet informally with Mr Ballesteros, the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, on 27 January 1998. He agreed that the UN Convention had deficiencies, but believed that the United Kingdom should sign it and then work to amend it. In his view, the United Kingdom could also draw on the Convention to draft primary domestic legislation appropriate to this country in relation to mercenaries. Such legislation would address the specific concerns discussed above He described the activities of private military companies as a form of "neo-colonialism" which both constituted serious interference with the role of the UN and adversely affected relations between Western countries and less developed ones where mercenary activities usually took place. Thus the current legislative vacuum in relation to private military companies, particularly the lack of sanctions, meant that the international community was very close to allowing them to act with impunity. In his judgment, international peace and security should never be allowed to be subject to private interests in this way.

95. The illegal part of Sandline's operation in Sierra Leone was not, of course, any supply of personnel but the supply of arms. The previous Government agreed that a "considered assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of primary legislation to prohibit arms trafficking" should be conducted.[326] The present Government have accepted that it would be right in principle to control the involvement of persons in the UK or UK persons abroad in trafficking or brokering of arms to countries subject to embargo.[327] We regret that primary legislation necessary to bring this into effect was not foreshadowed in this session's Queen's Speech. United Kingdom primary legislation would, of course, only be effective against persons operating from or domiciled in the United Kingdom, and the advantage of common effort by countries in co-operation is obvious. The European Union adopted in June 1998 a code of conduct aimed at the further standardisation of criteria governing the licensing of exports of arms from Member States.[328] We would welcome the extension of this Code to cover arms trafficking and brokering. We recommend that the Government take the lead in initiatives in Europe and/or the United Nations aimed at drawing up an international legal instrument on trafficking or brokering in arms subject to embargo.

96. In the meanwhile, there is nothing which prevents unilateral action by the United Kingdom. The economic benefit which private military companies and arms traffickers bring is so marginal that we have no need to await the actions of others. We recommend (a) in the case of mercenary activities, the publication, within 18 months, of a Green Paper outlining legislative options for the control of private military companies which operate out of the United Kingdom, its dependencies and the British Islands, and (b) in the case of arms trafficking and brokering, that the legislation to control these activities be introduced no later than in the next parliamentary session.


307   HC Deb 1 December 1998, c.670. Back

308   Q1985. Back

309   Legg docs. 39 and 40. Back

310   Unreported evidence. Back

311   Q1180. Back

312   Q812. Back

313   Q875. Back

314   Q774. Back

315   HC Deb, 8 December, c.163. Back

316   Para. 11.9. Back

317   QQ350-1; 1552. Back

318   QQ1870ff. Back

319   HC Deb 1 December 1998, c.670. Back

320   Sunday Telegraph, page 9, 22 November 1998. Back

321   Q1026. Back

322   Q1871. Back

323   Appendix 11, Annex C, p.314. Back

324   HC Deb 1 December 1998, c.670; Appendix 11, Annex C, p.314. Back

325   See para. 15. Back

326   HC Deb 21 January 1997 c.537. Back

327   Cm 3989, para. 3.3.1ff. The Government defines trafficking as "involvement in buying and/or selling goods" and brokering as "acting as an agent in putting a deal together between supplier and customer or making the practical arrangements for the supply of the goods." Back

328   See paras. 67 and 144 of First Report of Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1998-99, Foreign Policy and Human Rights, HC 100. Back


 
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