126. We began this inquiry with an open mind on the implementation of the Krebs report. We have been convinced by all the evidence we have received that the severity of the increase in bovine TB in cattle should make finding a means of control a high priority for the Government. We have also been persuaded that the package drawn up by Professor Krebs and fleshed out by Professor Bourne offers the best hope of finding a scientific, effective and lasting solution. This does not mean that we advocate the slaughter of badgers in the pursuance of either science or ignorance but there are other considerations of public health, animal welfare, the livelihood of farmers and public expenditure which justify the trial. We expect and hope that the minimum number will be killed in the most humane fashion that is consistent with the generation of valid scientific results and only as authorised by the Bourne Group. To ensure this, we reiterate our recommendations concerning the establishment of proper procedures and external auditing for the trial.

127. We are not convinced that the Government has been effective in getting its message across to the general public. The levels of anxiety among badger groups and farmers need to be addressed as a matter of urgency by clear up to date information offered in an open and transparent fashion. The secrecy which characterised the BSE situation is not easily forgotten by the public. We are also concerned at the lack of urgency displayed by MAFF officials in implementing the trial and other aspects of the programme. It is essential that lines of responsibility are clearly drawn and the strategy proceeds in line with declared objectives. This applies also to the Bourne Group which has a particular responsibility in ensuring that the entire package remains high in the Ministry's priorities. The Minister himself has shown commitment. We are impressed by the number of meetings he has held on this issue and his promise to visit every triplet to hold public discussions.[383] However, it is vital that he provides sufficient resources in good time and keeps up the pressure on his officials to see the programme through.

128. Other groups and individuals also have a part to play in ensuring the development of a sustainable policy which will benefit all sides. We were deeply concerned by the Wildlife Trusts' attitude towards compliance. While we accept that as a membership organisation, they must listen to their members, we believe that they have a responsibility to show more leadership and to consider the issue in a more balanced fashion. While the NFBG raised many objections to the trial, as did their affiliate groups, they have not advocated disruption and the NFU and TFA have also made efforts to reassure their members of the long term benefits of compliance, even at the very high short term costs of sustaining herd breakdowns on their farms. We hope that the Wildlife Trusts will reconsider their decision not to comply.

129. While the veterinary workers consider themselves practitioners in this field and we appreciate they have an important role to play in implementing disease control programmes, we were concerned at their attitude towards a scientific approach and science based policy. As a highly respected profession, they must take seriously the responsibility devolved on them and accept the limitations of knowledge and the need for scientific underpinning for all procedures and policy decisions. Indeed, many of the recent problems with disease control in farm animals have been the result of an unscientific approach and without question this has resulted in the current problems we are experiencing with TB in cattle. An interesting observation is that just 10 years ago a simple controlled trial would have provided sufficient evidence for the Krebs group to suggest policy options but since this scientific approach was never taken, we now require more rigour that can only be provided through an expensive experimental design.

130. Like all those who contributed to our inquiry, we wish to see a well-defined policy on the control of bovine TB in cattle which will reduce the incidence of the disease and allow badgers and cattle to continue to share farmland as they have always done. We believe that the Krebs report, properly and speedily implemented, offers a real chance of providing the information necessary to develop a sustainable policy, based on a variety of measures to suit different situations. This trial and the accompanying research should ensure that in future it will no longer be the case that the only option open to farmers is to kill badgers, whether or not they are the true source of infection.

131. Our other principal conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

Lessons from previous policies on the control of bovine TB

(a)  To avoid the charge in future that "significant amounts of public money [have been] spent on TB control measures that were inadequately thought through and were not subject to adequate scientific scrutiny", it is essential that future policy in this area is based on sound science and conclusive evidence and commands the full commitment of all parties involved (paragraph 12).

Other wildlife species

(b)  We recommend that MAFF ensure that a thorough and well designed sampling procedure of wildlife species other than the badger be put in place in the badger removal areas to determine if M. bovis can persist in other species when badgers are removed. This sampling should concentrate on species with frequent contact with cattle including rats, ferrets and deer (paragraph 17).

Cattle to cattle transmission

(c)  We recommend that further research be undertaken into the relative importance of cattle to cattle transmission of bovine TB and means of controlling it (paragraph 18).

Public health implications of the rise in incidence of bovine TB

(d)  The public health risks of the situation are extremely low. Comparisons have been made to the BSE crisis at various points throughout this inquiry but we wish to emphasise that there is no call for the public panic on that issue to be reignited over bovine TB (paragraph 26).

(e)  While the public health implications of any disease must be borne in mind and the lessons of the BSE case indicate the growing public need for information, we agree with Mr Rooker that the risk in this case "is not great" and we believe it should not be overplayed. We are concerned that the rise in bovine TB in cattle may be misunderstood and misrepresented in the media as being linked to the disturbing rise in the number of human TB cases in Britain, Eastern Europe and the USA. These are caused by the bacterium M. tuberculosis, a quite distinct species from that responsible for bovine TB (paragraph 26).

Conclusions on the rise in incidence of bovine TB

(f)  The rising incidence of bovine TB is a serious problem, with implications for public finances, the farming industry and animal welfare (paragraph 27).

(g)  The consequences to the farming industry if current levels of TB incidence are maintained, or worse continue to increase, clearly warrant the attention now being paid to the issue (paragraph 30).

(h)  It is evident that a policy is needed to control bovine TB in cattle on economic and animal welfare grounds. It is also clear from the rapid rise of the disease that a solution is needed with some urgency if the problem is not to gain an even greater hold on ever widening areas of the country. The latest statistics on the increased rate and widening geographical distribution of herd breakdowns are alarming. We believe that MAFF should pay more attention to identifying the principal cause of this increased rate. One approach would be to apply models and examine whether the spatial and temporal patterns observed could be accounted for as a consequence of the cessation of the badger cull in 1997. Other factors and hypotheses must also be addressed. These should include the movement of cattle between farms, the presence of other immuno-suppressive infections such as Bovine Immunodeficiency Virus (BIV), the direct and indirect consequences of BSE, climate change and possible nutrient deficiencies (paragraph 32).

The Krebs review

(i)  We agree with Professor Krebs that the terms of reference for his review were appropriate and not restrictive, but we understand the concern of the conservationists about the fact that the title of the review was "Bovine tuberculosis in Cattle and Badgers" (paragraph 34).

(j)  We accept Professor Krebs's conclusion that the evidence of a link between badgers and cattle TB is compelling but not conclusive and that a field trial is required to test and quantify the link between badgers and cattle (paragraph 40).

(k)  We conclude that, seen in context, the number of badgers likely to be culled in the trial will not substantially affect the overall UK badger population and is justified in pursuit of a soundly-based policy which should save unnecessary slaughter of both badgers and cattle in the future (paragraph 42).

(l)  We conclude that Krebs' approach of combining a culling trial with other research is the correct one and we see no reason why any of the Krebs proposals should be abandoned. We agree broadly with Krebs' conclusions and recommendations (paragraph 43).

(m)  We are convinced that more attention should have been paid by Krebs to the role played by husbandry in preventing TB breakdowns. We regret that Professor Krebs and his colleagues were unable to review the literature relating to this important area with the thoroughness of the rest of the report (paragraph 44).

Implementation of the Krebs report

(n)  We regret the delay between the publication of the Krebs report in December 1997 and the Government's announcement of 17 August 1998, two years after the start of the Krebs inquiry, especially given that no policy to control bovine TB was in place at all during that period (paragraph 52).

Vaccine research

(o)  The problem of skin testing is of particular concern to farmers as an inability to distinguish between infected and vaccinated cattle could lead to a herd losing its tuberculosis-free status under EU regulations and thus prevent a farmer exporting his animals or selling unpasteurized milk. It is essential therefore that a test is developed in line with a vaccine for cattle which allows the distinction to be made and which is accepted throughout the EU and by the European Commission. The Government should keep the EC informed of developments in this field (paragraph 56).

(p)  We assume that the Bourne Group's responsibility for advising Ministers on vaccines and vaccinations includes the monitoring of progress on vaccine development recommended by Krebs but would welcome clarification of this point (paragraph 57).

(q)  We agree that the correct approach for the development of a cattle vaccine is to piggy-back on the work on vaccines for humans and we recommend that the Government review its entire TB vaccination strategy to ensure that sufficient funding is given as a priority to human vaccine development, that research is conducted into the difference between TB in cattle and humans, and that UK scientists have access to the latest developments in this field (paragraph 58).

(r)  The difficulties with delivering a badger vaccine persuade us that a cattle vaccine offers more potential in the control of bovine TB, although we advocate the continuation of research into a vaccine for badgers (paragraph 59).

(s)  We agree with the Minister that because of uncertainties over vaccine development it is necessary to proceed with the Krebs programme on all fronts (paragraph 60).

Research into transmission

(t)  We disagree with the suggestion that it is unnecessary to prove how a disease is spread in order to deal with it successfully, as it would answer much of the debate if the transmission routes were to be identified (paragraph 62).

(u)  We recommend that MAFF provide more funding for research modelling spatial distribution of transmission patterns and routes commissioned from the best scientists in the field (paragraph 62).

Leg cuffs

(v)  Although we have not been persuaded that leg cuffs would injure badgers, for the sake of public perception, we urge MAFF not to pursue this route (paragraph 64).

Road traffic accident suvey

(w)  We recommend that the road traffic accident survey be implemented in the counties identified by the Bourne Group as soon as possible in order that information may be gathered to substantiate that from the culling trial. For counties outside the culling trial, we recommend that the Bourne Group determine how many badgers are necessary to identify prevalence within acceptable limits and the cost-effectiveness of such an exercise (paragraph 66).

Trace elements

(x)  The Government should investigate the potential role of trace elements in the incidence of TB in cattle. Questions on this subject as regards cattle are to be included in the epidemiological questionnaire but we recommend that in determining future research projects the role of trace elements in susceptibility to bovine TB in cattle and badgers should be specifically included. Indeed, part of the failure of MAFF to control TB is probably because it has concentrated its efforts on aspects of exposure to infection and failed to address more specific questions on the factors influencing susceptibility. This is surprising since tuberculosis in humans is generally considered a disease to which weakened individuals are more susceptible (paragraph 67).

Funding for research

(y)  We recommend that MAFF ensure that funding for research into bovine TB remain a priority and that the level of funding is sufficient to ensure that the programme of research recommended by Krebs be completed (paragraph 69).

Implementation of the research programme

(z)  While we acknowledge the time needed to complete the process of putting proposals out to tender, we believe that the lack of information on the research programme at a time when the culling trial was underway contributed to the impression of MAFF bias against the badger in the eyes of many witnesses. This was at best unfortunate. Coupled with the continued indecision over the road traffic accident survey and the withholding of information on the trace elements experiment, it has done much to undermine the goodwill of the animal welfare lobby and to break the perception of the Krebs report as a package of measures, rather than as the culling trial alone (paragraph 70).

Length of culling trial

(aa)  The delays in implementation carry the danger that the trial will have to continue for seven years, two years longer than the period which was already causing such concern to farmers (paragraph 74).

Trial design

(bb)  Although many witnesses claimed that the design of the trial was flawed, we have not been persuaded by their criticisms and feel that many of the protagonists have been irresponsible in using the term in a misleading manner. We are concerned about the logistical aspects of reducing the statistical power but in no way could we discover that the trial was scientifically flawed (paragraph 77).

Closed season

(cc)  We recommend that the number and age of cubs and lactating sows caught in culling operations after the closed season be monitored to assess the efficiency of the closed season policy (paragraph 79).

Co-operation with the trial

(dd)  Organisations such as the Soil Association whose members wish to keep TB-free badgers on their land have to opt out of the trial to ensure that they are not forced to allow culling. We understand this view but conclude that the wider interests of the farming community must be to co-operate fully with the trial. We are less sympathetic to the attitude taken by the Wildlife Trusts whose position demands that they act responsibly on such issues and we urge them to consider what message their non-compliance sends to others for whom non-compliance with the trial would take different forms such as illegal culling of badgers (paragraph 81).

(ee)  We recognise the concerns expressed by one badger group that "unscrupulous individuals could well take advantage of conveniently caged badgers" for use in badger-baiting. Such activities are of course illegal and we ask the Bourne Group through MAFF for reassurance that all traps are checked sufficiently regularly to prevent this occurring (paragraph 82).

(ff)  We agree with the recommendation of English Nature that the Bourne Group gather what information it can about the scale of illegal culling (paragraph 84).

(gg)  Many groups will not co-operate unless they can be convinced that the trial can produce reliable data. For this reason, it is essential that the Bourne Group can satisfy itself and hence interested observers that the trial can be completed within a reasonable timescale and that the results will be statistically sound (paragraph 85).

MAFF resources

(hh)  We recommend that MAFF publish its forward projections of the number of staff it will need to complete the trial within the five year period and how it proposes to meet this requirement (paragraph 86).

(ii)  We recommend that MAFF address the ability of its laboratories to cope with the workload caused by the trial as a matter of urgency and publish an analysis of the impact of the culling trial upon the existing laboratory resources (paragraph 87).

Auditing

(jj)  We recommend that MAFF publish an account of how and when it met the requirements of each of the three monitoring processes recommended by the Bourne Group for the first triplet and how these processes will be applied in the second, third and subsequent triplets (paragraph 89).

(kk)  Although existing evidence suggests that badger removal is unlikely to have adverse ecological consequences, we support the environmental impact study that is now underway and we recommend that it be made public as soon as it is completed (paragraph 90).

Badger densities

(ll)  The MAFF research proposals include a project to develop new techniques of estimating badger density. This would be helpful to the trial but we accept that it is not essential to know exact densities of badgers, only that numbers have been greatly reduced in the proactive areas (paragraph 91).

The statistical power of the trial

(mm)  Most of the factors discussed have little impact on the successful running of the trial. The one exception is illegal culling of badgers. This is the only factor which could result in the trial failing to show that culling is a practical way of reducing the incidence of TB, when in fact it would be. It is therefore extremely important to encourage the co-operation of farmers in the control areas and also to monitor the control areas periodically to assess the incidence of killing, as we have recommended above. The use of mortality tags to estimate the level of illegal culling should be further investigated. However, we believe that this is a theoretical rather than a practical problem at this stage as we accept the evidence that the various forms of interference and non-compliance already referred to have not in fact been a major problem in the culls so far carried out. Given sufficient resources from MAFF to ensure that the fieldwork and laboratory analysis are carried out in good time, there is no reason to believe that the trial cannot be implemented (paragraph 93).

(nn)  It is essential that power analysis is undertaken as the trial proceeds and more data becomes available. In this respect it is necessary for the Bourne Group to undertake regular power analyses, which should be verified independently by an expert, and to keep the Minister informed of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the trial. This is an essential component of the study and sufficient resources should be available to ensure it is undertaken regularly, preferably quarterly. We also recommend that the original data behind the power analysis conducted by Dr Donnelly from the Bourne Group, from which she concluded that the trial required ten triplets and should take five years, be verified by an external expert and the results of this check be made publically available. There is no flaw in the trial as such but these weaknesses could influence the confidence of the results and the clarity of any final policy decision (paragraph 94).

Conclusions on trial

(oo)  We do not accept that the answers to the questions posed by the trial are already known and we are greatly intrigued by Professor Bourne's comment that "There may be some surprising answers at the end of this trial". The trial should provide invaluable information about the cost-effectiveness of culling that could not be obtained by any other means and for this reason it is in the best interests of all concerned, including those who care deeply about the welfare of the badger as a species, for it to continue. We recommend that the culling trial be implemented in full and strongly encourage all interested parties to co-operate with it in order that reliable results be attained in the minimum possible time and with the minimum loss of life to badgers (paragraph 95).

Speed of implementation

(pp)  We share the view of one witness that a prolonged trial would mean data would be more difficult to interpret, the problem for the cattle industry horrendous and the credibility of Government to find a solution lost with unknown consequences (paragraph 96).

(qq)  We recommend that MAFF together with the Bourne Group examine ways in which the trial could be implemented more speedily without impugning its scientific rigour. At very least a target should be established for the full implementation of all ten triplets by the start of the closed season in February 2000 and progress towards this should be closely monitored. This is in keeping with the Bourne Group's recommendation last July. Like them, we recognise the logistical difficulties this involves but we consider it to be essential. Further delays cannot be tolerated (paragraph 97).

The Bourne Group

(rr)  We do not recommend that new members be appointed to widen the representation on the Group (paragraph 98).

(ss)  The Bourne Group will need to have the strength and authority to ensure that the schedule for implementation is met. At the moment, it is not evident that this is the case or that the Group have any sanctions should the timetable slip. This problem must be addressed by the Minister as a matter of urgency. We note that the Food Standards Agency is to be given the sanction of publication of its advice to Ministers. The Bourne Group is not a statutory body but full use of its ability to publish reports recommending action by MAFF would enhance its credibility (paragraph 99).

Communication of data and information

(tt)  We recommend that the Bourne Group prepare and release progress reports on a quarterly basis summarising the progress of the trial and giving qualitative indications of the preliminary results, with a strong warning as to the reliability of conclusions based on the data (paragraph 102).

(uu)  We recommend that, in consultation with an independent expert statistician, the Bourne Group carefully consider what information can be made available, when and in what form and that their decision be made known to the public well in advance (paragraph 102).

(vv)  We recommend that once the trial as planned is completed, the results be published as soon as possible and all data be made as widely available as possible for analysis by scientists or other parties (paragraph 102).

(ww)  We recommend that MAFF reassess its PR strategy in relation to the implementation of the Krebs report, with particular attention to improving public awareness of the purpose of the culling trial (paragraph 103).

(xx)  We recommend that the communication strategy followed by MAFF in relation to informing vets and farmers about TB incidents be reviewed (paragraph 104).

The Bern Convention

(yy)  It appears that MAFF officials made no attempt to prepare a case for the Bern Convention hearing last December which went ahead without even seeing the Krebs report. Mr Rooker found the Standing Committee's behaviour "astonishing". We find it astonishing that MAFF placed their Ministers in such an embarrassing position. We understand that the Standing Committee's finding has no legal implications. However, we await with interest the outcome of the Government's defence of its policy (paragraph 105).

Farm husbandry

(zz)  The withdrawal of its leaflet on farm husbandry practices in connection with badgers and bovine TB demonstrates MAFF's awareness of its shortcomings, but to do nothing to determine what better advice should be offered to farmers is unacceptable (paragraph 107).

(aaa)  While we accept that farmers cannot be expected to implement expensive management changes of unproven benefit, we are not convinced that the industry as a whole has done enough in the past to address the multifactoral nature of the bovine TB problem and the possible role played by husbandry practices in finding a solution (paragraph 108).

(bbb)  We recommend that, in consultation with the farming industry, MAFF and the Bourne Group simplify TB99. The new questionnaire should then be subject to a rigorous pilot exercise on farms and assessed for ease of administrative handling before approval is given to a final version (paragraph 110).

(ccc)  We recommend that MAFF appoint a small panel of experts to undertake a fast track review of the available scientific evidence on husbandry, taking evidence from the industry and the veterinary profession as appropriate. This expert panel should report to MAFF within three months with recommendations as to whether husbandry experiments are justified at this stage and if so which experiments would be most promising in terms of their likelihood of controlling disease outbreaks (paragraph 111).

(ddd)  We commend to the Ministry the proposal of the Soil Association for a comparison of the incidence of bovine TB on organic farms with that on conventional farms (paragraph 112).

(eee)  We recommend that the Government finance the cost of accelerated research investigating the most promising husbandry practices likely to assist in the control of bovine tuberculosis (paragraph 113).

Compensation

(fff)  We recognise that within current spending limits set for the Ministry in the Comprehensive Spending Review, national levels of compensation cannot be raised to reflect consequential loss. However, we also note that the Minister left open the possibility that the situation may be reconsidered (paragraph 114).

Short term action by Government

(ggg)  We recommend that, at present, no additional action should be taken outside the trial area. Our decision is based on the following considerations. First, the current financial constraints placed upon MAFF make it highly likely that any additional action would divert valuable resources of finance and personnel away from the existing trial, leading to further delays in its actioning and an inevitable postponement in the publication of results. Secondly, there is as yet no categorical evidence to support the proposition that culling has any effect on the rate of herd breakdowns. However, we consider that aspects of the NFU's proposals offer a positive and constructive way forward for tuberculous zones outside the trial area, and that a policy based on these proposals could assist in rebuilding the confidence of beef and dairy producers in these zones. We therefore urge the Government to give serious consideration to the NFU's case, with a view to introducing a policy for the control of localised bovine tuberculosis outbreaks in areas outside the trial within the next twelve months (paragraph 120).

Cattle passports

(hhh)  We recommend that the Minister reconsider his decision on including the date of the last TB test in cattle passports (paragraph 122).

Future policy options

(iii)  We recommend that the Government specify the criteria on which its sustainable policy on the control of bovine TB will be judged and publish detailed objectives for the policy in the short and the long-term. We also recommend that MAFF undertake a statistical risk assessment of the possible policy procedures, in conjunction with the Bourne Group and representatives of all interested parties (paragraph 125).