THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION IN THE SHORT TERM
115. There is great and growing concern at the position
of farmers experiencing herd breakdowns outside the culling trial
areas. These numbers are increasing with the recent rapid escalation
of bovine tuberculosis in the national herd, so that only some
50 to 60 per cent of the area of England and Wales suffering contiguous
and repeat herd breakdowns will be recruited as part of a triplet.[349]
Some witnesses recommended that the Government take additional
action in the short term to control the spread of bovine tuberculosis.
Judging by Mr Brown's speech to the NFU Annual Conference in February,
it is evident that the Minister is giving serious consideration
to the development of such alternative strategies. He and his
deputy, Mr Rooker, appear to have a completely open mind on what
these strategies might be. In answering a parliamentary question,
Mr Rooker said "We are willing to consider additional action
which could usefully complement existing measures. Among the ideas
being considered at present are more rapid responses to TB incidents,
more comprehensive local testing, local badger culling outside
the trial areas, and better advice to farmers on protecting the
health status of cattle herds".[350]
He told us that he was expecting to receive advice on this before
the end of the closed season (30 April).[351]
Ironically, the need for the Government to take short-term action
has been made acute by the slippage in MAFF's timetable for implementing
the culling triplets, and the collapse in morale among English
and Welsh beef and dairy farmers suffering herd breakdowns. Broadly
three alternative strategies were outlined to us: no action; additional
proactive and/or reactive badger culling; and additional tuberculin
testing of cattle, with reactive culling of the wildlife reservoir.
116. In his report to MAFF, Professor Krebs considered
much the same problem, although the options as he saw them were
respectively no action; reactive or proactive culling; and extending
the trial to the affected area.[352]
His Group's conclusion was that no further action should be taken
in areas outside the culling trial, but with the experts overseeing
the cull (the Bourne Group) retaining the right to recruit further
areas into the culling trial if deemed necessary. Krebs concluded
that proactive or reactive culling unconnected with the trial
should not be considered, for two reasons. In the case of reactive
culling, the aim was to prevent repeat and contiguous breakdowns,
and, as the worst affected areas were already the focus of the
culling trial, introducing reactive culling to these lesser affected
areas would become ineffective over time in terms of the number
of herd breakdowns prevented. Of course, this argument has now
been overtaken by events as bovine TB has continued to spread.
On proactive culling, the Krebs report commented merely that carrying
this out "on a much larger scale than the experimental area
is neither desirable nor feasible".[353]
This view was endorsed by both Professor Krebs[354]
and Professor Bourne[355]
in their oral evidence, on the grounds that the Government would
be using a treatment with neither proven effectiveness nor adequate
scientific rationale. This would remain the case until conclusive
results were available from the culling trial. Professor Bourne
also argued that "it could well compromise where we place
our trial areas and the randomisation process associated with
it".[356]
On a practical note, Dr Woodroffe warned that "the message
would go out there that culling badgers was the thing to do and
we would find it very difficult to defend our controls".[357]
117. This position has been challenged by Professor
Stephen Harris of University of Bristol. Professor Harris has
been the leading advocate of 'one-off' proactive culling of badgers,
where setts have a history of chronic bovine tuberculosis infection.
He has argued, although it is not clear on what basis, that since
these areas are already well known, one-off proactive culling
focussed on these setts could permit badger populations in other
regions to remain largely untouched. Furthermore, illegal culling
by farmers would be likely to fall as the farming community recognised
the robust nature of the approach, while one-off proactive culling
based on social groups (setts) rather than arbitrary squares (Krebs)
or circles (Bourne) would be more effective in the long term.
His comments have been taken by witnesses as applying to areas
outside the culling trial only, rather than as the alternative
to the trial itself which he clearly intends. Some farmers' groups
find his policy attractive because it seems to offer an instant
solution.[358]
The NFBG, on the other hand, condemn it on scientific, practical,
legal, financial and ethical grounds.[359]
Regrettably, Professor Harris was unable to accept our invitation
to discuss his ideas with us in more detail or to provide written
evidence to our inquiry.
118. One variant of this option is to increase the
number of triplets in the culling trial. This was favoured by
the CLA, who believed that the number of triplets "should
at least be doubled" to include all 10km squares where there
have been more than 6-8 breakdowns per square,[360]
and the NFU who argued that "the bigger the number of trials
the more robust the answers will be and the quicker we are likely
to find results".[361]
The NFU also put forward a strategy for what they termed "small
satellite outbreaks"[362]
of bovine tuberculosis, areas which would be too small to be the
focus of a culling triplet, even if extra resources were found
to extend the trial. For such areas, the NFU proposed the following
action. When an outbreak is first recorded, all holdings adjoining
the affected farm should have their stock tested within a two
month period. Stock on all farms should be tested again four months
after the first test. In the event of cattle testing positive,
a wildlife survey of the affected farms should be carried out,
using the TB99 form. The purpose would be to pinpoint the wildlife
reservoir responsible for the infection. In the event of a third
breakdown, a reactive cull of the "most likely cause of [wildlife]
infection" should take place. Mr Brian Jennings of the NFU
described the rationale behind this approach: "firstly, to
get a clear idea as to the scale of the outbreak and, secondly,
to try to identify at an early stage where the epicentre of the
outbreak is ... all we are trying to do [is] to identify the most
likely cause of infection and then to remove the source. Unless
you do that there is always the danger of this centre becoming
larger and larger and larger".[363]
119. In assessing the need for short-term action outside
the culling trial zone, we have been guided by four principles.
First, any short-term strategy must not compromise the scientific
validity of the ongoing culling trial. Secondly, the strategy
for areas outside the culling trial must not reduce levels of
funding assigned to the culling trial, or any other element of
the Krebs strategy. Thirdly, any action taken must be cost-effective
and efficient in its use of personnel, and must be capable of
ameliorating the rate of herd breakdowns in the affected area.
Fourthly, such action must be fully consonant with the Government's
stated aim of developing a sustainable strategy for the control
of bovine tuberculosis.
120. In view of these principles, and taking account
of evidence from Professor Krebs and the Bourne Group, we recommend
that, at present, no additional action should be taken outside
the trial area. Our decision is based on the following considerations.
First, the current financial constraints placed upon MAFF make
it highly likely that any additional action would divert valuable
resources of finance and personnel away from the existing trial,
leading to further delays in its actioning and an inevitable postponement
in the publication of results. Secondly, there is as yet no categorical
evidence to support the proposition that culling has any effect
on the rate of herd breakdowns. However, we consider that aspects
of the NFU's proposals offer a positive and constructive way forward
for tuberculous zones outside the trial area, and that a policy
based on these proposals could assist in rebuilding the confidence
of beef and dairy producers in these zones. We therefore urge
the Government to give serious consideration to the NFU's case,
with a view to introducing a policy for the control of localised
bovine tuberculosis outbreaks in areas outside the trial within
the next twelve months.
Cattle passports
121. There is one further measure which the Government
might take immediately which would have no impact on the trial
but would offer much wanted assistance to farmers. As a result
of the BSE situation, MAFF has now established the British Cattle
Movement Service at Workington which issues passports for all
cattle in order to monitor their movements throughout the country.
MAFF informed us that "in order to improve the effectiveness
of tracing cattle moved on or off holdings with TB breakdowns,
so that herds at potential risk may also be tested, enhancements
to the MAFF Animal Health and Cattle Tracing System databases
are planned."[364]
This will help MAFF, but many witnesses also raised with us the
possibility that the passport system could be used to give more
information to farmers when purchasing cattle. The BSE problem
has led to increased movement of cattle within the UK (Mr Rooker
declared that "cattle whizz round this country in a way that
is just unbelievable"[365]),
and we were told that "it is quite possible under the present
system for an animal to go its whole life without being tested".[366]
At present, farmers have no way of knowing if this were the case.
122. A possible solution would be to include the date
of the latest TB test on the cattle passport. The NFBG had raised
this idea, which is supported by many farmers and the National
Beef Association,[367]
with Ministers and been told that there were no plans to introduce
such a scheme at present.[368]
When we ourselves put the proposal to Mr Rooker, he suggested
that "it may be in the future ... that the cattle passport
can be used for this kind of innovation" but that "in
these very early days of the Cattle Movement Service I could not
possibly contemplate that".[369]
The difficulty as he saw it was that the system was relatively
new and its success had been guaranteed by avoiding the mistake
of including 'add-ons' to its basic purpose. He also pointed out
that "saying when an animal has been tested, of course, may
not tell you what its current status is".[370]
This is true. However, it would offer the farmer much more information
than is available at present, and we believe that it is in keeping
with the purpose for which the Cattle Tracing System had been
established. We recommend that the Minister reconsider his
decision on including the date of the last TB test in cattle passports.
349 Ev. p. 123. See also paragraph 45 above. Back
350 HC
Deb, 4 March 1999, c.911w. Back
351 Q
690. Back
352 Krebs,
5.6.34-36 Back
353 Krebs,
5.6.35. Back
354 Q
93. Back
355 Qq
198, 199. Back
356 Q
201. Back
357 Ibid. Back
358 Eg.
Ev. p.186. Back
359 Ev.
pp.61-2. Back
360 Ev.
p.210. Back
361 Q
401. Back
362 Q
402 Back
363 Ibid. Back
364 Ev.
p.138. Back
365 Q
730. Back
366 Ev.
p.184. Back
367 Ev.
p.186. Back
368 Ev.
p. 57. Back
369 Qq
726, 729. Back
370 Qq
726, 728. Back
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