Aircraft Cabin Safety

80. In 1991, the Transport Committee produced a report on Aircraft Cabin Safety.[208] It was stimulated to do so by the Manchester plane crash of 1985, and the Kegworth crash of 1989.[209] The Committee took evidence about improvements that might be made to the structure of, and equipment carried by, aircraft to help passengers to survive in the event of an accident. It was told that aircraft cabin improvements would not save 64 per cent of fatalities caused by aircraft accidents, in 22 per cent of cases they would make little difference, and in 14 per cent of fatalities, cabin improvements may improve survival rates.[210] Its recommendations focussed on the measures that might be taken to improve the chances of survival of the 36 per cent of all fatalities where such steps might have made a difference.

81. After the Manchester accident, considerable concern was expressed about the difficulty those inside the aircraft had experienced in trying to evacuate. The Transport Committee made a number of recommendations in 1991 relating to the spacing of seats generally, and particularly around emergency exits, as well as the design of the hatches of overwing exits. These were not matters we re-examined during this inquiry. One subject which also arose was the width of the gap through the forward bulkhead. As the Transport Committee put it in 1991, "no-one who heard it could fail to be impressed by the graphic account of the evacuation from the Manchester B737 ... Survivors reported that the 22-and-a-half inch wide aisle through the forward bulkhead jammed 'until the stewardess pulled the passengers free, but evacuation was slow as only one person could pass at a time, despite two main exits lying beyond'".[211] Another problem with the narrow gap was that the cabin crew, sitting beyond the bulkhead, did not have a clear view of the passenger cabin, and at Manchester could not see the smoke of the fire which entered the cabin from the rear.[212] It was therefore proposed by several interested parties that the width of the aisle through the bulkhead should be increased, and the Transport Committee recommended that "regulations governing the position of bulkheads, galleys etc and the passageways between them should be amended and action taken to ensure that cabin staff have a clear view of as much as is possible of the cabin for which they are responsible".[213]

82. The Civil Aviation Authority accepted that there was a serious problem with the bulkhead aisle. It sponsored competitive evacuation tests at Cranfield College of Aeronautics, and, as a result, agreed that the minimum gap in the bulkhead should be increased to 30 inches, from the existing minimum of 20 inches, although other witnesses in 1991 sought an increase to 36 inches.[214] However, rather than introduce the change unilaterally, the Civil Aviation Authority sought international approval, through the JAA.[215] As Mr Taylor, from Cranfield College of Aeronautics, told us, "the CAA took this to the JAA with a notice of rule-making change back in 1989 and we are still waiting. Here is something where the CAA wanted to do something but so far they have not, and nothing is happening in the United States either".[216] Certainly our witnesses from Boeing seemed uncertain about the precise regulation governing the size of the bulkhead aisle.[217] We have commented already about delays associated with the JAA; this situation provides evidence of the problem. We are extremely concerned about the delay in implementing the Transport Committee's recommendation to increase the width of the aisle through the forward bulkhead of the Boeing 737 in particular, following the accident at Manchester airport. We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group take steps to expedite the matter, and reports to us what steps it intends to take.

83. Another matter considered in 1991 was the provision of rearward-facing seats. It was pointed out that military aircraft had rearward-facing seats in order to reduce injuries in the event of a crash,[218] and evidence from the Kegworth accident showed that the cabin crew, who were sitting in rearward-facing seats, had suffered lesser injuries than the passengers, who were not.[219] There are, however, safety-related concerns about rearward-facing seats: they would have to be higher-backed, and stronger, in order to resist the whiplash effect of the passenger on impact, and, because passengers would be more exposed, there was a risk that they might be struck by objects thrown around the cabin on impact—"if a passenger is facing rearwards and the aircraft crashes there is a risk of projectiles coming down the cabin and seriously injuring the person".[220] Both of these problems are of course surmountable: seats can be constructed to meet the demands of being rearward-facing, and objects could and should be prevented from being thrown around the cabin by better construction of internal fittings, and particularly the overhead luggage lockers.

84. It is, therefore, clear that the main reason why rearward-facing seats have not been adopted is the airlines', and the Regulator's, belief that passengers would not be in favour. British Airways told us that "we operated a fleet of aircraft in the past with rearward-facing seats [but] they were found to be unpopular with passengers",[221] British Midland said that "there certainly would not be a commercial advantage" in introducing them,[222] and the Safety Regulation Group told us that "with modern high performance aircraft ... there is a passenger comfort issue because the aircraft is taking off steeply, and people tip forward".[223] This assessment may be correct, but we received no evidence that passengers had been consulted about the matter. Furthermore, the Safety Regulation Group's concern for passengers' comfort should not deflect it from its primary purpose, to make air travel safer. We recommend that further research be conducted by the Safety Regulation Group into the benefits and dangers of rearward-facing seats, and by the Civil Aviation Authority generally into passengers' views of them, particularly passengers fully informed of the benefits they might bring in the event of an accident. The results of that research should form the basis of the Safety Regulation Group's approach, through the JAA, to the issue.

85. Most of the fatalities during the Manchester disaster were the result of inhaling lethal quantities of carbon monoxide or hydrogen cyanide. Moreover, the evacuation of the aircraft was severely impeded by passengers collapsing unconscious from the effects of smoke.[224] As a result the Air Accident Investigation Branch recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority should develop a specification for a smokehood that could be worn by passengers to protect them from smoke and fumes, and thus give them longer to evacuate an aircraft, and to conduct research into the use of smokehoods. The Authority's specification was rigorous, requiring that the smokehood should provide protection against a variety of toxic and suffocating environments, be suitable for use during both a ground fire and an in-flight fire, when it would have to be used for longer periods, be easy to put on, not hamper vision, and allow the wearer to hear instructions.[225] As a result, it has been very difficult to manufacture a product to meet these requirements.

86. The Civil Aviation Authority is particularly concerned about the difficulty of donning a smokehood, the time it would take, and the time taken to evacuate the aircraft afterwards.[226] Quite apart from the delay in finding and then putting on the smokehood, it is possible that the hood would give a false sense of security, leading to passengers evacuating more slowly. Conversely, as the Transport Committee said in 1991, "it is no use passengers being able to evacuate an aircraft in 60 seconds if, in toxic smoke and without a smokehood, they collapse unconscious in half that time".[227] We recognise that there are sensible arguments that can be advanced against the provision of smokehoods, and we note the observation made by British Airways, that "the industry belief is that they would be more hazardous than helpful".[228] Virgin Atlantic said that "the Civil Aviation Authority and the Federal Aviation Administration have written reports on the use of smokehoods and they said basically that they would cause more problems in evacuation if people were installing smokehoods".[229] Nevertheless, we thought it very telling that several of our witnesses, including the Chief Inspector of Air Accidents, told us that they carried smokehoods whenever they travelled.[230] We recommend that the Safety Regulation Group should again conduct research into smokehoods, and the benefit which they might bring to evacuations of aircraft during fires. They should publish the results of their research within a limited timescale, and, unless there are compelling safety reasons why they should not be carried, the Safety Regulation Group should seek to make the provision of smokehoods on commercial aircraft a mandatory requirement.

Air rage

87. Reports of incidents of disruptive passenger behaviour, or air rage, have become a regular feature in the media over recent months. A great deal of the evidence we received, particularly from the airline industry, addressed the issue. As the Safety Regulation Group told us,[231] most air rage incidents do not directly endanger the aircraft as a whole: "the numbers [of incidents] where there is actually a safety concern, as opposed to the very unpleasant circumstances which people, the crew and other passengers, have to tolerate, are very low indeed".[232] Nevertheless, such incidents put individual passengers and members of the crew at risk of injury, and some more serious incidents threaten the aircraft as a whole.[233] We therefore considered the matter in some detail.

88. Media reports give the impression that air rage is an extremely common problem. It is not, although the evidence we received was less than precise, since the definition of an air rage incident is not well established. The Safety Regulation Group told us that "we get fewer than 100 reports a year where someone is concerned enough to write a report under the United Kingdom's occurrence reporting scheme".[234] Britannia Airways told us that it had 850 incidents on board its aircraft during 1998, and it had carried 10 million passengers on 40,539 flights.[235] By contrast, British Midland recorded only 59 incidents between May and December 1998, and "the majority of incidents did not require any action to be taken", since 17 per cent of potential incidents were defused by the cabin crew, and 10 per cent were dealt with by denying boarding to, or offloading, the offending passengers.[236] British Airways reported 266 incidents during 1997-98, whilst it flew 41 million passengers over the same period.

89. The cause of the problem is also unclear. A number of possibilities have been suggested, including alcohol, smoking, the amount of space given to each passenger, and the quality of cabin air. One of our witnesses even suggested that with the advent of very low fares the social and economic profile of air passengers might be changing in a way that made air rage incidents more likely.[237] Another suggestion was that the expectations of consumers, and their reactions when those expectations are not met, may have changed across all industries, including aviation.[238] Most debate, however, centred around alcohol, and the general ban on smoking which now exists on most airlines. British Midland told us that "the majority of disruptive behaviour is due to the influence of alcohol",[239] whilst easyJet said that "it is more often a smoking-related problem than a drink-related one".[240] British Airways told us that "there clearly is a connection" between alcohol and air rage.[241]

90. It is possible only to reach two conclusions about disruptive passenger behaviour. First, no-one is certain how frequently it occurs, although we note the Safety Regulation Group's attempts to gather information which are currently under way.[242] Second, no-one knows the precise cause. It is likely that the cause differs in each case. We simply make the observation that if a passenger is allowed to get drunk whilst sitting in cramped conditions for several hours and then is told that he cannot smoke it is understandable, although not excusable, that his behaviour may become disruptive. Whilst the cause of the problem is not understood it is not sensible to attempt to address it, as some have proposed, with nicotine patches, or by breathalysing passengers before they board aircraft.[243] This view was shared by the Safety Regulation Group, which said that air rage "arises from a variety of different behaviour, drink related, smoking ban, people suffering from various nervous dispositions. Some more research needs to be done on this".[244] We recommend that before further steps are taken to address the problem of disruptive passenger behaviour or air rage, the Safety Regulation Group, together with the British airlines, should urgently commission research to investigate its cause.

English as the language of the air

91. English is currently regarded as the standard language of the international aviation industry. There has been a suggestion that its use is diminishing, particularly in eastern European countries, and in the Far East, where it may not be spoken well.[245] This presents an obvious difficulty, that a pilot may not be able to communicate with air traffic control because one or other of them cannot speak English. Mr Taylor, of Cranfield College of Aeronautics, suggested that if English was not used as a standard language then it meant that other pilots would not gain useful information by the good practice of monitoring what other pilots are saying, for example about their movements or the weather. He told us that he could not "give examples but I have a feeling that some accidents have been avoided because other crews have been able to listen in and have been aware of what is happening to another aircraft somewhere else".[246] Furthermore, most operational manuals are written in English.

92. The Safety Regulation Group told us that at the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Assembly in September 1998, India had presented a report on the proficiency of flight crews in the English language.[247] This arose because of the investigation of a collision between two airliners in November 1996, which found that failures in communicating in the English language had contributed to the accident.[248] Although the Assembly supported the report without dissension, it has not yet become ICAO's policy to insist that English is the only language used in the aviation industry. The Safety Regulation Group told us that "any attempt by the UK or the USA to put pressure on ICAO to make sure that English is made mandatory for air-ground communications will be met with fierce resistance. It would have a much greater chance of success if 'Europe' could agree to sponsor such a move".[249] We are convinced that if English is not firmly established as 'the language of the air' then safety will be put at risk. We therefore recommend that the Safety Regulation Group, through the JAA, seek to ensure that English becomes mandatory for all communication between aircraft and air traffic control.

Military aircraft

93. A particular concern of the General Aviation community are the activities of military jets when they fly at high speed in uncontrolled airspace. In January 1999, there was a collision between a Tornado and a Cessna over the Midlands in which four were killed.[250] The British Helicopter Advisory Board said that "there have been notable mid-air collisions resulting in the death of the helicopter crew as well as some which, fortunately, were survived".[251] The principle of flight in uncontrolled airspace is 'see and avoid'. This is obviously difficult when the military aircraft is flying at high speed, and the Safety Regulation Group told us that "the Ministry of Defence is considering the use of collision warning systems in military aircraft which would help to prevent this kind of accident. They have not yet made any decisions about whether to fit these devices into their planes".[252] We are concerned about the activities of military aircraft in uncontrolled airspace, and we recommend that the Ministry of Defence install collision warning systems in aircraft involved in high-speed, low-altitude flights.