The Agriculture Committee has agreed to the following Report:—

1. Bovine tuberculosis (bovine TB) is a disease with a terrible history in the United Kingdom. In the decade before the Second World War, there were 50,000 new human cases each year and an annual death toll in excess of 2,500 people, largely caused by drinking unpasteurized milk from the national dairy herd where as many as 40% of the cows carried the infection.[1] A concerted strategy of slaughter of infected cattle and pasteurisation of milk reduced the incidence of bovine TB from over 17% of cattle tested in the 1930s to under 0.01% in 1986 and it seemed that control of this disease was one of the great public health success stories of the twentieth century. Then, at the end of the 1980s, the rate of infection in cattle began to rise and it has continued to do so ever since, with a total of 736 new herds affected in 1998 and the consequent slaughter of 6,086 cattle, an increase of over 50% on the previous year.[2] Of great concern is that these new incidents are occurring not only in the traditional strongholds of the disease in the south west of England but also in previously unrecorded counties such as Cheshire, which experienced two herd breakdowns in 1998.[3]

2. The resurgence of bovine TB also highlights an uncomfortable fact: past policy in this area has not eradicated the disease and could never hope to do so as the underlying cause and transmission route of bovine TB had never been scientifically established. There has long been a belief among MAFF staff, vets and the farming community that badgers are implicated in the spread of infection, as a result of which a badger culling policy has operated in various forms since the 1970s. Fifty years after the first attempts to control the disease, we now face the difficulty of finding a new strategy. This should be based for the first time on sound science, rather than folklore and guesswork.

3. In November 1996 Professor John Krebs and an Independent Scientific Review Group were charged by the last Government to review evidence of a link between badgers and bovine tuberculosis in cattle. The resulting report, Bovine Tuberculosis in Cattle and Badgers, was published on 16 December 1997, together with the new Government's response. An Expert Group headed by Professor John Bourne was established to review and implement Krebs' conclusions. Their first report was handed to Ministers in MAFF in July 1998 and on 17 August that year Mr Jeff Rooker, Minister of State responsible for this issue, announced the Government's decision to proceed with Krebs' recommendations, the most controversial of which was a trial to test whether and when culling badgers offered a cost-effective method of controlling bovine TB in cattle. The scale of public concern and debate about this development, both from animal welfare groups and from farmers, together with the public expenditure implications, led the Committee to decide to hold an inquiry into the subject. Accordingly, we announced terms of reference in a press notice of 4 November 1998, seeking evidence on "the practical implications of the Government's proposals for implementing the recommendations contained in the report on bovine tuberculosis in cattle and badgers by Professor John Krebs' Independent Scientific Review Group", with particular reference to:

"—  the design and likely effectiveness of the culling experiment proposed by the Krebs report, and any significant issues which will have to be considered by the independent Expert Group overseeing the experiment;

—  issues to be considered in the implementation of the experimental comparison of different husbandry methods proposed by the Krebs report;

—  the Government's implementation of the changes in the bovine TB research strategy proposed by Krebs;

—  other issues relating to the question of badgers and bovine tuberculosis, including the socio-economic effects of bovine tuberculosis on cattle farmers, the animal welfare implications of the proposed culling experiment, and the public expenditure implications of the Government's policy following the Krebs report."[4]

We specifically excluded evidence on "the historical and scientific background to the badgers and bovine TB issue, which is comprehensively covered by the Krebs report itself, except in relation to developments which have taken place since the Krebs report was published". It should be noted that the title of our inquiry reflected its focus on the implementation of the Krebs report, and was not a prejudgment by the Committee of the role of the badger in the increased incidence of herd breakdowns.

4. In response to this call for evidence we have received over 60 memoranda and held five oral evidence sessions, hearing from Professor Sir John Krebs, Professor John Bourne and members of the Expert Group, the National Federation of Badger Groups (NFBG), the Wildlife Trusts, the National Farmers' Union of England and Wales (NFU), the Tenant Farmers Association (TFA), the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS), MAFF officials and Mr Jeff Rooker MP, Minister of State at Agriculture. There were many other individuals and organisations who would have liked to appear before the Committee but our timescale for this inquiry was constrained by our wish to produce a report before the end of the closed season for badger culling on 30 April. We thank all who contributed to the inquiry for their assistance and for the generally high quality of their evidence. We regret that certain parties who are known to have a strong interest in these matters declined to provide us with a statement of evidence despite our best endeavours to facilitate this. We also regret the action of one particular lobby group which failed to submit evidence to the Committee in any form but instead a few days before our last evidence session instigated a letter-writing campaign to the Chairman. In excess of 3,500 letters were received in a little over a week and we are deeply concerned that so many members of the public have been misled about the role and powers of a select committee. The purpose of our inquiry is to examine the effectiveness of the Government's policy. In our report to Parliament we can only draw upon evidence which has been placed before us. No amount of letters, no matter how impressive or passionate, can influence our proceedings in the absence of such hard evidence. Fortunately, the animal welfare issues were well documented and cogently argued by the evidence received from groups such as the NFBG, the RSPCA, the Wildlife Trusts and many smaller organisations, all of whom ensured that by following the correct procedures their voices were heard.

5. We were greatly assisted in our examination of the evidence and understanding of the issues raised by this extremely complex and sensitive area of policy by our two specialist advisers, Professor Peter Hudson of the University of Stirling and Professor Tim Roper of the University of Sussex. To both, we extend our grateful thanks for their invaluable objectivity, guidance and expertise.

6. The purpose of this report is to examine whether the Krebs report as implemented by MAFF provides a sound basis for the development of a solution to the problem of TB in cattle. We recognise that the seriousness of the present situation is such that it is essential that MAFF adopt policies both for the short and long terms, founded always on scientific, practical and ethical grounds. In section II of our report we outline the background to the Krebs inquiry, including the historic policy in the UK towards bovine TB, the various control strategies implemented in the recent past, the state of scientific understanding of its epidemiology and the alleged role of the badger in infection of cattle. In section III we discuss the Krebs report itself and in section IV we assess the Government's implementation of Krebs' recommendations and progress towards a sustainable control policy. Our conclusions and recommendations are summarised in section V.