98. Our principal conclusions and recommendations are:

(a)  We recommend that the record of the Safety Regulation Group be closely overseen by the Government in the short term. In the longer term, we believe that the Safety Regulation Group should be incorporated within an independent Transport Safety Authority, once one is established in line with previous recommendations we have made (paragraph 11).

(b)  We note the particular difficulties posed by overseeing the safety cases of airlines which have contracted out functions, and by the emergence of 'virtual airlines'. We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group ensures that its oversight of such airlines is of the same high standard as the rest of its work (paragraph 12).

(c)  We believe that it is essential that the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions should take a close interest in the response of the Safety Regulation Group to recommendations made by the AAIB. We recommend that it ensures that the CAA should be made publicly accountable for its actions following reports by the AAIB (paragraph 14).

(d)  We recommend that, if the Safety Regulation Group continues to experience staff shortages, the Government should relax the pay constraints it imposes on the CAA. We believe that the rates of pay of those involved in safety regulation should reflect its fundamental importance (paragraph 16).

(e)  We recommend that the Government should review the level of staffing of the AAIB and, if investigations are currently delayed because of a shortage of inspectors, it should provide adequate resources to ensure that such shortfalls are made up (paragraph 17).

(f)  We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group re-examines its regulation of the helicopter industries, and we specifically recommend that those who inspect helicopter operating and maintenance companies have adequate specific experience of helicopters (paragraph 18).

(g)  We recommend that the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions seek to reassure the General Aviation community that the changes proposed to the status of NATS will have no effect on its activities (paragraph 20).

(h)  We are extremely disappointed, and very concerned, by the reports of increased numbers of overloads of air traffic controllers at LATCC. We believe that they are evidence of the risk to safety posed by continued delays of NERC at Swanwick. Once again, we strongly recommend that whatever steps are necessary be taken to ensure that NERC is opened as soon as possible: in the interim, we recommend that all available measures, including limiting the number of flights entering the airspace sectors concerned, be taken to eliminate overloads at LATCC (paragraph 23).

(i)  We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group should in due course be transferred to a new independent Transport Safety Authority. The remaining functions of the CAA should either continue to be the responsibility of the Authority, or absorbed within another, existing, body or Government department (paragraph 26).

(j)  We do not at this stage recommend any alteration to the means by which the Safety Regulation Group is funded. That said, when our recommendation that the Group should be transferred to an independent Transport Safety Authority is implemented the whole question of funding should be revisited (paragraph 28).

(k)  We view both the existing Joint Aviation Authorities and the proposed European Aviation Safety Authority with some concern. The United Kingdom's aviation industry has a proud safety record and very high standards of regulation: both have at least the potential to be undermined by membership of these organisations. Accordingly we recommend that the Government should clarify whether the European Aviation Safety Authority would have legal power to impose the standards it proposes, and the Government should seek an undertaking before joining the Authority that the safety standards of the United Kingdom will not be adversely affected (paragraph 35).

(l)  We recommend that the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions reviews its policy towards ramp checks of foreign-registered aircraft, with a view to carrying out a greater number, some on a random basis. We further recommend that airlines which do not meet good standards of airworthiness be dealt with rigorously, by preventing them operating into this country (paragraph 37).

(m)  We recommend that the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions and the Civil Aviation Authority should re-examine whether aircraft in difficulty, and particularly twin-engined aircraft with one engine inoperative, should land at Heathrow if to do so requires them to approach the airport over central London (paragraph 38).

(n)  We commend British airlines for the steps they have taken to address the anticipated increase in the number of pilots who have reached or will shortly reach retirement age. Nevertheless, we regard the situation with some concern since we believe that it is potentially a safety critical matter. Therefore, we recommend that the Safety Regulation Group should conduct regular reviews of the training and recruitment regimes put in place by the airlines to deal with the problem, and should publish the results of the reviews in its Annual Report (paragraph 46).

(o)  We are concerned that the projected shortage of pilots will adversely affect safety standards by leading airlines to seek to employ pilots from states whose standards are not equivalent to those of the United Kingdom. The Government and the Safety Regulation Group should ensure that the safety standards of British airlines are not compromised by their employment of pilots who have qualified abroad, regardless of our membership of the JAA, and in future the European Aviation Safety Authority (paragraph 47).

(p)  We recommend that the Government should take steps to ensure that access to training and practice for General Aviation pilots is not unduly limited, either by cost or by planning constraints. We believe that all pilots should be given incentives to undergo training and, accordingly, recommend that VAT should not be charged for appropriate training courses. We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group should re-examine the regulatory burden it places on General Aviation pilots and others, to ensure that the cost of meeting regulations does not inhibit pilots from keeping in current practice (paragraph 54).

(q)  We are extremely concerned about the shortage of aircraft maintenance engineers, both in the commercial and the General Aviation sectors. We recommend that in its consideration of the matter the Government's inter-departmental group should consider the situation in both sectors, and should urgently take steps to address the problem. In particular, as we have already said in relation to pilots, we believe that incentives should be given to encourage training and, accordingly, recommend that VAT should not be charged for appropriate training courses. Nevertheless, primary responsibility for overcoming this problem—particularly in the commercial sector—rests with the aviation industry, and we strongly recommend that it follows the proposals made in the Royal Aeronautical Society's report into aircraft maintenance engineers. Since it is a source of engineers for the future, the commercial industry should take some responsibility for the General Aviation sector, and should offer appropriate assistance to bolster aircraft maintenance engineering in the General Aviation sector (paragraph 60).

(r)  We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group, in its regular audits of airlines' safety strategies, actively addresses the possibility that commercial pressures have been brought to bear on pilots and others at the expense of safety, particularly in relation to slot times. If it finds any evidence that such incidents have occurred, it should impose rigorous sanctions on the companies concerned (paragraph 64).

(s)  We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group re-iterates its advice to airlines that the priority in certain emergencies, such as in-flight fires, is to land, rather than to seek to dump fuel in order to avoid an overweight landing. It should ensure through its inspections that airlines are passing on that information to aircrews. Furthermore, we recommend that air traffic controllers be given similar advice, so that they are able to respond appropriately to such emergencies (paragraph 69).

(t)  We recommend that any further recommendations that arise from investigations into the accidents involving Boeing 737s are rapidly implemented by British airlines. We further recommend that the Safety Regulation Group should closely monitor the situation, to ensure that all necessary steps to deal with the problem with the aircraft's rudder are taken (paragraph 75).

(u)  We recognise that this is a delicate matter. We do not suggest that the rights of injured passengers, or the relatives of those who have died, to seek compensation should be overly curtailed: nor do we wish to create a situation where disreputable or negligent manufacturers or airlines get away scot-free. Nevertheless, we believe that an appropriate balance can be struck. We recommend that the Government should open a dialogue with interested parties, both within the industry and outside, to consider limiting to a sensible level the liability of manufacturers and operators in the event of aviation accidents. It should explore such matters within relevant international fora, with the objective of limiting liability worldwide. We believe that such a step may help to encourage greater openness about safety matters in the aftermath of accidents (paragraph 79).

(v)  We are extremely concerned about the delay in implementing the Transport Committee's recommendation to increase the width of the aisle through the forward bulkhead of the Boeing 737 in particular, following the accident at Manchester airport. We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group take steps to expedite the matter, and reports to us what steps it intends to take (paragraph 82).

(w)  We recommend that further research be conducted by the Safety Regulation Group into the benefits and dangers of rearward-facing seats, and by the Civil Aviation Authority generally into passengers' views of them, particularly passengers fully informed of the benefits they might bring in the event of an accident. The results of that research should form the basis of the Safety Regulation Group's approach, through the JAA, to the issue (paragraph 84).

(x)  We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group should again conduct research into smokehoods, and the benefit which they might bring to evacuations of aircraft during fires. They should publish the results of their research within a limited timescale, and, unless there are compelling safety reasons why they should not be carried, the Safety Regulation Group should seek to make the provision of smokehoods on commercial aircraft a mandatory requirement (paragraph 86).

(y)  We recommend that before further steps are taken to address the problem of disruptive passenger behaviour or air rage, the Safety Regulation Group, together with the British airlines, should urgently commission research to investigate its cause (paragraph 90).

(z)  We are convinced that if English is not firmly established as 'the language of the air' then safety will be put at risk. We therefore recommend that the Safety Regulation Group, through the JAA, seek to ensure that English becomes mandatory for all communication between aircraft and air traffic control (paragraph 92).

(aa)  We are concerned about the activities of military aircraft in uncontrolled airspace, and we recommend that the Ministry of Defence install collision warning systems in aircraft involved in high-speed, low-altitude flights (paragraph 93).

(bb)  All involved in aviation should remember that openness and criticism aid safety, and that the maintenance of safety standards is the most important factor in building a successful aviation industry. We recommend that the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions maintain a careful eye on the relationship between the Safety Regulation Group and the industry it regulates, and act firmly to ensure that the Regulation Group remains independent and critical of the industry. As we have said, splitting the Safety Regulation Group from the Economic Regulation Group, through the creation of an independent Transport Safety Authority, would help to ensure that the safety regulator maintained an appropriate distance from the industry (paragraph 96).

(cc)  Safety cannot be addressed in a vacuum. Some of the difficulties we have discussed in this Report, such as the shortage of pilots and aircraft maintenance engineers, are not simple matters which can be resolved by the Safety Regulation Group alone. Above all, the dramatic growth of the aviation industry in recent years, partly as a result of deregulation, has resulted in greater overcrowding in the airspace of the southeast of England, and at the airports in that area. There are strong arguments on safety grounds in favour of increasing runway capacity. Such matters can only be dealt with in the context of an overall aviation policy, and we look forward to the publication of the Government's aviation daughter document (paragraph 97).