Memorandum by Cleanaway Ltd (EA 54)
SUMMARY OF
PRINCIPAL POINTS
Cleanaway welcomed the formation of the Environment
Agency and is concerned that there are a number of areas where
the necessary efficient operation of a large organisation is falling
short of expectations. The serious issue of unacceptable delays
in processing licence applications and modifications is not addressed
here, as it is covered in depth by the waste management industry's
trade association, the Environmental Services Association (ESA).
This memorandum aims to highlight the other areas that are of
major concern to the Technical Waste business of Cleanaway:
Issues surrounding lack of accountability/empowerment
of Environment Agency officersmaking it difficult to obtain
timely decisions and being faced with ever changing requirements.
Lack of transparency of policyguidance
documents are kept "secret" from industry or are introduced
at short notice. This makes it very difficult to supply the relevant
information or comply with the changing standards.
Poor delivery of servicerecruitment/promotion
of inexperienced staff causing unacceptable delays in processing
applications and in simple decision making.
Inconsistent Enforcement and Prosecution
policyappears to target the "soft option" and
the costs claimed bear no relation to the environmental harm caused
by the offence.
BACKGROUND
Cleanaway is one of the largest waste management
companies in the UK. It is involved in the management of all categories
of industrial, commercial, clinical and municipal waste with the
exception of radioactive waste. Cleanaway operates a number of
facilities including landfill, treatment, solvent recovery, transfer,
high temperature incineration and transport operations.
Cleanaway has dealings with the Agency at all
levels, from the functional Directors, through regional and area
managers, to site inspectors and administrative personnel. Cleanaway
operates in all of the eight Agency regions and has representations
on the REPAC and AEG groups.
Cleanaway has a total of 38 waste licences/authorisations
and numerous discharge consents to controlled waters for which
they pay approx £250,000 to the Agency in fees and charges
each year. In addition they produce some 5,000 Special Waste Consignment
Notes, Duty of Care Transfer Notes and other waste transport documentation.
Cleanaway welcomed the formation of the single
regulatory body as an organisation, able to bring consistency
and a single point of contact to a highly regulated and high profile
industry sector.
It is understood that the task that confronted
the management team responsible for the Agency was not an easy
one. The three regulatory bodies that make up the Agency were
originally three very disparate groups with widely differing areas
of expertise. It was expected that integration of the three groups
would cause some teething problems. However, it is now 3.5 years
since the Agency was formed and many fundamental problems do not
seem to have been addressed. Some of the major issues are not
even acknowledged by senior managers as "problems" at
all.
During the late 1970's and the 1980's, the then
waste regulation authorities and HMIP (formerly the Alkali Inspectorate)
officers operated in a spirit of firm regulation but with an attitude
of co-operation with industry. It was understood that the majority
of waste management companies' very existence depended on complying
with the legislation. Prosecutions were vigorously pursued for
pollution-related offences and where people disregarded the law.
But on another level officers were "industry facing"
and were able to give advice and make regulatory decisions on
a case by case basis without continual reference to lawyers.
There was some criticism of the "old regime"
by industry. Operators complained about the lack of consistency
throughout the 83 different waste authorities and seven HMIP regions.
This criticism is now being used as an excuse to justify the current
problems and delays as (some of) the EA does not wish to move
until everything is checked against a national uniformity. The
waste industry was never looking for national uniformity as it
recognised that all waste sites are different, but they sought
a consistency of approach to regulation in all the regions. Cleanaway
was supportive of the formation of the Agency as a national regulatory
body for reasons of such consistency.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Cleanaway's experience of dealing with the Agency
has been very mixed. In areas where the experienced officers are
still in post, there is generally a good working relationship
and a consistency of approach to the regulatory functions. This
tends to be, although not exclusively, in areas subject to Integrated
Pollution Control.
Restructuring in the Agency has resulted in
the appointment of senior and middle management with little or
no experience of waste regulation. This, and a complex matrix
management system, has given rise to delays in decision making,
inconsistency in regulatory practices and the imposition of new
guidance documentation with little or no notice. At the same time,
industry is being asked to pay costs, increasing way above the
rate of inflation, for what appears to be a deteriorating service.
As the Agency operates in a monopoly situation, industry has no
option but to accommodate the poor service, even though the licensing
delays are costing companies millions of pounds.
The costs imposed on industry for officers'
time appears to be arbitrary. If prosecuted for actually polluting
a river or breaching a licence condition, the costs claimed by
the Agency in Court vary from £16.69 to £61.45 per hour.
If prosecuted for breaching an IPC Authorisation (even if no harm
to the environment has occurred) industry is charged £164.19
per hour (£1,215/day). This higher cost is to be carried
over for the new IPPC regime. The Environment Agency needs to
be made accountable for the ever increasing charges and the variation
in charging bands that are irrespective of actual case complexity
or environmental harm caused.
In Cleanaway's experience the morale of many
Agency officers is very low. This has a direct impact on regulated
activities, as officers are often preoccupied with, or overpowered
by, paperwork, internal bureaucracy, and the matrix management
structure. A number of experienced staff have left the Agency
as they believe that the organisation has lost sight of the main
aim of protecting the environment and is concentrating on meeting
administrative targets. Younger, inexperienced staff are replacing
the older, experienced officers as they leave. This gives rise
to a "tick-box" mentality in regulation and regulators
who are unable to make decisions.
Much of the new environmental legislation now
relies to some extent on self regulation. Industry is expected
to make regular returns to the Environment Agency and report when
any breaches have occurred. This form of self regulation depends
in part upon industry co-operation and it is vital that the Agency
recognises this fact otherwise some less scrupulous operators
will be tempted to cover up minor incidents. This does not mean
that the Agency should be seen as being too close to industry.
There is a middle ground that provides firm, fair regulation and
enforcement whilst recognising the need for industry co-operation.
Cleanaway recognises that in most cases the
problems being experienced are not of the making of individual
officers. It is the "system" that seems to be causing
the problems. We believe that the current Environment Agency management
structure is cumbersome. A significant proportion of senior managers
have little or no experience of the technical aspects of the areas
they manage. This means that if the waste management industry
cannot resolve an issue with the junior site inspector, there
may be several layers of management above the inspector who do
not have the technical knowledge to resolve the issue.
In some areas, the Agency has worked well with
industry to implement legislation eg The Special Waste Regulations
1996 where the Agency produced timely, clear, concise guidance
to help industry comply with the law.
SPECIFIC ISSUES
Specific problem areas still being experienced
by Cleanaway with relevant examples are as follows:
Lack of accountability/empowerment of Agency officers
Most of the Environment Agency officers who
are dealing with industry on a day to day basis appear afraid
to make a decision and need to refer most queries, however small,
to the legal department or team leaders. This results in unacceptable
delays for answers to relatively simple requests.
The lack of individual accountability means
that Agency inspectors are able to keep changing their minds as
to the various pieces of information they require. The often continually
moving goal posts lead to frustration and loss of business opportunities.
Example 1: Cleanaway sought permission to accept
mildly contaminated soils onto one of its landfill sites. In 1997
the Agency wrote to Cleanaway stating that the method for assessing
contaminated soils as previously agreed with a former Waste Regulation
Authority was not acceptable. No alternative assessment method
of guidance was given. During 1998 a number of discussions took
place, Cleanaway submitted more and more documentation. Each time,
the Environment Agency asked for yet more details. At the end
of 1998 the Agency asked for a completely new system of reporting
to be put in place for soils. This was agreed. During 1999 the
officer changed his mind again and said that Cleanaway must ask
for specific approval for each and every contaminated soil enquiry.
This has resulted in the company being unable to receive any contaminated
soil on the site, and the time taken to receive Agency approval
would be prohibitive for any contractor wishing to remove contamination
from a development site.
Example 2: In 1998 Cleanaway asked the Environment
Agency for permission to take contaminated soil at another landfill
site. Positive discussions were ongoing with a particular officer.
During 1999 the proposal was suddenly taken out of the hands of
the officer and given to the National Technical Assessment function
who are still considering the proposal. Cleanaway have already
lost a year of potential revenue from this waste source.
Cleanaway are firmly of the opinion that a decision
should have been made on both these examples within three months
of application. No one in the Agency seems to have any will to
make things happen. There is no sense of responsibility that things
have dragged on for so long at huge expense to Cleanaway.
Despite spending over 12 months on these issues,
Cleanaway has been unable to resolve the problems. The lack of
individual accountability and constant reference to advisory committees,
legal departments etc means that important decisions are simply
not made by anybody.
Lack of transparency of policy
Although the Environment Agency claims to be
operating transparently, the reality is somewhat different. Guidance
documents are kept in "draft" form and as such they
are not available to the public or industry. Whilst it is believed
that this mechanism has been used to keep information out of the
public domain in the past, it is disappointing that the Agency
has such little faith in its own guidance documents. It is difficult
for industry to comply with changing standards or supply relevant
information if the guidance is kept secret and available to Agency
staff only. There have been a number of occasions when Agency
staff have quoted "it's Agency policy" but when asked
for a copy of said policy, replied that "it's for internal
use only".
Example 1: The Special Waste Regulations came
into effect in 1996 and industry had to make assessments as to
which wastes were "Special" within a few weeks to comply
with the law. The cement industry has failed to address these
Regulations and continues to landfill cement kiln dust (CKD) in
quarries without any of the safeguards and paperwork associated
with Special Waste. During the two House of Commons Environment
Committee hearings into the burning of hazardous waste in cement
kilns the Committee concluded:
If CKD is found to be an environmental hazard,
it should be reclassified as Special Waste. (1995 Second Report)
Evidence indicates that CKD produces an alkaline
run-off which could cause serious harm to those who come in contact
with it. This should be given very serious consideration when
the Agency decides whether to treat the dust as Special Waste.
(1997 Third Report)
Despite these recommendations the Environment
Agency has been reluctant to address the issue. First their Technical
Assessment Group produced an advice document saying that CKD was,
in their view, Special Waste. This document has never been published.
Finally some two and a half years after the regulations were implemented,
the Agency concluded that some CKD will be Special and some will
not. To Cleanaway's knowledge, no CKD is being classified as Special
Waste in the UK today. The reason as to why this large waste stream
appears to be of little concern to the Environment Agency is surprising
given the public concerns surrounding the burning of hazardous
waste.
On the same topic the Agency claimed to be undertaking
a study of which wastes were unsuitable for burning in cement
kilns. This study has taken over two years, has only just been
published and leaves the policy decision of whether to implement
it hanging in the air. Whilst Cleanaway is satisfied that there
are now better controls on the trial burning of waste in kilns
through the new Protocol, there is little evidence that there
is any better knowledge of exactly which wastes are being blended
away into the mix before delivery to the kilns. The burning of
hazardous waste mixes as a fuel is anything but transparent.
Poor delivery of service
In addition to the unacceptable delays in the
processing of waste licence applications there are other areas
causing concern.
The recruitment/promotion of inexperienced staff
has resulted in officers refusing reasonable requests from industry.
There seems to be a view that legislation should be used to "prevent"
industry from doing things rather than using the legislation to
"enable" industry to operate. This is mainly caused
by the increase in use of the "legal department" rather
than using a common sense approach.
Example 1: Cleanaway asked the Environment Agency
for permission to use a shredding machine for a short trial to
establish whether the equipment could shred car tyres. The plant
is currently licensed to accept hazardous waste. The Agency refused
saying that the company must modify the licence and pay an extra
£2,200 fee. This could have typically taken 6-12 months from
application to approval. There was no environmental justification
for refusing the request and although the Waste Management Licensing
Regulations do not specifically provide for trials, they do not
prohibit them either. A common sense approach by the Agency would
have encouraged a short trial, especially as the proposed tyres
were considerably less hazardous than the materials covered in
the existing licence.
After several telephone calls, letters and wasted
management time, the short trial was finally allowed.
Example 2: The Agency's abysmal administration
of the Transfrontier Shipment of Waste Regulations (TFS) cost
the UK high temperature incineration industry several millions
of pounds in revenue. The UK Management Plan for Import and Export
of Waste came into effect on 1st June 1996. The Plan introduced
the prohibition on imports of incinerable waste to be phased in
over a period of three years. There were many meetings with the
Environment Agency and industry was given promises of definitive
guidance on how the quotas contained in the legislation were to
be implemented. Months passed and no waste could be imported as
the Agency was waiting to produce the guidance before approving
any shipment. The Agency restructured the TFS section at least
three times and on each occasion Cleanaway was told that matters
would be sorted out "soon". By the time the ban on imports
became total in June 1999, only a tiny proportion of the volume
of imports allowed under the Plan had been imported. This was
a direct result of the Agency's lack of proper administration
causing delays and confusion, despite many meetings at Board level.
Prior to the formation of the Environment Agency, imports were
approved by the Waste Regulation Authorities who informed the
local Councillors, everything was transparent and worked effectively.
Once the Agency took over this legal trade virtually ground to
a halt through bureaucracy and a negative attitude. The latest
TFS team, appointed just before the import ban took effect, has
tried to introduce guidance but it is now too late to help the
UK high temperature industry compete internationally. To date
less than 50 per cent of the promised guidance notes are available.
Inconsistent Enforcement and Prosecution policy
This policy went "live" in November
1998. Copies were not available for industry for several months.
The draft internal guidance explaining the details of the policy
is still not available to industry despite repeated requests.
This means that the regulated industries are not advised as to
how the Agency is applying the Enforcement Policy giving rise
to the fear that it is targeting the "soft options".
The much-publicised Hall of Shame listing the Agency's
successful prosecutions did not include any waste related prosecutions
taken against individuals causing pollution by tipping waste illegally
without a licence. Instead it listed companies prosecuted for
breaching licence conditions, in some cases for relatively minor
offences. Easy targets, but not much benefit to the environment.
The Agency's annual report suggests that they
are proud of the 11 per cent increase in prosecutions yet the
success rate in court fell from 98 per cent to 88 per cent. This
suggests that the Agency is pursuing too many minor, poorly prepared,
or simply erroneous cases. The report suggests that this is particularly
the case in the waste sector. The report also shows that the waste
sector is the subject of 56 per cent of all the prosecutions taken
by the Agency. Given the complex waste legislation, waste licence
conditions, transfer notes, consignment notes etc, it is easier
to take expensive legal action for minor technical breaches in
this industry than elsewhere. We believe this is occurring simply
to increase the number of prosecutions the Agency managers can
claim.
Example: Cleanaway were recently prosecuted
for depositing one litre cartons of orange juice on a landfill
site prohibited from taking "liquid waste" but licensed
to accept domestic food and biodegradable wastes. The company
tried to discuss the interpretation of the licence condition with
officers but they seemed determined to take enforcement action.
Cleanaway elected to have the case heard at Crown Court and engaged
legal advice. At the preliminary hearing before the Magistrates
Court, the Environment Agency withdrew all charges and Cleanaway
were awarded costs. The deposit of orange juice on the landfill
site had no adverse environmental consequences and the subsequent
prosecution does not appear to fit with the stated Prosecution
Policy.
October 1999
|