Designated ports scheme

128. The designated ports scheme is a somewhat different story. In March 1998, in an attempt to find a solution to the blackfish problem which the Minister felt was "out of control" at the time he took office,[463] the Government issued a consultation paper on plans to introduce a new scheme under which vessels over 20m in length fishing for non-pelagic species should either land their catch at a designated port within specified times or elsewhere give prior notification of their landing time.[464] This scheme came into operation on 5 January 1999 with the designation of 31 ports and a time limit of four hours notification in a non-designated port.[465] The EC approved of the measures as "the only possible response to the problem created by the multiplicity of landing points" and a "very positive" initiative, although the caveat was added that "it remains to be seen whether they [designated ports, together with satellites] will be sufficient".[466] Within the UK, the North Sea Fishermen's Organisation claimed to be "alone in welcoming the designated port scheme".[467] Writing in March, they believed that the scheme had been successful in its objectives and should perhaps be extended to cover a larger segment of the fleet, although the Organisation accepted that the restrictions were "undoubtedly unduly inflexible".[468] In fact, others had also supported the scheme. The Fleetwood Fish Forum believed that it "could assist in maintaining businesses from producer to processor and ancillary trades and services", by increasing the supply of fish at the port.[469] This view was shared by the Scottish Fish Merchants' Federation, which looked beyond the immediate objectives and concluded that, as well as stopping blackfish, designated ports "would hopefully establish centres of excellence where you would get economy of scale and all the services required for a modern food industry would be there".[470]

129. In general, the catching side of the industry was less sanguine. The CFPO believed "the implementation of designated ports to be a costly means of tackling a largely exaggerated problem, which will also compromise the safe operation of many fishing vessels and threaten the socio-economic existence of local 'non-designated' fishing ports".[471] In February this year, it told us of "bureaucracy gone mad", with fishermen expected to give exactly four hours notification of landing and in some cases missing the tide and hence losing fishing time because of the inflexibility of the regime.[472] The NFFO made the same point and suggested that "Amending the requirement to require advance notice anytime up to 4 hours prior to landing would greatly reduce the burden on vessel operations whilst not prejudicing the underlying point of the scheme".[473] In contrast to the CFPO's concerns about non-designated ports which were shared by the SFF,[474] the Grimsby industry complained that the "too restrictive" arrangements imposed on the port, which had been designated under the scheme, "had negated the Grimsby efforts to attract other vessels to the port".[475] Finally, the objectors to the scheme raised the usual point that it applied only to the UK and not to the rest of Europe[476] and the more serious consideration that its impact would be limited if vessels from other Member States landing in the UK were excluded from its application.[477] There were also industry concerns about flag-ships landing away from UK ports, evading the scheme's provisions.

130. MAFF reassured us that "the measures should not impact adversely on the economic viability or operation of individual ports or markets because vessels will be able to land their catch at any port and at any time".[478] The landing times for individual designated ports had been "determined on the basis of their normal working practices".[479] The Fisheries Departments also told us in December, before the scheme came into operation, that they would "keep the measures under

close review to ensure that they are practical, effective and meet the desired objectives".[480] We are pleased to be able to congratulate the Government on doing just that since as a result of representations "the arrangements were fine tuned with effect from 19 April 1999".[481] The periods of notice in particular have been greatly extended and made more flexible and the hours at designated ports adjusted. Revised controls on landings agreed at the December 1998 Fisheries Council also answered criticisms by applying the rules to vessels from elsewhere in Europe.[482] Mr Du Vivier of the SFPA confirmed that the scheme was being enforced against vessels of other Member States landing in Scotland.[483]

131. There is also general agreement that the system is achieving its primary objective of enhancing control of landings. Mr Goodlad of the SFF predicted in January that for white fish "the introduction of the designated landing port scheme will make any substantial landing of over-quota fish much more difficult in the next year".[484] This was borne out in Scotland by the Chief Executive of the Scottish Fishermen's Organisation who believed the scheme, together with the disappearance of the Russian factory ships as a result of EC rules on transshipment, had "wiped out blackfish".[485] Mr Morley agreed the scheme had been a success: "it is working, it is having an effect".[486] However, designated ports may yet turn out to be a temporary measure as the use of satellite monitoring equipment arguably could render designated ports restrictions redundant. There is to be a review at the end of the year in the course of which, Mr Du Vivier assured us, "There will be plenty of scope for trying to rationalise enforcement processes taking account of the industry's concerns about over-regulation."[487] We are encouraged by the success of the designated ports scheme and equally by the evidence it gives of the Government's willingness to listen and adapt regulations where possible to meet the industry's genuine concerns. We recommend that the Government continue to review all regulations imposed on the fishing industry with a view to ensuring that the regulatory system be streamlined and restrictions removed unless there is reason for their continuance consistent with the objectives we have set. However, we recommend the continuation of the designated ports scheme as a means of concentrating the industry and ensuring more effective management.

ENFORCEMENT

132. Enforcement is a difficult and costly business. The EC recognised that the UK had "a number of intrinsic difficulties" with which it had to cope, ranging from the wide extent of UK waters (some 725,000 sq km), a long coastline (approximately 16,000 kms) with over 450 landing points and many interfaces with the national zones of other Member States which created problems of coordination at sea.[488] In 1998 there were more than 170,000 landings by over 10m vessels and some 500,000 landings by smaller boats.[489] In addition, as the EC pointed out "many fish caught in UK waters will be landed outside the United Kingdom, which significantly complicates the combination of controls at sea and ashore".[490] The total spend by the UK on monitoring these activities and enforcing the rules is around £24m a year, of which £6m goes on shore work, £13.5m on surface surveillance and £4.5m on air surveillance.[491] The table below sets out the resources devoted to each of these tasks in 1998.

Source: UK Fisheries Department, Ev. p.244.

In that same year, there were 65,680 inspections on land, 4,136 inspections at sea and 34,225 sightings made by aircraft in the UK as a whole.[492] Figures for England and Wales in 1998 indicate that the Sea Fisheries Inspectorate undertook 4,271 inspections of vessels in ports and that the Royal Navy provided 1,081 patrol days and undertook 1,828 inspections at sea, at a cost of some £6m.[493]

133. Of course, not all of these inspections detect infringements of regulations. In 1998, UK authorities found a total of 1,446 infringements in respect of 810 vessels.[494] We were told that these were mainly misreporting of position or other logbook offences.[495] Where this occurs, a decision is then made by the UK Fisheries Departments on whether to prosecute. Some infringements are minor matters where such action is not necessary but the figures for prosecution seem comparatively low, with the owners and/or skippers of just 173 vessels prosecuted for 258 infringements in 1998. Even then the prosecution might not succeed. Of the boardings at sea by UK authorities in 1998, just 19 resulted in successful prosecutions.[496] The table below sets out information about fisheries prosecutions in England and Wales from 1996 to 1998.

¹ Includes skippers who are owners.
² Calculated as the total value of penalties imposed (fines and any financial
 penalties to the value of the catch and/or gear as appropriate) divided by the
 number of skippers prosecuted.
³ Information on the nationality of skippers is not readily available.

Source: MAFF, HC Debates, 31 March 1999, c742.

134. The overall performance of the UK in enforcing the fisheries regime is hard to judge as it is impossible to know what proportion of infringements are detected and hence whether the system is acting as a deterrent to would-be wrongdoers. Certainly, the industry believed itself to be uniquely stringently policed by the authorities. The CFPO, for example, declared that "the UK has the strictest enforcement body in Europe", whilst at the other end of the country the SFPA recognised that the industry regarded it as "rather more officious in the way it does its business than some other enforcement agencies in the rest of the Community".[497] However, the EC was equally certain that this was mere prejudice and that "Many in the UK over-estimate the effectiveness of British controls and underestimate the controls of other Member States".[498] It concluded that "the United Kingdom, which has been a forerunner as regards monitoring of fisheries, has tended to rest on its laurels while other Member States have made considerable progress".[499] Among the latter, it included Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain, the last named of which was foremost among complaints by UK fishermen. The EC's detailed criticisms of UK enforcement centred on its historical reliance on control at sea (which was in itself highly praised for the UK's "far-reaching experience and a widely-recognised professionalism"), compared to its average to poor record on shore controls. Other shortcomings were either dealt with no more effectively elsewhere or like the difficulties with misreporting of catches and blackfish were being tackled by fresh initiatives such as designated ports.[500]

135. On the accusation of bias towards sea enforcement, Mr Morley believed that the Commission's criticism of onshore inspections "was out of date", following the successful efforts made to combat blackfish.[501] The SFPA further explained that sea patrols were needed to monitor the boats of other Member States which fished in UK waters but landed their catch abroad. It was also the case that with such a long coastline "to cover every jetty that can take fish on a constant basis is just an impossibility".[502] It was therefore necessary to target resources to ensure worthwhile returns. The SFPA Director of Operations explained how the agency had changed its working methods to improve its monitoring and intelligence-gathering activities, seeing this as the key to the blackfish problem.[503] We were reassured by these answers, although we note that in England and Wales the number of patrol vessels actually increased from 1997 to 1998 while there was a slight decrease in the number of inspectors.[504]

136. We have some reservations, however, on how the effectiveness of UK enforcement is supported by the prosecution process. The figures for successful prosecutions seem to us too low to provide much of a deterrent to fishermen. Mr Wentworth of MAFF accounted for the difference between the number of infringements and the number of prosecutions by explaining that "Sometimes infringements are dealt with by warnings of some kind, written or otherwise" and that "There is also a question as to whether the evidence will be sufficient to secure a prosecution and whether it will serve a worthwhile purpose".[505] In Scotland we heard there had been particular difficulties with interpretations by the courts of the technical conservation regulations on the measurement of nets.[506] Such problems must be a disincentive for the enforcement officers on the ground and work against respect for the integrity of the system. Similarly, we heard concerns expressed that the time taken for a case to come to court was too long. On this latter point, the SFPA admitted hearing the complaint but argued that it was a matter for the Crown Office.[507] The Minister too accepted that "we do need to try to speed this up, although these are in the hands of lawyers and the legal system".[508] We recommend that the Government commission a review of how the prosecution process for fishing offences could be made more efficient, more speedy and more consistent. The Joint Nature Conservation Council also suggested that fines were too low to be proper deterrents.[509] Judging from the table above, we are inclined to agree. A vessel earning £600,000 a year is unlikely to be deterred by the distant prospect of an average fine of just over £2,000. In Norway, penalties for violations have been increased in the last decade in order to make it uneconomical to break the regulations.[510] We recommend that the penalties for serious breaches of fisheries regulations be increased and that information tables be published on the fines levied in different courts to ensure common levels of charges. We also recommend that licences be revoked for second offences.

137. The industry's attitude towards the UK enforcement agencies is coloured by its perception of the manner in which vessels of other Member States are treated in similar circumstances, both in UK waters and in their home territories. In the first instance, the fishermen in Cornwall, for example, told us that "the British in the United Kingdom waters in this area are monitored more intensely than the international players".[511] There is also a deeply-held industry belief that the vessels of other countries are flouting the rules in the knowledge that they will not be caught. The EC was particularly scathing about this view, for example referring to the regular denunciation of Danish industrial fishing as involving "psychological fixations rather than proven facts".[512] It pointed out that controls in British waters were the responsibility of the UK authorities and reminded us that "fishermen from other Member States regularly challenge the poor compliance with technical measures of certain UK fishermen", the most obvious example being the discarding of haddock in the North Sea and black landings which "inevitably harmed the resources and the interests of other Community fishermen".[513] The official figures on monitoring of foreign vessels in UK waters tend to support the Commission's argument. We were assured by the Minister that UK and other vessels in UK waters are treated equally with "the breakdown of boardings between UK and non-UK vessels ... about 55 per cent UK vessels and 45 per cent non-UK vessels".[514] As the Spanish industry was eager to stress to us in La Coruna, no Spanish vessel was found in breach of the regulations in 1998.[515]

138. The EC accepted that "the vessels which fish in UK waters and land in other Member States pose a specific problem".[516] This has been tackled through a recent amendment of the EU control regulation to improve co-ordination between the Member States but it is just one aspect of the wider problem of the lack of faith of the UK industry in the monitoring systems of other states. We heard various allegations which add up to the accusation that the regulations are not being enforced evenly, and that this is to the disadvantage of the UK industry.[517] This belief was widespread, shared even by the Chief Executive of the SFPA who noted that "The monitoring that goes on abroad does not always fill us with confidence".[518] Such evidence as there is is necessarily anecdotal, for example the witnessing of baby fish for sale on Spanish markets.[519] We agree that the Spanish consumer's preference for smaller fish does pose particular challenges for the enforcement authorities and we were impressed by the campaign being conducted by the Spanish authorities, particularly in Galicia, aimed at countering these traditional tastes.

139. Justification for allegations of inadequate monitoring abroad has also been sought in the number of inspectors employed in each Member State. The considerable variation is obvious in the table below which gives statistics for 1995.

¹ In addition to 30 national inspectors based in Madrid this includes a further
 232 inspectors who work for the autonomous regions. Since the report was
 published MAFF has been informed that the number of national inspectors
 for Spain has  increased to 53.
² In theory some 5,200 persons are available for inspection work as part of
 their duties.
³ The UK currently has 152 inspectors.

Source: MAFF, HC Debates, 16 March 1999, cc638-9w.

The only definite conclusion that can be drawn from this table is that there is no uniform definition of inspector in operation across the European Union, just as there is no consistent pattern or level of inspection. This underlines the scale of the task in attempting more general comparisons of relative performance by Member States in enforcement activities. In 1995 the EC produced a report on enforcement in individual Member States, which included these statistics, and in 1998 it issued a Communication describing general areas of difficulty. The Communication concluded that progress had been achieved in enforcement but that more effort was needed. This could be achieved only by amending regulations and, more importantly, by "closer cooperation between all those responsible for monitoring fisheries".[520] The EC's efforts to encourage even enforcement are also witnessed by the new control regulations, which came into effect from 1 July 1999 and were welcomed by Mr Morley as taking "us very much further down the road in making sure that the same standards are being applied".[521] The Commission has a key role in furthering this process on the ground. For example, its inspectors make unannounced visits to monitor the activities of national inspectors.[522] Mr Fox, the District Inspector for the western region, told us that "We have visits from EC inspectors perhaps twice a year".[523] We found no enthusiasm for the Commission to take on more enforcement activities but this monitoring process is worth supporting and its findings should be more widely publicised. One problem with the EC's efforts to ensure that the same standards are being applied across the board is the time taken for it to issue reports. We recommend that to increase transparency the Government propose that the Commission speed up publication of its reports on enforcement so that both areas of difficulty and improvements, in general and in individual Member States, are highlighted in a timely fashion. We urge the Commission to ensure more regular inspections of European port practices and to produce an annual report to the European Parliament.

140. As the EC noted, communication and coordination of activities between Member States is a vital element in improving consistency of enforcement. The UK is already building a relationship with Spain to deal with the issue of UK-registered vessels landing into Spain. The Minister told us: "we are co-operating with the Spanish authorities, to the extent that we have had Spanish inspectors visit our country and our ports and our inspectors have been to their ports".[524] The SFPA also explained that "we work very closely with our opposite number enforcement agencies in other countries", which enables the various bodies to pass on information about fish caught in one jurisdiction and landed in another.[525] We are satisfied that attempts are being made on a national level to improve these links and we recognise that this co-operation should become even more effective with the advent of satellite links and electronic communication.

141. The Minister was adamant that regulations were not "uniquely hardly enforced" in the UK, giving examples of rigorous new measures brought in by other countries against the will of the industry.[526] He also argued strongly that he detected "quite genuinely, from all countries, a desire to get to grips with enforcement, because all countries recognise if you do not have proper enforcement then you undermine sustainability and you undermine the prosperity and the future of your national fishing fleet."[527] We accept that this is true. However, it is vital that the principle is also acted upon. This is one of the most difficult areas of fisheries management. We recommend that MAFF encourage reciprocal visits by fishermen to other Member States in order to build up trust between fishermen and to encourage the sense of a common purpose. Furthermore, we recommend that the Government promote visits by its own regulators to other Member States to exchange knowledge on best practice. We also recommend that the Government monitor the standards of enforcement applied in the Member States through its embassies and rigorously pursue any breaches with the European Commission.

Conclusions on enforcement

142. We conclude that in general the UK is providing an acceptable standard of enforcing regulations and that it has taken steps to address areas of weakness identified by the European Commission. The cost is substantial and will continue to be so, although we welcome assurances that the introduction of satellite monitoring systems will make enforcement activities more cost-effective.[528] Figures from MAFF show that in 1997-98 expenditure on enforcement in England and Wales as a percentage of the overall value of landings was 5.74 per cent.[529] The South Wales Sea Fisheries Committee argued that the expenditure should be seen in the context of the real value of landings rather than the official figures.[530] This highlights one of the remaining difficulties which is the monitoring of all catches where the data are affected by illegal landings and discards. We would like to see improvements in this respect.

143. A more serious problem is the relationship with the industry which clearly feels subjected to new regulations without proper consultation or consideration of the consequences. This affects its willingness to comply and creates a sense of "them and us"[531] which is not helpful. Fishermen from all over the UK argued in various ways that "the enforcement situation is really treating symptoms."[532] It is extremely expensive to apply any monitoring system and much more effective to devise one with which people will wish to comply.[533] As one PO wrote, the greatest hurdle to surmount is the breaking down of "attitudes amongst certain sectors of fishermen": "When a culture of support for conservation exists it is significantly more difficult for a minority of vessels to continue to ignore regulations."[534] Fishermen need to see the benefits of the system and also to have faith in the ability of enforcement agencies in other Member States to deliver those benefits. The Minister pointed out that enforcement "is about sustainable management."[535] This message has to be brought home to the industry but this can only be achieved where there is trust between the two sides. We can offer no easy solutions to this problem, only a reiteration of our conviction that the Government must set out a clear framework for its strategy on fisheries and must work with the industry to ensure parity of treatment within the EU. It should also seek to transfer a proportion of the regulatory task to fishermen so that ownership of the process is genuinely shared.

Financing of enforcement

144. The cost of enforcement and fisheries management is such that the issue is periodically raised of whether the industry should make a contribution. These arguments are being heard again in the light of the increasing value placed on licences and quota allocations, which have been issued free of charge to vessel owners and from which they are now able to realise considerable sums of money. Economists from the University of Portsmouth concluded that "it is arguable that at least part of the costs should be borne by the industry".[536] They referred us to a study they had undertaken for MAFF in 1998 which had examined in depth the issue of cost recovery and charging and recommended that it be looked at on an EU-wide basis.[537] Such a system could only be effective if done on that basis.

145. Not surprisingly, all other witnesses who referred to this matter strongly objected to the idea that fishermen should pay either through licences or in any other way. The NFFO reiterated the arguments it had put forward against the Portsmouth report. These included the fact that the beneficiaries of fisheries management extended beyond the catching sector, that the remoteness of the CFP negated the proposition that vessel operators were customers of a service provided by fisheries managers, that licence charges could push vessels into bankruptcy or illegal fishing, and that the industry already operates at a disadvantage to its European counterparts.[538] The NFFO also believed that the failings of the present system would make it "difficult to convince most fishermen that fisheries management in its totality represents a 'benefit' or service worth paying for".[539] The SFF also argued that as a law enforcement agency the Fishery Protection Service should be paid for by general taxation, suggesting further that "The only prospect of defraying cost is through the proceeds of fines and other monetary penalties exacted on defaulters".[540] In oral evidence, the SFF President claimed that the trade in quotas made the industry less able to pay, as individuals were having to pay off the loans they had used to buy the quota.[541]

146. There is no immediate prospect of the Government charging for licences. The NFFO took the credit for convincing Ministers that "even if charging for licences was justifiable, it would be damaging, unfair and inequitable to apply them to the UK industry".[542] The Minister included in his letter to the industry on the subject of satellite monitoring the assurance that "there is no current intention to charge for fishing vessel licences issued to industry."[543] We agree that it would be a very unpopular decision to charge the industry for the licences it needs to work and that many vessel owners could not afford any extra costs, particularly in the context of the compliance costs with new regulations. However, there may be a case for taxation of excess profits on the sale of licences which would contribute towards the cost of fisheries management and might make the purchase of licences less attractive to outside speculators. It could also lessen the moral uneasiness many feel at the unearned profits some vessel owners are realising from possession of a licence which was granted free of charge.

SEA FISHERIES COMMITTEES

147. The Sea Fisheries Committees play an important role in managing inshore fisheries. It was noteworthy that the chief supporters of their work were conservation groups[544] but they are clearly valued by others as introducing a local element into regulations and enforcement. The Minister judged that "they do a very good job within the six-mile limit, they often involve local people, they know local issues very well, and, although they sometimes run into a little bit of difficulty, from time to time, I think that they provide an excellent role and function, and I would not want to see that changed".[545] The SFCs themselves, however, have long been arguing that changes relating to their powers and funding are desperately needed. On the first question, their Association claimed that unless the legislation under which they are constituted is updated, "a totally efficient and effective regime of regulation, monitoring, inspection and enforcement of the inshore fisheries within UK water cannot be carried out".[546] It referred to two particular difficulties concerning the power to deal with possession offences and the definition of districts,[547] and the Cornwall Sea Fisheries Committee gave us detailed examples of how its activities were hampered by the legislation which dates back to 1888.[548] The only dissenter from the view that SFCs should be awarded greater powers was the Environment Agency which was anxious to maintain its own responsibility for estuaries.[549] The Minister told us that MAFF was looking at the need for a change in legislation and also was assisting the Sea Fisheries Committees to meet concerns which were based on "a question of interpretation of the law" and therefore would not require scarce parliamentary time.[550] However, the ASFC told us that the matter had been raised annually with Ministers for the last five years and "The answer is always the same, there is no Parliamentary time".[551] It is evident that the SFCs have not been able to convince the Ministry of the urgency of their case. We therefore recommend that MAFF initiate a full review of the powers of the Sea Fisheries Committees and publish it together with a timetable for any necessary action.

148. The funding difficulties faced by the SFCs also indicate the lack of priority placed on their contribution to fisheries in the UK. The annual cost of running the twelve committees is approximately £3.5m which is currently met by local authority funds. Unfortunately for the SFCs, this funding has been threatened by local government reorganisation which has created unitary authorities (to which there is no reference in the Sea Fisheries Regulation Act 1966) and other authorities which no longer have a coastline but are expected to provide finance for fisheries management through the Committees.[552] In January this year we were told that the two Welsh committees were still without their permanent order following the reorganisation and that they had suffered cuts of over 20 per cent in their funding.[553] The crisis is made worse by the new responsibilities SFCs have acquired under recent environmental legislation.[554] This is clearly an unacceptable situation and one which does not enhance the authority of the SFCs. The EA was concerned that, if the funding issue was not resolved satisfactorily and the responsibilities of the SFCs were transferred to MAFF, "the level of management and conservation would be significantly diminished", and the Agency would suffer "the loss of a useful partnership".[555]

149. The ASFC argued that "This question of insecure funding and the possibility of assistance from Central Government funds via whatever route must be addressed".[556] This was supported by the RSPB.[557] However, while Mr Morley was sympathetic to the plight of the Committees, he defended the current system of funding as a recognition of their "localised and regionalised function".[558] Since "local authorities are represented on those Committees, and that is part of the link and the local democratic accountability", then "The price of that is ... local authorities have to accept that they have a financial contribution to make".[559] We have no strong views on what the funding arrangements should be but it is essential that they are settled and enforced. We recommend that the funding arrangements for Sea Fisheries Committees be re-examined in order to establish a secure, permanent financial framework within which they can plan and perform their duties.

150. The Sea Fisheries Committee structure is currently limited to England and Wales. The National Trust called for legislation to establish similar bodies in Northern Ireland, while the Wildlife Trusts and WWF-UK also suggested that the system be extended to Scotland.[560] This is now a question for the devolved assemblies but we note that the SFF was against the proposal, believing that Sea Fisheries Committees tended "to be more driven by local authorities than by the fishing industry".[561] Instead, Mr Goodlad supported "the idea of regulating orders which is something which ... is better because it can be more industry driven".[562] We discussed the proposed Shetland Regulating Order during our visit to Scotland and we share both the belief of the Shetlanders that this is a promising way forward and their frustration at the time it is taking for the order to be made. One possible drawback, we were told, was that it was not possible under such an order for fisheries to be managed for wider environmental purposes. This relates also to the powers of SFCs in England and Wales. Mr Bradley referred to this as the lack of "precautionary power, which most environmentalists will be pressing".[563] The Minister had doubts that such local bodies were "necessarily so restrained", but he was "interested in the idea of closing fisheries for environmental reasons" and was prepared to review the relevant legislation.[564] This is another area where clarification of the legal powers and restraints concerned with such issues might be sufficient. We recommend that the Ministry investigate the powers available to Sea Fisheries Committees and other local management bodies to take action on environmental grounds and publish proposals for consultation on action needed to close the loopholes.

COASTAL AND ZONAL MANAGEMENT

151. We specifically excluded from our inquiry wider discussion of the CFP. However, we acknowledge that it is hard to keep this distinction within many of the issues we wished to explore. One subject of particular interest which was raised with us, directly related to the shape of the CFP post-2002, was the concept of regional or zonal management. Although we strongly support efforts to improve enforcement throughout the EU, we have great sympathy with the view that more flexibility is needed in response to regional variations and customs. The NFFO and the SFF have jointly called for "a decentralisation" of the CFP and a greater degree of coastal state management, arguing that "Blanket measures, inappropriate to the specifics of particular fisheries, generate resistance and hostility. Control measures, sometimes tough control measures, are accepted as necessary only when their relevance and fairness is apparent to the fishermen concerned".[565] The industry is not advocating repatriation of waters but concession of more management power to the coastal state and working within the CFP "to make it less remote, to make it more responsive, to speed up decision-making, to customise measures to specific fisheries".[566] The industry had put these ideas to the Commission and the NFFO told us in January that "There seems to be an ongoing debate within the Commission now about how that can be taken forward."[567]

152. One of the chief difficulties is the definition of "regional" in this context. The Cornwall Sea Fisheries Committee observed that "At the moment the phrase appears to mean all things to all people, the definition changing on depending on who is speaking at the time".[568] The NFFO/SFF proposal involves zones "such as the North Sea or the Irish Sea or western approaches and the Channel: coherent, identifiable blocks of sea".[569] It envisages a system of "regional committees involving the ministers of [relevant] Member States to agree such things as total allowable catches and technical measures".[570] To some extent precursors of these arrangements are already in place with committees representing scientific experts, managers and the industry from different Member States meeting to discuss regional fisheries. Mr Gordon of the Scottish Office believed that in the northern pelagic fisheries it was "possible for the commercial interests - the fishermen themselves - to come together at European level and discuss issues to do with the management of the fishery."[571] The Minister also pointed to the example of "a committee looking at flatfish in relation to North Sea management".[572]

153. The Minister expressed himself "sympathetic to the concept of regional management", particularly where it involved the fishing industry more closely.[573] The Government was "beginning to talk to other Member States about how we could bring elements of this into the CFP", although it was "not in a position to bring forward any kind of drafted proposal".[574] The Minister saw the first step as "the definition of both regional and zonal management", which needed to be resolved before any progress could be made but again he assured us that "we are giving thought to that at the present time".[575] The concept of zonal management involving fishermen in responsibility for taking decisions as well as obeying the rules fits well with our vision of the future direction of the UK industry. We are pleased that the Minister is "keen to explore ways of regional devolution" and that he has responded so positively to the industry's proposals. Although this issue cannot be decided except within the context of the review of the CFP in 2002, it would be timely to develop proposals now in order to bring onside the other Member States. We recommend that the Government publish outline proposals within the next twelve months for the introduction of coastal and zonal management of fisheries which should involve the management of research, monitoring of activities and common regulatory processes.

154. Related to this issue is the future of the 6 to 12 mile limits. At the moment, these are established under the CFP Regulation 3760/92, with the relevant provisions due to expire on 31 December 2002, and the ASFC in particular was concerned that "unless and until they are permanently established under national control then the future for the coastal fishing industry will continue to be uncertain."[576] Though renewal is not automatic, we were reassured during our discussions with the Commission and others that there is no real threat to the limits and that they will

be carried over into any future shape the CFP might take. We of course welcome this reassurance and fully support the retention of the 6 and 12 mile limits after 2002.

464  Ev. p.20, para 4.15. Back

465  Ev. p.211, para 8. Back

466  Ev. pp.330-1. Back

467  Ev. p.312. Back

468  Ibid. Back

469  Ev. p.261. Back

470  Q 736. Back

471  Ev. p.95. Back

472  Qq 490-2. Back

473  Ev. p.296. Back

474  Ev. p.294. Back

475  Ev. p.313. Back

476  Ev. p.261. Back

477  Ev. pp.54, 261. Back

478  Ev. p.200, para 85. Back

479  Ev. p.200, para 86. Back

480  Ibid. Back

481  Ev. p.211, para 9. Back

482  Ev. p.211, para 10. Back

483  Q 654. Back

484  Q 187. Back

485  Q 793. Back

486  Q 1099. Back

487  Q 652. Back

488  Ev. p.330; Ev. p.18, para 4.4. Back

489  Ev. p. 244, para 4.5. Back

490  Ev. p.330. Back

491  Ev. p.19, para 4.12. Back

492  Ev. p.244, para 4.10. Back

493  HC Debates, 13 April 1999, c222w. Back

494  Ev. p.244. Back

495  Informal evidence, see also SFPA Annual Report and Accounts 1997/98, p.4. Back

496  HC Debates, 2 March 1999, c725w. Back

497  Ev. p.95; Q 608; see also eg. Ev. p.309. Back

498  Ev. p.330, para 2. Back

499  Ibid. Back

500  Ev. pp.329-31. Back

501  Q 1108. Back

502  Q 628. Back

503  Q 629. Back

504  Ev. pp.19, 244. Back

505  Q 87. Back

506  Q 671. Back

507  Q 647. Back

508  Q 1106. Back

509  Ev. p.275. Back

510  Ev. p.338. Back

511  Q 381. Back

512  Ev. p.331. Back

513  Ev. pp.331-2. Back

514  Q 1102. Back

515  Informal evidence; HC Debates, 2 March 1999, c725w. Back

516  Ev. p.331. Back

517  Eg. Ev. p.309. Back

518  Q 626. Back

519  Ev. p.260. Back

520  COM (1998) 92 final, pp.17-8. Back

521  Q 1112. Back

522  Q 1111. Back

523  Q 580. Back

524  Q 1111. Back

525  Q 639. Back

526  Q 1109. Back

527  Q 1112. Back

528  Q 628; Ev. p.312. Back

529  HC Debates, 21 July 1998, c518w. Back

530  Ev. p.271. Back

531  Q 384. Back

532  Q 202; Q 414. Back

533  Ev. p.293. Back

534  Ev. pp.311-12. Back

535  Q 1004. Back

536  Ev. p.293. Back

537  Ibid. Back

538  Ev.pp. 40-1. Back

539  Ev. p.41. Back

540  Ev. p.54.  Back

541  Q 195. Back

542  Ev. p.42. Back

543  Ev. p.195, para 48. Back

544  Ev. pp.258, 265-8. Back

545  Q 1007. Back

546  Ev. p.77. Back

547  Q 326. Back

548  Q 523. Back

549  Ev. p.277, para 4.2.2. Back

550  Q 1008. Back

551  Ev. p.77. Back

552  Ev. p.277, para 4.3.2; Q 1008. Back

553  Q 348. Back

554  Ev. pp.245.6. Back

555  Ev. pp.277-8. Back

556  Ev. p.77. Back

557  Ev. p.258. Back

558  Q 1008. Back

559  Q 1008. Back

560  Ev. pp.281, 266. Back

561  Q 199. Back

562  Q 199. Back

563  Q 326. Back

564  Q 1010. Back

565  Ev. p.42. Back

566  Q 155. Back

567  Q 155. Back

568  Ev. p.104. Back

569  Q 156. Back

570  Q 156. Back

571  Q 59. Back

572  Q 1011. Back

573  Qq 1011, 1014. Back

574  Q 1015. Back

575  Q 1016. Back

576  Ev. p.77, para 14. Back