INTRODUCTION

  The House of Commons Environment Committee produced its Third Report on The Environmental Impact of Cement Manufacture in 1996/7. It made many recommendations in its conclusions. The Governments response was to support its Environment Agency (EA), confident in the expectation that it would get to grips with its past deficiencies. It has not done so, on the Westbury evidence. Unfortunately the close working relationship between the EA and the Cement Industry precludes the successful conclusion of this report and as a consequence little has changed to update the workings of the EA.

  From senior level in the EA (Ed Gallagher) to senior level in the Cement Industry (Ian Mackenzie) there is a network that is reflected all the way down the chain of command to site manager for the Westbury plant to site inspector for the EA. Their close working relationships have built barriers which exclude the public. The site inspector in particular betrays vulnerability to criticism, as his role has become increasingly open to abuse, or a casualty owing to overwork with inadequate resources.

  To understand the pressures he is under it is essential to review the Cement Industry Ambitions.

CEMENT INDUSTRY AMBITIONS

  The British Cement Association (BCA) in its presentation to the House of Lords, March 1999, indicated that its ambition is to incinerate in its kilns 180,000 tonnes of tyres per annum and 700,000 tonnes of selected packaging waste per annum. By doing this the BCA will save over 1 million tonnes of coal, it will thereby save on its fossil fuel bill and will also be paid to dispose of the selected packaging waste at £25 per tonne earning the BCA £17 million per annum altogether.

  To dispose of tyres will earn £40 per tonne creating £7 million income for the BCA with the likelihood that the companies can raise their disposal prices, once landfill is no longer an option for tyre disposal.

  With so much money at stake the pressure on the EA is intense. The call for incineration from Government level to the same call from the European Environment Committee, makes the kilns of the BCA the preferred option of disposal by all concerned. This is despite warnings given to the House of Lords by Blue Circle Director Peter Hoddinott in March 1999. He said "Even the most modern dry kiln in the UK cannot currently meet the proposed limit for NOx without costly abatement technology". He indicated that the old wet process kilns would provide little expected success, and that 13 such processes will close by 2002. Westbury is such a process.

  Has the EA taken any stand for the environment or for people's health? The answer is no. The expectation was that the EA would insist that the windfall money coming to the BCA, be used to update abatement equipment and clean up the emissions coming from their kilns. The cement industry appear unmoved by the latest research on fine particulates (PM10's to PM2.5's) that show these dust particles accumulate in the human body and are particularly harmful to developing lungs and those with heart and lung disease. We are talking about the most vulnerable in our society, children and the sick.

THE WESTBURY EXPERIENCE

  Westbury Blue Circle Plant was built 37 years ago, with a proposed life span of 25 years. It was welcomed into the community as it offered employment for 1,200 people, just as the railways were axing that number of jobs in the region. The current number employed is around 150 with many approaching retirement. The plant is located a mile from the town centre, with a Primary School less than 1/2 mile away. There are four Primary Schools and one Secondary School within a three mile radius of the plant, as well as one Hospital and eight Nursing Homes.

  So far, the Company (BCC) have trialled tyre burning in this plant twice with a failure to satisfy the EA each time. The Company remained convinced of the advantages of tyre incineration as a fuel and applied successfully for a third trial in 1998, even though it was opposed by a vociferous lobby of local residents.

  A series of company-led promotional meetings followed, with the EA also organising two meetings and a public surgery in the town of Westbury. That they failed adequately to notify the public in time was apologised for, but approved to those who were interested in the issue, to be finding their ways in areas of public accountability which they regretted being in.

  At those meetings various assurances were given by the EA that they were professional and competent to handle the trial. The Area Manager for North Wessex Area, Chris Birks said "We are the guardians of the environment for the future generations". His colleague Steve Chandler, Environmental Planning Manager, stated "IPC seeks firstly to prevent emissions and, where it isn't possible, to minimise them and render them harmless". The purpose of the trial therefore is to establish whether burning tyres is the Best Practical Environmental Option (BPEO) over the burning of just coal. To evaluate this, the loading has been unfairly placed by the EA on acid gases with a failure to eradicate the more harmful metals, dioxins and organic compounds which the environment cannot tolerate.

THE THIRD TRIAL AT BCC WESTBURY

  Steve Chandler, EPM for North Wessex Region in talking about the Third Tyre Trial said "The Agency is allowed four months to determine authorisation applications under IPC". The first stage of the trial was to maximise the number and volume of tyres so as to identify the optimisation level. It was planned to take five weeks. What has happened beggars belief. The trial was running for three weeks when suddenly it was suspended, because the Company breached the back-end temperature limit and failed to notify the EA that they had done so. The reason the limit was in place was that it is theoretically possible for dioxins and furans (see Appendix 2) to re-form. The level was set at 230oC even though it is 177oC in the USA. Despite reassurances from the company, it failed to demonstrate that it fully understood this point and received a written reprimand from the EA site inspector. It is therefore incredible to us that the EA promptly gave the Company an increased back-end temperature limit of 240oC on recommencement of the trial. This was done on the back of 2 dioxin tests, as if this was sufficient reassurance.

  In 1995 the EA commissioned the Symmonds Travers Morgan Report, the only independent report to test for dioxins in the stack. The significance of the report is that they found evidence of di novo synthesis re-formation of dioxins in Westbury's chimney, when in theory it was not possible. This was with coal, where the metal and chlorine content is not as high as in tyres. The irresponsible action by the EA in raising back-end temperatures almost certainly means dioxins will re-form.

  Why was there a need for the higher back-end temperatures? It was purely an operational matter, where the Company failed to meet the standards set. (Appendix 3).

  To compound their duplicity in this situation the EA gave a week's permission to trial with truck tyres despite reassurances from the company it would only use car tyres. The higher metal content in the truck tyres must pose a health risk. The chlorine in tyres is an important factor in the re-formation of dioxins. What percentages are in the imported tyres from China and South American Nations can only be guessed at. We do know that these tyres make up 40 per cent of the scrap tyre mountain in Britain.

  The higher levels of oxygen encouraged by the EA are another factor in the re-formation of dioxins. Put all these factors together and the alarm bells should be ringing at the EA.

  Since recommencement of the third trial it has taken a further 18 weeks to complete stage 1. A total of 21 weeks to complete five weeks. There has been a plethora of excuses from the Company and the EA.

  Our Group say at this juncture, "If the Company is unable to meet the trial safety limits without constantly shifting those limits, then they have failed the trial". Without the active collusion of the EA this trial would have failed.

  The EA has justified the length of the first stage saying that they have been gaining five weeks of tyre burning statistics and not when the process had been shut down. So they will be evaluating a fixed trial and avoiding the overall production difficulties encountered during this trial. It does make a mockery of Steve Chandler's assurance to the public of the duration of authorisation determination would be four months.

  The statistical response of the previous two trials was challenged by the Group in the EA surgery and it was conceded that the figures posted on the public register were pathetic. Why the EA approved this format goes to the heart of the problem. They are incapable of keeping up with the volume of data and interpreting it, during the duration of the trial. They refer all questions levelled at them to the Company for its response. Not only does this breach confidentiality, but it points to the inadequate preparation and competence of the EA to meet the needs of this tyre trial.

  Along with these concerns are the way the EA has approved the averaging of average figures making a statistical nonsense of the trial. When a limit is placed on a process which it should not exceed, why is the Company able to circumvent it by averaging the figures? These breaches of the limit leave the Westbury stack every day.

  The Chairman of the EA has himself endorsed the action taken by the Agency, stating that these decisions were advised by the Substitute Fuels Advisory Panel. One has to ask on what data did they make their recommendations. I wrote to Ed Gallagher for clarification on this point two months ago. So far I have received no reply. The public wishes to have confidence in the EA and it is crucial that this is so. We have a right to a professional body able to oversee a process that produces thousands of tonnes of emissions every day.

  As a point of interest this plant has been gradually increasing its CO2 levels every year. It is now running on 2,800 tonnes every day and yet there is no policy for them to reduce these levels in line with the 20 per cent reduction targets that the nation signed up to in Kyoto. The EA has not made CO2 a subject of monitoring during this trial. Why is industry able to escape its national obligations?

  The monitoring equipment for this trial should have been calibrated by MCERTS, overseen by SIRA. MCERTS is a nationally based Monitoring Certification Scheme launched in April 1990 for:

  —  large combustion plants

  —  incineration of municipal and hazardous wastes

  —  solvent-using processes

highly desirable for a cement kiln trialling tyres or solvents you would rightly expect. But NO—the EA only plans to introduce this scheme later for cement kilns. It must be asked why is has failed to provide MCERTS for the trial.

  MCERTS would have shown that the electrostatic precipitators designed to attract dust, fail in trapping the finest particles PM10 to PM2.5's. The highest standards of monitoring were promised in the public meetings by the EA, because the environmental hazards are known to be so dire.

  For this reason Westbury's The Air That We Breathe Group has very strongly urged on the EA the use of LIDAR, so as to track and follow the stack emissions. It can evaluate chemical content, monitor wind dispersal and plume grounding. Our endeavours in support of LIDAR have been dismissed by the EA owing to cost.

  The environment itself is showing signs of change and intolerance to man-made intrusion, the EA is aware of the volume of evidence being gathered, yet it has failed to grasp the industrial pollution nettle. The Government has also failed to tackle the powerful industrial lobby. Resistance to European limits demanded by the Scandinavian countries who are recipients of our industrial pollution, also indicated the power of this industrial lobby.

  The BCA sees the incineration of tyres, solvents and waste as essential to their economic survival and competitiveness in the worldwide market. During this changing time, the Company and the EA have developed their working relationship but it was only able to flourish with the relaxation of standards in favour of the Company. It has only been owing to active and continuing scrutiny by the public that the EA has come under critical questioning.

  The EA should be leading the call for higher standards and for the abolition of BATNEEC (Best Available Techniques NOT Entailing Excessive Costs). Industry hide behind this statement and it is a scandal.

  The issue of public health, stressed as a top priority by the House of Commons Select Committee Report 1996-97 into the Impact of the Cement Industry on the Environment is both difficult and expensive to address. But it is the issue that evokes most anxiety to the public. Here it is important to view overseas experience. The American Environment Protection Agency has been taken to the High Court for failure to protect communities near cement kilns from the harmful effects of such metals as Mercury. It is only a matter of time, as things stand, before our own EA will be confronting the same judicial review. We have a right to protection under the law and the EA must face up to its policing obligations. Meanwhile the Government should repeal BATNEEC. The BCA has to face up to its environmental responsibilities and not pay lip service to them.

  Another of the concerns this group has, is the integrity of independent testing. The favoured company used by the EA is the Coal Research Establishment (CRE). The point of contention is that the Company pay for the trials and only release that data to the public register, after they have vetted the results. I would draw your attention to the significance of the Agency's Travis Symmonds Morgan Report, paid for by them. It was buried in the public register and took several months to find. Once found by this Group, we have tried to establish in those minds of the people who matter, just how important this report is and should be the basis on which other testing is evaluated. The TSM Report was done whilst BCC Westbury was burning only coal. We are concerned that the EA have never recognised the significance of their own report or felt the requirement to commission a similar report for tyre burning.

  1.  Summary—The House of Commons Environment Committee 1996-7 Third Report of the Environmental Impact of Cement Manufacture

  2.  Dioxins and Furans—Burning Tyres in Cement Kilns

  3.  Letter from EA (25.5.1999) (Ev. Not printed. Available for inspection at the House of Lords Record Office.

  (a)  Local people's objections should not be dismissed where they are backed up by reliable evidence, or when there is little evidence to back up the industries contradicting claims.

  (b)  Our evidence has revealed a number of deficiencies in the EA's handling and interpretation of environmental monitoring data. The EA must ensure that all its monitoring exercises and environmental assessments are based on sound science.

  (c )  We recommend that the EA take a more rigorous and consistent approach to the application of BPEO methodology, so that it will no longer be open to charges of manipulating the data to produce a desired result.

  (d)  The EA must act to restore public confidence in its regulation of the cement industry. Wherever practicable, inspections should be unannounced. Inspectors should not automatically believe what they are told by the industry.

  (e)  The EA should treat all novel processes, including the trial burning of all alternative fuels in cement kilns as involving a substantial change.

  (f)  Further trials of fuels in cement kilns should not go ahead until a national regulatory policy for each type of fuel has been drawn up at Director level by the Agency.

COMMENT

  It is the Westbury experience that the EA has failed in each aspect of these recommendations. The Air That We Breathe Group has raised on a weekly basis, questions and queries about the Third Tyre Trial that are serious in nature but have been dismissed in favour of industry's claims.

  The EA has failed this community during this trial by accepting monitored data that is meaningless and without recourse to its own experts and own independent (paid by them) data. All specially commissioned testing is paid for by the Company. To date none of the data has been released to the public. The EA is determined to give the Company every assistance to achieve the success of the trial, even if it means adapting the limits and moderating the statistics.

  By doing so the EA has revoked its position as the regulator and has consequently lost what confidence this Group had in it. The site inspector makes announced visitations and to date he has taken the company line in all aspects of the trial, even after he has written to them admonishing them for failure to recognise the science of their own process.

  The failure of the EA to act on these recommendations, including the Director level regulatory policy for fuels, indicates that in these matters the EA has set aside its resolve to tighten up. We believe it has been undermined by Governmental failure to act and its own historical links with industry that makes the EA a part of the problem, not its cure.

  1.  The USA Environmental Protection Agency in 1995 conducted a reassessment of the dangers to human health from dioxins and furans. The findings are published in Combustion Emissions Technical Resources Document—USA EPA 1995

  2.  These were some of their findings:

(a)  Cement kilns contribute significantly to dioxin emissions

(b)  The EPA is introducing more stringent regulations on dioxin emission

(c )  The most important parameter found was that the inlet temperature to pollution control devices should not exceed 177oC, so that dioxins do not get the chance to be formed from flue and stack gases being emitted.

  This means then, that in cement kilns, the temperature of the gases leaving the kiln and entering the flues and then the electrostatic precipator shall not be above 177oC before passing through.

  3.  When Continental Cement of Missouri carried out temperature tests on their kilns, flues and chimney stack equipment, they found the lowest temperature they could achieve using water spraying into the back-end of the kilns was 249oC. Normal temperature at that point without water spray was 271oC.

  4.  Now we turn to look at Blue Circle—Westbury, Wiltshire, England. In their criteria laid down for tyre burning which they recently produced 26 November 1998 they state under "Tyre Trial Team" Section—I quote from their document.

  Kiln Conditions

—  The kiln back-end temperature has a maximum limit of 230\C for duration of the trial unless written permission is given by the Environment Agency.

—  When tyres are being burnt, the kiln back-end oxygen has a minimum limit of 2 per cent and must not fall below this level.

  5.  So... the back-end temperature will be 230oC. This is 53oC above the USA EPA recommendation of 177oC. 53 divided by 177 = approximately 30. The Blue Circle back-end temperature will be 30 per cent too high and well into the temperature zone where dioxins and furans can form from the kilns gases.

  6.  The matter of the oxygen level is also important. If it is to be 2 per cent greater of the whole 100 per cent of gases present leaving the kiln, then that means oxygen is available for combining with other elements like carbon.

  As dioxins and furans require the presence of oxygen to form, it seems most likely that reactions taking place will lead to an output of some level of mixed dioxin and furan chemicals, especially as the temperature is sufficiently raised to permit this to occur.. that is well above 177oC.

  As the tyres release chemicals like chlorine and sulphur to a higher degree than just coal, then these nasty elements will be available to make more horrible compounds in the flues, precipitator and chimney stack. Chlorine in particular will lead to the formation of chlorinated dioxins.