44. There are a number of lessons to be drawn from the failure of the Horizon programme, and it also provides plentiful indications of pitfalls that must be avoided in the future. We have set these out above. It has to be said, however, that the story of European collaborative ventures is not a particularly inspiring one so far as learning the lessons of history is concerned. The new emphasis on the development of a European defence capability makes the need to learn and apply these lessons all the more urgent. While the government continues to encourage consolidation of the European defence industry, to cut costs and delays in acquiring military equipment,[128] the MoD's freedom of action is still greatly circumscribed by the impediments of the current structure of the industry and governments' protection of their 'national' firms. We will be watching closely for concrete results in improving European collaboration—which must come at least as much from the efforts of our European Allies to make compromises as from the MoD. If greater European defence capability is to become a reality, it is a vital and urgent necessity that the measures which could help make it possible are put in place, including harmonised procurement and project management procedures (such as those hoped for from OCCAR) along with a genuinely trans-national industrial base.

45. In future years, we hope to examine a wider selection from our portfolio of 'tracker' procurement projects in order to draw lessons from them. The Type-45 destroyer will however, at least for the next few years, remain a close focus of our attention. This country cannot afford to let the Royal Navy's capabilities be compromised by further delays.