Select Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Fifth Report


REGIONAL EUROSTAR SERVICES

Introduction

The History of regional Eurostar services

1. In its First Report of Session 1985-86, the then Transport Select Committee considered the proposed Channel Link. The Committee expressed its wish to see some rail services to Europe which "originated from or terminated in provincial cities".[1] That view was shared by many other Members of Parliament, and flavoured the debates which followed during the passage of the Channel Tunnel Bill. Consequently, Section 40 of the Channel Tunnel Act 1987 required British Rail to prepare by the end of 1989 a plan stating measures it proposed to take, and any measures it considered ought to be taken by others, to secure the provision or improvement of international through services serving various parts of the UK, and an increase in the proportion of international passengers and goods carried by through services.[2]

2. In 1988, British Rail established a subsidiary company, European Passenger Services Limited, to operate passenger services to Europe, both from London and elsewhere, in conjunction with the national railways of France and Belgium, SNCF and SNCB. In December 1989, British Rail revealed plans for daytime services originating in Manchester, Wolverhampton, Edinburgh and Leeds, and sleeper services beginning in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Swansea and Plymouth.[3] These, it said, would prove profitable. As a result, in December 1991, European Passenger Services Limited ordered seven regional Eurostar train sets, at a total cost of £180 million.[4] These trains were similar to the inter-capital Eurostar sets which operate between London, Paris and Brussels, but with modifications to allow them to utilise four different power sources, and four different signalling systems.[5] In addition, stock to operate sleeper services was also ordered.

3. Regional Eurostar services, however, have never operated. The regions have been cheated. The acquiescence of Members of Parliament to the Channel Tunnel Act 1987 depended on the provision of regional services. We do not understand why the Government has not conducted research into the economic and social impact on the regions both that the Channel Tunnel has had, and that regional Eurostar services would have. The regional train sets have not been used, other than on occasion to fill in on the inter-capital service. Two of the sets are ready for use now, and the remaining five are mothballed.[6] The sets procured to provide the sleeper service have also never been used. Earlier this year it was decided not to proceed with the service, and the lease on the rolling stock was terminated. Since European Passenger Services Limited (by then renamed Eurostar (UK) Limited) could not meet its share of the termination costs, it called on a guarantee given by the previous Government. On 1 June 1998, the Government paid approximately £109 million to the stock's lessors. We have already commented on this fiasco in a previous report.[7]

4. Although regional Eurostars have never run north of London, from May 1995 a domestic rail service was operated from cities north of London, using the West Coast and East Coast Main Lines, to connect with inter-capital services at Waterloo. The service consisted of a daily service each way on each Main Line available only to international passengers at a low add-on fare of £10 to £20. Fast Tracks to Europe Alliance told us that this trial service was "the biggest secret in the North West ... It was never marketed. They talk about it being fast but it was very slow".[8] Only 30 to 40 passengers travelled on each train, and the service was ended in January 1997.[9]

5. In February 1996, London and Continental Railways Limited (LCR),[10] won the right to design, build, finance and operate the Channel Tunnel rail link. As part of its development agreement with the Government, control of European Passenger Services Limited passed to LCR, and became Eurostar (UK) Limited. Financing for design and construction of the rail link depended heavily on the future performance of Eurostar (UK) Limited. By January 1998 LCR had reassessed projections of future Eurostar traffic, and had concluded that "its original forecasts were far too optimistic. As a result, LCR ... would not be able to attract project finance from the debt and equity markets, as planned".[11] The company asked for additional finance from the Government. Since this was not forthcoming, it was, in effect, forced to default on the development agreement.

6. The Deputy Prime Minister allowed LCR to explore other sources of finance for the rail link. On 3 June 1998, he signed a new statement of principles with LCR and Railtrack plc which would enable the link to be built.[12] Part of the agreement was that Eurostar services would be managed outside LCR. Two bids had been considered for the right to operate Eurostars: one from Virgin Group, and another from a consortium comprising British Airways, National Express, SNCF and SNCB. The consortium, now known as Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited, was successful,[13] and was awarded the contract to manage the Eurostar business until 2010.[14]

7. In his statement, the Deputy Prime Minister said that "LCR remains under an obligation to provide the infrastructure for regional Eurostar services".[15] Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited had already proposed a service from Heathrow airport to Paris, beginning in 2001. The company was also asked urgently to commission research into the feasibility of more extensive regional services, and to report by the end of the year. The appointment of Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited to conduct the feasibility study, and the resulting report to the Deputy Prime Minister, in our view lacks credibility because (a) Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited had already decided by May 1998 to promote a Eurostar service from Heathrow to Paris, (b) British Airways, which has an obvious interest in the operation of Eurostar services from Heathrow, had taken a stake in Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited in June 1998,[16] (c) Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited were asked to conduct the feasibility study of regional Eurostar services only after they had been appointed managing agents of Eurostar (UK) Limited, and (d) the study took no account of the alternative proposals of Virgin Group.

Our Inquiry

8. The Transport Sub-committee's intention was to conduct a very brief inquiry, taking evidence from the Government and others in order to review the situation. In the end, we received a good deal of evidence, including written evidence from the Government, Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited, Virgin Group, LCR, Railtrack, and a number of other interested parties. We took oral evidence from Fast Tracks to Europe Alliance, Virgin Group, Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited, and officials from the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions.[17]

9. During our inquiry the report on the feasibility of regional Eurostar services, commissioned by Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited was published. It was not positive about the viability of regional services. The Deputy Prime Minister announced on 8 December 1998 that he would commission consultants to review the report.[18] In his evidence to the Sub-committee on 16 December Mr Roy Griffins, Director of Railways at the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, asked for our views before the terms of reference of the Government's review were fixed.[19] Consequently we have produced this report speedily, in order to present our views to Government without unduly delaying the process.

The feasibility of regional Eurostar services

Technical constraints

10. Seven regional train sets were delivered in 1995 and 1996. We were told that two of the sets are ready for service now, and three more could be made available very quickly. The remaining two require work to replace components, and to bring them back up to a standard appropriate for passenger services. That work might take several months, but all seven train sets "could be made available by the second half of 1999".[20] The cost of the work has already been accounted for by Eurostar (UK) Limited.

11. Regional Eurostars from north of London will use either the West Coast or the East Coast Main Lines. From the East Coast Main Line the trains will join the North London Line to access the West London Line. The West Coast Main Line leads directly to the West London Line. The trains will then pass through Kensington Olympia to join the routes currently used by Inter-Capital Eurostar services from Waterloo. The West London and North London Lines have already been electrified and improved for use by Eurostar services.[21] Works to improve the West Coast Main Line began in April 1996. Final approval from HM Railways Inspectorate was received in September 1997.[22] Work to improve the East Coast Main Line is ongoing, and the necessary infrastructure may not be in place for some months.[23]

12. The greatest obstacle, however, to clearing regional Eurostar train sets for use north of London has been the powerful electro-magnetic fields which the trains produce. This was found to interfere with track circuits which control signalling equipment, and some modifications were required to counter the problem.[24] A programme of testing the trains on the West Coast Main Line is now largely completed. By early January Railtrack and Eurostar (UK) Limited will have begun to process all the data gathered, and "once Railtrack are satisfied that the analysis demonstrates that the power cars from the regional rolling stock will not interfere with track circuitry, Railtrack will be able to issue a safety certificate".[25] That is expected in Spring 1999.

13. Progress on the East Coast Main Line has been slower. Testing of the trains has only been completed over 100 miles of the route, which extends for 450 miles in total.[26] We were told that more work is needed to establish a Railway Safety Case, particularly north of York. It seems certain that regional Eurostar services to the north-east of England, and to Scotland, could not begin before 2000.[27]

14. Eurostar (UK) Limited has already negotiated train paths on the rail network north of London with Railtrack, and with Railtrack and Eurotunnel on the network between London and Calais. Indeed Councillor Stacey, of the Fast Tracks to Europe Alliance, drew our attention to the fact that the railway timetable already allowed for 'ghost' Eurostar services.[28] In France some of the train paths originally reserved for regional Eurostars have been reallocated, and would have to be renegotiated.[29] It was not, however, suggested that such problems would be insurmountable.

15. It is, therefore, apparent that there are no significant technical obstacles to operating regional Eurostar services on the West Coast Main Line and the East Coast Main Line by early 2000. All seven regional train sets could then be ready for use, the train paths are already cleared, and the necessary modifications to the infrastructure on both lines should have been completed. However, we expect those conducting the Government's review of regional Eurostar services to confirm our assessment of the matter.

16. In the absence of any firm decision about regional Eurostar services we recommend that Eurostar (UK) Limited should consider leasing the regional train sets to domestic rail operators for use elsewhere on the rail network, in order to relieve the existing shortage of available rolling stock.

Economic viability

17. At first glance it seems unlikely that regional Eurostar services might be operated profitably, and therefore without further public subsidy. They must compete with air travel, coaches and cars in terms of journey times, cost, comfort and flexibility. For example, the time taken to get to the airport in London, to board the aircraft, to disembark in Paris, and then to travel into the centre of the city, means that travelling by inter-capital Eurostar may be at least as quick as flying. The same is not true from Manchester, when the journey takes one hour 20 minutes by air, and is projected to take approximately six-and-a-half hours by regional Eurostar.[30] Furthermore, reduced airline prices mean that regional Eurostar services may not be hugely cheaper than air travel. Coach travel is cheaper still, although the journey time would be much shorter on a regional Eurostar.

18. Research into the feasibility of regional Eurostar services was conducted on behalf of Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited by Mercer Management Consulting Limited. Its report was delivered to the Deputy Prime Minister on 13 November 1998, and published by him on 8 December 1998.[31] The researchers were gloomy about prospects for regional Eurostar services. They said that direct regional Eurostar services to destinations north of London would not be commercially viable on a cash basis at least until completion of both phases of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, with the improvements in journey times it will bring; that the addition of new stops at Watford and Kensington would improve cash flows without making services north of London financially viable; that in the medium to long term the Eurostar operator will face additional costs for replacement of train sets and access charges which mean that even after completion of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link regional services may not be commercially viable; and that a Watford-Paris service with feeder services from the regions, provided by domestic train operators, could offer significant benefits to passengers, and would be likely to be the most effective way of providing Eurostar services from the regions to Paris and beyond.[32]

19. Some of those who gave evidence to our inquiry did not agree with Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited's conclusion that regional Eurostar services would lose £63 million in total from 2000 until phase two of the Channel Tunnel rail link opens in 2007.[33] Virgin Group, in particular, thought that the service could be profitable. It is prepared to operate regional Eurostar services at its own risk, and to compensate LCR for reductions in income caused by abstracting passengers from the existing inter-capital services.[34] Its service, which could begin within six months, would include a daily service from Glasgow via the East Coast Main Line, two services a day from Manchester and one from Birmingham on the West Coast Main Line, as well as four services daily commencing at Watford.[35] If it were to operate such a service, Virgin thought that it would require initial capitalisation of approximately £10 million,[36] which the Group would itself provide, and that the service would be profitable after about three years of operation.[37] Virgin Group also offered to operate a limited regional service in conjunction with Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited's announced preference to run services from Heathrow airport.[38]

20. We were surprised that Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited and Virgin Group could reach such different conclusions about the viability of regional Eurostar services. However, Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited's report says that "other interested parties may consider that they have particular marketing skills or commercial advantages that would improve the viability of regional Eurostar services",[39] and Virgin Group told us that it could operate regional Eurostar services profitably because of its existing long-distance services, and its ability to build a market.[40] However, whether or not the use of marketing tools and economies of scale in selling tickets is adequate grounds for Virgin Group's optimism is unclear. We recommend that the Government's review should examine closely Virgin Group's business plan for regional Eurostar services, and, in addition, should conduct its own research into the potential market, costs and revenues of regional Eurostar services.

Watford and Kensington Olympia

21. Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited's review identified Watford and Kensington Olympia as stations at which regional Eurostar services might stop in the London area. Services from north of London would pass through Olympia on the West London Line in any event, and, if trains called at the station, a further 474,000 passengers a year would use the service by 2002, reducing the deficit in operating regional services by half.[41] Considerable works, costing up to £12 million, would be required at Olympia to allow Eurostars to stop there, not least of which is the extension of the southbound platform.[42] Nevertheless, we recommend that the Government's review should examine the effect that a stop at Kensington Olympia would have on the regional Eurostar market, and the revenue that such a stop would generate. It should also consider what works would have to be carried out to make it possible for Eurostars to use Olympia.

22. Regional Eurostar services on the West Coast Main Line would pass through Watford Junction on their way to the West London Line. Several of those who gave evidence to our inquiry identified Watford as a natural point for Eurostars to call at on their way to or from further north, or as a starting point and terminus for services.[43] Watford is well-placed to attract passengers from the M25 and M1, subject to the provision of adequate car parking, as well as having excellent rail connections on the West Coast Main Line. Indeed Virgin Group told us that once its new tilting trains had been delivered it intended "to enhance Watford as a main interchange station by stopping all of its services there".[44]

23. Whether or not regional Eurostar services should operate from cities to the north, the evidence given to our inquiry clearly illustrated the potential of direct Eurostar services from Watford. Inter-Capital and Regional Rail's review of regional Eurostar services concluded that "a Watford-Paris service with feeder services from the Regions, provided by domestic train operators, could offer significant benefits to passengers in the West Midlands, North West, North Wales and Scotland and is likely to be the most effective way of providing Eurostar services from the Regions to Paris and beyond".[45] Minimal works would be needed at Watford to improve the station, costing up to £2 million,[46] and the difficulty of maintaining security would have to be addressed. Even so, we believe that Watford is well-placed to become an integrated transport hub, and we recommend that the Government's review should consider what benefits and costs would be associated with (a) direct services from Watford, and (b) through services on the West Coast Main Line calling at Watford. Subject to the review's findings, we recommend that services from Watford to Paris should commence as soon as possible.

Heathrow to Paris services

24. On 3 June 1998, the Deputy Prime Minister announced that Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited proposed to establish a direct service from Heathrow to Paris.[47] Mr Prescott pointed out that Heathrow was the world's busiest airport, one of the country's biggest bus stations, it was connected to the Underground system, and, in the Heathrow Express, it had a fast connection to London. He said that the new service would "establish Heathrow as an integrated transport interchange of international importance, connecting long-haul air services directly to the European high-speed rail network".[48] The written submission of Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited echoed the Deputy Prime Minister, suggesting that a Heathrow to Paris service might be attractive to passengers arriving at Heathrow by air both from regional airports, and on long-haul flights, as well as to residents of west London, Surrey and Berkshire.[49]

25. We were therefore surprised, when we took evidence from Mr Child, from Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited, to discover how limited his ambitions for the Heathrow to Paris service were. He said that he found it "quite difficult to see the attractiveness of a three or three-and-a-half hour train journey starting at Heathrow after a long-haul flight",[50] especially compared to a connecting flight of 45 minutes. He also suggested that a passenger from Glasgow, for example, was unlikely to fly to Heathrow to take a train to Paris when he could fly direct in much less time.[51] Instead, he envisaged Eurostar services from Heathrow attracting passengers from the local area: "there is a big catchment area at Heathrow for point-to-point ... passengers originating in the Home Counties and travelling to Paris, and not actually connecting with other flights or services".[52] He thought that half of the 1.5 million journeys annually from Heathrow to Paris currently made by air, and 700,000 journeys made from Waterloo to Paris by Eurostar would be abstracted to a regional Eurostar service from Heathrow.[53]

26. We agree with Mr Child that it does seem unlikely that many air passengers will opt to change at Heathrow on to a Eurostar in order to complete their journey to Paris or elsewhere. We recommend that the Government's review should examine the proposed Heathrow to Paris service, to discover the size of the market for such a service, especially in comparison to services to Paris from other possible centres, to ascertain the impact that operating from Heathrow will have on the provision of other regional Eurostar services, and to evaluate its impact on traffic flows on the roads around Heathrow. We also recommend that the review should consider what additional benefits might be gained by British Airways, one of the partners in Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited, as a result of the introduction of a Heathrow to Paris service, and whether those benefits should be allowed to affect the decision to operate such a service at the expense of wider regional Eurostar services.

27. Virgin Group said that unless Terminal Five is constructed at Heathrow Eurostar services from the airport will not be "technically viable",[54] firstly because of the way the current tunnel and station structure, serving the Heathrow Express, is configured, and secondly because of difficulties with accessing the West London Line between Acton and Olympia.[55] Although Mr Child, of Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited, was not asked to address the second point, he did say that Terminal Five had "hardly featured at all" in the company's consideration of whether or not to operate a service from Heathrow.[56] We recommend that the Government's review of regional Eurostar services should consider what technical constraints there might be to the operation of a Heathrow to Paris service.

Domestic passengers

28. Both Virgin Group and Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited said that the economic viability of regional Eurostar services would be much improved if domestic as well as international passengers might be carried on the trains.[57] Mr Whitehorn, from Virgin Group, told us that the ability to carry domestic passengers on regional Eurostar services "would be fantastic",[58] although he stressed that it was not part of the Group's business plan.[59] It is obvious that the speed, comfort and cachet of regional Eurostar services might attract some customers travelling, for example, from Manchester to London, generating additional revenue.

29. There are a number of constraints on proposals to carry domestic passengers on regional Eurostar trains. The overriding consideration is security, in terms of countering the threat of terrorism, allowing Customs and Excise to operate effectively, and passport control. Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited identified practical difficulties in maintaining security "where domestic and international passengers are carried together",[60] and Virgin Group told us that it would be "very difficult within any medium time frame to persuade the Immigration Service and others [to allow regional Eurostars] to carry domestic passengers".[61] Another difficulty would be the limits on competition intended to protect franchise operators.[62] It is worth noting that the company most likely to be affected by competition from regional Eurostar services on the West Coast Main Line would, of course, be Virgin Trains.

30. Nevertheless, we recommend that the Government should as part of its review examine the possibility of regional Eurostar services carrying domestic as well as international passengers. In doing so, it should assess what extra revenue might be brought in by domestic passengers, how security could be maintained on the trains, and at what cost. We do not accept that the obstacles to maintaining security are insurmountable. The review should also consider the effect of competition from regional Eurostars on existing services, and the attitude of the regulatory authorities as well as the companies potentially affected.

The Channel Tunnel Rail Link

31. All of those who gave evidence to us agreed that regional Eurostar services will be much enhanced by the opening of the Channel Tunnel rail link. Phase one of the link, which is scheduled to open by 2003, will run between the Channel Tunnel and Ebbsfleet, in Kent, where a section of reinstated track will connect the rail link to the existing rail network. Inter-capital services from Waterloo will use this connection, and it would be possible for Eurostar trains originating from north of London to do the same. Journey times would be reduced by 20 minutes.[63] Phase two of the rail link, due for completion in 2007, will have a highly significant impact on regional Eurostar services, which will be able to access the rail link quickly, and will not have to travel around London on the West London Line. Journey times on the West Coast Main Line will be reduced by 45 minutes, and on the East Coast Main Line by 60 minutes.[64]

32. The decision to build the second phase of the rail link will be made shortly, since construction must begin in 2001 if the link is to be completed as planned by 2007. Phase two will be much more expensive and difficult than phase one, since it includes a three kilometre tunnel under the Thames, and twenty kilometres of tunnel under east London.[65] Consequently, in spite of the Deputy Prime Minister's assertion that there is "a strong incentive to complete the whole link, from the tunnel to St Pancras",[66] doubts remain about whether the entire Channel Tunnel rail link will be completed as scheduled.[67]

33. Fast Tracks to Europe Alliance expressed concern about the dilemma that the decision to construct phase two of the link would be influenced by an assessment of the size of the market for regional Eurostar services, but that the full size of the market could not be determined until phase two of the link was opened, with consequent reduced journey times.[68] For that reason, the Alliance argues that the second phase of the rail link should be built in any event. We recommend that the Government's review should take due regard of the impact of phase two of the Channel Tunnel rail link on the journey times of, and the demand for, regional Eurostar services, and should make clear in its report what the impact will be. In assessing the viability of regional services, the review should assume that phase two of the rail link will be built by 2007.

The Wider Context

34. Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited is obliged by its contract with LCR to maximise cash flow from Eurostar (UK) Limited, and thus reduce the need for LCR to fund Eurostar services.[69] It was the greater than expected losses on inter-capital Eurostar services, currently running at £150 million per year, which led to LCR's original financial difficulties,[70] although it is now predicted that from 2005 the inter-capital services will move into profit. Consequently Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited is also required to seek only profitable uses for the regional Eurostar train sets.[71] We note that Eurostar (UK) Limited must be operated to maximise the revenues flowing from it to LCR. We recommend that the Government's review should recommend nothing that jeopardises the financial position of LCR while it constructs the Channel Tunnel rail link.

35. The Fast Tracks to Europe Alliance argued that this emphasis on profitability was itself flawed. The Alliance made several points in support of its case. The first was that £180 million had been invested in the regional Eurostar train sets, and £140 million in clearing train paths, by the taxpayers of the whole country, and that all of the country, not just the south east, should expect to benefit from passenger services through the Channel Tunnel. Councillor Stacey, from the Alliance, said that the public had "already paid for these trains; they just cannot use them because no-one is running them".[72] Virgin Group agreed, claiming that it was "inconceivable that the nation would abandon an investment of £320 million to link the Midlands, the north of England, Scotland and Wales to mainland Europe leaving only London and the south east as the beneficiaries".[73]

36. The second point made by the Alliance was that even the review of regional Eurostar services conducted by Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited anticipated losses of only £12.1 million per year, and, with stops at Watford and Kensington Olympia, that loss might be reduced to £4.9 million annually. Councillor Stacey contrasted that figure with the losses experienced by the inter-capital services, telling us that "the inter-capital service is already losing £150 million [but] I have not heard that they are proposing to stop running those trains".[74] Thirdly, the Alliance pointed out that rail travel was more environmentally-friendly than travel by air, and that, in the future, air travel between European destinations might be restricted.[75]

37. Finally, the Alliance argued that regional Eurostar services had, in effect, been promised during the passage of the Channel Tunnel Act 1987. It claimed that "both the Channel Tunnel and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Acts were seen as national projects providing an infrastructure to assist the development of the whole country ... Members of Parliament from all parts of the United Kingdom gave an easy passage for both these Acts in the expectation of attaining such benefits".[76] A decision not to operate regional Eurostar services would therefore run counter to the promise implied by Section 40 of the Channel Tunnel Act 1987.

38. Taken together, the Alliance argued that these four points made "an unanswerable moral case for Eurostar services to be provided at the earliest opportunity".[77] Although the Alliance noted that Virgin Group had offered to operate such services at its own risk, and believed that "the services will be profitable at least in the medium term",[78] the implication behind its argument was that such services should be subsidised, at least in the short term, if necessary.[79]

39. In support of its case the Alliance stressed the benefits which would be brought to the regions by regional Eurostar services. There would be "real benefits both to the populations served by it in the journey opportunities it will give to them, but also in terms of bringing people into the regions in terms of direct economic [activity] but also the development of leisure tourism ... in regions other than London".[80] In addition, the Alliance pointed out that the European high speed rail network, or Trans-European Network, is expanding, and it is "now becoming essential for cities and regions to have an address on that network ... Regions are going to be disadvantaged in economic development terms if they are not seen as important enough to have an address on the network".[81] That said, the Alliance was unable to provide precise information about the social and economic benefits which regional Eurostar services would bring.[82]

40. We recommend that, above all, the Government's review should be conducted against the background of the promise of regional Eurostar services implicit in Section 40 of the Channel Tunnel Act 1987, and the investment of £320 million, by taxpayers across the country, already made towards providing such services. Regional Eurostars should operate, otherwise the regions will continue to be short-changed. Whether the provision of regional Eurostar services should be achieved through a small Government subsidy or by accepting the proposal made by Virgin Group is a matter for the Government's review to decide.

Conclusions and Recommendations

41. Our principal conclusions and recommendations are as follows:


1  
First Report of the Transport Committee, Channel Link, Session HC (1985-86) 50. Back

2   Taken from the foreword to International Rail Services for the United Kingdom, British Rail Board, December 1989. Back

3   See International Rail Services for the United Kingdom, British Rail Board, December 1989, figure 5. Back

4   Q.56. Back

5   RES 11, paragraph 6. Back

6   RES 04, paragraph 2.1. Back

7   Twelfth Report of the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee, The Departmental Annual Report 1998 and Expenditure Plans 1998-99, Session HC (1997-98) 844. Back

8   Q.21. Back

9   RES 04, paragraph 3.1. Back

10   A consortium comprising Ove Arup and Partners, Bechtel Ltd, Sir William Halcrow and Partners, National Express Co. Ltd., Virgin Group and S G Warburg and Co. Ltd. Back

11   HC Deb, 28 January 1998, col.461. Back

12   See HC Deb, 3 June 1998, col.368. Back

13   See HC Deb, 3 June 1998, col.368. Back

14   See RES 04, paragraph 1.2. Back

15   HC Deb, 3 June 1998, col.369. Back

16   See Q.169 ff. Back

17   Councillor Stuart Stacey and others from Fast Tracks to Europe Alliance, and Mr Will Whitehorn and Mr Mark Furlong from Virgin Group on 9 December 1998; Mr Colin Child and Mr Richard Goldson from Inter-Capital and Regional Rail Limited, and Mr Roy Griffins and Mr Mike Fuhr from the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions on 16 December 1998. Back

18   HC Deb, 8 December 1998, col.135w. Back

19   QQ.243 to 245. Back

20   RES 04, paragraph 2.1. Back

21   RES 04, paragraph 2.2. Back

22   RES 07. Back

23   RES 04, paragraph 2.2. Back

24   See RES 04, paragraph 2.1, and RES 11, paragraphs 6 and 18. Back

25   RES 11, paragraph 18. Back

26   RES 04, paragraph 2.2. Back

27   See RES 11, paragraph 18, and RES 04, paragraph 2.2. Back

28   Q.51: see also Appendix 1 of RES 04. Back

29   RES 04, paragraph 2.3. Back

30   See RES 04, Table 2. Back

31   See HC Deb, 8 December 1998, col.135. Back

32   See Review of Regional Eurostar Services, 13 November 1998, p.4. Back

33   Review of Regional Eurostar Services, 13 November 1998, p.5. Back

34   RES 02, paragraphs 1.5 and 3.8. Back

35   RES 02, paragraph 3.1. Back

36   Q.130. Back

37   Q.66. Back

38   RES 02, paragraphs 6.1 to 6.6. Back

39   Review of Regional Eurostar Services, 13 November 1998, p.5. Back

40   QQ.58 and 62. Back

41   See Review of Regional Eurostar Services, 13 November 1998, p.5. Back

42   Review of Regional Eurostar Services, 13 November 1998, p.30. Back

43   See, for example, RES 2, paragraph 3.1, and RES 04, paragraph 3.7. Back

44   RES 02, paragraph 3.1. Back

45   Review of Regional Eurostar Services, 13 November 1998, p.6. Back

46   See Review of Regional Eurostar Services, 13 November 1998, p.30. Back

47   HC Deb, 3 June 1998, col.369. Back

48   HC Deb, 3 June 1998, col.369. Back

49   RES 04, paragraph 4.1. Back

50   Q.160. Back

51   See Q.160. Back

52   Q.160. Back

53   QQ.161, 162, and 191. Back

54   Q.94. Back

55   Q.95 and RES 02, paragraph 5.4. Back

56   Q.184. Back

57   See RES 04, paragraph 3.8, and RES 02, paragraph 3.7. Back

58   Q.96. Back

59   Q.98. Back

60   RES 04, paragraph 3.8. Back

61   Q.99. Back

62   See RES 04, paragraph 3.8. Back

63   RES 04, paragraph 3.6. Back

64   RES 04, paragraph 3.6. Back

65   Special Report from the Select Committee on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Bill, Session HC (1995-96) 204, paragraphs 10, 37 and 39. Back

66   HC Deb, 3 June 1998, col.369. Back

67   See, for example, HC Deb, 3 June 1998, col.374. Back

68   Q.21, and RES 05, paragraph 4.0. Back

69   RES 04, paragraph 1.4. Back

70   HC Deb, 28 January 1998, col.461. Back

71   Review of Regional Eurostar Services, 13 November 1998, p.4. Back

72   Q.49. Back

73   Q.56. Back

74   Q.4. Back

75   Q.30. Back

76   RES 05, paragraph 3.5. Back

77   RES 05, paragraph 3.5. Back

78   RES 05, answer to Q.2. Back

79   See Q.9. Back

80   Q.8. Back

81   Q.5. Back

82   See Q.22, and QQ.41 to 45. Back


 
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