Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of
Defence responding to the Committee's question on Royal Ordnance
Bisopton (31 March 1999)
1. PROGRAMMES DEPENDENT
ON BISOPTONCOMPARISON
OF LISTS
1.1 The Committee asked for clarification of
why the lists of projects dependent on Bishopton provided by the
Trade Unions and by British Aerospace were different to the list
provided by the MoD. The committee asked for details of all current
contracts with Royal Ordnance. The tables provided at Annexes
A and B to the MoD Memorandum of 15 February, therefore, showed
the MoD prime contracts that are currently in place with Royal
Ordnance, together with details, where these are known, of significant
current sub-contracts which have been placed with the company
by other prime contractors. This information was checked against
data provided by Royal Ordnance.
1.2 The information provided by the Unions and
by British Aerospace is consistent with that included in the Ministry
of Defence memorandum. There are differences in presentation,
and the Union and British Aerospace tables list separately several
elements which are included in the MoD list under a single contract
entry. The Union and British Aerospace tables also include some
programmes where the Ministry of Defence no longer has a requirement
and, accordingly, where no contract is currently in place, and
some potential requirements which are still at the planning stage
and where the Ministry of Defence has, therefore, taken no decision
whether to procure such equipment.
1.3 The table attached at Annex A shows, for
each of the programmes identified by the Unions and British Aerospace,
whether or not the programme is included in the memorandum and,
if not, provides an explanation as to why it has been excluded.
It also indicates where Royal Ordnance Bishopton is involved with
these contracts.
2. WEAPON SYSTEMS
AND AMMUNITION
CURRENTLY IN
USE OR
IN PROSPECT
THAT WOULD
ORDINARILY BE
PRODUCED AT
BISHOPTON
2.1 Royal Ordinance Bishopton manufactures multi
base propellant, which is used in the production of ammunition
charges, rocket motors, and aircraft assisted escape systems,
such as ejector seat cartridges. Bishopton has, historically,
been significantly involved in the manufacture of a range of artillery
and tank ammunition charges. However, many of these products are
now no longer required because the equipment to which they relate
has been taken out of service or because the ammunition natures
themselves are now obsolescent.
2.2 Against this background, the number of future
programmes which might have involved Bishopton had it remained
open beyond 2000, is limited. Including the three programmes already
notified to the Committee, the Naval 4.5" gun ammunition,
Seawolf Block 2, and Challenger 2 training round ammunition, we
identified 23 possible future programmes which, provided Royal
Ordnance won the relevant MOD competition or were selected as
a sub-contractor by another company bidding to meet the requirement,
might have involved Bishopton as a supplier of propellant. These
include future programmes for tank, mortar, medium calibre and
small calibre ammunition, rocket motors, and aircraft assisted
escape system charges. Many of these possible programmes are at
the initial planning stage and have no funding or approval. There
is, therefore, no guarantee that these projects will reach production,
or that, with competition, any associated contracts would be awarded
to Royal Ordnance. It would not be appropriate to release details
of possible future programmes in advance of them being formally
endorsed and funded.
3. PROPELLANT TECHNOLOGY
AT DERA
3.1 During his evidence to the Committee on
RO Bishopton and related matters, Lord Gilbert offered to provide
a note on propellant technology at DERA comparing the current
level of effort with that of 10 or so years ago.
3.2 DERA manpower data is not necessarily attributable
to specific technologies. Much of the research on energetic materials
is generic in nature and can be applied to explosives, propellants
and pyrotechnics, covering both gun and rocket systems. However,
current DERA staff effort attributable to applied research is
estimated at 4.5 people working on propellants, approximately
3.0 people on gun propelling charge systems and 1.5 people on
rocket propellant. Work is concentrated on the following areas:
(i) Insensitive compositions for next generation
gun propelling charges.
(ii) Higher density charge systems and low
temperature coefficient propellants for greater overall gun performance.
Work on both these areas has been in collaboration
with Royal Ordnance.
(iii) A small level of effort on hybrid gel
and liquid propellant motors.
3.3 Corresponding DERA staff effort on longer
term propellant research consists of three people studying technology
potentially applicable to successor gun and rocket systems. Much
of this work is collaborative with industry, primarily Royal Ordnance.
3.4 Ten years ago, the corresponding figures
would have been a total of about 8-10 people on gun propelling
charge systems and about two people on solid rocket propellants.
These latter figures appear low because, as a result of a decision
some 12 year ago, most in-house effort and funding was transferred
to Royal Ordnance, who at the time formed an integral part of
the research team with the then Royal Armaments Research and Defence
Establishment, RARDE.
3.5 DERA carries out no development, as opposed
to research, work on propellants, except work under contract to
companies such as Royal Ordnance, although there is none at present.
4. REQUALIFICATION
COSTS WHICH
WOULD BE
INCURRED BY
MOD AS
A RESULT
OF THE
CLOSURE OF
RO BISHOPTON
4.1 As explained in the MoD Memorandum of 15
February, and again in Lord Gilbert's evidence to the Committee,
the calculation of the premium of £20 million for MoD to
keep Royal Ordnance Bishopton open, included a number of elements.
These were the extra costs of directing work on the Modular Charge
System, and the Challenger 2 training round, *** to Royal Ordnance,
offset by net requalification costs, *** which MoD would incur
if Bishopton closed. This calculation was based on information
from Royal Ordnance about the work required to retain 150 jobs
at Bishopton in the short term and MoD's own assessment of the
requalification costs which it would incur if Bishopton closed.
The extra cost of directing work on the Modular Charge System
contract to Bishopton was calculated by Somchem and agreed by
Royal Ordnance.
4.2 MoD estimated the *** premium for the Challenger
2 training round, based on indicative prices for this work provided
by industry in 1996. *** Without competition this would undoubtedly
be higher. The requalification costs were estimated following
careful examination of MoD's forward procurement plans using typical
costs of similar procurements.
4.3 MoD considers these calculations conservative
and is confident that they represent the minimum initial premium.
Looking further ahead is more speculative, but, if Royal Ordnance
requires further work to be directed to Bishopton to preserve
the factory for the longer term, the size of the premium to MoD
would increase.
4.4 The Committee asked for additional information
on requalification costs. Ordnance Board regulations require all
ammunition to be qualified as safe and suitable for Service use.
This encompasses qualification costs for new products and requalification
costs for existing products. The costs for new products do not
impact on the calculation of the premium, because MoD would incur
such costs regardless of whether Bishopton was involved in the
manufacture. Where an open competition is conducted, any necessary
requalification costs are subsumed into the bids. For existing
products, the prices of items currently under contract are already
set and any requalification costs would, therefore, fall to the
contractor, including where Bishopton is a sub-contractor. Furthermore,
existing products which have not been manufactured recently at
Bishopton would incur requalification costs for repeat orders,
whether they were manufactured at Bishopton or not. Therefore,
additional requalification costs as a result of Bishopton closing
only have an impact on the calculation of the premium where MoD
expects to order a product which has been previously qualified
at Bishopton and where recent production has taken place.
4.5 The only planned procurements identified
by MoD which fell into this latter category were Sea Wolf rocket
motors and the Naval 4.5" Extended Range Round. Royal Ordnance
had already announced that the rocket motor facility would close
even if Bishopton stayed open, so the *** requalification cost
associated with Sea Wolf would be incurred regardless of what
happened to Bishopton and did not, therefore, have an effect on
the net cost. The requalification cost for the 4.5" ammunition
was estimated at *** resulting in a net figure of *** which was
deducted from the cost of directing MCS and Challenger 2 training
round work to Bishopton, *** giving a net premium of ***, which
we are quoting publicly as £20 million. In keeping with the
conservative nature of these costings, MoD considers the *** estimate
to be the highest likely requalification cost, taking account
of the type of the round.
4.6 As the Committee is aware, the MoD is reviewing
ammunition stockholdings. However, as explained above, in the
great majority of cases requalification costs are either unavoidable
or do not arise for MoD, whether Bishopton remains open or not.
Therefore, increasing stockholdings would not help MoD avoid requalification
costs. A table is attached at Annex B showing existing products
where a future buy is possible, and which would require requalification
because of Bishopton closing.
5. INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT BETWEEN
MOD AND
DENEL FOR
THE ERO/MCS CONTRACT
5.1 The Industrial Participation, IP, arrangement
agreed with Denel is for 100 per cent of the value of their contract.
IP arrangements usually comprise a proportion of direct IP, work
to be carried out specifically on the MoD contract, and indirect
IP, which is formed of other defence work to be placed in the
UK. Together the direct and indirect elements amount to 100 per
cent of the value of the MoD procurement contract. The agreement
reached with Denel does not specify the proportion of direct or
indirect IP. When the final contract negotiations are complete,
further discussions will take place to establish the final composition
of the IP package. Regardless of the result of these discussions,
the total amount of IP offered will remain at 100 per cent.
5.3 In advance of the signature of the contract,
Denel has already started to place work in the UK which qualfies
as indirect IP and will count against the obligation resulting
from the agreement. In addition, there is an informal agreement
between MoD and Armscor of South Africa to abate the remainder
of the Denel IP obligation against some of the IP obligations
incurred by UK companies that have won work through the UK/RSA
Strategic Defence Equipment Partnership, thereby reducing the
amount of work that these companies would need to transfer to
South Africa.
WAR STOCKS
The Committee also posed a number of questions
on the policy and plans on War Stocks for tank and artillery ammunition.
The answers to each specific question are set out below.
6. What are tank and artillery ammunition war
stockpile requirements and what is the basis on which these figures
are calculated, differentiating between NATO requirements and
UK national requirements? What are the differences, if any, in
stockpile requirements for NATO-standard ammunitions and national
items like Challenger 2 ammunition?
6.1 The Army currently has a tank and artillery
ammunition war stockpile requirement of *** and *** rounds respectively.
These figures are derived using a level-of-effort methodology
using the assumptions set out below. These assumptions were derived
from operational analysis which calculated the amount of ammunition
expended across the battlefield; these figures were then averaged
out over the number of tank/artillery pieces on the battlefield
to give an average number of rounds expended per equipment per
day. The various types of ammunition are each used for different
purposes and holdings are balanced to ensure we have the optimum
mix. This also takes into account the relative effectiveness of
each type for its intended purpose; ***
| | |
|
| Ammunition type | Number of equipments
| Usage rate (30 days) | Requirement
|
| | |
|
| *** | *** | ***
| *** |
| *** | *** | ***
| *** |
| | |
|
| Tank total | |
| *** |
| | |
|
| *** | *** | ***
| *** |
| *** | *** | ***
| *** |
| *** | *** | ***
| *** |
| *** | *** | ***
| *** |
| | |
|
| Artillery total | |
| *** |
| | |
|
| | |
|
6.2 These assumptions are consistent with generic NATO stockpile
planning guidance. SPG, rates issued to all NATO members. As the
Army does not declare all its manpower and equipment for NATO
use, however, the NATO stockpile requirement is, in total, less
than the national requirement.
7. Has any simulation or war-gaming work been undertaken since
the Gulf War to test the robustness of UK tank and artillery ammunition
stockpile requirements, and what were the results?
7.1 Simulation and war-gaming work are currently being undertaken
both nationally and by NATO as part of our operational analysis
into tank and artillery stockpile requirements. The results of
this work are not yet available.
8. What changes to the UK tank and artillery ammunition war
stockpile requirements, if any, have been made as a result of
the Strategic Defence Review?
8.1 No changes have yet been made to UK tank and artillery
ammunition stockpile requirements as a result of the Strategic
Defence Review. Work has been set in hand, however, to review
MOD stockpile planning guidance and current holdings to ensure
that they are consistent with the outcome of the SDR. This work
is due to conclude towards the end of this year.
9. What are actual holdings of such ammunition (expressed in
terms that are comparable to the UK's war stock requirement),
giving a broad indication of the locations involved (e.g., in
the UK, in Germany, elsewhere)?
9.1 Actual holdings of tank and artillery ammunition are
rounds against current liabilities of *** and ***
9.2 The overprovision of tank ammunition is largely attributable
to the reduction in the overall size of the tank fleet since Options
for Change. Action is in hand to eliminate the shortfall in the
artillery stockpile, and this will be reviewed once new stockpile
figures are confirmed.
9.3 Most stocks are held *** with some forward holdings in
support of training, for example in Canada, and in current theatres
of operations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo.
10. What studies are underway within the MoD, or funded by
the MoD, into tank and artillery ammunition requirements for future
warfare scenarios (such as those envisaged under the Revolution
in Military Affairs), and what preliminary conclusions can be
drawn from these?
10.1 The study referred to at paragraph 8.1 above will test
ammunition requirements for future warfare scenarios through combat
modelling. Operational analysis is now underway but initial results
will not be complete until May at the earliest. These results
will need to be validated and merged with other aspects of the
work before the final conclusion of the study at the end of the
year. Early indications are that, in future, the stockpile balance
ought to shift towards holding more "smart" precision
munitions.
11. What is the MoD's view on the importance of ammunition
and propellant with low barrel wear characteristics in the sorts
of military operations, which it is envisaged are likely to occur
in the future?
11.1 Low barrel wear, helps maintain consistent weapon performance.
On operations, it can also reduce the logistic burden by obviating
the need for barrel changes in theatre. In the case of the Extended
Range Ordnance/Modular Charge System programme, the Somchem product
is assessed as delivering the required capability more cost effectively
than any of the alterative solutions.
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