INTRODUCTION

1.   The River Exe

  The South West of England embraces almost 25 per cent of all the migratory salmon and sea-trout rivers in England and Wales.

  The River Exe and its tributaries form one of the largest and most diverse catchments in the South West of England.

  There is a major strategic headwater reservoir impoundment for public water supply with a supplementary winter pumped storage scheme, an inter catchment transfer to the River Taw, and an annual water bank for fisheries use. The river is used as a conduit for reservoir releases to supplement two local major public water supply abstractions, and the inter catchment transfer to North Devon. The river also receives discharges from many sewage treatment works, and as a consequence of all the foregoing is the recipient of significant mitigation expenditure from South West Water Plc.

  The River Exe has 11 weirs, stretching from the upper reaches to the tidal limit, and two major canals with coarse fisheries.

  The farming practice in the Exe's river meadows is historically mainly livestock, but there is an increasing conversion of these permanent pastures to arable farming, some of which is supported by spray irrigation using river abstractions.

  The River Exe remains the most prolific salmon river in the South West region, and one of the few that continues to meet its spawning targets. Whilst it has experienced the decline in Multi-Sea-Winter (MSW) Salmon since the 1970s, this has coincided with a resurgence in Grilse and there is statistical evidence to suggest a 60 year cycle of counter dominance between these stock components. Nevertheless, comprehensive conservation measures for MSW Spring Salmon were introduced voluntarily by The River Exe & Tributaries Association in 1996, resulting in the rod anglers taking less than 8 per cent of the salmon that enter the river's freshwater from its tidal estuary.

  The river's primary salmon spawning tributary is the River Barle, most of which is an SSSI, and spawning stock from the Barle is being used to rehabilitate the neighbouring River Exe.

  The Exe Valley is a popular tourist destination, and there are a number of available fisheries located along the valley including two of the South West's major sport fishing hotels.

2.   The River Exe & Tributaries Association

  The River Exe & Tributaries Association represents the riparian owners, rod fishing, and other river interests on the Exe system. The Association is a pro-active organisation of 135 members, and has a long and proud history of excellent practices and endeavours. It is a principal member of the South West Rivers Association, an organisation which represents all the 18 salmon and sea-trout rivers in the South West of England.

  The Association provides the sole fisheries representative on the Environment Agency's Devon Area Environment Group. The Association also has a successfully operating canoe access agreement with the British Canoe Union.

  The Association recognises that almost every important issue in the management of the Exe Catchment, one way or another, sooner or later, affects the River Exe itself. As the custodians of the river, its tributaries, its banks, its habitat and ecology, and much of its adjoining meadows, our members carry a broad and important responsibility. They also have a sustantial financial investment in the Exe fishery, with a personal risk of loss if things go wrong. Consequently, our members are concerned with every influence on the River Exe, and the Association spends much time, effort and expense in actively defending and enhancing the river's well-being, not purely its fishing.

  The Association is a strong critic of the Environment Agency's fisheries operations.

FUNDAMENTALS

  In England and Wales the bed and soil of a river are part of land owned by farmers, private individuals, associations, clubs etc, and in many instances, the division of properties between owners is the centre line of the bed and soil of a river. The right to fish and take fish from the river which flows over the bed and soil is owned similarly, and if divided down the centre line is known as single bank as opposed to double bank. Fishing rights are a traded commodity, and can include or exclude ownership of the related bed and soil of the river.

  Historically, the River Exe fishery was locally controlled and financed by its owners through the Exe Board of Conservators (1862-1949), and during this period came to be regarded as one of the best managed rivers in England and Wales. This continued under the aegis of the Devon River Board (1950-1965) and the Devon River Authority (1966-1973).

THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM

  The influence and control of owners over their own fisheries together with locally focused management and finance, and the importance and good husbandry of the migratory salmon was rapidly eroded under the authority of the South West Water Board (1974-1988), was not recovered under the National Rivers Authority (1989-1995), and has finally become effectively buried beneath the Environment Agency's ever expanding remit (1996-present).

  Under the present system as operated by the Environment Agency, owners of fishing rights have no real say in the Agency's application of its statutory injunction under the direction of the Environment Act 1995 Section 6 (vi) which gives the clear duty to "maintain, improve and develop fisheries".

  We have observed that these statutory fisheries duties are now undertaken by Agency staff with little or no practical experience of day-to-day river and fisheries management. We also know of very few Agency fisheries staff who have experience of river fishing.

  The Agency's fisheries staff are almost exclusively "scientists" sitting at desks, who appear to consciously or sub-consciously resent the presence of any other influence, and who all too readily adopt a rather arrogant attitude of knowing best. They rely increasingly on scientific formulae in their management of the river's salmon stocks, with less emphasis on physical monitoring and hands-on observation.

  Similarly inherent within the Agency's staff is a culture of management by committee, an aversion of risk, and an overriding concern of self-preservation. For instance, any expenditure over £1,000 requires obtaining three quotations. Expenditure over £10,000 requires the establishment of an internal Project Board involving a plethora of staff and yet more meetings.

POTENTIAL FOR BIAS IN CONSULTATION

  Primary advice and direction on fisheries is obtained by the Environment Agency from its statutory Regional Fisheries, Ecology, and Recreation Advisory Committees (RFERACs), which meet quarterly.

  However, of the 21 members of the RFERAC (SW) including its Chairman, there are just 10 for fisheries, the remainder representing Agency Cross-Membership, Academic Bodies, Recreation, Navigation, Conservation, Riparian Owners, and Fish Farming. Of the 10 fisheries representatives there are two for Netsmen, three for Coarse Fisheries, three for Migratory Fisheries, one for Still Water Fisheries, and one for Trout Fisheries.

  Further, due to the appointment process and administration of this RFERAC, the advice sought and received by the Agency cannot be relied upon to be either impartial or representative:

—  the meeting agendas and papers presented to the RFERACs are prepared by the Agency, with a reommendation for the Committee to take a specified action. Little opportunity is afforded to hear alternative proposals or evidence from outside the Agency;

—  all members of the Agency's RFERACs are appointed by the Agency. Our Chairman's own application to the South West RFERAC in 1997 is a telling indictment. It involved the submission for scrutiny by the Agency of a comprehensive nomination form, and as a short-listed candidate a subsequent interview with the Agency's Regional General Manager, its Regional Fisheries Recreation Conservation & Navigation Manager (who regularly seeks RFERAC endorsement of the Agency's fisheries proposals), and the RFERAC Chairman. That interview was a one hour intensive analysis of his views, including what his reaction would be if the Committee took a decision with which he disagreed. He was advised that if successful his appointment would be initially for a probationary 12 months, he would be required to attend an Agency induction course, and would be expected to assume an ambassadorial role;

—  initial appointments to RFERAC were made by the Agency under the competition guidelines of the Nolan Committee. But, the Peach Commission's code has since been adopted, which allows first reappointments to be made by the Agency without competition "subject to an appropriate standard of performance having been achieved during the initial period of office". In the Agency's own words "there are opportunities for turnover of RFERAC membership, but this needs to be balanced with stability and maturity of the committee and, of course, retention of good members";

—  there is minimal turnover of RFERAC membership. Many of the existing members are long standing appointees to REFRAC and its predecessors, who have been regularly reappointed by the Agency for further terms of three years;

—  the Chairman of RFERAC (SW) is not independent. He is also an appointee paid for one day per week. In 1998, The River Exe & Tributaries Association experienced its correspondence with the RFERAC (SW) Chairman being abruptly taken over and effectively terminated by the Agency's Regional General Manager.

LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY

  At present, the Environment Agency can only be monitored by Parliament, or by having a decision challenged by Judicial Review. Both procedures take time and are of limited value in providing any remedies and in the case of Judicial Review involve considerable expense and endeavour.

  A current example illustrating the need for greater accountability has involved the River Exe. This example also exposes some disturbing conflicts of interest within the Agency.

  Earlier this year, without notice or consultation, the Agency gave a coarse fishing club a permit under Section 30 of the Salmon & Freshwater Fisheries Act to stock a lower stretch of the River Exe with 1,200 juvenile Chub. This coarse fish is a non-native species which competes with the natural salmon and trout juvenile populations for habitat and food.

  We only learned of this stocking by chance, and upon investigating we discovered:

—  the Agency owns this stretch of the River Exe;

—  the Agency leases this stretch to the coarse fishing club;

—  the Agency reared the juvenile chub in its own hatchery;

—  the Agency charged the angling club £1,400 for the chub;

—  the Agency undertook the physical stocking of the chub.

  And, the Agency gave the stocking consent in direct contravention of its own 1996 Catchment Management Plan for the River Exe, a public document in which it stated:

"the presence of non-native species (particularly chub) in the catchment suggests that illegal releases of fish have taken place, and if these stocks become established the rivers natural fish population may be adversely affected due to the risk of disease transfer and competition for food and habitat with the non-native species. We will continue to enforce Section 30 of the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1975 to prevent releases of illegal fish species".

  Furthermore, the Agency failed to consult with the adjoining owners whose fisheries are now polluted with and are being damaged by these chub which are known prolific breeders and colonisers of rivers.

  A formal complaint to the Agency was initially rebuffed, although a subsequent apology was eventually received. However, the Agency has stated that any claim for damages would be vigorously defended, and without access to the unlimited public funding available to the Agency, the affected owners can ill afford to press such a claim.

FUNDING

  The Environment Agency blames a lack of funding for its inability to carry out its statutory duties to mantain, improve and develop fisheries, and is particularly aggrieved by the Government's proposed one-third reduction in Grant-in-Aid in 2001-02. However, it appears that the Agency's first response will be to protect staff numbers and cut investment.

  Fishery owners have been understandably reluctant to even contemplate providing funds for investment to the Environment Agency because the responsibility for physically maintaining, improving and developing fisheries presently lies with the Agency, which is considered bureaucratic, inefficient, incompetent, ineffective, and not accountable to the fishery owners, were they to provide such finance.

  We consider the reduction in GIA to be extremely unfortunate at a time when salmon stocks are in serious crisis. However, with the reduction being two years away we believe this presents an ideal opportunity to redefine and simplify fisheries funding requirements, and establish the proper responsibilities for funding and administering each of those requirements.

  There are four primary funding requirements, and it is important to distinguish between those which are on-going maintenance commitments and those which require capital investment.

On-Going Maintenance

1.  Funds to maintain fisheries

  The responsibility for maintaining each fishery and providing the funding to do so should lie collectively with the owners of that fishery. As the possessors and custodians of valuable assets they have the incentive and will to ensure that their fishery is not naturally degraded. However, enactment of the "polluter and abstracter pays" principle should rightly provide for the costs of adequate mitigation for any such unnatural damage being caused to the fishery.

2.  Funds to regulate fisheries

  National responsibility for regulating fisheries (including enforcement) should lie with MAFF, with local regulation being exercised by fully representative and locally elected bodies with statutory powers. The income from fishing licences should be dedicated as the source of funding regulation, and be set accordingly.

Capital Investment

3.  Funds to rectify the historical damage to fisheries caused by poorly regulated abstractions, pollutions, and land practices.

  A substantial but finite capital investment is required, but it would not be reasonable for fishery owners to be responsible for rectifying such historical damage caused by others. Although there is justification for seeking redress from those who caused the damage, it would be an immensely difficult task, and in practical terms is not a realistic option.

  The primary responsibility should therefore lie with MAFF, and its GIA should be dedicated exclusively to repairing this historical damage. In the national interest, GIA should continue at its reduced 2001-02 level until fisheries have been reinstated to their previously undamaged condition. At that time, GIA could cease. During the period of its continuance, fishery owners, tackle manufacturers and retailers, anglers, and others, should all be encouraged to contribute so that the process could be accelerated.

4.  Funds to improve and develop fisheries

  The responsibility for improving and developing each fishery and providing the capital finance to do so, should lie collectively with the owners of that fishery. As the possessors and custodians of valuable assets they have the incentive and interest to undertake this role.

  To the extent that there is a maximum amount by which a fishery can be improved and developed, this would be a finite obligation.

Administration

  The simple principles outlined above identify the areas where each funding and investment requirement should rightly be designated the responsibility of MAFF, the polluters and abstracters, the fishery owners, or the anglers.

  Under this scenario, the Environment Agency's fisheries role could become purely regulatory, enabling its requirement for funding to be cut accordingly.

October 1999