Thank you for your letter of the 25 March 1999, seeking additional information for the Environment, Transport and regional Affairs Committee, Transport Sub-Committee, following the meeting held on 24 March 1999. We submit for your records, the following additional information, which we hope the Committee will find helpful.

1. Why would it be undesirable to split the economic and technical aspects of regulation? Surely the fact that the SRG, responsible for safety and ERG, responsible for encouraging competition, are both parts of the CAA causes at least the impression of conflict.

  It is the BALPA view that there needs to be close co-operation between the regulatory functions. Newcomers to the industry, particularly now, we are seeing the emergence of a number of low cost airlines needing to be screened for financial fitness. The possibility of conflict in the relationship between ERG and SRG has been highlighted by the ICAO Safety Oversight Audit (April 1998). The ICAO concern relates to the financial health of an operator, who, facing economic constraints in an operation, might be inclined to reduce costs in various areas, particularly related to the safety of operations, We would support that view and also add that SRG should not be constrained too tightly by ERG, safety and competition are not compatible, and our fears are that safety issues might not be fully addressed if constraints are too tight.

2. Can you give examples of cases in which the safety regulation group has been browbeaten by a larger airline?

  I thought that I covered this issue quite thoroughly in the example which I provided on engine inoperative ferry operations. The guidance to operators, outlined by CAP 360, is detailed and specific. However, CAP 360 is not law and the operator may, with the agreement of the CAA, use alternative means of compliance. British Airways do not follow the CAP 360 guidance for such operations being permitted to operate quite differently, and with co-pilots who have never trained for, or experienced an engine out take-off. BALPA has never received a satisfactory response from SRG as to why BA should be allowed to conduct themselves quite differently to the rest of the industry. Quantas for example, before commencing such a ferry operation, would put both Captain and co-pilot through a simulator detail, to practice the actual procedure to be flown, before arranging for them to ferry the aircraft.

  We have also seen airlines "browbeat" SRG into issuing variations to the Flight and Duty Time Regulations. Last Summer, Bristow Helicopters achieved an approval to operate five consecutive early morning starts. Only a few months earlier, SRG at a number of "roadshows", had confirmed that variations to Flight and Duty time regulations would not be issued without the approval of the Pilots. This was done without prior consultation, (apparently there was no time to consult as the approval was needed quickly if Bristows were to win a particular contract). BALPA managed to get this stopped, the practice was never used.

3. Do you have any evidence to back up your suggestion that the current means of funding the SRG is failing?

  BALPA has not suggested that the current means of funding the SRG is failing, but we do see a Regulator prepared in some cases to bend their own guidelines to extremes (see the examples given at question 2), which may be attributable to the way in which SRG is funded.

4. In what ways does the evolution of "virtual airlines" make it more difficult to police industry standards and performance in maintenance of safe operations. What impact do "virtual airlines" have on efforts to imbue "top down" safety cultures in airlines.

  The virtual airline owns nothing and therefore cannot control its components. There is no guarantee that by mixing operations (flight deck crew from one company, cabin crew from another, maintenance elsewhere, etc.), that acceptable safety standards will be achieved. It becomes difficult to "Police" standards and without a common aim, without airline safety expertise managing the company, or a top down safety culture, we are likely to see an erosion of standards. The Valuejet experience in the US of a virtual airline is an example where we have seen safety oversight fail with tragic consequences.

5. What particular problems are posed by "flags of convenience"? What steps can be taken by UK Authorities to counter the problem?

  This is an area where we would like to see SRG take on a very much more robust role. Aircraft wet leased into the UK on behalf of a UK operator, are supposed to meet UK equivalent standards. Reports indicate that the Air Atlanta operations do not. The aircraft are based permanently in the UK, do not visit Iceland and we have not received any assurance that the Icelandic Authorities send representatives to the UK to provide the required Regulatory Safety Oversight. We are also advised that some of the Air Atlanta non-EC crews reside permanently in the Crawley area. When questioned by UK Authorities, they avoid the work permit issue by saying "they're in transit".

  The purpose of allowing UK airlines the facility to "wet" lease overseas registered aircraft is "designed to allow UK Airlines the flexibility to respond to short term and temporary fluctuations in traffic". One UK charter operator, wet leased two wide bodied aircraft through last summer, then had the permission extended to retain the aircraft through the winter season, and if, as we expect, permission is given for the aircraft to remain in the UK for the coming Summer, this will have been an unbroken period of 18 months.

6. Are you satisfied that pilots with low cost airlines in particular will gather sufficient experience through the use of simulators to make up for the loss of more experienced pilots to retirement?

  Low cost airlines are not necessarily the poorly resourced airlines. Most pay well, attract experienced pilots from the poorly resourced airlines and have very thorough training standards. The poorly resouced airlines, these are often the regional carriers, where the overriding imperative is cost reduction, cut training details to the minimum, often sending their crews to the larger companies to receive the required 20 sectors training, after which they are are leased to line flying. We know that some crew members struggle to achieve the standard required within 20 sectors whereas those employed with a better re-sourced company, would see the training sectors extended as necessary to ensure they had achieved the required standard.

7. What is the rate of turnover of pilots at regional and low cost airlines compared with the major carriers such as BA and BMA? Is there anything in this trend that concerns you?

  The turnover in most of the Regional Airlines tends to be high. This is the poorer end of the market where remuneration is lower. Low cost airlines on the other hand, sell a cheaper no-frills product, but are doing well financially. They remunerate their crews well and have a relatively low pilot force turnover rate. The concern is with Regional Airlines, where the experienced pilots are moving to better paid jobs. This is leaving Regional Airlines with low experienced crews.

  To get round the low experience problem, we are seeing experienced pilots, often representing lower cost labour, being brought in from outside the EU. We have recently been notified that Caledonian are negotiating to bring in US crews to operate UK registered aircraft out of the UK for this Summer. These crews are to be admitted to the UK without work permits, under the S.8. Immigration Act 1971.

8. What percentage of air accidents are caused by errors by the air crew, and what actions should be taken to address the problems of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) Accidents? How much would such steps costs?

  Seventy to eighty per cent of accidents are probably attributable to Human Factors, where the aircrew failed to prevent the accident. CFIT is a result of aircrew being unsure of their position, but it is debatable why they end up in this situation, often as a result of other failures, either hardware or human factors that lead them down this route. EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems) and improved training standards will help as well as introducing decent landing aids in places where CFIT accidents tend to occur, i.e., get rid of poor procedures, such as Puerta Plata in Columbia, non-precision approach procedures should depict a constant rate of descent, ideally 3 degrees, from the Minimum Safety Altitude (MSA).

9. What concerns do you have about the SRG's response to the TWA 800 accident?

  We were not aware that the accident investigation into this crash had reached a stage where SRG had been invited to respond. However, there are initial recommendations to the Manufacturer which have revolved around the fuel centre tank on the aircraft. These recommendations have resulted in airworthiness directives (AD's) being produced to eliminate the use of the electric fuel pumps in the B747 and B767 centre tanks once the fuel load reaches 500kgs. What we are finding, particularly in the B767, is that the practicality of achieving this requirement is very difficult. It needs to be handled at a time of particularly high workload. SRG have not provided guidance as to how to alert crews to switch off the pumps at the required time, and they are not monitoring that there is compliance with this AD.

10. What can be done to ensure that English remains the language of the air, and what are the safety implications if this is not enforced?

  If only—there remains a strong argument that, for example, a French Controller talking to a French Pilot will handle the situation more efficiently and effectively in French than if they both take on a foreign language (i.e., English). However the use of more than one language does not benefit the overall situational awareness of all the other aircraft operating that same area of airspace. It would help if the current regulations were enforced, but they are not, particularly in Italy and Greece. The answer will probably rest with the introduction of CDTI's (Cockpit Display of Traffic Information), which will then ensure that pilots are fully situationally aware.

Note: Please find enclosed the draft transcript of the Minutes taken on the 24 March, which we are returning with our suggested corrections highlighted.

Captain David Marshall

Chairman

8 April 1999