This paper is concerned only with the Environment Agency's regulation of pollution, and not it's functions relating to flood defence etc. The premise of this paper is that the Environment Agency is highly ineffectual as a pollution regulator, and the net result of this is large scale health damage to many UK citizens, spiralling health costs and a country where future generations will have to pay higher taxes to sort out the predicament created by the current administration.

  It is most people's expectation that they should live in a country where toxic emissions are highly regulated and pose no danger to health. Unfortunately, this is not true and the real situation is many people are exposed to emissions that cause debilitating diseases and early deaths. While it is the duty of the Environment Agency, under the 1990 Environment Act, to regulate the most polluting industries in the UK, and no doubt in the minds of parliamentarians and others protect the health of the public, the kind of regulation currently employed by the Agency results in an externalisation of costs. In simple terms, the Environment Agency is not ensuring that the correct abatement equipment is fitted to many processes, because of the cost to industry, and instead are licensing processes that emit unlimited toxic substances that cause health damage. The taxpayer, who ultimately has to pay for the NHS and benefits system, is the one who picks up the bill for this non regulation, and the health damage it causes. The human suffering this want and lack of regulation causes is in addition to cash costs.

  But how, considering their duties under the 1990 Environment Act, are the Environment Agency getting away with not ensuring the right kind of abatement equipment is fitted to polluting processes? In the opinion of the author, there are five principle ways in which the Environment Agency is doing this. They are:

1.  Non acceptance of health problems and premature deaths in a polluted area.

2.  Related to the first issue above, but a separate consideration. The non acceptance of new evidence on the effect of emissions, and hence morbidity and mortality.

3.  Failure to observe basic rules of chemistry and toxicology.

4.  Classification of incidents and emission limits.

5.  A lack of unannounced independent monitoring of emissions, or deliberate monitoring of the wrong kind of emissions.

THE NON ACCEPTANCE OF HEALTH PROBLEMS AND PREMATURE DEATHS

  Around many industrial sites in the United Kingdom it is common to find residents who are concerned about their health, the incidence of a certain disease, or diseases, in their area and how these relate to emissions from local industrial sites. It is common that one vociferous person, or group, after obtaining some data showing emission levels that can cause health problems, will be concerned enough about the effect of the said emissions to start questioning local council officials and Environment Agency officers. If enough pressure is brought to bear on both the Environment Agency and the local Council it is likely an investigation may be launched into the allegations. The first part of this investigation should be an epidemiological study of disease in the area by the local health authority.

  This is a completely logical step and one which nobody can disagree with. However, this very first stage is the one where problems with the Environment Agency's regulation begin. For the Environment Agency to reduce emissions from a particular site they will argue they have to have evidence of a health problem. Again, a logical statement. But, what if the investigation is not carried out properly, if at all, by the health authority?. This is something probably beyond the scope of the sub committees brief, but must be mentioned to understand the ineffectual operation of the Environment Agency.

  It is very common in the authors experience, and that of others, for local health authorities not to carry out epidemiological studies correctly. A good example comes from Norfolk, and allegations of health problems around the Bacton Natural Gas Terminals. In 1995, North Norfolk District Council's Environmental Health Department and Dr J Bailey from the local health authority investigated cases of skin complaint, thought to be caused by emissions from the terminals, in the local area around Bacton. The reported problems were investigated by sending out health questionnaires to 58 names that had been passed to them, from responses in a local parish magazine, and by putting copies of the questionnaires in local shops for anybody else affected to respond. Following consultations with Dr Bailey over the responses to the questionnaires, North Norfolk District Council claimed, that the results showed that there was nothing to be concerned about. Their figures showed only 5 per cent of the population suffering from the skin complaint, and, according to them this was nothing unusual. This investigation was exceptionally unprofessional, because it was very unrepresentative, and relied on the assumption that those who came forward were the only people affected. How many people didn't see the advertisement in the Parish Magazine, or the questionnaire forms in the local shops? How did the council decide that it was 58 people in a population of 1000? Where did the 5 per cent figure come from and what about the rate of other diseases? The above could in no way be called a proper epidemiological study, but it was, and has been used since as an excuse not to investigate health problems at Bacton properly.

  It is the authors experience that every case referred to a public health department of a local health authority has an outcome of "no problem". However, very few figures are ever produced, or published, and nobody wants to hand over raw data for independent opinion. Typical excuses used are patient confidentiality, despite the fact that figures requested are in a form where a patient could not be identified, and the figures would be looked at by an independent doctor. The local health authority has absolute control over a decision of whether there is a health problem, despite the fact no doctor in the health authority has more special training in toxicology than a normal GP. The situation this position creates is illustrated by the fact that in one county 41 GP's were told that their evidence of a health damage from emissions was anecdotal by the health authority. As it is difficult to expand on this point further in such a short paper I would refer the committee to Dr Dick Van Steenis of 11 Lilac Close, Milford Haven, Pembrokeshire, SA73 1DF, for further evidence. Dr. Van Steenis has worked on many pollution related illnesses in the UK and has much evidence on this subject, such as the proposed meeting for public health doctors in Edinburgh where the subject under discussion was "how to deal with complaints from members of the public on clusters of health problems around industrial sites".

  Whenever the health effects of pollution have been discussed with members of the Environment Agency they respond with the statement that "the Environment Agency are not competent to comment on matters of health". This is a ridiculous statement because if the Environment Agency are not competent in matters of health how can they regulate processes to protect public health? As yet they have not given an answer to this question. The lack of an answer suggests that there is a major flaw in the way the Environment Agency operates and this must be addressed if the public are to be protected.

THE NON ACCEPTANCE OF NEW EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF EMISSIONS.

  In some cases data is available that shows emissions at a level where health effects can occur. However, this is when other countries, and not the UK's, standards are applied. A good example of this is the United States Environmental Protection Agency's standard for particulates. The US EPA has two air quality standards for particulates, one for particles below 10 microns in size (PM10's) and one for those below 2.5 microns in size (PM2.5's). They are set at 50 and 15 micrograms per cubic metre respectively. So, in simple terms, if you had an area where the PM10 concentration was 40 micrograms, but the PM2.5 concentration within that 40 micrograms was 20 micrograms, then the air quality standard would be exceeded. The US EPA introduced the PM2.5 standard in 1997 after large amounts of research showed the smallest particles were the most dangerous to health and the existing PM10 standard did not offer enough protection.

  At Bacton, in Norfolk, monitoring showed average particulate concentrations of 40 micrograms per cubic meter, and when these were interpreted using data from Professor Roy Harrison's book "Airborn Particulate Matter in the UK" it was found the PM2.5 concentration was likely to be around 23 micrograms per cubic meter. So, above the US EPA limit. Although 8 micrograms doesn't seem a great difference the WHO state that for every 10 microgram rise above the limit one and a half years can be reduced from life expectancy. The data from Bacton was given to Mr Archie Robertson, Director of Operations for the Environment Agency, for him to act upon. At a meeting with Mr Robertson in June 1999, when being questioned about why he had not acted on the data, he admitted that he did not know the health effects of PM2.5's. It is true to say the UK doesn't have a PM2.5 standard, but the question has to be asked why aren't the Environment Agency advising Ministers that one is required when there is so much evidence from the US EPA and WHO about adverse health effects. Well, one reason must be that those at the top of the organisation seem highly incompetent and bent on ignoring the evidence supplied to them. Despite being referred to the relevant data on the health effects, Mr Robertson still hasn't taken any action on the figures passed to him. In this case, any many others in the UK, it means people are likely to be suffering unnecessary health damage and shortened lives.

FAILURE TO OBSERVE BASIC RULES OF CHEMISTRY AND TOXICOLOGY

  This subject is best illustrated by the case of burning toxic waste in cement and lime kilns, although it must be stated that the problems with certain pollutants can be applied to any process where similar emissions are encountered.

  Disposal of toxic waste is always a problem, and at a first glance the combustion of high calorific value wastes in a kiln seems a good idea. However, for it to be a success, emissions must not be at a level where they can cause adverse health effects.

  When considering a combustion process, or nearly any process, it must be remembered that what goes in must come out, even if the chemical species that enters might exit in a different form. For the carbon, hydrogen and sulphur components of a fuel, complete combustion results in the production of gaseous carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, water and sulphur dioxide respectively. While for non combustible minerals and metals contained in the fuel, combustion results in the production of particulates. The question should therefore be is there the right abatement equipment to deal with these pollutants.

  At Castle Cement, in Clitheroe, Lancs, where toxic waste is burnt as fuel, the kilns were fitted with abatement equipment, but the equipment was for pollutants from coal. When authorisation was given for toxic waste to be burnt as fuel, consideration was not given to the fact that liquid fuel produces smaller particulates than coal, and, has a higher metal content than normal good quality coal. Consideration was only given to the sulphur content, for which Castle Cement installed a scrubber. However, this scrubber does not stop the small damaging particulate emissions, or the dioxin emissions from the chlorinated fraction of the fuel.

  The main argument, in most cases, for no further equipment seems to be that the emissions are released through a tall stack, and, after dilution, ground level concentrations of the pollutants are acceptable. However, this completely ignores the fact that many chemicals, such as dioxin and metals are persistent in the environment. They do not just disappear. So, where the plume grounds these emissions will contaminate the local environment and their levels will build up. This is where the acceptance of dilution to safe ground level concentration, a particular favourite for not justifying the correct kind of abatement equipment in IPC authorisations, is the wrong criteria and a case of ignoring basic chemistry and toxicology. The truly important criteria in deciding if a process is safe is exposure, because this encompasses contamination already present in the environment, as well as day to day ground level concentrations. It must also be remembered that plumes ground when there are temperature inversions, present on 60 per cent of days in the UK, and this results in high level concentrations at ground level. In most IPC applications it is stated these will occur infrequently, but this is not the case.

  In conclusion, the Environment Agency are licensing many processes that are not suitable for different fuels or waste, on the grounds that a BATNEEC or BPEO study says they are safe, despite the fact that the study is usually flawed and is missing essential chemical or toxicological data.

  It is also interesting to note how the Environment Agency ignores its own advice on these kind of matters. In 1990, the White report recommended that gasification plants should be built in the UK to deal with toxic waste, as this was about the cleanest way toxic waste could be disposed of. As yet, there is not one of these plants built or in operation in the UK, despite the fact that there are quite a few in operation in Continental Europe. While the Agency does not have resources to build one of these plants, it does have the ability to advise Government and Ministers that the building of these plants is essential for reducing emissions and protecting the public from toxic emissions.

CLASSIFICATION OF INCIDENTS AND EMISSION LIMITS

  As part of it's duty of authorisation the Environment Agency set limits for pollutants from part A processes. These limits are usually set on the basis of what an operator states is the performance of the plant producing the emissions, the throughput of the plant and the BATNEEC case (which always state that the emissions won't damage health, as detailed above) in an application for authorisation. Following consultation on whether the requested limits meet requirements, such as the UN sulphur protocol, and in some cases improvement notices to the operator to meet the requirements of a declared target such as the sulphur protocol, a license will be granted. After this the operator will only be deemed to have committed an offense under the 1990 Environment Act if they exceed the set limits. This on the surface seems a reasonable approach. But what if the BATNEEC case is wrong and the emission level is set too high, or, as in some cases, an emission limit is not set for a particular pollutant?. The answer is very simple, the Environment Agency will not do anything, even though in real terms an environmental/health crime has been committed. In the event of a limit set above levels where health problems will occur, revision of a limit is very unlikely to occur, because the first thing the Agency will say is they need evidence of a health problem from the local health authority. This returns to the first problem listed in this paper.

  The problem with Environment Agency's current approach is probably best illustrated by a further example from Bacton, Norfolk. Mercaptan is a very toxic substance with a TWA (time weighted average) exposure concentration 10 times less than deadly hydrogen sulphide. It is a substance to which exposure should always be minimised. During 1995, 1996 and 1997 Phillips Petroleum, Bacton, regularly released this substance from their process. Despite exposure to this substance causing local residents to suffer skin and eye irritation, respiratory problems and gastro intestinal problems, the Environment Agency still did nothing about this emission being deposited over the public highway and in local people's homes. When questioned about its release senior Environment Agency managers used to comment that the release was quite safe because by the time it reached the road it would have dispersed to a safe concentration, and, an offense hadn't been committed because Phillips had not broken the conditions in their authorisation. Phillips authorisation contained no mention of the emission of mercaptan, so no limit was set. Nobody from the Environment Agency ever checked to see what the concentration of mercaptan in the road was, and, in reality, Phillips could have been prosecuted under the 1990 Act for not rendering a toxic emission harmless. However, Phillips were not prosecuted and changes to the process only came about through local people putting large amounts of pressure on the management of Phillips over this issue. Furthermore, the Agency regularly told members of the public to phone the company about the problems, rather than keep phoning the Agency. This seems to be a widespread practice and one that the Agency uses to negate it's duties.

  Deciding whether a particular authorisation limit has been broken, or a reportable incident has occurred, is also an area for concern, because the Environment Agency relies on the operator of a process reporting to them whether a condition of authorisation has been broken and what emissions have occurred during a reporting period. This system is clearly open to abuse, because no operator will want to be prosecuted for an offense, and therefore, with the exception of big incidents where reporting can not be avoided because everybody knows about it, it is highly likely an operator will not report figures in excess of their limit values. Therefore, prosecutions will not take place and regulation is nothing more than a farce.

A LACK OF MONITORING FOR EMISSIONS, OR THE WRONG KIND OF MONITORING FOR EMISSIONS

  Independent monitoring of emissions should be an intrinsic function of regulation, but again this is an area where there is questionable performance. At present there is very little independent monitoring and the Agency relies on figures produced by the operators of a process. This is a system again open to abuse. The majority of operator's are not going to want to report figures in excess of national limits, so again high figures might be reduced to meet air quality standards, even if they are using approved monitoring methods. There is also the situation where the operator might not calibrate or maintain an instrument properly. A classic example of this was with Phillips Petroleum at Bacton, where sulphur dioxide monitors produced a zero reading for four months in succession. Even in the most rural location there will always be traces of sulphur dioxide in the air, so a zero result is highly improbable and indicates the instrument is not working correctly. Results used from Local Authorities, as a justification of satisfactory air quality in a BATNEEC case, can also have problems. In Derbyshire and Northumberland, an investigation of low PM10 results showed the data that made up the averages contained many zero and minus readings. It is impossible to have a minus reading for particulates as a vacuum has a value of zero.

  Monitoring of emissions in trials is also another area where concern must be expressed, because sometimes analysis of emissions doesn't run concurrently with changing process conditions. The basis for this is if results are low, why keep monitoring and showing this. The reason why this is a bad practice is best illustrated by Castle Cement's, Clitheroe, draft variation to burn ChemfuelR. While Castle Cement propose to do large amounts of monitoring during their Chemfuel trial they propose to only periodically monitor for metals, dioxins and furans after the trial. This is highly alarming because the Chemfuel used in the trial might be substantially lower in chlorinated solvents, that will form dioxin, and metals than would normally be the case. Therefore, when they start burning Chemfuel regularly the metal and dioxin emissions could be substantially higher, although nobody will know.

  Even when independent monitoring is ordered by the Environment Agency, there can be problems with the results. This is because they give too much warning to the company to be monitored, order the monitoring to be done at the wrong time, or specify the wrong parameter to be monitored. This is again well illustrated using Bacton, Norfolk. The Environment Agency commissioned REC Consultants to carry out monitoring in the Bacton area, and specified they should examine the concentration of sulphur dioxide, odorous compounds (such as mercaptan) and volatile organic compounds. The date the monitoring was carried out was the 17 April 1998. The date was highly significant because Phillips Petroleum stopped processing sour gas on, or around about, the 1 April, so emissions of sulphur compounds would be greatly reduced on normal winter/spring values. The Agency then commented that nothing out of the ordinary had been found in the Bacton area. More concerning was the fact previous monitoring indicated particulates were the likely cause of health problems, and these were not re-monitored.

  When problems are usually highlighted by members of the public, about levels of emissions and health, and members of the public request the Agency to carry out monitoring of toxic substances in their area, it is quite common for the Agency to comment that it is technically very difficult for them to monitor because they must know what they are looking for when specifying monitoring. This is completely untrue and a case where the Agency is using the public's lack of knowledge on monitoring to their advantage. There are many instruments on the market that can be used to assess what compounds are present in the environment on a semi quantitative basis, and if these were used first they could easily specify which chemicals should be monitored more accurately in a second set of monitoring.

  Another problem with monitoring is that the Environment Agency say they require proof of a problem before, in certain cases, they will investigate a matter further. This therefore leaves the onus on the public to gather information to prove a problem. Monitoring is expensive and usually beyond the financial reach of ordinary people. However, it is the authors experience that even when members of the public do manage to gather some scientific results, along with large amounts of circumstantial evidence, the Agency will not order necessary follow up monitoring. This makes proving a problem virtually impossible for any member of the public.

THE COST TO THE COUNTRY

  One possible argument in favour of the Environment Agency's current regulation regime is that abatement of toxic emissions, to a greater extent than is currently the case, is very expensive. This is true, and one reason for BATNEEC, rather than just BAT. However, the industries regulated by the Environment Agency are making good to large profits, and BATNEEC seems to be used as a way of ensuring that these profits stay high. In affect, the tax payer is subsidising industries profits, by the externalisation of costs to key services such as the health service and benefits system.

  But, what is the cost to the United Kingdom?

  It is very difficult to put a total price on the damage the current regulation regime is causing, due to a lack of available data and because accounting for the number of people on social security benefit as a result of disability caused by pollution etc is very difficult to do. The Royal Brompton estimated that pollution cost the United Kingdom around £11 billion per annum. However, some idea of the cost to the health service can be grasped by looking at just three diseases caused by pollution.

1.   Asthma

  Allergic asthma occurs only in about 5 per cent of all sufferers. This means 95 per cent of asthma is likely to be caused by exposure to pollution. Asthma is technically an inflammation of the lungs, and small particles (PM2.5's) have been shown to cause this inflammation. If half of this 95 per cent is caused by industrial pollution, while the other half is caused by motor vehicles, then 47.5 per cent of the drug bill for asthma, currently £170 million per annum, could be saved. The number of hospital admissions for asthma could also be cut by a similar amount. Unfortunately, the author doesn't have a figure for this cost.

2.   Endometriosis

  One in 10 women in the United Kingdom now suffer from this condition. Data from Rachael's Environmental Weekly, on a study of diseases around waste tips contaminated with dioxin by the US EPA, suggested this disease could be caused by very low levels of dioxins. The level is well below that considered necessary to produce cancer, so very minute levels of dioxin seem to be required to induce this disease. If the adult female population of the UK is 20 million, then 10 per cent is 2 million. The only cure for endometriosis is a hysterectomy. If a hysterectomy costs £6,000, then the cost of treating all the women in the UK will be £12 billion. The rise in this disease seems centered in pockets where dioxin contamination is known to be present, such as in Derbyshire.

3.   Cancer and Heart Conditions

  Cancer and heart conditions are known to be caused by many factors, but particulate and dioxin pollution will probably count for a large number of the UK admissions. To give the committee more data on the cost of the conditions the author would need access to hospital admission figures in polluted and non polluted area's. However, as these are some of the most expensive diseases to treat, then cutting the figure by only a few per cent could bring large benefits to the health service.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  It is obvious that the current regulation regime is ineffective and needs reforming. Below are some brief recommendations for reversing the current situation and reducing the ill health in UK caused by industrial emissions.

  1.  Responsibility for epidemiology should be taken away from local health authorities and be given to a new national unit with specific responsibility for correlating health effects with pollution. The unit should be independent of the Environment Agency, Health and Safety Executive, Local Health Authority and Government control. It should probably come under the control of the National Audit Office. Any data it receives should be available to a Doctor registered with the GMC, or other professionals registered with professional bodies and involved in pollution control, such as members of the Royal Society of Chemistry and Royal Society of Pharmacy etc.

  2.  It should be an offense for directors of the Environment Agency not to be aware of the latest research (within six months of publication) and to have made recommendations to the Government on the implications for the United Kingdom. It also needs to be made a requirement that Government Ministers act on the advice of the Agency in determining air quality standards from this research.

  3.  It should be an offense for directors of the Environment Agency to ignore the latest research drawn to their attention.

  4.  Best Available Technique (BAT) should be adopted as the normal abatement requirement for a process. If improvements are to cost more than 15 per cent of a companies profits over five years, then the outstanding cost should be subsidised by central government. The cost of this can be met by savings in the NHS and Social Security budgets.

  5.  The Environment Agency should be downgraded to a licensing agency only for industrial pollution matters. Prosecutions for breaking licensing limits should be carried out by the Health and Safety Executive. The HSE must be also be given explicit powers to protect the public from pollution, and not just workers effected by emissions on an industrial site. The HSE must have the ability to prosecute the Agency for not assessing health damage properly in IPPC applications. Ten per cent of fines imposed on polluters, or the Agency, should be given to HSE staff as performance related bonuses.

  6.  A tax should be levied on all part A processes to pay for, or severely subsidise, an expansion of the HSE laboratories. These laboratories should then assume responsibility for monitoring emissions from all part A processes and their effect on the local environment.