71. By far the most controversial decision announced by Mr Rooker on 17 August was that he had accepted the recommendation of the Bourne Group that a badger culling trial was a necessary part of the strategy to develop a sustainable policy to control TB in cattle. He agreed to the changes proposed by the Group to Krebs' initial design, including the closed season and the use of cage-trapping only, and announced that the trial would begin in 1998 in six of the recommended 30 areas, that is two of the ten triplets. These initial areas were to be in first Devon/Cornwall, then Gloucestershire/Herefordshire/ Worcestershire. Mr Rooker responded to the sensitivities of the issue by stressing that "badgers are a protected species, and will remain so" and that during the entire trial, "trapping will only take place over 2,000 square kilometres - an area little more than half the size of Cornwall".[207] He also addressed the concerns of various groups about the openness of the trial by promising that "internal and external audit procedures will be put in place to monitor procedures, efficiency and data quality and completeness" and by establishing new pages on MAFF's website, giving details of the history of bovine TB in the UK and information concerning the current strategy to deal with it.[208]

72. The six areas selected for the first stage of the trial were in counties with a high incidence of bovine TB in cattle and badgers based on data up to the end of 1997. The table below gives detailed figures on the two triplets while figure 3 shows their location.

Trial Area	Area (km2)	Number of Cattle Herds	Confirmed TB incidents 1995/7	Confirmed TB incidents 1997
Hereford/Gloucester Triplet	286.6	316	104	37
Devon/Cornwall Triplet	285	387	101	48

Source: MAFF statsheet 6.

Immediately after the Ministerial announcement, MAFF's Wildlife Unit wrote to all known landowners in the two areas to arrange initial visits. Once permission had been received (participation in the trial is voluntary), officials could begin to survey the area for badger activity. Surveying started in both areas on 28 August 1998, in line with the Bourne Group's proposal that the two triplets should be up and running by the end of the year. By mid-October, however, it had become clear that surveying was slower than had been hoped, the difficulty being attributed by MAFF to the unfavourable terrain in the Gloucestershire/Herefordshire triplet. In view of the approaching closed season, resources were switched from there to Cornwall in order to allow at least one of the areas to be implemented.

Source: MAFF PN 337/98.

73. On 4 November, the three areas within the Cornish triplet were randomly allocated between the three treatments but the result was not divulged until a week later when Professor Bourne agreed that surveying, hampered by heavy rain, was "almost complete" and the proactive cull had to begin.[209] Cage traps were sited in the Putford area on 16 November and were pre-baited with peanuts from 23 November to allow the badgers to become familiar with their presence. Traps were then set and trapping continued over twelve nights from 1 December to 13 December. 238 badgers were captured and shot and their carcases submitted for post mortem and laboratory testing, the results of which are not yet known. There will be a follow-up cull in Putford after the closed season ends and then further culling at 12 month intervals to keep the area clear from badgers. [210] No activity has taken place in the reactive area (Hartland) where badgers will only be culled after a herd breakdown and out of the closed season, or in the no culling area (Bude). Surveying in the Gloucestershire/Worcestershire/Herefordshire triplet is still continuing, although we had been told by MAFF that this would be completed in February 1999.[211] However, the Bourne Group has made progress in identifying the next triplet, which will be in East Cornwall.[212]

74. It is immediately clear that the timetable for the trial has slipped appreciably. Krebs recommended that the trial should begin in Spring 1998,[213] while Professor Bourne told us that "we suggested we would put two in place in the first year, that is, by January of this year. Then eight in place during 1999".[214] The advice given to us by MAFF is that "we would like to enrol four more this year, but I think we are doubtful about our ability to start trapping in all of them; and we would like to bring in the remainder next year".[215] Therefore, the ten triplets now look as though they will not be in place until the end of 2000, more than a year and a half after the date proposed by Krebs. This has obvious implications for the length of the trial. The delays in implementation carry the danger that the trial will have to continue for seven years, two years longer than the period which was already causing such concern to farmers.[216] As the RSPCA commented, "Evidence to date indicates that even the more phased introduction of the experiment is experiencing considerable operational difficulties. This does not engender confidence for the future operation of the trial, the timescale in which significant results might be obtained or even whether such results might be produced".[217]

75. The commencement of the culling trial has by no means ended opposition to the policy. While arguments over the principle and necessity of the trial have been decided in favour of proceeding, there remain many objections to the means by which it is being implemented and doubts such as those expressed above by the RSPCA about whether it can achieve its aims. These centre around the fact that this is science conducted in the field. As one badger group put it, "The trial design tries to impose laboratory conditions on the wider countryside", thus rendering it "unworkable".[218] Professor Krebs accepted that "it is certainly going to be the case that the experiment will not be as clear as it would be if it were a laboratory experiment in a laboratory in a building".[219] Professor Bourne too recognised that "a field trial cannot have the precision of a laboratory experiment", but he argued that the factors which were likely to affect this precision had been taken into account.[220] This is the crux of the matter: the extent to which the design of the trial is sufficiently robust to withstand imperfections in and disruptions to its implementation. We examine below each of the obstacles faced by the trial, followed by an assessment of the statistical power and thus scientific rigour. The NFBG usefully divided these obstacles into "practical problems" and "the failure to implement key procedures in the trial".[221] Practical problems include the design of the trial, trapping efficiency, non-compliance by landowners, interference by animal activists and illegal culling by farmers. Procedures include resources, auditing and calculation of badger densities.

i. Trial design

76. The changes made by the Bourne Group to the design proposed by Krebs have largely been accepted as beneficial to the feasibility of the experiment. However, doubts were expressed in evidence to us as to the difficulties in defining and maintaining boundaries between the different treatment areas within a triplet. English Nature foresaw "considerable difficulties in delineating the boundaries of such an area where it needs to follow the boundary of badger social groups", a point also made by the NFBG.[222] The Craven Badger Group raised the further issue that unless badger-proof fencing was installed between the areas, "there is very likely to be movement of badgers from one area to the next" which would distort results and perhaps lead to the introduction of infection as healthy badgers were replaced by infected ones.[223] We note in this context that the effect of perturbation on badger social groups is one of the projects funded by MAFF in the current financial year. Questions were also raised about the large number of variables between artificially defined areas in the natural countryside. Some witnesses argued that difference in territory, farming practices and innumerable other factors would affect the comparability of the areas and defeat the attempts to provide a control for the experiment.[224]

77. A further point raised concerning the design of the trial was the justification for including a proactive treatment. The Minister has already clearly stated that he would not implement a policy of eradication so badger groups such as that from Herefordshire questioned "what valid reason is there for conducting the experiment at all?"[225] This view is understandable but it mistakes the purpose of the proactive area which is to provide one extreme against which the reactive and control treatments can be measured. It is therefore essential to the trial design and to the aim of obtaining a good quantitative estimate of the force of infection arising from badgers. Although many witnesses claimed that the design of the trial was flawed, we have not been persuaded by their criticisms and feel that many of the protagonists have been irresponsible in using the term in a misleading manner. We are concerned about the logistical aspects of reducing the statistical power but in no way could we discover that the trial was scientifically flawed.

ii. Trapping efficiency

78. It is important to the success of the trial that as many as possible of the badgers in the proactive area are caught and removed. For this reason, both Krebs and Bourne laid some emphasis on employing the most efficacious acceptable capture method. The Bourne Group accepted that public perceptions of cruelty to animals would not permit the use of snaring which has a capture efficiency of 90-100% and that instead cage trapping alone at an efficiency rate of up to 80% would be used. Several witnesses, mainly animal welfare groups anxious to stop the trial at all costs but also the Farmers' Union of Wales, argued that the use of cage-trapping "is unlikely to ensure a capture rate which maintains the integrity of the culling trial".[226] This view was apparently supported by data released on the MAFF website concerning the proactive cull in Putford which indicated that 238 badgers were caught there, less than half the number predicted. The RSPCA concluded that "either the general figure for badger density was not applicable for the situation in the Putford area or MAFF staff have failed to capture a lot of badgers".[227] The Bourne Group and Dr Chris Cheeseman, a scientist from Woodchester Park who was involved in observing the trial, denied both charges. Professor Bourne told us that the figure of 500 was "an estimate provided by MAFF staff which we considered and rejected",[228] while Dr Cheeseman explained the figure referred to the number of traps set rather than badgers likely to be caught: "the rule of thumb is you use twice as many traps as you expect to catch badgers".[229] The number caught "was actually in line with the estimates that were made by myself and a member of the Bourne Group, Dr Woodroffe" and, although on the low side of badger density, "you have to remember that Putford has actually been culled in the past, and it is very difficult to estimate at what level the badger population is on its recovery phase". The NFBG reported that it had "been reliably informed that there is still significant badger activity in the area".[230] However, this in itself is not surprising as it was always expected that a certain number of badgers would escape culling, hence the need to revisit the area on a regular basis.

79. A related area of difficulty is that posed by the ban on culling between the end of January and the end of April, imposed by concerns about the welfare of badger cubs if their mothers were caught and killed. The Bourne Group considered that "a closed season would not cause problems for the efficacy of the proactive strategy as regards the initial cull", although it had potentially "a greater impact on the efficacy of the reactive strategy" since culling could be delayed for some time after a herd breakdown had been identified.[231] The RCVS thought that for this reason the policy "will undoubtedly delay the eventual completion of the trial and should be re-examined". The backlog in reactive culling would "undermine the confidence of the farming community and could lead to increased illegal badger removal by farmers".[232] On the other hand, the badger groups argued that the closed season was still too short, leaving an estimated 2,300 badger cubs to starve underground in the proactive areas alone.[233] The NFBG argued "we do not believe that, as the detail of the cull becomes more widely known, the wider public will tolerate this cruelty".[234] There have been no official estimates of the number of cubs likely to be affected. As the RSPCA noted, both this and "the potential welfare benefits of having such a closed season will only be realised if the cubs are caught in the trapping operations when they resume".[235] They suggested that this should be monitored closely by the Bourne Group. We agree and we recommend that the number and age of cubs and lactating sows caught in culling operations after the closed season be monitored to assess the efficiency of the closed season policy.

iii. Non-compliance

80. By far the most frequently raised obstacle to the successful completion of the trial was that of non-compliance. MAFF has no powers to compel landowners to participate in the trial or to allow Wildlife Unit staff onto private property for surveying purposes. This has the potential to compromise the trial by making it unworkable if non-compliance is widespread and by providing havens for badgers where it occurs on any scale. Non-compliance could also take the more active forms of interference with the traps by animal activists or illegal killing by farmers. The latter has raised most fears among witnesses, being cited as "the greater concern of the forms of non-compliance" by the Wildlife Trusts, and a "major source of concern" to the RSPCA who believed it would render "the results of the trial worthless".[236] The NFU considered in general that "the effectiveness of the random culling trials will depend on achieving as near as possible to 100 per cent participation".[237]

81. The Bourne Group was prepared for the possibility of resistence to the experiment by individuals. In their first report they admitted "non-compliance on a large scale would have serious consequences for the interpretation of the trial data".[238] It would have been impossible for them to predict in advance the likely level of non-compliance. However, some months later and with the experience of the Putford cull, some observations can be made, although they are subjective and open to interpretation. First, on the non-compliance of landowners, the NFBG told us that as a matter of policy "the Wildlife Trusts, the Woodland Trust, the RSPB, other nature organisations and some private landowners have already confirmed that they will not allow culling on their land".[239] This was confirmed by the head of the Wildlife Trusts.[240] However, the evidence is that in Putford non-compliance has been very low. The NBA told us that "only 80 per cent of the land is trappable, due to owners not agreeing for such action to take place",[241] but the NFU suggested that "of the landowners who refused to partake the vast majority were one and two acre landowners and 99 per cent of the farmers are co-operating with the trial".[242] Professor Bourne too assured us that "Non-compliance has not been a feature with the Cornish triplets. We have had a very high level of compliance with farmers".[243] There is a particular difficulty as the nature of the trial requires that the wishes of an individual landowner cannot be taken into account in deciding on treatment areas because of the randomisation process. Therefore, organisations such as the Soil Association whose members wish to keep TB-free badgers on their land have to opt out of the trial to ensure that they are not forced to allow culling.[244] We understand this view but conclude that the wider interests of the farming community must be to co-operate fully with the trial. We are less sympathetic to the attitude taken by the Wildlife Trusts whose position demands that they act responsibly on such issues and we urge them to consider what message their non-compliance sends to others for whom non-compliance with the trial would take different forms such as illegal culling of badgers.

82. Secondly, on the question of interference in the trial by badger activists, there are indications that this has occurred in Putford but probably not at levels that compromise the trial. The NFBG, who are advising their members to "take no action which is illegal",[245] reported that "badger traps [had been] destroyed and/or removed" and that "badgers have been released from traps in the first culling area of the trial".[246] Meanwhile, Dr Woodroffe of the Bourne Group told us that "There were some badgers released by Animal Rights activists but that is quantified, so we know how many were caught and then released".[247] We conclude that this is unlikely to pose a severe threat to the trial. We recognise the concerns expressed by one badger group that "unscrupulous individuals could well take advantage of conveniently caged badgers" for use in badger-baiting.[248] Such activities are of course illegal and we ask the Bourne Group through MAFF for reassurance that all traps are checked sufficiently regularly to prevent this occurring.

83. Illegal killing of badgers presents a far greater threat in terms of scale and of effect on the trial. The NFU and the TFA both assured us that they "would in no way condone the illegal killing of badgers".[249] They were offering advice to their members on co-operation and the NFU claimed that farmers "are co-operating with the cull better than ... expected ... even in the control area where no badger culling is taking place".[250] It is in these areas that the problem is most likely to arise as the farmers have little direct incentive to participate in the trial when no action is being taken directly to deal with any herd breakdowns on their farms. We can see that in these circumstances, particularly if the experiment is extended over a long timeframe, farmers may be more inclined to take illegal action against the badgers in order to protect their livelihood as they perceive it.

84. Although we are sympathetic to their plight, we join the farmers' unions in condemning such action and we would expect the authorities to take severe action in any case where such illegal activities had been discovered. The NFU, the CLA, the Farmers' Union of Wales and the RCVS all suggested that extra compensation should be paid to farmers in these areas as an incentive for co-operation.[251] We understand that this is the case in the farms bordering the Woodchester research centre where payments of 125% of market value are made available to cover consequential loss.[252] We return to this subject below. As regards the effect of illegal culling on the trial data, Professor Bourne assured us that he "would have some idea if illegal killing was being carried out",[253] presumably through surveying. However, the RSPCA doubted that "the arrangements for surveying - whether initial or subsequent - will be adequate to measure the extent and impact of any illegal culling".[254] English Nature recommended that the Bourne Group gathered what information it could about the scale of the problem.[255] We agree that this should be done.

85. Professor Krebs explained to the Committee that "it is not really in the interests of those who want to find a sustainable policy for the future to disrupt the trial. If, for example, farmers are tempted to cull out badgers in the control areas and take things into their own hands, the implication of that would be that, after a period of years, the trial would show no difference between the removal areas and the control areas. MAFF would conclude that removing badgers was not an effective way of controlling the disease, so farmers would be stuck with a conclusion that may be inappropriate but was nevertheless shown by the experiment. Equally, if the wildlife and conservation groups believe that the badger is completely innocent, as some of them do, then this is a way for them to gain incontrovertible evidence that the badger is completely innocent and the debate will then close."[256] We agree with this analysis but the fact remains that many groups will not co-operate unless they can be convinced that the trial can produce reliable data. For this reason, it is essential that the Bourne Group can satisfy itself and hence interested observers that the trial can be completed within a reasonable timescale and that the results will be statistically sound.

iii. MAFF resources

86. One of the practical elements which will determine the feasibility of the trial is the resources devoted to it by the Government. The relocation of staff from the Gloucestershire triplet to Cornwall last October seemed to bode ill for the ability of MAFF to implement the plan laid down by the Bourne Group. It is accepted by the Group that the delays in the field have been caused by "a problem of logistics with respect to getting wildlife staff in place and giving them the appropriate training".[257] MAFF officials echoed this, admitting that the speed of implementation depends "essentially upon our ability to bring in the wildlife teams to operate in those areas, and the most important single constraint is actually recruiting and training the staff who will carry out the work on the ground".[258] MAFF has 54 fully-trained staff at the moment and "it takes about six months to get somebody fully competent in the field skills necessary to carry out the trapping and the surveying; it is quite a demanding job."[259] We do not dispute this, and we would stress the importance of ensuring that all staff involved in the trial are fully trained in the necessary skills. We are concerned, however, that the need for more staff was not recognised and addressed before last December when an advertisement appeared in various publications. This, together with Professor Bourne's remark that in Putford "there were probably more staff at that particular time than we needed",[260] implies that MAFF had failed to adequately consider the resource implications of the trial. We accept the Minister's argument that this was a new experience for MAFF but it is still a matter of some concern that the trial should have been so delayed for this reason. More staff will be needed as the trial progresses both for enrolling new triplets and resurveying and culling in the established one. Professor Bourne said he was "reassured that the necessary amount of cash is there for the fieldwork"[261] and that the Ministry had "met every challenge thus far that we have put to them".[262] In the light of the time needed for training new staff and our deep suspicions that the trial may not be completed on schedule, we recommend that MAFF publish its forward projections of the number of staff it will need to complete the trial within the five year period and how it proposes to meet this requirement.

87. The problem of staff resources has been revealed because of the stage reached by the trial before the start of the closed season. The ability of the laboratories to cope with the number of carcases from badgers and other wildlife samples remains untested. Professor Bourne raised this matter himself, although he was not concerned about it.[263] Mr Scudamore, the Chief Veterinary Officer, on the other hand, admitted that "the resources are not only the wildlife people collecting the badgers, it is also the laboratories examining the badgers, and that can be a constraint".[264] He also admitted that it would be "quite difficult to increase that particular resource in the laboratories". We have already seen how this constraining factor has had an effect on the willingness of MAFF officials to implement the road traffic accident survey. The difficulties of dealing with the workload caused by the trial are likely to become much more severe as the next triplets are recruited, and the continuing public acceptance of the trial will be badly dented if no information becomes available due to the inability of the laboratory service to conduct the post mortems and release data either to the Bourne Group or more widely. We recommend that MAFF address this issue as a matter of urgency and publish an analysis of the impact of the culling trial upon the existing laboratory resources.

iv. Auditing

88. The Bourne Group recommended to Ministers last July that there should be three separate audits of the trial to ensure that it was properly conducted. These should be a MAFF internal audit to check that staff closely follow the standard operating procedures at every stage of the trial; an external audit to check how efficient the culling is within the limitations imposed and a further external audit of data quality and completeness some months after the trial is commenced. As the Bourne Group recognised, these were essential to the proper conduct of the trial.[265] They would also go some way to reassuring observers that the trial was being conducted in a humane fashion and was likely to achieve its goals.

89. In fact, the trial began before these procedures and checks were in place. Standard operating procedures were drawn up by MAFF and approved by the Bourne Group for use by the officials carrying out the trial,[266] but the extensive auditing programme described by the Group had not been established. A contract was put out to tender on 30 October 1998 and on 15 March 1999 Cresswell Associates of Stroud, Gloucestershire, were appointed as external auditors to check field operations. Their contract runs only until November 1999 when a further invitation to tender will be necessary.[267] This delay has caused concern to many groups, including those who would support the trial. The RSPCA commented that the external audit would have helped with the bad publicity on the number of badgers caught in Putford by offering reliable information, while the NFBG expressed the opinion that in the absence of "independent external auditors, which should have been in place from the start ... there were no welfare checks. There were no checks on the ability of the people to do the work".[268] Professor Bourne told us that "we did carry out our own audit, following the trapping procedures, on the basis of the area" and that "we were also reassured by our own internal audit that the trapping efficiency was even higher than we could have expected".[269] However, this is no replacement for external checks. We agree with the Wildlife Trusts that "monitoring, quality control and continuous evaluation [are] essential" and that "many components key to the monitoring programme are far from being in place".[270] We recommend that MAFF publish an account of how and when it met the requirements of each of the three monitoring processes recommended by the Bourne Group for the first triplet and how these processes will be applied in the second, third and subsequent triplets.

90. A particular type of auditing absent from the trial is an environmental audit on the ecological effects of removing badgers on this scale. The Bourne Group commissioned a desk study, the executive summary of which was attached to the report, but no full scale study has been undertaken. The Countryside Council for Wales (CCW) were insistent that "it is unacceptable to commence such a trial involving culling of a protected species before an Environmental Impact Assessment has been undertaken".[271] English Nature agreed: "the ecological `knock-on' effects of large-scale badger removal are unknown, and we believe that the Ministry has a responsibility to undertake a programme to monitor the wider ecological effects of the trial".[272] MAFF told us that "it was too early to mount a full environmental impact assessment before the cull was to take place. But there is going to be a full environmental impact study of the effects of proactive culling, which will be done on the back of the trial, as the triplets are recruited".[273] Although existing evidence suggests that badger removal is unlikely to have adverse ecological consequences (see paragraph 23 above), we support the environmental impact study that is now underway and we recommend that it be made public as soon as it is completed.

v. Badger densities

91. The CCW were also highly critical of the commencement of the trial before methodologies for assessing badger density had been resolved which they regarded as integral to the trial protocol.[274] As English Nature pointed out, it was necessary to know the proportion of badgers removed in order for this to be included it in the analysis of data. They were concerned that "it may not be possible to carry out the required fieldwork to the high standard required" with the inevitable result that "there would then be pressure to extend the trial by culling more and more badgers in an attempt to reach a statistically-valid conclusion".[275] Dr Woodroffe agreed that "there is no validated technique currently for estimating badger numbers in the field without catching them".[276] However, the Bourne Group had few concerns about the impact of this upon the trial. They had made no formal estimate of the badger population in Putford but they were satisfied that they had caught a high proportion during the trapping operation. The MAFF research proposals include a project to develop new techniques of estimating badger density. This would be helpful to the trial but we accept that it is not essential to know exact densities of badgers, only that numbers have been greatly reduced in the proactive areas.

The statistical power of the trial

92. The factors described above all affect the efficacy of the trial and therefore its statistical power. The extent to which they prove disruptive has to be built into the calculations of the Bourne Group on whether the trial can succeed. The Group clearly has been persuaded of this but the question still deserves careful examination here as it lies at the heart of this whole inquiry. Our first observation is that the Bourne Group are overseeing a "trial" not an "experiment". This is not mere semantics. The distinction is that a trial aims to test the practical utility of a methodology whereas an experiment aims to test a scientific hypothesis. The culling trial is a trial because its function is primarily to test the cost-effectiveness of badger culling as a means of reducing the frequency of TB breakdowns in cattle, and only secondarily to test the role of badgers as a reservoir of infection.

93. Once this distinction is appreciated, most of the criticisms that have been made of the trial can be put in context. For example, factors such as sabotage by animal rights activists, inability to capture all the badgers in the culling areas, and farmers refusing access to their land will not render the trial invalid: they are simply part of the field conditions that the trial is intended to incorporate. Any culling strategy developed out of the trial would have to include all these factors as part of its implementation in the real world. Most of the factors discussed above therefore have little impact on the successful running of the trial. The one exception is illegal culling of badgers. This is the only factor which could result in the trial failing to show that culling is a practical way of reducing the incidence of TB, when in fact it would be. It is therefore extremely important to encourage the co-operation of farmers in the control areas and also to monitor the control areas periodically to assess the incidence of killing, as we have recommended above. The use of mortality tags to estimate the level of illegal culling should be further investigated. However, we believe that this is a theoretical rather than a practical problem at this stage as we accept the evidence that the various forms of interference and non-compliance already referred to have not in fact been a major problem in the culls so far carried out. Given sufficient resources from MAFF to ensure that the fieldwork and laboratory analysis are carried out in good time, there is no reason to believe that the trial cannot be implemented.

94. The factors we have described along with many others have an impact on the power of the trial or its ability to achieve a reliable result in a given time. Our major concern is that the combination of the many logistical problems, including trapping efficiency, non-compliance and the closed season, will act to reduce the power of the experiment and hence the robustness of the trial as originally conceived. These factors may well vary between trial areas and vary during the time course of the experiment. Moreover, it is neither clear to us what is defined as a "breakdown" nor how one determines what are independent breakdowns to insure against double-counting. As such, it is essential that power analysis is undertaken as the trial proceeds and more data becomes available. In this respect it is necessary for the Bourne Group to undertake regular power analyses, which should be verified independently by an expert, and to keep the Minister informed of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the trial. This is an essential component of the study and sufficient resources should be available to ensure it is undertaken regularly, preferably quarterly. We also recommend that the original data behind the power analysis conducted by Dr Donnelly from the Bourne Group, from which she concluded that the trial required ten triplets and should take five years, be verified by an external expert and the results of this check be made publically available. There is no flaw in the trial as such but these weaknesses could influence the confidence of the results and the clarity of any final policy decision.

95. The key question is whether the trial should go ahead or whether as has been suggested to us it should be abandoned or at least suspended until doubts about its power or procedures have been resolved. Professor Krebs argued strongly for its continuation: "I still believe that there is no alternative way forward in relation to badger culling or non-culling that can be justified. It is not justified to stop, it is not justified to do a mass cull because the evidence is not there, so if MAFF decided to abandon it, then they would be in great difficulty because they would have to start all over again with a further inquiry and I do not believe that is appropriate".[277] We agree. The lessons of the past where the live test trial collapsed in ignominy after only eighteen months are that the problem of TB in cattle needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency and through a thoroughly researched scientific approach. Professor Bourne also stressed that "we are totally convinced that this a sensible way forward. What alternatives are there? We have heard of alternatives but frankly they do not stack up and they will all simply repeat mistakes of the past. You will get ten years down the line being no further forward than you are now."[278] We do not accept that the answers to the questions posed by the trial are already known and we are greatly intrigued by Professor Bourne's comment that "There may be some surprising answers at the end of this trial".[279] The trial should provide invaluable information about the cost-effectiveness of culling that could not be obtained by any other means and for this reason it is in the best interests of all concerned, including those who care deeply about the welfare of the badger as a species, for it to continue. We recommend that the culling trial be implemented in full and strongly encourage all interested parties to co-operate with it in order that reliable results be attained in the minimum possible time and with the minimum loss of life to badgers.

Speed of implementation

96. Our support for the culling trial is dependent upon the speed and propriety of its implementation. The Minister told us "I am as confident as I can be that we can conduct the culling aspect of the overall strategy in the areas once they are designated".[280] However, we are concerned both at the delays in commencing and completing the fieldwork for the first two triplets and the haste with which the trial was begun before all the necessary protocols such as external auditing were in place. We are not in a position to judge whether the impression created that something had to be seen to be done after so much time had already been wasted is a correct one but it is certainly one which persists and needs to be addressed. From the point we have now reached, it is important that both the Bourne Group and MAFF staff learn from these experiences and that the speed with which the rest of the trial is implemented be increased. MAFF is currently planning to have all ten triplets up and running by the end of 2000. This obviously has an impact on the overall length of the trial, although as Professor Bourne told us "it is the quantitative data that we need and it will take time to achieve that. Whether it is five years or seven years or four years, we do not know. It depends on the strength of the data". [281] He also told us that "if the data is strong enough we could perhaps terminate this prematurely".[282] This argues even more strongly for more effort and resources to be devoted to the trial. The former head of the Badger Panel suggested that it should be "compressed into three years by bringing forward new trial areas and providing the necessary full level of funding".[283] He argued that "a prolonged trial will mean the data is more difficult to interpret, the problem for the cattle industry horrendous and the credibility of Government to find a solution lost with unknown consequences". We share this view.

97. The question remains of how to speed up the trial. The NFU suggested that all ten triplets should be up and running by the end of this year, twice as fast as MAFF intends.[284] Others have suggested that at the very least the ten triplets should be identified this year so that farmers are reassured that the trial is going ahead. We sympathise with this view but it must be weighed against the Bourne Group's insistence on using the most up to date data to establish the trial areas. Early identification could exclude potential areas of interest, particularly given the increasing spread of the disease. We recommend that MAFF together with the Bourne Group examine ways in which the trial could be implemented more speedily without impugning its scientific rigour. At very least a target should be established for the full implementation of all ten triplets by the start of the closed season in February 2000 and progress towards this should be closely monitored. This is in keeping with the Bourne Group's recommendation last July. Like them, we recognise the logistical difficulties this involves but we consider it to be essential. Further delays cannot be tolerated. We examine below whether areas in addition to the planned ten triplets should be enrolled in the trial.[285]

Role of the Bourne Group

98. The six members of the Bourne Group represent a wide range of expertise, including epidemiology, statistics and badger behaviour. The Group has also co-opted an economist to increase the skills available to them. Witnesses suggested that other interests and areas of knowledge should be represented on the Group. For example, the RCVS and the BVA not surprisingly wished to include a veterinarian,[286] although, as Mr Rooker reminded us, Professor Bourne himself is a vet.[287] English Nature considered that "the Expert Group may wish to seek greater involvement from those with experience of badger field studies" to review the experiment.[288] This was echoed by the NFBG who were "concerned that the Group does not have members with more expertise in badger welfare, on farming practices and in dealing with practical issues of bovine tuberculosis in badgers and cattle." [289] We have considered whether new members should be added to the Group to meet these concerns. The Minister was against this, arguing that "I do not want ... to replicate a mini-MAFF inside the Expert Group".[290] He added, "I do not think that would provide us with the independent scientific advice". In this respect, the Bourne Group is crucially different from the Badger Panel which preceded it which did include representatives from farming, badger groups and other interests. The role of the Bourne Group is to oversee the scientific trial and while we appreciate the vital importance of ensuring that they are aware of the practical implications of the trial and advice to Ministers, we feel that it would be most appropriate to achieve this through regular contacts and communication between the Group and other parties, as the NFU suggested.[291] It is essential that the independence of the Group is not compromised by imputations of bias from either lobby. We do not recommend therefore that new members be appointed to widen the representation on the Group.

99. There is also the question of the effectiveness of the Group as currently constituted. Mr Rooker was adamant that "the Independent Scientific Group is running the trial, overseeing the trial, and we are relying on their advice and expertise".[292] Nevertheless, we detected some tensions between the Group and MAFF on how the Krebs programme was to proceed. There are clear disagreements between the two parties over the road traffic accident survey, for example, which have delayed decisions on its implementation.[293] There was also dispute over the estimate of 500 badgers in Putford disseminated by MAFF without the approval of the Bourne Group and which resulted in so much adverse publicity. If the Bourne Group really is running the trial as is claimed, we would have expected their advice to be listened to in this and other matters. Again, while Professor Bourne has recorded his thanks to MAFF, particularly the Wildlife Unit, for their hard work in implementing the two triplets and his appreciation of the support offered by Ministers,[294] the discrepancy between his firmly stated target of implementation of the entire trial by the end of 1999 and MAFF's more relaxed timetable remains of concern. The Bourne Group will need to have the strength and authority to ensure that the schedule for implementation is met. At the moment, it is not evident that this is the case or that the Group have any sanctions should the timetable slip. This problem must be addressed by the Minister as a matter of urgency. We note that the Food Standards Agency is to be given the sanction of publication of its advice to Ministers. The Bourne Group is not a statutory body but full use of its ability to publish reports recommending action by MAFF would enhance its credibility.

Communication of data and information

100. In its response to the Krebs report, the Government gave a commitment to make data available to outside researchers. This is an issue which matters greatly to those who gave evidence to us. For example, the NFBG called for data to be made available at the earliest opportunity and for this to be "balanced data sets ... rather than just those which focus on the badger".[295] They complained that they had asked the Government or the Bourne Group for information on various points but not received satisfactory answers, commenting "If we are not given that information it does not instil confidence".[296] The NFU also thought that "the release of information as discovered throughout the trial period is important";[297] while one of their members wrote that "greater openness by MAFF about all the facts and figures would help the general public understand the issue better".[298] It is therefore regrettable that despite MAFF's initiative in establishing a website dedicated to the issue, we were told that "there actually is much less information flowing than there was under previous strategies. It is hard to find out what is happening".[299]

101. There are two issues here - that of releasing scientific data from the trial before it is complete and that of MAFF's public relations strategy - which we will examine separately. From a scientific point of view, the position is clear that data from an experiment should never be analysed, let alone released, until the experiment is completed as planned. Once a power analysis has been used as a basis for setting the sample size, the experiment should not be terminated prematurely or added to. The Bourne Group itself has undertaken not to conduct an interim analysis until there have been 100 breakdowns, with further interim analyses about every six months thereafter.[300] The question arises of whether either the analyses or the data should be released at that time. The decision is a political one, in that independent scientists will be aware of the limitations of such preliminary data and the only gain would be to reassure the public that there was not a conspiracy of silence and that the trial was coming up with meaningful results. Against this is the argument that interested parties may either misrepresent the data or come to premature conclusions that are not borne out by the eventual outcome of the trial. Professor Bourne told us that "we want to be as transparent as we can" but "we do have to be careful, as a Group, that data is not released which could compromise the trial and interfere with the integrity of the trial in future, and which would lead individuals to make an early assessment, an early analysis, on the basis of totally inadequate data".[301] He has asked the Minister to ensure that the agreement of the Group is obtained before any data is released.[302] Mr Rooker himself told us "the way it is released and the timing of the release of valid, scientific information for use by other scientists is obviously of interest, but we must release it so it is valid, it is scientific and of use to other scientists. I am not going to release it just because it is of use to a PR campaign for the NFU or a PR campaign for the badger groups."[303] The NFU meanwhile called for periodic progress reports in which the information was "put in context so that the danger of misrepresentation is minimised".[304]

102. In the past, the Ministry has been criticised for their slowness, and some would say hindrance, in the release of scientific data to bona fide scientists. Quite clearly, the data from the trials must be readily available to scientists for analysis and then these findings should be released to interested parties and the media as soon as possible. However, we are very aware that early release of such data may jeopardise the trial and lead to farmers and others in control areas reacting to the findings. We feel strongly that nothing should be done to jeopardise the trial. We recommend that the Bourne Group prepare and release progress reports on a quarterly basis summarising the progress of the trial and giving qualitative indications of the preliminary results, with a strong warning as to the reliability of conclusions based on the data. The contents for these reports is obviously a matter for further discussion within the Bourne Group but we recommend that, in consultation with an independent expert statistician, they carefully consider what information can be made available, when and in what form and that their decision be made known to the public well in advance. A criterion of no release of data before a certain point had been reached, be it 100 breakdowns or the recruitment of all ten triplets, would be better understood and respected than the current uncertainty over policy on the release of information. None of the considerations above relate to the release of data once the trial has finished. We recommend that once the trial as planned is completed, the results be published as soon as possible and all data be made as widely available as possible for analysis by scientists or other parties.

103. Release of data is the responsibility of the Bourne Group. General public relations for the trial and indeed the whole Krebs package is the concern of MAFF and it would appear on current form that it has been handled less than perfectly. As Professor Bourne said, "there is a misconception that the trial is cull, cull, cull ... I do believe that there is a much more vigorous PR job that must be done here, on better informing members of the public about what we are doing."[305] This is particularly important in the TB hotspots, both areas identified for triplets and those where farmers are anxious to see action taken to address the threat of herd breakdowns on their farms. The Wildlife Trusts told us that "there seems to be no local dialogue" and that MAFF "really does need to do a lot more about developing local dialogue with organisations like ourselves".[306] Such organisations have a major role to play in disseminating information to their members and while we deplore the decision of the Wildlife Trusts not to comply with the trial, we can understand that this lack of dialogue will not help to persuade them otherwise. The Minister denied that the trial had been a public relations disaster and claimed that those who referred to it in these terms were not recognising the complicated nature of the issue.[307] However, the ease with which sympathy has been stirred up by those who wish to present this as a simple choice between badgers and farmers demonstrates more clearly than anything else the failure of MAFF to get its point across. We realise that this is an extremely sensitive issue and that many people will never be reconciled to the trial. Nevertheless, although it is now perhaps too late to repair the damage, the public relations strategy should be re-examined to ensure that the public and those groups who represent special interests are aware of all the issues and developments. We recommend that MAFF reassess its PR strategy in relation to the implementation of the Krebs report, with particular attention to improving public awareness of the purpose of the culling trial.

104. A specific issue about openness and MAFF's predisposition for secrecy was raised by the RCVS. They told us that local veterinary inspectors, who are key players in informing farmers in their area about TB, were sometimes not informed of action taken by MAFF following the identification of TB reactors.[308] This criticism was not directly related to the trial but "stems from the lack of communication between MAFF and LVIs on the whole subject of TB control and TB presence in the area".[309] It was backed by a group of farmers from the South West who told us that "cattle testing by MAFF ... needs to be less secretive, with more communication between MAFF Tolworth and the grass roots who have to operate the policy: vets, farmers and the local VI centres".[310] We recommend that the communication strategy followed by MAFF in relation to informing vets and farmers about TB incidents be reviewed.

The Bern Convention

105. On 2 December last year wildlife organisations including the NFBG presented arguments to the Standing Committee of the Bern Convention that the culling trial contravened the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory. The Standing Committee adopted a recommendation calling on the Government to postpone the trial and to prepare a response on the planned culling trial. The Minister told us that MAFF would put forward "a very robust defence" to show it was complying with the Convention.[311] The decision against the UK has hardened opposition to the trial, being raised in evidence to us by several badger groups and the Wildlife Trusts.[312] We are concerned that the significance of the Convention does not seem to have been considered in advance by MAFF legal officers. Professor Krebs told us that the advice he received from MAFF on the legal framework for badger culling had not mentioned the Bern Convention, although he added that "it would not have actually altered my conclusions, recommendations had I been aware of it at the time".[313] By the time the Bourne Group came to consider the implementation of Krebs, MAFF had added the Convention to its list of legal implications to bring to the attention of the Group but Professor Bourne told us "They believed it not to be an issue and we are persuaded subsequently that it is not an issue".[314] It appears that MAFF officials made no attempt to prepare a case for the December hearing which went ahead without even seeing the Krebs report.[315] Mr Rooker found the Standing Committee's behaviour "astonishing". We find it astonishing that MAFF placed their Ministers in such an embarrassing position. We understand that the Standing Committee's finding has no legal implications. However, we await with interest the outcome of the Government's defence of its policy.