With regard to the adequacy of the current UK safety oversight mechanism for the UK as vested with the Civil Aviation Authority:

  We would like to raise concerns over the safety oversight exercised by the CAA in the safety regulation of Aviation, and in particular, the Safety Regulation Group's "oversight" of National Air Traffic Services (NATS).

  Of primary concern, is the lack of detailed analysis of the safety of the UK Air Traffic System. The CAA seems more concerned to "keep the lid on" events, rather than critically analyse the actual levels of safety achieved in the UK and the potential risk for a major accident. W are not convinced that the CAA and in particular, the Safety Regulation Group (SRG) of the CAA has any clear understanding or measure of the safety of UK Airspace. We are not even convinced that the CAA has the means or the competence to carry out such an analysis.

  NATS failure to bring the NEW En-Route Centre (NERC) on-line, despite the enormous cost, doe snot give confidence in that organisation either. As an aside, we also believe that in the privatisation of NATS, it Airports business should be utterly separated from its En-route (monopoly) business. The manipulation of either business for the benefit of the other could have significant safety, as well as obvious economic, implications.

  Other, specific issues include:

1. ADOPTION OF EUROPEAN RULES

  The status of JAA rules in the UK seems unclear. If JAA rules are adopted under European legislation (i.e., 3922/91/EEC) which apply directly, then it is reasonable to expect significant parts of the Air Navigation Order (ANO) to be deleted. This has not been the case. The CAA seems to have opposed the legal adoption of these JAA rules under European legislation in the UK without adequate justification—despite its participation in the JAA drafting committees. This gives the impression of the CAA "having its cake and eating it". Of particular concern, are the rules concerning Airline operations (JAR Ops) where it appears unclear whether current Air Operators Certificates (AOCs) have been granted under JAA rules or whether blanket exemptions have been given from UK legislation (So called "BCARS").

  The status of European legislation should be reviewed and the ANO drastically rationalised. The continuing presence of many clauses of the ANO which include terms such as: ". . . to the satisfaction of the CAA", is unacceptable. It should be clearly stated what the rules are and proper justification (in terms of safety) should exist for each rule.

2. CAPS

  The CAA appears to prefer the continuous development of rules in numerous "Civil Aviation Publications" (CAPs), this process should be examined to remove all question of the arbitrary extension of existing rules. It is nothing less than "Back Door" Regulation and as such is unacceptable. New rules should be subject to parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny.

3. SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF NATS

  Currently, both NATS and SRG reside within the umbrella of the CAA. The management of both organisations have common origins. This incestuous relationship does nothing to improve safety or to convince industry that safety regulation is even handed or uniformly applied. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the current Director of SRG (Mr R Profit), who previously held the post of Director of Safety, NATS.

  Perhaps even more alarmingly, his former post in NATS was combined with the NATS Director of Operations—a situation unacceptable for airline operations under UK and JAA rules and wholly against established safety management practices.

—  Safety Regulation should be fully independent of NATS.

—  New blood is required.

  The presence of NATS Senior Management on other bodies, e.g., Chief Executive NATS on the Board of Highlands and Islands Airports Ltd, (HIAL), should be examined to ensure no undue influence or compromise exists.

SAFETY MANAGEMENT

  There is no evidence that SRG regulates NATS senior management in a way comparable with JAA rules for airline operations. This is remarkable given the safety significance of Air Traffic Services. Regulation should be uniformly applied throughout the management structure. Evidence of safety management auditing should be published.

5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SRG AND NATS STAFF

  Equally, many of the staff (at all levels) involved in day to day safety regulation of Air Traffic Services are drawn from NATS and periodically return to that organisation (effectively as an "internal transfer"). All SRG senior management involved in ATS regulation are drawn from NATS. This suggests that impartial regulation may at the very least be compromised—bearing in mind the potential "career limiting" nature of some regulatory duties and actions. NATS personnel even frequently share lunch facilities at SRG (confidentiality?). The tendency to draw SRG staff from NATS does little to convince industry that safety regulation is independent, impartial or evenly applied.

6. "SAFETY CASES"

  The "Safety Case" approach to NATS is a cosmetic exercise with little critical examination of NATS day to day operations. No criteria have been established to examine the adequacy of these Safety Cases, most of which are not developed in depth or even examined by SRG. This approach leaves NATS unfettered from regulation in a way not enjoyed by the rest of the industry. No insight from the safety of NATS operations is available from this process and no published requirements for action have been made of NATS. This begs many questions:

—  Is this oversight mechanism adequate?

—  Do safety issues get "swept under the carpet", "hushed up" or "agreed"?

—  Is SRG doing its job properly and how do we know?

  Either way, there is no evidence to indicate whether NATS is "doing well" or otherwise.

—  The "Safety Case" processes for regulating NATS should be independently reviewed (preferably not by organisation who have major contracts with NATS, e.g., DERA).

7. ATS INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

  It is unacceptable that investigations of Air Traffic Services incidents be carried out by the same organisation responsible for approving those services. Currently, these investigations are carries out by a unit which reports directly to the Head of Air Traffic Services Department (ATSSD) and Aerodrome Standards (ASD) of SRG. This could appear to be a mechanism more for briefing the Head of ATSSD and ASD on incidents that might make the National press—rather than for improving safety. This function (not all its personnel) should be transferred to the AAIB—under new management—in order to break the link. Currently, this unit is composed mostly of ATC personnel and may even serve the licensing function of ATSSD. It is unclear what recommendations this unit has ever made for improving safety in UK Airspace. Its findings and the corresponding actions of the CAA should be published (e.g., as in the Australian model—BASI).

8. ATC LICENSING

  SRG/ATSSD's regulatory oversight of Air Traffic Services seems to concentrate on ATC licensing, with disproportionate resources for what is essentially an administrative function. This function should be simplified and transferred to a licensing unit. The ATC licensing function also seems dedicated to supporting the status of the ATC profession. Many past and present members of ATSSD perform functions in trade organisations e.g., IFATCA. These links are inappropriate and should be severed. The role of the ATC licensing function should be examined. It is a very expensive function to operate (considering the small number of operational licenses) and does not appear to contribute to safety in any clearly defined way.

  It has also created an artificial hierarchy within the ATC profession that boosts costs and leads to restrictive practices that do little to serve safety. Large and small ATC units are treated equally, often requiring high staffing levels irrespective of actual traffic loads. This seems to flatly contradict the Safety Case approach adopted elsewhere. Despite the apparently rigid nature of these rules, many exemptions and dispensations have been given, making it difficult to understand why such a rigid set of rules was ever developed. SRG may perceive this as evidence of a flexible approach, but the result is that regulation appears arbitrary and open to accusations of favour.

—  ATC licensing should be simplified and resources diverted to address safety.

9. RADIO SPECTRUM ISSUES

  Currently, NATS maintains a grip on the UK spectrum in a manner which appears to give it an unfair advantage in the assignment of frequencies and unusually rapid radio site clearances. This is not merely a serious economic issue, but one that also implies that NATS is able to "bend the rules" for its own benefit. There should be a level playing field to ensure both safety and fair access to the spectrum.

  This function should be examined.

10. AIRSPACE POLICY

  Airspace is an economic resource with considerable safety implications. All ties with NATS should be broken and the role and function of this section of the CAA publicly reviewed. No previous link has existed between Airspace Policy, Economic Regulation and Safety Regulation. There seems little justification for keeping these Divisions in a single organisation.

11. INTERNATIONAL REPRESENATAION

  Currently, NATS representatives predominate on the UK representation to ICAO and numerous other committees. Thus, UK policy is effectively developed by NATS without any input from wider input from wider industry interests. This makes it possible for NATS to serve its vested commercial interests, e.g., favouring particular technical solutions, (that, in turn, favour its services) rather than working in the interests of UK Aviation safety.

  The results of the work of these committees is not freely available and is often treated by NATS as "confidential".

  This should be examined and such information should be made freely available.

K E O'Neil

Director, Advanced Aviation Technology Ltd.

February 1999