7. Historically, Government policy towards the eradication of bovine TB has concentrated on three areas. First, since the 1930s, the immediate public health implications have been addressed through the pasteurisation of virtually all milk. Heating milk destroys the bacterium responsible for the disease (Mycobacterium bovis or M. bovis) in the same way as it is destroyed by cooking meat. The sale of unpasteurised or "green top" milk is closely regulated. In England and Wales,all herds from which untreated milk is sold directly to the public are subject to annual testing for bovine TB, while in Scotland the sale of such milk is prohibited. Secondly, all carcases are inspected at slaughterhouses by Meat Hygiene Inspectors for signs of tuberculosis. Thirdly, the disease has been attacked at source by a programme of eradication of bovine TB in the national herd. This began in 1935 with voluntary testing but in 1950 a compulsory programme was introduced. Animals reacting positively to the TB test ("reactors") were removed for slaughter and two further tests of each remaining animal were required before the herd was declared TB free or "attested". By commencing the eradication programme in low incidence areas and using cattle from these herds to restock in the worse affected areas, after ten years the whole of the UK was officially attested. Continuation of the policy meant that by 1986 the number of infected cattle had fallen to 0.01% of the national herd.[5]

8. The dramatic reduction in the national incidence figures, however, masks the fact that the eradication programme met with markedly less success in the south west of England (see figure 1). This indicated that there was an infection source in these areas that was probably a wild animal reservoir. In 1971 attention switched to the badger as a potential wildlife reservoir when a dead badger infected with bovine TB was found on a farm in Gloucestershire which had just suffered a TB breakdown.[6] Tests by MAFF showed that the prevalence of TB in badgers was higher than in other species and the link with TB in cattle was convincing enough by 1973 for MAFF to sponsor the Badger Act which gave Ministers the power to issue licences for the culling of badgers where they presented a threat to animal health. In 1975, as a result of concerns about individuals shooting badgers or killing them by other means, the Conservation of Wild Creatures and Wild Plants Act permitted the use of gas as a method of control and the Government undertook that only MAFF staff or authorised persons could obtain licences. At the same time the Consultative Panel on Badgers and Tuberculosis was formed to advise MAFF on this area of policy. The Panel had members drawn from the fields of conservation, welfare, farming and veterinarians.

9. According to the British Veterinary Association (BVA), the gassing strategy was "effective" but was considered "inhumane and therefore unacceptable".[7] Criticism of the practice and of the purported link between infected badgers and cattle led to MAFF asking Lord Zuckerman to review the problem and make recommendations. During the review period (September 1979 to October 1980) gassing operations were suspended. Zuckerman's report, Badgers, Cattle and Tuberculosis, concluded that "on scientific grounds it was clear that badgers constituted a significant reservoir of bovine TB", that "the high density and close proximity of the cattle and badger populations in parts of South-West England favoured the transmission of the disease" and that "the disease seemed to have spread since control measures had been halted".[8] Following his recommendations, the so-called "clean ring" strategy was introduced in which all badgers were culled in the area of an outbreak until a clean ring of uninfected badger setts was found. Continuing doubts over the humaneness of gassing led to its replacement by cage trapping and shooting. We were told that the clean-ring policy was "effective".[9] However, in September 1984 MAFF implemented another of Zuckerman's recommendations which was to initiate a second policy review three years after his report. Professor Dunnet was therefore commissioned by the Government "to conduct an overall review of the problem of dealing with badgers infected with bovine tuberculosis insofar as it affects the eradication of the disease in cattle, taking into account changes in the field and research since Lord Zuckerman reported on the problem in 1980". In March 1986 Dunnet concluded that there had to be some form of badger control. He expected, however, that there would soon be an effective means of testing live badgers for TB and that a further review would be possible once sufficient data from research and badger removals were available. Consequently, he advised the use of an "interim strategy".[10]

10. The interim strategy put in place in 1986 involved the removal and culling of badgers only from farms where a TB incident had been confirmed and attributed to badgers. Of the three badger control strategies of the last 25 years, it is this which has attracted most criticism in evidence to us. The NFU described it as "much maligned ... flawed for several different reasons".[11] Other witnesses identified these flaws as twofold: first, the interim strategy targeted only badgers on the farm and not whole social groups with the effect of encouraging the movement of badgers, possibly infected with TB, into the cleared areas;[12] and second, there was too long a delay between the detection of TB in cattle and action taken against the badger.[13] The statistics indicate its failure as incidence of TB increased in traditional hotspots and the disease appeared in other previously clear areas. By 1993 there was "general recognition" among members of the Consultative Panel that "the Government needed to address the increased incidence of badger-related TB breakdowns".[14] On 8 December 1993 the then Parliamentary Secretary, Nicholas Soames MP, announced a new six-point plan, the centrepiece of which was a five-year trial of a live test for TB in badgers. The interim strategy would remain in place outside the trial areas.[15]

11. There were doubts about the live test from the start. In examining MAFF's Departmental Annual Report in 1994, our predecessor Committee concluded that "We are extremely doubtful that this trial will produce meaningful results, and we consider that the Government is floundering as a result of the need to be seen to be doing something, while simultaneously placating anxious cattle farmers and badger supporters within the wider community". Somewhat presciently, they added "the most likely upshot of this policy will be to provide The Archers with a rich vein of story-lines in the years ahead, rather than to solve the real problem which exists".[16] In the event, the trial was abandoned after 18 months due to the poor sensitivity of the test which correctly identified only 41% of infected badgers, as well as problems with the trial design. The interim strategy itself ended upon the publication of the Krebs review in December 1997, although the new Government had already halted badger removal operations in any new counties immediately after the 1997 election.[17] While awaiting decisions on the implementation of the Krebs report, there has been a moratorium on culling of badgers in the UK.

12. There are clear lessons to be drawn from this short review of past policies. The first is, as Mr Rooker told us, "the old policies did not work ... they did not control bovine TB, they certainly did not eliminate it."[18] The RCVS believed that the failure of these policies, specifically the abandoning of the clean ring strategy in 1986, meant that the overall aim of achieving the eradication of TB in cattle which had been mooted in the 1930s was no longer possible: TB has become "endemic in the badger population and now there is effectively no hope of eradication and we have to look to control".[19] Professor Bourne accepted that the aim was now control, rather than elimination, but reflected that "the effectiveness of these policies is unknown".[20] The second lesson is the effect of failure. Self-evidently, the worst effect is that bovine TB is continuing to rise but there is also the impact on the willingness of both farmers and conservationists to co-operate with any new strategy. The TFA described it as "frustrating that after many years of research no adequate method has been found to check the spread of the disease", while the NFBG pointed out that "over 20,000 badgers have been killed already by the Government, and yet TB in cattle is increasing".[21] The third and final lesson is why these strategies have been unsuccessful. It is accepted that the main explanation lies in the lack of a sound scientific understanding on which policy decisions could be taken. The badger groups quite rightly object that "the terms of reference of the last three independent scientific reviews [Zuckerman, Dunnet and Krebs] have focussed on badgers and bovine tuberculosis; they have not focussed on the whole issue."[22] It is equally the case that, as the Country Landowners' Association (CLA) wrote, "there has, for too long, been too little science and too much political judgement in this policy area".[23] As Professor Krebs told us, past policies had been to "get on and do it without finding out whether the thing you are doing is really the thing that is going to have an effect. That is why we are in this situation at the moment. It is not because we have focussed on badgers; we just have not approached it in a way that policy is based on evidence."[24] To avoid the charge in future that "significant amounts of public money [have been] spent on TB control measures that were inadequately thought through and were not subject to adequate scientific scrutiny",[25] it is essential that future policy in this area is based on sound science and conclusive evidence and commands the full commitment of all parties involved.

CURRENT SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS

13. An understanding of the epidemiology of bovine TB requires identification of the factors that determine exposure of cattle to the pathogen and those that predispose individuals to infection. While the factors influencing susceptibility still require greater investigation, field studies on badgers give some indication of transmission routes and patterns of infection. Infection status of individual badgers can vary greatly. Some individuals appear resistant to infection while others may carry a latent infection, for example, where they carry an infection but do not excrete bacilli but then commence excreting bacilli at a later date. However, there is no clear evidence of acquired immunity in adults but some data to suggest cubs may develop immunity. Development of an infection in individual badgers is probably related to age and stress, in a manner similar to that recorded for human tuberculosis. There are several potential routes of infection, via coughing from a respiratory infection, through sputum, open wounds with infected pus and through urine or faeces. There is reasonable evidence that mothers pass the pathogen to their cubs by coughing on them in humid and enclosed underground setts. Another possible route is through urine, deposited at scent marking places and badger latrines.[26]

14. Rapid transmission occurs within badger groups but between group transmission is relatively scarce.[27] Since most lesions are found in badger lungs we can suppose that most between badger transmission occurs through the pulmonary route. Infection rarely causes mortality in badgers and does not induce morbidity or influence behaviour in anything but a small proportion of severe cases, so most workers agree that TB in badgers has little influence on badger abundance. There is no evidence that infection increases with badger density but there is some evidence that group sizes of more than eight individuals are more likely to be infected than smaller group sizes although this idea remains unproven. There is the possibility that some setts may remain infected for long periods of time since warm, dark and humid conditions tend to favour survival of the bacillus, perhaps for several months.

15. Further insight can be achieved by undertaking molecular typing of M. bovis. Work to date indicates that the TB spoligotypes (particular molecular strains - see Glossary) are usually clustered in specific areas implying that herd breakdowns are localised events originating from a relatively static reservoir. In many instances cattle and badgers have been found to share similar spoligotypes but further sampling of badgers, cattle and other wildlife would help to identify which species can share the infection. We stress, however, that care is needed in the interpretation of these data since without careful temporal as well as spatial sampling one can never be sure of the direction of infection and there is a tendency to assume transmission from wildlife to cattle rather than the reverse.[28]

16. Since cattle infected with TB usually carry respiratory infection, a possible route of badger to cattle transmission is from the inhalation of bacilli from badger urine.[29] Cattle preferentially graze edges of fields and when grazing pressure is high they will be forced to graze close to badger latrines and scent marking areas that are frequently deposited at the edge of fields. One hypothesis states that since badgers urinate when they scent mark and they do this when they cross field boundaries then there would be increased transmission where their home range includes small fields. There is some evidence to support this hypothesis but other evidence indicates that a range of habitat and climatic conditions influences transmission between species.

17. There are other theories of transmission which do not involve the badger at all. It has been suggested that other wildlife species may act as alternative or additional TB reservoirs. Bovine TB has been found in a range of species, including ferrets, rats and deer, as noted in the Krebs report,[30] although it is difficult to assess its prevalence as the number of samples examined by MAFF for which data is available is too small. These species may be "spill over hosts" from badgers but provide a significant reservoir for cattle infection even when prevalence in these species is low since they may have frequent contact with cattle. Better estimates of infection levels and of possible transmission routes involving species other than the badger could be invaluable in determining a policy to control bovine TB. We recommend that MAFF ensure that a thorough and well designed sampling procedure of wildlife species other than the badger be put in place in the badger removal areas to determine if M. bovis can persist in other species when badgers are removed. This sampling should concentrate on species with frequent contact with cattle including rats, ferrets and deer.

18. There is also the question of the extent to which TB infection in cattle results from intra-species transmission, ie cattle to cattle.[31] The Krebs report dismisses this theory, citing a 1995 research paper which indicates that "present evidence suggests that although some recently infected cattle do excrete M. bovis, transmission to other cattle is not common".[32] Krebs did not recommend any further work on this issue and MAFF has made no provision for any research projects in this area in the current financial year. However, we believe that it should not be overlooked. We recommend that further research be undertaken into the relative importance of cattle to cattle transmission of bovine TB and means of controlling it.

THE BADGER

19. The badger (Meles meles) is widely distributed across Eurasia, ranging from about 15°to 65°N, and from about 10°W to 135°E. The most recent global report on the population and management of badgers concludes that population density is moderate (0.1 -0.99 badgers/km²) over most of central and eastern Europe and high (>0.1 badgers/km²) in Ireland, Sweden and Great Britain.[33] No estimate is made of the total population size, but Griffiths and Thomas conclude that available data "do not evoke a great deal of concern for the status of the badger in Europe as a whole".[34] Thus, the species is not currently endangered.

20. Badgers occur throughout the whole of mainland Britain and also on the Isle of Wight, Arran and Anglesea.[35] The number of badger social groups in Britain was estimated to be about 42,000 in the late 1980s[36] and about 50,000 in the mid-1990s, [37] an increase of 24%. These counts, based on numbers of main setts, translate into approximate numbers of adult badgers of 250,000 and 295,000 respectively, assuming a mean group size of 5.9.[38] More detailed data on changes in population sizes are available from three study areas: Wytham Woods, Oxfordshire; Woodchester Park, Gloucestershire; and part of the South Downs, East Sussex.[39] All three studies also indicate an approximate doubling of badger population density since the 1970s. Given that the British countryside has long since ceased to be a naturally regulated ecosystem, it is meaningless to discuss whether the population density of badgers has reached an "unnatural" level.

21. The maximum growth rate of badger populations is considered to be about 70% per annum but this rate of increase falls as badger populations increase, probably as a consequence of competition between badgers for food.[40] Competition for food results in reduced breeding rates, which will ultimately regulate the population at some level determined by food availability. Before this level is reached populations may be limited by the availability of suitable ground so the abundance of badgers and the population growth rate is a balance between availability of setts and food coupled with past culling. Most populations of badgers have been increasing because their natural mortality, including those killed in road accidents, is about 50% and usually lower than the reproductive output of the population. When a population is suppressed, badgers will have increased productivity and there will be dispersal into unoccupied areas so that localised culling is compensated for and is unlikely to have a significant impact on total population size, a conclusion also reached in a recent Council of Europe report.[41]

22. Badgers were first protected in Britain by the Badger Act 1973 (amended in 1981 and 1985) and subsequently by the Badgers Act 1991, Badgers (Further Protection) Act 1991 and Protection of Badgers Act 1992. This protection has always been acknowledged to be welfare-based: that is, it is intended to defend the species against cruelty such as badger-baiting rather than to conserve it for ecological reasons. Apart from being listed in Appendix III of the Bern Convention, badgers are not the subject of any international treaty or legislation. In most of the countries to which the Bern Convention applies, badgers are hunted either for sport or because they are perceived as a pest; and over much of Europe badger setts were gassed in the 1960s and 1970s for purposes of rabies control.[42] With the possible exception of the Netherlands, therefore, it is probably fair to say that since the 1970s badgers have enjoyed better protection, not just in theory but in practice, in Britain than anywhere else in the species' range.

23. The ecology and behaviour of badgers, especially their feeding ecology, have been extensively studied, especially in the UK.[43] In addition, an assessment of the potential ecological impact of badger culling has been undertaken by MAFF's Central Science Laboratory (see paragraph 90 below).[44] Badgers prey on a wide range of animal and plant species but there is no evidence that they impact significantly on any of these other than hedgehogs. In the UK, they have no predators other than man. They have readily discernible effects on the landscape in the immediate vicinity of a main sett[45] but only minor effects elsewhere: for example, they may act as seed dispersers but probably not to any significant extent nor for any plant species that are uncommon. Altogether, badgers seem to be an "ecologically neutral" species, in the sense that few significant positive or negative effects on other species would be expected as a result of their localised extinction.

24. Of course, badgers also have a special cultural significance in this country. They are used as the symbol of the Wildlife Trusts and many people are members of badger groups which originally came into existence to protect the species against badger baiting and other cruelty, and now have a more general protective role.[46] It should also be said that, despite the deep division evident in responses to badger culling, farmers can also be badger lovers. Many farmers are not only prepared to tolerate but actively wish to encourage populations of healthy badgers on their land.[47]

INCIDENCE OF BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS IN CATTLE

25. Although official figures for the whole of 1998 are not yet available, there is no doubt that the recent escalation in the incidence of bovine TB in cattle has continued. Table 1 below gives the number of new confirmed tuberculosis incidents from 1995 to 1997 with provisional figures for 1998.

Note: A small number of laboratory test results are still pending so the 1998 figure may change slightly as further results become available.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.

Of course, these figures relate only to herds which had been TB free, so the real number of cases is even higher. In 1997 there were 515 new confirmed herd breakdowns which meant the total number of herds under restriction was about 750, according to the NFU.[48] Table 2 shows the increase in the number of cattle compulsorily slaughtered after reacting to the test or coming into contact with such animals over the last twenty years.

All figures include cattle reacting to the tuberculin test and contact animals. The animals are from herds which have had their Official Tuberculosis Free Status suspended. Some herds will have disease confirmed, others will not.

Source: MAFF statsheet 7, updated by information from MAFF.

It can be seen from these figures that there has been a steady rise in incidents since the low point of the early 1980s, and a far more dramatic rate of increase since 1990. The TB Committee of the National Beef Association had been told by "scientists involved in research into this disease" that "the spread will increase even faster in 1999."[49] They were rightly concerned that TB incidents were occurring in new areas including Cheshire, the main dairying area of the UK. While still mainly a problem in certain hotspot areas of the country such as the South West which experienced a 45% increase in January to May 1998 compared to the same period in 1997 and the West Midlands where the increase was 27%,[50] Mr Rooker admitted that "the disease is on the move ... there is a northward spread, Derbyshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire".[51] Major outbreaks are also occurring in Wales, although in Scotland the incidence is low and falling.

26. This increase in the number of cases and the geographical spread of the disease is causing great alarm in the farming industry. Two contributors to the inquiry referred to bovine TB as becoming "out of control"[52], while the TFA spoke for many when they wrote of "a great fear amongst TFA members about the spread of TB ... the TFA is alarmed at the rapid rate of growth in TB outbreaks over recent years".[53] Their prediction that "If TB continues to increase in our cattle population at the rate it has been over the past year then we could have killed 110,000 cattle by the end of the five year period of the Krebs trial" is truly horrifying.[54] Comparisons of the breakdown rate in 1998 to that in 1948[55] underline the dread that the UK industry is returning to the pre-war levels of TB infection. However, the overall rate is still low for the UK as a whole. In 1997 0.07% of the national herd tested positive and, as Professor Krebs reminded us, "One should always bear in mind that TB, although increasing and increasing quite rapidly, is still a very rare disease. It is only a very small proportion of the national herd that is affected by it."[56] In addition, the public health risks of the situation are extremely low. Comparisons have been made to the BSE crisis at various points throughout this inquiry but we wish to emphasise that there is no call for the public panic on that issue to be reignited over bovine TB. A study in 1995 indicated that only 1% of human tuberculosis cases could be attributed to M. bovis and those were likely to be old cases which had lain dormant.[57] We fully accept MAFF's advice that "Human health generally continues to be protected by the heat treatment of milk and by cooking meat"[58] and the advice of Professor Krebs and the RCVS that there is no evidence of higher incidence of bovine TB among people working closely with animals.[59] While the public health implications of any disease must be borne in mind and the lessons of the BSE case indicate the growing public need for information, we agree with Mr Rooker that the risk in this case "is not great"[60] and we believe it should not be overplayed. We are concerned that the rise in bovine TB in cattle may be misunderstood and misrepresented in the media as being linked to the disturbing rise in the number of human TB cases in Britain, Eastern Europe and the USA. These are caused by the bacterium M. tuberculosis, a quite distinct species from that responsible for bovine TB.

27. Nevertheless, we would certainly agree that the rising incidence of bovine TB is a serious problem, with implications for public finances, the farming industry and animal welfare. In 1997 total expenditure on controlling TB in cattle in Great Britain was £16.1 million, of which £7.1m was spent on TB testing, £2.4m on compensation for slaughtered cattle, £4.1m on staff, £1.7m on badger removal operations and £1.7m on research (£0.9m was received for salvage value of carcases).[61] These costs were certain to rise significantly in 1998 and after, even without expenditure on the Krebs recommendations, owing to the increased number of cattle affected and the change of compensation rates from 75% to 100% of market value from August 1998. The spread of TB also increases the overall cost of testing to the public purse as the rate of testing is regulated by EU Directive 64/432/EEC which requires that where the level of disease for a country is less than 0.1% of the cattle herds, then testing is on a four yearly basis; if the level rises to between 0.1% and 0.2%, testing is three yearly; between 0.2% and 1% is two-yearly; and greater than 1% requires annual testing.[62] At present, there is no such thing as tuberculosis-free status for a country and although this is provided for under amendments to the Directive which come into force on 1 July 1999, MAFF is hopeful that it "can interpret it to be done on a regional basis"[63] in order to gain officially tuberculosis-free (OFT) status for the large majority of Britain which has a low rate of incidence.

28. The official method of recording TB statistics does not reveal the seriousness of the situation for individual farmers. As the CLA pointed out "`0.4 per cent' means 1 in 250 herds, and `1 per cent' means 1 in 100".[64] In the South West region of Gloucester, Avon and Wiltshire where the rate is now 2.59%, that means approximately 1 in 40 and for Cornwall with a present rate of 1.83%, it is about 1 in 50.[65] If a reactor is found during routine testing, movement restrictions are placed on the farm to prevent the spread of infection and the affected animal is taken away for slaughter. If TB is confirmed at slaughter, an incident or breakdown is recorded. Other farms considered to be at risk are tested, as are animals moved off the farm in the months before the incident. Cattle on the affected farm are tested again at a minimum of sixty days intervals and the restriction on movement is lifted only when two successive tests show the whole herd is TB-free.[66] These restrictions can remain for many months or even years, creating what the BVA described as "the devastating socio-economic effects of bovine tuberculosis on cattle farmers".[67]

29. While farmers are compensated for the cost of the slaughtered animals, it has been estimated by the NFU and accepted by MAFF that the compensation represents just 16% of the total cost of a breakdown.[68] We were told that other consequential costs mean that "the average outbreak costs each individual farmer £3,000 a month for the duration of his breakdown".[69] A high proportion of this total represents loss of potential profit rather than actual expenditure, although MAFF agreed that the loss of production and the restriction order "can cause significant disruption to a farm business, and can have prolonged effects on the viability of a farm".[70] MAFF listed the extra costs for "buildings, equipment and bedding, disruption of breeding programmes, loss of revenue from selling cattle at less than optimum times, purchasing or leasing additional milk quota to allow extra production to be marketed, loss of subsidy, and costs for additional feed".[71] The NFU told us that this was particularly a problem for farmers who sold store animals who would have no output from the farm during the restriction period, a point made also by the National Farmers' Union of Scotland.[72] The cost of insurance to cover such costs is prohibitive in high risk areas, if it is available at all, so the farmer has to bear a considerable financial burden. Individual farmers told us of costs of £200,000 in the last ten years and of the same sum in a single year.[73]

30. Mr Jerry Rider of the TFA brought home to us the point that the financial implications of a breakdown are more than matched by the enormous stress experienced by the farmer who cannot plan ahead and has no way of knowing whether bovine TB will recur in the herd.[74] We accept the TFA's argument that this is particularly serious for tenant farmers who do not have the value of the farm to fall back on and must continue to pay rent on the property.[75] However, it is a huge problem for all farmers whose herds are affected. There are fears that the situation might be made even worse if supermarkets decide that affected herds should be excluded under quality assurance schemes as a result of public concerns about the safety of food.[76] The NFU also claimed that "there is recent evidence to suggest that two-tier cattle markets are developing within certain hotspot areas".[77] In addition, there are implications for trade if animals and products from affected herds are banned under EU law.[78] The consequences to the farming industry if current levels of TB incidence are maintained, or worse continue to increase, clearly warrant the attention now being paid to the issue.

31. There remains the question of the effect of bovine TB on the cattle themselves. The evidence is that while infected cattle do suffer from the disease, the greater difficulty is the stress of testing which of course increases in frequency in the affected areas. The NFU, despite advocating more frequent testing, told us that "the injection seems to distress them enormously and the repeat exercise is not only dangerous and stressful for the animal, it is quite dangerous for the operators who are driving the stock through".[79] In any case, it is obviously in the interest of both cattle and badgers, despite their apparent lack of suffering, for the disease to be controlled.

32. It is evident then that a policy is needed to control bovine TB in cattle on economic and animal welfare grounds. It is also clear from the rapid rise of the disease that a solution is needed with some urgency if the problem is not to gain an even greater hold on ever widening areas of the country. The latest statistics on the increased rate and widening geographical distribution of herd breakdowns are alarming. We believe that MAFF should pay more attention to identifying the principal cause of this increased rate. One approach would be to apply models and examine whether the spatial and temporal patterns observed could be accounted for as a consequence of the cessation of the badger cull in 1997. Other factors and hypotheses must also be addressed. These should include the movement of cattle between farms, the presence of other immuno-suppressive infections such as Bovine Immunodeficiency Virus (BIV), the direct and indirect consequences of BSE, climate change and possible nutrient deficiencies. In the next section, we examine the most recent attempt by MAFF to determine a scientifically sound policy for managing bovine TB.