House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report

SIERRA LEONE

BACKGROUND

Sierra Leone's recent history: the Committee's role

1. Sierra Leone's civil war began in 1991 when the Revolutionary Unified Front (RUF), aided by Liberia, launched an attack on the then President. After an unsuccessful period of military rule beginning in 1992, there were elections in 1996 which gave the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) 27 out of the 68 seats in the National Assembly, and returned the SLPP candidate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, as President with almost 60% of the popular vote. On 25 May 1997, there was another military coup by a Junta led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. The coup was backed by the RUF, which had not contested the 1996 elections. President Kabbah fled to Conakry in Guinea. In July 1997 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent a Nigerian-dominated force, known as the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG),[1] to oust the Junta. There was intense fighting before a peace agreement (the Conakry Peace Accord) was reached in October 1997. This involved a cease-fire and the return of President Kabbah within six months, with immunity for Major Koroma. Peace broke down in February 1998 amid mutual recriminations. Fighting resumed; ECOMOG troops gained control of Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital, on 12 February 1998, and President Kabbah returned from Guinea on 10 March. Trials and executions of coup supporters occurred subsequently. The situation in the country has remained critical, with fighting continuing and a crying need for demobilisation and disarmament.[2] Appended to the Report[3] is a Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on the situation in the country up until 1 February 1999. We comment on this in a postscript to the Report.[4]

2. Sierra Leone became independent within the Commonwealth in 1961. It is one of the poorest countries in the world. 1996 GNP per head was $200; male life expectancy is 37 years. But this level of poverty disguises the fact that Sierra Leone has been one of the world's principal diamond producers. The allure of these diamonds has attracted outsiders with an eye for quick profits, and has been at the root of internal power struggles. As one of our witnesses told us, "some people would argue that diamonds have been the curse of Sierra Leone."[5] The diamond trade has also financed the considerable presence of mercenaries within the country. Diamonds can certainly be seen as one cause of the civil war which still ravages the country, and which has claimed at least 10,000 lives and displaced half the population. Horrific brutalities have been committed against the people.[6] These are concerns for the world community in general, but particularly for the United Kingdom. Sierra Leone first came into existence as a result of the settlement of freed slaves under British protection, and it remains "one of our closest friends in Africa and a place to which we have a particular responsibility."[7] Our role in fostering democracy in Sierra Leone, and in helping to ensure the restoration of the democratically elected Kabbah Government, has been important and is regarded as such.[8] The United Kingdom helped ensure that the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in October 1997 strongly supported the return of the Kabbah Government. The British Government also took the unusual step of evacuating our High Commission to be in exile with President Kabbah in Conakry. In consequence, this country has a deep well of goodwill in that country on which it can draw.

3. The Committee's report does not deal with these wider matters. That is not because we consider them unimportant. The sufferings of the people of Sierra Leone should cause much deep reflection about the nature of the new international order and of its relevance—or lack of it—to the inhabitants of some of the world's most strife-torn nations. The terms of reference of the inquiry on which this report is based have instead a much more narrow focus. They are set out in paragraph 7. But our inquiry is one which we consider of great significance in our role, set by the House of Commons, of examining the administration of the FCO and of reporting to the House when and where that administration has gone wrong.

The Sandline affair: a political bombshell

4. In the case of what has come to be known as the Sandline affair, it is common ground that something went very wrong. Arms were delivered by a British company to Sierra Leone for use by President Kabbah's forces in contravention of a United Kingdom arms embargo. This was prima facie an offence punishable by up to seven years imprisonment. The facts that a contract to supply the arms had been agreed, and then that arms had been supplied, were known to certain FCO officials. There was undue delay in passing material information to the prosecuting authorities, and an equally serious delay in informing Ministers. A considerable number of serious mistakes were made. The crisis caused by the Sandline affair at the heart of the FCO was palpable. Ministers were suspected of misleading Parliament—allegations with which we shall deal later—and the Foreign Secretary has himself recently been quoted as saying that the affair "took its toll" on his standing as a Minister.[9]

The Committee's work

5. Although there had been earlier press reports, the Committee's work began when the Minister of State responsible for Sierra Leone, Mr Tony Lloyd MP, appeared before the Committee in its inquiry into Foreign Policy and Human Rights on 5 May after the story broke in the previous weekend's newspapers. Mr Lloyd was questioned at length about the affair.[10] The following day, the subject was raised by the Leader of the Liberal Democrat party at Prime Minister's Question Time, and a private notice question from the Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs was allowed by the Speaker and answered by the Foreign Secretary.[11] Sandline dominated Prime Minister's Questions on 13 May.

6. On 14 May, the Committee took evidence from Sir John Kerr (the Permanent Under-Secretary at the FCO). This session was intended to be on the Public Expenditure Plans of the FCO, but questions related exclusively to Sandline.[12] It was a difficult session. During questions, Sir John appeared to indicate to the Committee that a Minister knew of the Sandline deal at the time of the Adjournment Debate on March 12. But then Sir John wrote to the Committee that afternoon to correct this important part of the evidence he had given.[13] By 18 May (when Sandline was the subject of an Opposition Day debate[14]) the Government had decided to set up an investigation, conducted by Sir Thomas Legg, the former Permanent Secretary at the Lord Chancellor's Department, and Sir Robin Ibbs, an expert on management. This investigation was given the remit of establishing:

what was known by government officials (including military personnel) and Ministers about plans to supply arms to Sierra Leone after 8 October 1997;
whether any official encouragement or approval was given to such plans or such supply; and

if so, on what authority.

The inquiry was given full access to papers, and its report was published on 27 July 1998.[15]

7. Meanwhile, the Committee's interest in Sierra Leone continued, but was impeded by the refusal of the Government to release to the Committee firstly telegrams concerning Sierra Leone, and secondly to refuse to allow release of the information which fell within the ambit of the Legg inquiry. These two refusals were the subjects of the Committee's First and Second Special Reports of last Session.[16] Two frustrating oral evidence sessions with Sir John Kerr took place on 9 and 30 June. On the morning of the latter session, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman telling the Committee that if it wished "to persist in putting questions on these matters, they must put them directly to myself."[17] On 7 July, on an Opposition Day, the House debated a motion containing words from the Committee's Second Special Report.[18] This demonstrated the context of intense partisan debate inside and outside the House in which the Committee's deliberations were conducted. On 16 July, the Committee took up the Foreign Secretary's offer to give oral evidence. Thereafter it agreed formal terms of reference for an inquiry. These were:

"To examine, taking into account the report of the Sierra Leone arms investigations (the Legg Report), whether:

actions by Government personnel in relation to Sierra Leone after 25 May 1997 were consistent with implementation of the Government's policy that the restoration of President Kabbah should be pursued by peaceful means; and

deficiencies have been revealed in the arrangements in the FCO for passing information to Ministers and implementing their instructions."

8. In the inquiry, we first took evidence from the Foreign Secretary on 28 July 1998, the day after the Legg report was published. Then, in November and December 1998, we took evidence from Mr Tim Spicer OBE of Sandline International; Mr Peter Penfold CMG OBE, HM High Commissioner in Sierra Leone; Vice Admiral Alan West, the Chief of Defence Intelligence; Ms Ann Grant and Mr Craig Murray, officials involved in the relevant department of the FCO in London (Africa Department (Equatorial)) (AD(E)) during the time in question; Sir John Kerr; and the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of State, Mr Lloyd.[19] We have again encountered some frustrations. Our original request to hear three of the officials involved in the affair (Mr Dales, Ms Grant and Mr Murray) was met by a proposal that we should take evidence from only one of them (Ms Grant). We were able to achieve a compromise of seeing Ms Grant and Mr Murray. Although all the documents referred to in the Appendices to the Legg report was made available to us in confidence, we were not allowed to see relevant intelligence reports, and our requests to take evidence in private from the Head of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and, failing that, to be briefed by him in private, were refused. We return later to the lessons we have learned from our disputes with the Government about the production of papers and of witnesses, and we make recommendations of general interest to select committees.

9. For ease of reference, we publish in two Annexes to the Report[20] a list of all those individuals whom we mention, with a brief description of each, and a chart showing the line of command in the FCO.

The Legg report

10. It has not been the intention of our inquiry to duplicate the work of Sir Thomas Legg and Sir Robin Ibbs, though—inevitably—there has been some overlap. Our report is complementary to theirs. For example, we do not rehearse the chronology of events which they describe, nor do we deal with departments other than the FCO or with the peripheral actors in the Sandline drama. However, we reject the Foreign Secretary's view that our inquiry has uncovered nothing new.[21] To use a parliamentary analogy, we have used the Legg/Ibbs report (which for convenience we refer to elsewhere as the Legg Report) as the Public Accounts Committee uses a report of the National Audit Office. Our oral evidence sessions have illuminated a great deal which is not clear from simply reading the Legg report. On occasions we have differed from the conclusions which Legg and Ibbs drew. It is important not to be mesmerised by the Legg report: theirs is not necessarily the last word in this affair.

1 A list of acronyms, etc, is published at Annex I. Back

2 Q1341. Back

3 See Appendix 13, pp.315-6. Back

4 See para. 112. Back

5 Q1148: Mr Penfold. Back

6 QQ1340; 1441; 1994. Back

7 Q93: Sir John Kerr. Back

8 Q1263. Back

9 New Statesman, 13 November 1998. Back

10 QQ463-541, published in HC 369-vii of Session 1997-98, and pp.1-8 of Volume II of this Report. Back