OVERVIEW

  We welcome the opportunity to present evidence to The Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee's Transport Sub-committee.

  In responding we do so in the context that the risk based approach to safety management implemented in recent years and sustained through the subsequent privatisation process has enabled rail travel in Great Britain to move to the point where it is now some 20 times safer than travel by car and nearly 10 times safer than bus or coach. This is an improvement from some 15 times and under five times safer respectively at the start of the decade.

  The relative safety of surface transport is shown in the following table:

  The data for rail has historically not been considered on a directly comparable basis as our data includes both the casualties to vehicle occupants arising in train accidents and also other movements accidents, for example where a trespasser is struck by a train. As road vehicle statistics only include vehicle occupants, excluding for example any pedestrians they strike, it appears to us more equable to compare car and bus and coach with only the train accident element. If this approach is adopted the above rail figure overestimates the relative risk by some five times, in other words on this basis, rail is 100 times safer than car travel.

  This does not mean we are complacent and we consider it good business to pursue further improvements in absolute and relative safety performance so long as the costs are not grossly disproportionate to the safety benefits when accepted societal benefit factors are applied.

  Within this submission we:

  1. Explain our responsibility for safety and commitment to a risk based safety case philosophy with regard to the needs of a growing and commercially viable railway.

  2. Demonstrate that an improving railway safety record has been sustained through the privatisation process with a continuance of the open safety culture developed after the 1988 Clapham accident. Critical to this is the railway businesses' acceptance of responsibility for safe operation.

  3. Explore the issues of passenger, public and workforce safety with supporting explanations of the initiatives being taken to improve safety performance. We also expose the extent to which improper use of the railway—essentially trespass and vandalism—dominates the casualty statistics.

  4. Explain the process by which safety objectives are set taking into account recorded safety performance, lessons learned from accidents and wider societal expectations.

  5. Set out our process to ensure that our contractors are competent. In so doing we show that we are working to achieve improvements in this area. We illustrate, as an example of effective asset stewardship our progress in the area of track quality.

  6. Detail the actions being taken to reduce the risks associated with signals passed at danger and shown how, to date, they have been effective.

  7. Propose arrangements to strengthen the independence of our Safety and Standards Directorate as a lead safety body for the rail industry within Railtrack Group PLC.

  8. Define technical and organisational terms used in our submission. This is to be found as Appendix A.

  An independently conducted benchmarking study completed in November 1997 looked at the safety management processes of seven European and North American railway administrations found us to have best practice in:

—  Safety case approaches including self review of compliance.

—  Use of sophisticated risk based techniques.

—  Processes for the safety validation of organisational change and implementation; of safety change programmes.

—  Safety plans.

—  Safety management system standards.

  We are totally committed to the delivery of a railway which meets customer needs while delivering safety performance which meets or exceeds stakeholder expectations. To achieve this we will and must balance safety, cost and reliability in order to support further freight and passenger growth.

  Underpinning this is our recognition that for a railway to be successful it has to be safe.

1. Please describe Railtrack's responsibility for railway safety

  Our responsibilities are encapsulated in The Railways (Safety Case) Regulations made under the Health and Safety at Work, etc., Act 1974 and the Railways Act 1993 which confirmed applications of Part 1 of the H&SAW, etc., Act 1974 to the operation of the railway system.

  The Regulations provide that the prime responsibility for safety on the railway rests with the party controlling the activity in question, for example train and station operation. In recognition that such operation on the infrastructure might introduce risk we, as infrastructure controller, are required to impose safety controls on operators and monitor compliance. In turn the discharge of our statutory responsibilities is overseen by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) through Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate (HMRI).

  The Regulations require that we prepare a Railway Safety Case for acceptance by the HSE and that train and station operators secure acceptance of their Railway Safety Cases. These safety cases demonstrate that risks have been identified, control measures developed and that the resources, capability and commitment necessary to ensure the application of safe practices are in place.

  Our Railway Safety Case contains HSE accepted societal benefit factors, which are integral to our safety decision making. Application of these factors is fundamental to the effective operation of safety controls through the risk based Railway Group Standards regime presently underpinned by the financial strength of Railtrack Group PLC. We support all major decisions regarding safety using these accepted societal benefit factors. Profit is never a factor. The approach is covered further in our response to question seven.

  Our Railway Safety Case is a "living" document evolving as our understanding of the context within which we deliver an acceptably safe railway and our organisation to deliver it develops. We and those who have Railway Safety Cases are required to undertake a triennial review. We found the recently completed first review to be both rewarding and challenging, we believe we demonstrated best practice when submitting the revision for HSE acceptance. The benefits of this process are now being cascaded to those from whom we accept a Railway Safety Case.

  The strength of the cascaded safety case approach is that it explicitly aligns responsibility with those directly accountable for delivering safety. Safety cases, the contractual framework, our check and audit regime supplemented by HSE/HMRI assurance activity, creates an open and effective framework within which it is not necessary to "second guess" those who are mutually committed to achieving safe operation.

  Similarly we have extended the principle of safety cases to contractors undertaking work who may, through their activity or that of their sub-contractors, import risk to our network. Our response to question five explains the cascade of responsibility and controls in place for both main contractors and their sub-contractors.

  Our accepted Railway Safety Case demonstrates that we are committed to:

—  The maintenance and justified improvement of safety performance for all activities on our controlled infrastructure.

—  The provision of risk-based mandatory safety standards to underpin delivery of system safety and safe interworking.

—  Acceptance of train and station operator Railway Safety Cases which demonstrate how they control risks to as low as reasonably practicable.

—  Application of an effective cascade for the implementation of policies, standards, plans and objectives to secure safety.

—  Effective operation of a rigorous safety management system representing best practice.

—  Proactive control of risks assessed by the application of modern management techniques.

—  Having robust arrangements in place to control access to, and use of, our infrastructure.

—  Understanding that safety case compliance is a prerequisite to meeting legal requirements.

—  Check, audit and corrective action.

—  Organising to underpin the above.

  Our Safety and Standards Directorate (S & SD) creates and maintains Railway Group Standards in accordance with the Group Standards Code approved by the Regulator; these are mandatory on all Railway Group members. A structure of subject committees with elected members from across the industry helps develop these standards and in so doing input to the safety justification. Compliance with these and supporting "company" standards are commitments integral to all Railway Safety Cases. To separate the creation and maintenance of Railway Group Standards from the industry and the specific commitments given in operators Railway Safety Cases would weaken and reduce ownership of the safety structure.

  It has been suggested that Railtrack should not be responsible for investigating incidents on its infrastructure because it will be influenced by commercial factors. A Railway Group Standard lays down the process by which all significant incidents are investigated. This process requires all parties to the Inquiry to sign off the report and recommendations contained therein. Additionally, the trades unions have observer status where their members are involved. To ensure that commercial pressures cannot compromise objectivity we provide for the Inquiry to be chaired by an independent individual of stature. Such Chairmen are always used for major incident investigations.

  The HMRI are consulted during the development of all new and revised Railway Group Standards. They have confirmed that they have never had any significant concerns regarding the standards set by S & SD.

  The Railtrack organisation splits beneath the Chairman to reflect the necessary distinction between the "wider industry" requirements through the Safety and Standards Directorate and the "Line" organisation responsible for the stewardship and operation of the controlled infrastructure. This is explained in more detail in our response to question seven.

2. What has been the safety record of the privatised railway compared with the last three years of the nationalised system? To what do you attribute any significant changes?

  We have undertaken detailed analysis throughout the period of privatisation and believe that the key safety indicators establish that safety has not been adversely affected by the change from state to private ownership. Indeed, key areas such as significant train accidents, workforce safety and Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) we are able to establish that improvements have been sustained. These and other significant areas are examined in more detail in our responses to questions three, five and seven.

  Our analysis has focused on the examination of longer run trends as the recent process of railway re-organisation, with the potential to impact on safety performance, can be seen as a continuum beginning with the response to the Hidden Inquiry into the Clapham accident, followed by British Rail's implementation of a business-led structure ("Organising for Quality"). This in turn leads to pre-privatisation re-organisation and the subsequent sale/franchising process concluded late last year.

  Thankfully, train accidents resulting in passenger fatalities are now sufficiently rare that it is difficult to directly observe what is happening to the level of risk from looking at individual train accidents. We consider HMRI's analysis to significant train accidents published annually to be an effective indicator of underlying trends as this long run analysis better demonstrates the reality of safety performance than would be the case if only infrequent—high consequence events were considered. The analysis shows that a reduction of two-thirds from the 1975 level to 1996-97 has been achieved. Application of HMRI criteria to our data for 1997-98 suggests a further reduction. This is shown in the following graph:

  These reductions have been achieved over periods of very significant change in the industry, not least privatisation in the 1990s. The implications of passengers, railway workers and the public are considered in more detail in our response to question three. We consider that the factors contributing to the sustained improvement are:

—  The vigorous application of lessons learned from Clapham, King's Cross and other major accidents (rail and non rail) in the late 1980s.

—  The adoption of risk-based safety management.

—  The introduction of a validation process underpinning organisational change.

—  The application of safety case principles from other industries focused on risk control.

—  Commitment to check, audit and corrective action.

—  An open safety culture within the industry.

—  Ownership of the responsibility to deliver safety being actively sustained through the privatisation process.

—  Recognition that a safe railway is a pre-requisite for a successful and developing railway.

  Our network has experienced a significant increase in utilisation with 1997-98 showing a 12 per cent rise in freight tonne kilometres along with a 5 per cent increase in passenger train miles. At the same time we have seen infrastructure investment increase by some 30 per cent with consequent increases in workforce activity levels. It is against this background that our overall safety performance needs to be considered. Further detail is contained within our response to question four.

  In short, we do not see privatisation as having diluted any commitment to provide acceptably safe railway services. Indeed, it has served to highlight the importance of safety and to strengthen the industry's safety management system. Long term indicators continue to show underlying improvements but where safety events are very infrequent a single major occurrence such as the accident at Southall can produce an apparent deterioration if only short term performance is examined.

3. What were the most common causes of deaths and serious injuries to railway workers, passengers and public in the last three years? What is being done to address these?

  The most common cause of death in the last three years (1995-96 to 1997-98) was for:

—  Passengers—Struck by train while trespassing

—  Public—Struck by train while trespassing

—  Railway workers—Struck by train.

  For the same period the most common cause of serious injury within the scope of current RIDDOR reporting criteria was for:

—  Passengers—Slips, trips and falls at stations

—  Public—Struck by train while trespassing

—  Railway workers—Slips, trips and falls other than from height.

  The detailed response which follows has focused on those areas where fatal consequences are most likely. However, each of the initiatives should also be seen as being targeted at the reduction of injury.

  Over the long term rail has become significantly safer for both passengers and railway workers (including contractors). This is illustrated in the following table which shows workforce safety having progressively improved to reach what are very low levels of risk when compared with post 1945 history. In contrast passenger fatality rates show large reductions in the 1940s and 1950s, followed by three decades of stability. However in the 1990s there has again been an improvement, mainly reflecting the reduction in falls from train doors.

  Parallel analysis of public fatalities shows an increase in trespass and suicide fatalities through the 1970s and early 1980s followed by a decline towards the previously prevailing level. Included within the following table are level crossing and other fatalities which show a long term reduction.

  We are proactive in working with our industry partners to reduce the risk to passengers, those working on the railway and the public. In each area there is an understanding that further justifiable improvements must be pursued.

  The following table categorises recent passengers accidental facilities and includes both those using the railway as intended and those contributing to their own demise through inappropriate behaviour.

	1987	1988	1989	1990-91	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94	1994-95	1995-96	1996-97	1997-98
From trains in running
Door falls	26	19	19	20	14	7	4	5	2	0	2
Leaning out	nc	nc	nc	2	0	0	0	2	1	0	1
Train accidents	3	34	6	2	2	0	0	3	2	1	7
At stations
Boarding/alighting	nc	nc	nc	5	1	2	1	0	2	0	1
Falls from platforms/close to edge	nc	nc	nc	3	3	2	1	1	1	6	2
Others	nc	nc	nc	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	3
Passenger trespassers
Surfing/climbing on top of trains	nc	nc	nc	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Crossing/on tracks
—Electrocution	nc	nc	nc	0	1	1	2	1	2	0	2
—Struck by trains	nc	nc	nc	nc	3	1	1	4	4	7	6
Total	291	531	251	332	24	13	9	17	16	16	25
nc—different categorisation applied. 1 Total incomplete and not comparable with 1991-92 and subsequent years. 2 January 1990—March 1991.

  This shows:

—  Benefits of power doors and secondary door locking.

—  The impact of inappropriate behaviour.

  Our response to question six covers in details the progress since the 1988 Clapham accident in developing and delivering a risk based train protection strategy.

  The effectiveness of long-term initiatives to reduce "on train" risks taken in conjunction with changed patterns of behaviour at stations, requires us to work with train and station operators to bring greater focus on safety at stations.

  We ran a national conference in November 1996 and are working to facilitate a greater understanding of best practice in respect of station safety.

  Control measures in place may be grouped as follows:

—  More information to educate: lines on platforms, signs about dangers (especially third rail electrification), posters.

—  Reducing physical opportunities: station layout design, review of crossing points, access considerations at platform ends.

—  Reducing motivation: improving bridge and subway crossings, CCTV cameras, improved lighting, security and staff visibility.

—  Better problem identification: evaluation tools, best practice and liaison groups, HAZOP studies.

  The context in which station safety of passengers and public (essentially trespassers) is managed is dominated by inappropriate behaviour and impaired competence—often involving alcohol and/or drugs.

  We have recently developed a "risk propensity matrix" which enables us to use an improved understanding of an individual's vulnerability (impaired physical abilities, alcohol, mental illness, age, etc.) in the context of the legitimacy of their conduct. This matrix has been designed to help the search for cost-effective control measures being relevant to the design of appropriate initiatives, prioritisation and targeting, and identification of the expected improvement from the various control measures. We also intend to use the matrix to improve the monitoring of behavioural patterns and identification of underlying factors.

  Applying the matrix to all recent passenger and accidental fatalities at stations confirms that only 15 per cent of casualties related to those using the station as intended and that in nearly three out of four cases competence was repaired, often through alcohol.

  In terms of passenger injuries resulting from trips and slips we did, of course, inherit a substantial backlog of station maintenance from British Rail. Through our £1,000 million programme of station regeneration—platform resurfacing, repairs to leaking roofs and improved lighting—can be expected to contribute to improved performance in this area over the next few years.

  The wider problem of trespass and vandalism is largely experienced away from stations, generating significant loss of life to those behaving improperly, frequent train delay and damage to equipment as well as the possibility of causing harm to those using the railway as intended. Trespasser deaths, principally as a result of having been struck by a train, now dominate the statistics of the public killed on our network.

  We have recently completed a major research study which helps explain the context in which we must manage the endemic issues of trespass and vandalism. We now know that:

—  twenty-five per cent of adults admit to having trespassed on or vandalised the railway;

—  thirty-five per cent of adult males admit to having trespassed on or vandalised the railway;

—  four per cent of adults admit to having vandalised the railway.

  The research has also updated our understanding of the pattern of negative public behaviour reinforcing the realisation that it is essentially a "young persons" issue. In terms of their own harm peak casualty rates involve adult males under 30. However, in terms of detected vandals the peaks are:

—  objects on the line—age 12;

—  graffiti and general damage—age 15.

  These are two to three years lower than previously noted.

  Our recently concluded research has generated a comprehensive review of the issue covering the size and nature of the risk, the scope and quality of our existing response, approaches adopted by others, and stakeholder perception. This is being used to reinforce our targeting of known blackspots through, for example:

—  Trespass and vandalism-resistant fencing.

—  Improved surveillance.

—  Covert initiatives to detect offenders.

—  Enhanced educational and awareness initiatives.

  We can only succeed in securing a reduction in trespass and vandalism by working in partnership with train and station operators, the British Transport Police and other agencies representing the wider society within which we operate.

  We consider vandalism to be the greatest current threat to railway safety and a likely cause of a major railway disaster. This is an issue which can only be tackled effectively with support from Government and society at large.

  Level crossings in general and train/road vehicle collisions in particular are an area where considerable effort has been expended to identify reasonably practicable control measures and we have, with the British Transport Police, tackled poor road vehicle driver practice using both educational initiatives and covert surveillance.

  The number of train/road vehicle collisions is likely to be a good indicator of the risk to road users being strongly related to, but more frequent than, such accidents resulting in casualties. We are encouraged that these show a statistically reducing trend, which suggests an improvement of over one-third in the last seven years. This is illustrated in the following graph which should be considered in the context of:

—  The vast majority of road vehicle related level crossing accidents being caused by the unsafe actions of motorists.

—  An HSE report (Vehicle Driver Behaviour at Level Crossings) confirming "the annual rate of injury accidents per level crossing is approximately one-fiftieth of the rate at road junctions, and less than one two-hundredth of the rate at junctions controlled by automatic traffic signals".

  Returning to the generality of public accidental fatalities (including level crossings) during the period 1994-95 to 1997-98, application of the risk propensity matrix shows:

—  Over one half (51 per cent) of deaths occur when competence is impaired in some way. Alcohol is the largest single contributor (over one-third) with age (youngsters) just under one-third and mental problems (one-fifth).

—  A significant number (13 per cent) are in the "vulnerable" category.

—  Most (89 per cent) are intentionally taking risks—despite half being fully "competent" at the time.

—  Nearly one in every 10 deaths arise from people using the railway to seek thrills (40 per cent being competent at the time).

  We illustrate this graphically:

  Insofar as track workers safety is concerned the table below shows the performance achieved and immediate cause of death:

  When the above data is normalised to reflect exposure the risk per worker has fallen from an average of over three fatalities per 10,000 workers in the 1980s to an average of 0.9 for the last five years. This reflects very considerable activity across the industry.

  Regrettably three deaths occurred in 1997-98 to railway workers undertaking trackside activities. This is particularly disappointing as all occurred in the last quarter after a fatality free period of 14 months—in fact calendar year 1997 was the first in the history of the national network with no trackside fatalities. All were struck by trains—two track maintenance staff in a single incident and the third a train operator employed shunter.

  Naturally this raises questions about the underlying level of risk and adequacy of the controls on the many interfaces, particularly as more work is undertaken within a contractual framework.

  We have recently reviewed performance to put these deaths in context and ensure that we better understand the factors lying behind the significant improvements generated through the 1990s. These include:

—  Greater separation of track workers and trains.

—  Continuous attention to staff awareness.

—  A growing commitment to competency.

—  Less labour-intensive working practices.

  We are committed to sustaining the improvement through:

—  Our leadership of a pan-industry approach.

—  Further separation of track workers and trains.

—  Implementation of standards of competency for all safety critical work.

—  Introduction of automated track safety warning systems.

—  Better measurement of precursors.

  Comprehensive statistical analysis of available accident and precursor data indicates that the three deaths in 1997-98 are consistent with expected fluctuations and are not by themselves indicative of an increase in the underlying risk level.

  We are committed to ensuring that working on the railway becomes safer in future years. Likewise we are committed to improving the safety record for both passengers and the public.

4. What were the conclusions of the recent Railway Group Safety Review?

  Following clarification we understand that this question refers to the 1998-99 Railway Group Safety Plan, in particular the review of safety performance contained within it.

  The Railway Group Safety Plan itself does not reach conclusions in the way in which the question as originally posed suggests. Rather it sets out objectives to be achieved in the coming year developed as a result of an extensive consultation process.

  A superficial review of its analysis of past performance against objectives may be seen to be negative in some aspects, but closer statistical analysis shows that the overall trend is one of improvement although it is perfectly possible for an individual incident to appear to buck the trend.

  If we and our industry partners are to deliver safety it is essential that we have a common understanding of, and shared commitment to, delivery of agreed safety objectives. As stated in our Railway Safety Case these are contained within an annual Railway Group Safety Plan.

  The safety objectives contained within the plan are high level and strategic and provide the framework beneath which individual organisations are required to develop appropriate objectives, action plans and programmes which contribute to the achievement of the Railway Group safety objectives. We operate such an approach within both our business organisation and Safety and Standards Directorate.

  We consider that the wide consultation within the Railway Group and beyond with other stakeholders prior to an annual conference at which the plan is agreed, adds strength to a process focused on continuous improvement and delivery of worthwhile safety benefits.

  As illustrated in our response to questions two, three and five a sound understanding of safety performance is a pre-requisite to identifying and targeting improvements. Accordingly we publish within the Railway Group Safety Plan a review of progress to define the base position and focus activity in the plan year.

  The annual review leading to the development of the 1998-99 Railway Group Safety Plan objectives took into account concerns including those generated by last September's Southall accident. It also specifically addressed experience in maintaining and renewing our network using contractors determining that a new objective was required. We cover how action plans have been developed to achieve this new objective in our response to question five.

  Our review processes are currently examining how emerging lessons learned from the recent tragedy at Eschede in Germany are best incorporated in our safety objectives. Clearly, if there are immediate lessons from this and any other accident they are promulgated within the industry for action now rather than saved for inclusion in a future plan.

  The objectives have been and will continue to be set so as to be challenging. They are also, in our view correctly, designed to cover both those issues directly within the control of the Railway Group and those where wider societal attitudes and behaviour towards the railway are material. Failure to achieve an objective in any given year should not, therefore, lead to automatic criticism of the industry.

  Our Board considers progress against Railway Group Safety Objectives and significant safety events on a period by period basis. This approach is cascaded through the executive meetings structure of the company thereby ensuring review and action necessary to deliver supporting company safety objectives.

  In reviewing progress we always report year on year progress, defining in an absolute manner success or failure in achieving each objective. However, in so doing we seek to ensure that non statistically significant year on year perturbations are seen as such.

  The 1998-99 Railway Group Safety Plan contains an objective requiring our Safety and Standards Directorate to lead an industry review of railway risk control and to develop and publish a long term risk management strategy by January 1999.

  This reflects a conclusion that the present family of Railway Group safety objectives which have served the industry well through the period of pre-privatisation re-organisation and the subsequent sale and franchising programme, need to be reviewed and taken forward with a longer term view of how risk reduction can be achieved.

  This approach will recognise achievements to date and enable us to better absorb new technology in trains, signalling and other engineering necessary to safely deliver the business pans of our company and our business partners.

5. What steps does Railtrack take to ensure the safety and competence of contractors and sub contractors working on the railway?

  We employ contractors for the design, construction, maintenance and repair of our infrastructure assets. Our procedures for the selection and management of contractors are based on the requirements of the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 and subsequent Regulations made thereunder. Our approach to satisfying these requirements is detailed within our Railway Safety Case accepted by the HSE.

  We unreservedly accept full client responsibility pursuant to the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 for all contracts we let.

  It is our policy that all new and existing contractors must evidence their competence through development of a safety case to satisfy the requirements of our own Railway Safety Case. Included within each Contractors' Safety Case are the arrangements by which he in turn will ensure the competency of his sub contractors and suppliers.

  Given the demanding environment in which contractors have to work on the railway, we employ a staged approach to establish the competence of a contractor both before contract award and during contract execution.

  This is simply illustrated:

Define procurement strategy

  As illustrated above our processes are structured to ensure that contractors may not start work until they have an accepted Contractors' Safety Case covering both their general competence and the particular safety requirements of the individual contract.

  In accepting Core Contractors' Safety Cases we concentrate on validating that the contractor's safety management systems are aligned with our own and capable of enabling them to effectively manage the risks associated with the activities to be undertaken. At the individual contract level we look to a demonstration that the contract specific requirements are understood, hazards identified and that robust methods of work will be applied so as to control risk as far as is practicable.

  Underlying the whole contractors safety case philosophy is our requirement to validate that each of our main contractors is competent and will employ competent staff and sub-contractors on safety critical and safety related work. As a minimum this covers:

—  The framework of the competence management system.

—  The process used to select and develop appropriate standards of competence.

—  The approval process used by the contractor in setting standards of competence.

—  The training, assessment and appointment process used for competence assessors.

—  The process that is used to assess whether an individual is competent.

—  The process used to issue an "authority to work".

—  The system used to maintain records of competence.

—  How verification of the competence management system will be achieved.

—  Self-monitoring.

  To reinforce this approach we require that any contractor who wishes to provide operational and/or safety services must be qualified before they are invited to tender. In qualifying to work for us contractors are evaluated against pre-defined objective criteria.

  All our tender evaluations provide for the safety dimensions of the submission to be assessed against objective criteria. Failure in this area is absolute and precludes acceptance of the tender even if on the other commercial dimensions it may be preferred.

  Our arrangements for contractor management are discharged through contract and project managers whose duties require them to work to ensure that contracts are safely delivered. They are involved through the planning process leading to a contractor being allowed to start design, site works and maintenance. Specifically they are involved in the approval of safe systems of work and for ensuring that delivery is in accordance with the accepted safety plan and contract specification.

  Our contract managers with responsibility for contractors maintaining the network are supported by random "end product check" arrangements to sample outputs. These arrangements which provide for statistically sound sampling of activity, in accordance with the approach contained within BS600I, are being implemented progressively and provide an increasing assurance that contract safety requirements are being met.

  All our contractors are also subject to random and periodic site and safety management system checks to determine that the systems they employ are delivering competent staff and sub-contractors operating within the safety management system in the accepted Contractors' Safety Case. Inter alia these checks validate that mandated standards are being systematically applied.

  This is achieved by applying the principles of British Standard 6001 to derive a robust sample for the examination of contract control activities across the relevant contractor organisation. Because it is not reasonably practicable to check all elements of each contractors' management system we are adopting a systematic, historical loss based approach to prioritise the surveillance of contractors management systems.

  These "end product", site and management system checks are in addition to each contractor monitoring his own activity. Our infrastructure maintenance and renewals contractors have generally adopted the International Safety Rating System and are jointly developing with the administrators of the system, an enhanced audit protocol tailored to railway engineering and operations. Our contractors are now, as a condition of contract, required to advise us of any significant failings and the action taken to correct them. in addition contractors are required to arrange their own independent audit of their activity.

  Over and above the monitoring and check arrangement we undertake safety audits of contractors. These are programmed to take account of the relative risks within each contract and the safety performance identified through checking and monitoring contractors processes and outputs. Accordingly, audits will vary from routine high level surveillance to confirm process integrity to an in depth evaluation of both process and outputs triggered by evidence of less than satisfactory safety performance.

  Should at any stage non conformance or danger be identified we have appropriate contractual powers to suspend any relevant activity or affected safety critical or related operation until corrective action has been taken.

  At the end of each contract and intermediately where appropriate contractor performance is assessed and fed back both to the contractor and internally.

  In applying the above processes we also monitor, check and audit sub-contractor activity to ensure that the processes detailed in the main contractors' safety case are applied and that satisfactory outputs are delivered. We always reserve the right to refuse any sub-contractor where competence is not assured.

  We believe that effective contractor management requires a common commitment to safe working. Accordingly the track safety initiatives detailed in our response to question three operate with significant contractor involvement.

  Of necessity a competent contractor will employ competent staff and therefore we have taken the initiative in providing a competency framework within which we require our contractors to operate.

  We have further taken the lead in developing standards of competency for track safety and are working with contractors and training suppliers to ensure that these are applied in an assured environment. We are currently considering how best to facilitate the provision of a national records of competence system covering all safety critical work activity undertaken on our network.

  We have the right of audit for all organisations authorised to certificate staff in track safety competencies. We have demonstrated our commitment to achieving improvements in this area by:

—  Supporting the development of the Association of Railway Training Providers assurance scheme.

—  Suspending or withdrawing authority from training organisations not meeting required standards.

—  Eliminating the need for multiple certification.

  We recognise that in moving the infrastructure design, installation and maintenance functions, historically undertaken in house, onto a contractual basis requires not only significant changes in the safety management processes. The company has had to take firm action to reinforce safety management processes.

  We also recognise that full implementation of a competency based approach is taking time. However, we are managing acceptance of Contractors' Safety Cases in an integrated manner to ensure that overall standards are progressively raised. In so doing we are working with our contractors to facilitate the spread of best practice.

  Although safety performance through the period of privatisation demonstrates that risks to passengers and staff have continued to reduce we recognise there is room for improvement. This recognition is shared by our principal contractors with whom we are committed to work to further improve processes to the stage that their performance, and our management of their activity on our network, is not seen as an issue by any of our stakeholders.

  A key measure of the effectiveness of the contracting framework is its ability to deliver improvements in the condition of the infrastructure. Given a very small number of high profile incidents and publicly articulated concern that track quality has fallen as a consequence of privatisation we wish to reassure the Committee that we are effective stewards of the national rail network.

  We have developed a matrix of asset related key performance indicators used alongside those developed to assess performance of individual contractors. Taking track quality as an example these asset related indicators cover:

—  Serious or potentially serious track defects.

—  Broken Rails.

—  Derailments.

—  Condition of track temporary speed restrictions.

—  Track twist, top and gauge exceedances.

—  Track geometry—profile and alignment.

—  Component condition—ultrasonic testing of rails.

—  Overall condition of track.

  These can be applied at contract level to assess the overall performance of the contractor in maintaining track to specification. They can also be used to compare and contrast contractor performance.

  The following graphs show, for sample key performance indicators the progress made since we assumed responsibility for the infrastructure on 1 April 1994.

  The reduction in track defects needs to be seen in the context of the infrastructure as inherited in 1994 following a "maintenance holiday" imposed on parts of it's network by a cash limited British Rail. We remained subject to public ownership external funding requirements through 1994-95 and 1995-96 and experienced a decline of between one and two per cent in overall track quality. Track quality has been stabilised and can be expected to improve as the benefits of increased renewals and improved maintenance delivery feed through. The small increase in the number of broken rails reflects the average age of rail having increased consequent on British Rail's latter day renewals programme and increased tonnages of freight traffic. This issue is being addressed as a priority by significantly increased track renewals.

  By way of illustration we have managed to increase infrastructure related spend since 1994 as shown in the following table:

Category	Expenditure £ million
	1994-95	1995-96	1996-97	1997-98	1998-991
Stations and Buildings	99	88	148	279	329
Track	239	293	339	349	370
Structures/Other	131	179	229	296	180
Signalling	195	155	180	193	299
Plant and Machinery	20	20	26	85	151
Electrification	51	67	67	43	35
Backlog 1 and 2	0	9	28	63	128
Grants	(72)	(67)	(56)	(54)	(40)
Total investment	663	744	961	1,254	1,452
Infrastructure maintenance	696	725	732	702	678
Total	1,359	1,469	1,693	1,956	2,130
1 budget forecast

  The reductions being achieved in the cost of infrastructure maintenance reflect contractor efficiency and do not represent any lowering of quality requirements on our part. This year our planned investment in track will further increase reflecting our commitment to invest to secure a safe and effective railway. We will achieve this in partnership with our suppliers building on the experiences of the past to ensure that we deliver a railway engineered to meet or exceed expected safety performance.

6. What is being done to prevent trains passing signals at danger?

  We are actively leading an extensive programme to reduce the number of trains passing signals at danger. This addresses:

—  Human factors.

—  Rolling stock performance.

—  Pilot ATP installations.

—  A driver's reminder appliance to address platform start away risks.

—  Developing a Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) incorporating train stop and red signal speed trap facilities.

—  An infrastructure design support tool.

—  A transmission based Train Control System (TCS) with inherent ATP for initial deployment on the West Coast Main Line.

  We now address these initiatives in more detail and explain the underlying incidence of signals passed at danger.

  We recognise the benefits of there being a collaborative lead within the Railway Group to ensure a cohesive portfolio of initiatives to reduce risks associated with SPADs. This is a responsibility that we have accepted in recognition of the risks imported on to our controlled infrastructure when a signal is passed at danger. In co-ordinating SPAD management we at times need to operate beyond the strict definition of our legal responsibility. We do this willingly as a vacuum or loss of focus in this key area would impact on public confidence in the railway.

  SPADs are infrequent events—train drivers should be expected to be competent, dedicated professionals and the average driver is involved in a SPAD incident only about once in every 10 years. However the consequences of such an error can be serious and reducing these risks remains a priority. To assure this position we run the broadly based SPAD "Focus Group" and SPAD workshops are organised involving all in the industry—and particularly drivers—in analysing the causes of SPADs and appropriate measures to control them.

  We consider human factors to be as important as some of the technical measures discussed below in improving the industry's SPAD performance. We also fund the production of "Red Alert", a regular newsletter promoting awareness and giving information on SPAD issues and initiatives to the industry. Funding also comes from most, but not all, train operators.

  Improvements in driver selection, training and performance monitoring have continued. The formal safety case regime now operated means Railtrack Safety and Standards can ensure that all train operators commit to adequate systems and S & SD audit to provide assurance that they are applied in practice.

  A number of train operators have been training their drivers in defensive driving techniques. The results are very encouraging and we are considering how best to extend these techniques to other routes.

  These "human factors" improvements have, we believe, been signficant in helping to deliver the improving trends in SPAD numbers.

  In 1995, the Health and Safety Commission and Government supported the conclusion reached by British Rail that add-on Automatic Train Protection (ATP) was not reasonably practicable for network wide installation. We realised at that point that public concern about these matters remained high and embarked on a wide ranging programme to search out cost effective ways of reducing this risk.

  Our train protection strategy was set out in a letter to the Secretary of State for Transport dated 21 November 1995. The five elements of the strategy are to:

—  Bring into full operation the pilot BR-ATP installations and evaluate their operating performance.

—  Press on with a range of measures to improve braking, driver and system performance, and require all new equipment to embody the latest Railway Group Standards.

—  Pilot, monitor and if successful, install a driver reminder appliance (DRA) to reduce the risk of starting against a red signal.

—  With the supplying industry, develop a Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS), which could replace the existing Automatic Warning System (AWS). In addition to the current AWS functionality, this would provide train stop and red signal speed trap facilities. Install TPWS on a pilot basis and assess how far it will be reasonably practicable to implement it operationally.

—  Develop evaluation methods including the Layout Risk Model, and installation plans, so that risk reduction measures can be applied cost-effectively at the earliest opportunity.

  We also committed to develop a new transmission based Train Control System (TCS) with inherent ATP for initial deployment on the West Coast Main Line.

  While there has been some slippage in the envisaged programme, due to the sort of technical issues which tend to affect complex developments, we are determined to pursue all elements of the strategy with vigour committing all necessary finance and human resources. This strategy is now moving firmly into the implementation phase. It is overseen by an industry steering group led by our Director, Safety and Standards. It is also supported by regular dialogue with all industry parties including the trades unions who make significant positive contributions to the programme.

  Achieving the necessary reliability on the two inherited ATP pilot schemes (Great Western and Chiltern) has proved to be extremely difficult. Following independent reviews by reliability consultants during 1997 these problems, principally relating to train borne equipment, are finally being overcome.

  On Great Western only the Great Western Trains HST fleet was fitted with the on-train equipment despite many other operators using the route. This position has recently changed with the Heathrow Express trains operating in accordance with a train operators Railway Safety Case based on ATP—this being the method by which buffer stop protection at the underground terminal station has been secured. To enable Heathrow Express to operate under full ATP supervision we have extended the scope of the Great Western pilot to encompass all lines over which Heathrow Express operate even though the costs were grossly disproportionate to the safety benefits. The HMRI have approved the fixed installation and Heathrow Express on-train elements of the Great Western scheme. However, the Great Western Trains on-train equipment is not expected to be approved until the reliability problems are resolved.

  The Committee may wish to note that those European railways which have fitted ATP on their main lines have mostly not attempted to solve the problems of complex terminal stations and we believe Paddington to be the best protected major terminal station anywhere in the world.

  The Great Western Main Line is a TEN's route and the system will have to be replaced by the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) at a future date. This makes any further extensions to the existing system on either track or trains even more unattractive.

  The Chiltern pilot is now achieving high levels of running under ATP supervision. We have extended the scope of the scheme by filling "gaps" and fitting the new double track section from Princes Risborough to Bicester being built to cater for increased demand. We are upgrading the system for 100 mph operation which will be exploited by the new ATP fitted trains being deployed by Chiltern Railways.

  These extensions have been carried out because of our commitment to safety and the previous undertaking given with regard to this scheme. The cost of the extensions vastly exceeds the safety benefit delivered. We have committed to maintain the system until it is either life-expired or replaced by an equivalent system. We are preparing a submission seeking HMRI approval to bring the system into operational service.

  We are very keen to see the two pilots in full service to gain operational data necessary for the design of the new Train Control System (TCS) covered later.

  The Driver Reminder Appliance, a simple device fitted in train cabs which addresses the risk of drivers starting against a red signal at station platforms, completed trials in 1997, was mandated by Railway Group Standard, and will be implemented by December 1998. We estimate this measure to reduce the total risk from signals being passed at danger by about 10 per cent.

  We have exempted the Merseyrail fleet from DRA fit because we are extending the provision of London Underground type train stop equipment already utilised by these trains on underground sections. This will give early protected route benefits.

  The next measure in the strategy is the Train Protection Warning System (TPWS). TPWS is just completing a successful trial on part of the Thameslink fleet and route. Studies indicate that TPWS will be capable of delivering about 70 per cent of the benefits of ATP at 10 per cent to 15 per cent of ATP's estimated £1 billion cost. It will also be capable of much more rapid deployment which means that over 20 years, in conjunction with TCS, it will produce a greater safety benefit than ATP.

  We consulted the industry about TPWS via a "Green Paper" in February 1998 and were delighted by the broad support expressed. We have incurred development costs of about £5 million to date and are now investing another £4.5 million preparing for network roll-out. Further work already committed includes a full scale pilot installation on the route from Tonbridge to Hastings to validate production installation; completion of the fit of the Thameslink trains and route, and carrying out the design work for locomotive fitment.

  We have welcomed the HSC's recent consultation paper as it relates to train protection, seeing the postulated approach as endorsing the principles and benefits of TPWS developed by the industry as an appropriate solution. This support for the thrust of the HSC's approach will be central to our formal response to the on-going consultation. In conjunction with TCS, TPWS will deliver a safer railway than ATP at a cost which does not exceed its benefit to society.

  Although we were already committed to TPWS within approximately the same timetable as the HSC wish to mandate, the making of a Regulation can be expected to simplify the required consultation with train operators and ease the debate with respect to the funding split between industry parties.

  For the longer term, we are developing a new Train Control System for high speed main lines using transmission based signalling. The system will be fully compliant with the requirements of Directive EC96/48 and the ERTMS standards. We have entered into a joint venture with the French, German, Italian, Dutch and Spanish railways to specify and test the system, and we are receiving signficant European Commission support both in terms of finance and their management time.

  While some of the railways with whom we are working have implemented add-on ATP to a greater extent than we have, few have fitted more than their core network and they are all finding its costs too high to justify further fitment. They all want the new system to replace their existing systems as well as for new high speed lines.

  We recently announced that GEC Alsthom was the preferred bidder for development and deployment of the system on the West Coast Main Line. TCS works in a way which delivers ATP functionality as an inherent part of its design rather than as an expensive add-on. We have already spent over £25 million on its development and completion of development and deployment on the WCML will cost between £500 million and £1,000 million. TCS will later be deployed on other main lines and then spread over the rest of the network. However, this is a very complex technical development which will take many years to complete and roll-out, so TPWS remains an important interim route to secure improvements in safety through SPAD reduction.

  Another important area in reducing SPADs is adhesion management. Particularly in the autumn leaf fall season many SPADs are caused by braking problems due to low adhesion. The best ATP system is useless if the train cannot stop. Most adhesion related SPADs simply result in a train sliding a few yards past the signal and stopping in the overlap—however more serious incidents can arise.

  An Adhesion Working Group (AWG) has been running for some time concentrating on these issues. It reports to the Train Protection Steering Group and is funded principally by our Safety and Standards Directorate, although most train operators also contribute to the group which is chaired by the Managing Director of Chiltern Railways. This group:

—  Has carried out several important programmes of research into adhesion management.

—  Produces training and awareness videos for drivers to teach them good low adhesion driving techniques.

—  Generates a regular newsletter on adhesion issues.

—  Has sponsored research leading to several lightweight Diesel Multiple Unit fleets being fitted with either manually activated or automatic sanders linked to the train's wheel slide protection systems (the train equivalent of ABS).

  We have recently ordered a fleet of new multi-purpose vehicles capable of addressing poor rail head condition. These vehicles can both clean the rail head using high pressure water jets and wire brushes and lay a non-slip paste to the rail head. This £40 million investment will allow more rapid and effective remedial action to be taken at low adhesion sites starting next autumn.

  We are focusing action on what are known as "technical SPADs", which are generally fail-safe signal reversions triggered by power interruptions and component failures within the signalling. If a train is approaching a signal when such an event occurs, it is not uncommon for there to be insufficient warning for the driver to be able to stop before the signal. As the route was set for the train before the failure occurred this rarely produces a safety problem. Our actions include renewal of standby generators, fitment of data loggers and duplication of cables to enhance reliability whilst maintaining the already high degree of integrity built into the signalling system.

  Radio communication will not normally prevent SPADs but can affect the consequences by allowing a train to be stopped or warned between signals. We have completed the fitment of cab secure radio over the whole of the former Network South East area except for one route to be used as a DART pilot, see below. The rest of the country is covered by a slightly less capable system called the National Radio Network (NRN). We have invested to improve NRN coverage and performance by adding base stations and re-configuring the system. We have issued a Railway Group Standard requiring all trains to carry a minimum radio fit of NRN.

  The situation is very much better now than in 1994 when we inherited the network. However, both systems are analogue and becoming obsolete so we are developing a new system called DART (Digital Advanced Radio for Trains). Last year a £13 million contract was awarded to Siemens UK to develop the system hardware.

  The Layout Risk Model, which was jointly developed with the HMRI, has proved impossible to calibrate for absolute risk or relative risk, location to location. After a long programme of work including using "world class" modelling experts we have concluded, in conjunction with HMRI, that we should approve it and roll it out only for its originally intended purpose of comparing relative risks between different layout designs at the same location. We believe it works well for this purpose and it will, once approved, be used to evaluate most new designs.

  These national initiatives are supported by a portfolio of local initiatives managed through our zonal delivery organisation. for example, if a signal is identified as "high risk" appropriate local improvements will be made. This can take a variety of forms including:

—  Resiting the signal.

—  Providing a "repeater" in advance of the signal itself.

—  Provision of a "SPAD indicator" to give a secondary warning.

  Such actions go on continually and when taken with the national programmes evidence our commitment to effective SPAD management.

  While there have been a number of high profile incidents during the last year the absolute number of trains passing signals at danger continued to decline even with the increasing traffic volumes we are managing. This is illustrated in the graph below:

  Examining the incidence of SPADs in the context of activity (rate per million train miles) shows:

  We firmly believe this decline results from our continuing positive commitment, that of train operators and to the wide breadth of initiatives developed to address Signals Passed At Danger.

7. What changes should be made to the regulatory structure of the railway? What is your opinion of the recommendations in paragraph 145 of the sub-committee's recent report?

  We welcome the review being undertaken by the Health and Safety Executive and are committed to ensuring that we participate in a constructive manner to identify if there are ways by which a good safety record can be improved further.

  Our Safety and Standards Directorate is already effectively an independent industry forum. During 1997 we consulted widely with train operators, rolling stock owners, contractors and other stakeholders about the directorate's objectivity and role. We restructured S & SD in March 1998 to improve delivery. We are also establishing a Safety Advisory Board, comprising leaders from across the industry, to oversee S & SD's work. This board will have the power to commission a biennial independent review of the directorate's independence, impartiality, objectivity and performance.

  Our Safety and Standards Directorate is responsible for:

—  Determining, consulting and gaining Railtrack Board support for safety policies applicable to the overall control of safety risk on our infrastructure and monitoring their delivery.

—  Preparing, consulting and gaining Railtrack Board endorsement of an annual Railway Group Safety Plan which will contain risk-based objectives to be met by Railtrack Line, and train and station operators.

—  Managing the process by which mandatory Railway Group Standards are produced, revised, accepted, authorised and issued.

—  Acceptance of safety cases presented to it by train and station operators under the Railways (Safety Case) Regulations 1994, and the validation of ongoing material revisions.

—  Auditing compliance with Railtrack's own Railway Safety Case internally and by Railtrack Line and its contractors.

—  Auditing train and station operators' compliance with their Railway Safety Cases.

—  Auditing compliance of all parties with Railway Group Standards.

—  Monitoring the efficacy of Railway Group Standards.

—  Receiving specified safety performance information to determine the efficacy of risk control measures plus, development and agreement to implementation of appropriate action plans.

—  Approval of vehicle conformance and acceptance bodies which certify rolling stock as compliant with Railway Group Standards.

—  Appointment of Independent Chairmen for inquiries into major incidents.

—  Monitoring the implementation of inquiry recommendations and enforcement notices.

  These activities are distinct from our mainstream business activity which, like other members of the Railway Group has prime responsibility for the day to day safe discharge of its activity.

  We refer to this business activity as "Railtrack Line" which through a distinct headquarters and zonal delivery structure, develops policies and strategies for engineering, operational and safety management which support Railtrack's business goals.

  Railtrack Line's primary safety responsibilities are:

—  Management, control and signalling of the infrastructure to ensure the safe movement of trains.

—  Management and safe operation (including emergency planning and evacuation) of any stations we operate.

—  Management of contractors by selection, safety monitoring and audit to ensure maintenance and renewal of the infrastructure is carried out in accordance with the required safety standards.

—  Safety management check of the activities of a train or station operator to the extent that they affect the safety of our infrastructure and/or the safe movement of trains.

—  Ensuring outside parties carrying out works which may affect our infrastructure do not import unacceptable risk.

—  The management of safety for all major changes to our infrastructure.

—  Ensuring independent check procedures are in place for the design of all works affecting our infrastructure.

—  Negotiation and agreement of contracts with operators to provide them with a safe, efficient and cost effective service.

—  Stewardship of our assets to ensure they reman fit for purpose at all times and taking whatever action may be necessary to ensure the safety of all users of the infrastructure.

—  Train planning and timetabling.

—  Creation, exercising and subsequent implementation when necessary of contingency and emergency plans in conjunction with train operating and infrastructure maintenance companies.

—  Investigation of basic causes of any accidents, incidents and failures which have affected the integrity of our infrastructure and the implementation of any necessary follow up action.

—  Keeping of statutory records and certificates and their presentation to the regulatory authorities as required.

—  Ensuring that our business operates in compliance with our Railway Safety Case.

—  Monitoring that train and station operators operate in compliance with their railway safety cases.

—  Route acceptance of new and modified traction and rolling stock.

  We accept that we must visibly demonstrate the independence and lack of commercial bias of our Safety and Standards Directorate and are therefore considering transferring this directorate into a stand-alone company within Railtrack Group PLC. This would enable industry stakeholders to formally participate in the governance and direction of the lead safety body for the Railway Group by the appointment of non-executive directors.

  We believe this to be superior to any transfer of responsibility to a third party. We consider the following to be the downsides of a transfer of Safety and Standards responsibility to a third party:

—  Standards related liability issues are highly likely to produce significant delays on projects such as the West Coast Main Line.

—  Wholly removing lead safety responsibility from the business and commercial context of the industry would dilute safety management being seen as integral to the business leading to a reduction in safety for society as a whole.

—  A significant risk of safety decisions imposing unreasonable costs on rail when it is already by far the safest form of land transport leading to a reduction in safety for society as a whole.

  We are further concerned that any transfer of responsibility back to a State body might generate resourcing difficulties as evidenced by HMRI's inability to perform new works inspections currently. S & SD has, and the new company will need, near instant access to funding to deal with safety issues within its scope.

  A "Civil Aviation Authority" type body will not, in our view, work as well in the rail sector because of the nature and complexity of the interfaces to be managed.

  The approach of turning S & SD into a company would, we believe, enhance our ability to objectively apply the HSE accepted societal benefit factors detailed in our Railway Safety Case. These are integral to our safety decision making and capable of review to ensure that they remain aligned with the wider societal expectations of safe public transport. Application of these factors, with regard for a growing and commercially viable railway, is fundamental to the effective operation of safety controls through the risk-based standards regime. This regime is presently underpinned by the financial strength of Railtrack and to retain this the company needs to remain within Railtrack Group PLC or an equivalent liability cover must be provided. We do not see the transfer of these significant liabilities back to the state as necessary or desirable.

  The company governance arrangements could provide for non executive directors to be drawn from representative sections of the industry. We also recommend a non-executive director nominated by the Strategic Rail Authority as the future prime funding body and are discussing with the trades unions how they might be represented. We have also asked HMRI to consider how they might wish to be involved in this or an enhanced safety advisory board approach. Adoption of the company approach would also provide a better framework and encourage the secondment of staff from other rail companies.

  We believe that placing S & SD in a separate company within the Railtrack Group would allow it to take on responsibility for the areas presently outside the scope of the Directorate and without clear ownership in the industry. These include vehicle areas such as the interior fit of passenger vehicles and vehicle safety related research and development. The Railtrack locus in these additional areas could be codified by variation of track access agreements.

  To further facilitate this we propose that the safety and standards company should be funded by a rail turnover related levy approved by the Rail Regulator or in future the Strategic Rail Authority. We would reduce track access charges to reflect the present notional contribution of train operators to the costs of S & SD. Railtrack's business activity should be subject to the levy on the same regulated basis. As previously stated we believe that the new company must remain within the umbrella of the Railtrack Group PLC to provide full liability cover.

  We are also reviewing the arrangements for accident investigation and implementation of lessons learned to determine if there is a case for the greater involvement of S & SD as a neutral and objective lead safety body for the Railway Group.

  We shall continue to argue for continuous safety improvement on the basis of affordable measures. It seems to us central to the success of an integrated transport policy that there is equality between competing modes.

  It is therefore counter-intuitive to take steps to force what is already the safest mode to invest disproportionately in safety measures because they are possible rather than reasonably practicable.

  Many of the key changes required to facilitate further freight and passenger growth require standards changes. Safety, cost and reliability invariably have to be balanced against one another. Moving safety responsibility away from the responsibility for cost and reliability will, we believe, stifle growth and network development.

  In conclusion we consider that transferring our Safety and Standards Directorate outside Railtrack Group PLC will delay standards development and hence the application of new technology; consequently defer realisation of net national safety benefits by limiting rail capacity, and transfer liability from the private sector to the state unnecessarily.

  We believe our proposed changes would assure all our stakeholders that safety is a priority for the industry, that the cost of safety measures are considered only in the broader societal context and that Railtrack Line is not treated more favourably than other industry parties in determining where safety costs fall without incurring the above disadvantages.