Select Committee on Agriculture Eighth Report


IV. MANAGING FISHING EFFORT

Individual Transferable Quotas

87. Concerns about legal title indicate how close the market is moving towards the introduction of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). There are various forms of ITQs in operation in other fishing countries but the most developed are probably in New Zealand and in Iceland. We were grateful for an enlightening paper from the New Zealand High Commission in London on their ITQ system which was introduced in 1986 to aid industry restructuring, at the same time as TACs were first set for stock conservation. The paper concluded that although "ITQs are not a panacea for fisheries management problems", the experience of New Zealand showed that "ITQs are an excellent instrument for effectively reducing and restructuring fishing effort".[320] In Iceland too the ITQ system has been hailed by many as a success. The Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries claimed that it had "transformed all sectors of the Icelandic fishing industry".[321] It had enabled the catching sector "to optimise and specialise their catch efforts by the transfer of quota shares", leading to "increased efficiency and increased profits", while the processing sector had benefited from the "steady supply of high quality raw material".[322] At least one of our witnesses urged that "we can learn a great deal from the methods of our Icelandic counterparts when it comes to protecting vital fish stocks in the UK."[323] During the course of a short but highly productive visit to Reykjavik in June, we focused on the impact of ITQs on their fisheries and any lessons this held for the UK. Of particular interest to us was the exact detail of how the system worked and mechanisms built into the process which protect the interests of local or small-scale industries. Our discussions there with politicians, academics, vessel owners and representatives of fishermen, both staunch supporters and opponents of ITQs, have informed our consideration of the introduction of the system in the different circumstances prevailing in EU waters.

88. Mr de Rozarieux of the CFPO declared that in the UK ITQs were "almost in place now in all but name".[324] Most would agree with this, although the Minister pointed out that this is mainly within POs rather than for individuals as in the Icelandic or New Zealand model.[325] The concerns which led the NFFO and SFF to regret the development of trade in quota[326] are therefore also relevant to a move towards overt ITQs. The overriding fear is that ITQs could lead to the concentration of fishing rights in the hands of large companies, possibly from outside the fishing industry or outside the UK. Mr Goodlad of the SFF explained that quota trading "will inevitably concentrate the ownership of fish quota and therefore vessels in fewer and fewer hands".[327] Fisher Seafoods believed the system was "biased towards the larger, more powerful fishing companies" which would be tempted to "acquire the majority of licences by scrapping smaller boats and transferring the quota to larger vessels", thus enabling them to "monopolise the quota resources and ultimately ... dictate the price of fish".[328] They considered that smaller vessels would be willing to sell because of the cost of repairs or renewals, thus forcing the owners out of the business. The Anglo-North Irish Fish Producers' Organisation saw this already happening because "the value of track records has increased to such a degree that most individual fishermen find it impossible to compete with those that have the financial clout of large companies behind them".[329] These concerns found sympathy with the Minister whose principal objection to ITQs was "the way it can be concentrated in the hands of a relatively few individuals or companies".[330]

89. The NFFO observed that while "normal economic theory would suggest that, with individual transferable quotas or something very similar to them, those companies with financial clout would monopolise fishing opportunities", in fact this had not yet happened in the UK.[331] Instead, "what you have seen is the quota hopper phenomenon where capital from other Member States seems to have absorbed a large number of licences".[332] Mr MacSween of the SFO noted that "virtually every pelagic licence that has come up for sale in the past year and a half has ended up in the ownership of the Netherlands freezer trawler fleet".[333] His concerns were echoed by the SFF which argued that "an individual fisherman can sell his quota and that quota can ultimately end up in the hands of a non-UK company which may bring much more economic benefit to another Member State or another country than to the UK".[334] The situation was not comparable to milk quotas, for example, where the production of the milk had to take place in the UK, since with fish it would be possible to buy British quota and operate elsewhere.[335] Although international sales of quota are currently not permitted, the Minister reminded us that "there is nothing to stop, under Single European [Market] legislation, a Dutch-based company buying a British-based vessel",[336] so the concerns remain.

90. Apart from foreign companies, the industry's great dread is that fishing opportunities will fall into the hands of speculators from outside the industry, keen only on maximising profits. At the moment, attention is focused on so-called 'fireside fishermen' who lease out quotas instead of fishing the stocks themselves. The Aberdeen Fish Producers' Organisation claimed in its evidence that such people can "make more money than those who actually go to sea",[337] and its Chief Executive produced figures which indicated that "someone leasing [an average vessel's track record] out can sit back and do nothing and take in £120,000".[338] He did not find this "a very healthy scenario".[339] The SFF believed that the situation was already occurring wherein people bought licences for this very purpose and then leased them at high prices to fishermen. The SFF President declared, "we do not want to see fishermen held to ransom to lease fish from speculators".[340] The Federation is developing its own proposals to deal with this problem, which it intends to put to Ministers.

91. These changes to the ownership structure of the industry, both real and predicted, are important because of their implications for fishing communities and for new entrants. If fishing comes to be dominated by large companies, whether domestic or from overseas, then it is likely to lead to concentration in a much smaller number of ports where operations can be run more cost-effectively, thus further increasing the pressure on small vessel owners to sell. The Anglo-North Irish Fishermen's Organisation considered that ITQs "would be a disaster for small scale fishing operations such as those that exist in Northern Ireland".[341] Mr MacSween of the SFO was equally concerned, arguing passionately that "the confirmation of property rights in the fishing industry will do for coastal communities what highland clearances did f or the agricultural sector", as "smaller coastal communities, particularly those on the West Coast [of Scotland], would find their fishing rights being purchased by places like Peterhead".[342] In Iceland, we heard similar concerns expressed by those who had seen vessel owners from smaller ports sell their quota entitlement outside the area, leading to job losses on the vessels themselves and in ancillary industries. This process has already affected the UK industry with the purchase of quota by Scottish interests and particularly by Shetland from English ports. Such a trend if heightened and sustained could take the weaker ports below the level of viability necessary to sustain facilities essential to fishing.

92. The cost of quota and of licences has a particular impact upon new entrants who are the future of the industry. In Cornwall, all four fishermen we interviewed formally told a similar story of working their way up within the industry, moving between different sectors as they progressed.[343] The NFFO argued strongly that trading in quotas "closes the door very much to young fishermen joining the industry".[344] The SFF also identified this as one of the principal objections to the system.[345] The price of entry is such that even where people can afford a vessel the cost of quota and licence is prohibitive. Youngsters with ambition will therefore look outside the industry, perhaps adding to the decline of the small coastal communities. Mr MacSween described new entrants as 'the lifeblood' of the industry, arguing that "we will end up with a population of aged but rich fishermen with no young guys coming through to take command of the boats and that is a recipe for stagnation".[346] Similarly, he argued that ITQs stop the diversification which has been a key feature of the success of the Scottish industry and also, as we have seen, of individual fishermen.[347]

93. Mr Goodlad of the SFF summed up the background to many of these serious concerns about ITQs and the trade in quota when he explained that fishing "is an industry whose whole culture is indelibly associated with the freedom of the individual. The market economy in terms of buying and selling of VCUs and fish quotas goes very much against that deeply held tradition within all fishing communities".[348] In some ways, it is the culture of the individual which has led to the current situation. As the Minister rightly commented, vessel owners "do not have to sell, it is individual fishermen [who] sometimes make a decision on where they can get the best price, and that is why there has been some migration of quota and licences".[349] The NFFO, even in regretting the trade, accepted that "the individual's perspective and the collective perspective are not the same".[350] However, there have been moves within the industry to counteract this tendency and to use the changes we have described to the benefit of the community. This has chiefly occurred through the purchase of quota by POs. The most advanced in this area is the Shetland Fishermen's Organisation, run by John Goodlad, which we visited during our visit to Scotland. The first PO to recognise the future market trends in the industry, it began by investing heavily in buying quota with its own money and then persuaded the local council to invest public funds, at commercial rates of return, in further purchases. The quota is held as a community asset and a percentage of it is rented out to young fishermen who would not otherwise be able to enter the industry so that Shetland has become a model of what can be achieved with foresight supplemented by public commitment not generally available to the rest of the industry.

94. Other POs have not been so fortunate in that the Shetland Islands Council has a particular asset in its oil funds which it is able to use for such purposes, but they have still followed this path. For example, the Fleetwood Fish Producers' Organisation bought quota from six decommissioned vessels in late 1997 and a further £58,000 worth from a single vessel in 1998.[351] The latter purchase involved a bank loan, confirming the Minister's assertion that "many banks, at the moment, see fishing as a very good investment".[352] It should be noted, however, that the Fleetwood PO overstretched itself in taking on this commitment which became a contributory factor in its decision to accept quota hoppers into its membership. The Cornish Fish Producers' Organisation, prompted by concerns that "if the quota round these shores were to leave this area the industry would die", was looking at collectively purchasing quota with the aim of enabling "future fishermen to get into the industry".[353] As quota is "enormously expensive",[354] the CFPO was "in negotiations with local councils trying to emphasise the importance of fishing to the community in its broader sense".[355] The Minister saw the pooling of resources to buy in quota and then share it out as "exactly the right way forward",[356] although as he indicated, "some POs have been much better at this than others".[357] This in itself could exacerbate the trends within the industry and lead to the slower areas being deprived of quota.

The Committee's view

95. When our predecessor Committee last examined the question, it recommended the introduction of ITQs into the UK fishing industry. Since then, the market in the UK has developed rapidly and there is also more experience to draw on from countries throughout the world which have experimented with ITQs. We believe that the system has much to offer the industry in the change of attitude it engenders to one of responsibility for the future of the stocks. It is far better for the industry to rationalise itself by adapting to the available resources than for the Government to attempt a half-hearted decommissioning programme as in the past. ITQs could also contribute to reducing regulation and removing restrictions on effort, leaving fishermen to manage their own businesses. We do not believe that any system currently in operation elsewhere in the world, however successful in that country, should be or could be transplanted wholesale into the UK and we are certainly convinced that any ITQ system should be agreed in collaboration with the industry, although the Government must not use the perennial disagreements within the industry as an excuse for not introducing management measures which it, after consultation, regards as necessary. However, like the industry, we recognise that the UK is moving inexorably towards an ITQ system and it is surely better for this to be an orderly development than a chaotic scramble for fish at ever-increasing prices.

96. There is a perfectly good case to permit unrestricted trade in all the components of fisheries entitlements to achieve a rapid transformation of the industry into a modern, well-invested, commercially orientated sector of the UK economy. This could achieve an industry that was more viable commercially, easier to regulate, and less demanding of public funding. On balance, however, our support for a properly devised, UK-specific ITQ system is dependent upon solutions to the genuine concerns expressed by the industry as to the knock-on effect of giving property rights to individuals to trade as they wish. It is not for us to produce a blueprint but we have the following suggestions to make. First, to protect dependent fishing communities, it would be possible to limit the amount of quota that could be sold outside the area. This could be done through restrictions on ability to sell outside a PO, as the Minister suggested.[358] However, we would not want these restrictions to be too constraining. Like the Minister, we recognise that POs want to trade, either to gain quota and licences for new species or to obtain VCUs.[359] We also have no wish to see POs become closed shops which would have a stultifying effect on the industry. There may be other ways of introducing an economic links scheme to the licence, as has been done with quota hoppers, to overcome the concern that particularly vulnerable economies which retain a tradition of fishing may be stripped of quota.

97. Secondly, on new entrants, we accept that ITQs may precipitate changes in the traditional career pattern of fishermen. The development of larger companies may mean that new entrants have to begin as trainees and progress to the position of skipper on a company vessel, rather than become a vessel owner, just as the demise of small businesses in other sectors has led to the formation of different career structures in those industries. That said, there are ways to encourage new entrants who wish to follow the traditional path within an ITQ system. For example, we were greatly impressed by arrangements made by the Shetland Fishermen's Organisation to lease quota at varying rates within the PO to those who could not otherwise afford to enter the industry, though we recognise the special advantages Shetland has enjoyed. Such 'tenant farmers' schemes for new fishermen should not just apply to the young, but to those wishing to diversify or perhaps take on their own vessel after working for an owner who has sold on his business. We also believe that there is a strong case for taking certain low-impact fisheries such as mackerel hand-lining out of the quota system altogether which would encourage new entrants, and we urge MAFF to examine this possibility with care. Alternatively, the Minister suggested a form of top-slicing or a quota reserve where he "would cream off a percentage, which would go into a national reserve, which the Ministry could then allocate".[360] He indicated that this was "not a very popular idea with the industry",[361] but we believe it offers potential to allow new lifeblood into the fishing industry. It would also contribute to counterbalancing any monopolistic tendency within the industry, which would be our third area for action. In Iceland, there are strict limits on the percentage of each TAC a person or company can hold. Therefore, it is not possible for one organisation to corner the market in a particular stock. Again, this was an option the Minister was willing to consider,[362] which we would support. Mr Morley had other concerns about protection for the non-sector, which is increasingly succumbing to market pressures and joining POs, and the under 10 metre vessels.[363] These are further questions which would need to be addressed in drawing up a workable scheme.

98. Fourthly, there is the issue of quota being sold to non-UK interests. This is an emotive subject, given the history of Spanish and Dutch quota hoppers in the UK. The Government has attempted to tackle the problem by the introduction of the economic links requirement whereby a foreign-owned, UK-registered vessel has to meet certain criteria in order to prove its economic contribution to a particular port and thereby keep its licence. It is too early to judge the impact of this scheme. In Spain, we certainly heard complaints that the restrictions were unfair and too stringent, while the Dutch have met the requirements in some cases by handing back quota to the UK fleet. Meanwhile, in Cornwall the CFPO told us that "there is some evidence to suggest that the number of quota hoppers is reducing" and "is going to drop markedly in the next two years".[364] This does not mean that the problem has been solved but it does open up the possibility that the direction of the trend may reverse and UK fishermen may begin to buy licences and quotas from foreign vessel owners. The Minister may also care to consider, as no doubt will be strongly advocated by the industry, whether constraints on transfers from outside the UK can be devised compatible with EU rules.

99. Finally, there is a further lesson from Iceland which may work well in the UK in controlling the rise of 'fireside fishermen' and speculators. Apart from the limits referred to above, there is also a requirement that any holder of quota must fish a certain percentage himself in any one of two years. This ensures that all quota-holders are active fishermen whilst retaining some movement within the leasing market and allowing vessel owners to rent out their quota if for some reason they are unable to go to sea. Again, we put forward this suggestion for consideration. We note in this context that the supermarkets we spoke to had no intention of buying quota themselves.[365] This may alleviate some fears that such companies from outside the catching sector would purchase quota in order to force vertical integration of the industry or to increase their hold over the vessel owners.

100. It is clear that there are any number of imaginative ways in which the disadvantages of ITQs as perceived by the industry can be ameliorated. We were impressed by the thought the Minister had evidently given to the issue. He was adamant that "if there were indications that was what the industry wanted, ITQs, then I do not think I would have a great problem about that, as long as we could put in the kind of safeguards that meet the quite legitimate objections".[366] However, he maintained that "there is not consensus for ITQs in this country, and in that respect we do not have any proposals to bring it forward".[367] We find this response inadequate. Whilst we agree that there is no consensus in favour of ITQs, we regard it as equally important that there is complete agreement in the industry that the system is coming in without official backing. This is leading to understandable fear on the part of many fishermen as to what is happening to their industry. Some organisations have managed to turn the situation to their advantage. Others are waiting for disaster.

101. What is needed above all is clear direction from the Government on the future shape of the quota and licence regime. Mr Morley stressed to us that, in looking at the development of the system, "yes, we want to formalise it, we want to regulate it, we want to make sure that we know what is happening".[368] This is exactly what is required but there is little sign of any action. Many of the decisions necessary in this area are dependent upon whether the Government and the industry wish to see the fishing industry develop into one run by fewer, larger, competitive and commercially orientated companies or to remain fragmented and small-scale, sustaining local communities. Unless the Government acts now it could lose the ability to control the industry at all. The North East of Scotland Fishermen's Organisation argued that "formal recognition by Ministers and officials of the present trade in licences would be a first step."[369] We agree. We recommend that, in conjunction with representatives of the fishing industry, the Government devise proposals for managing the existing trade in licences and quota, with a view to introducing them as a matter of urgency. We are also acutely aware that, while action is needed to regulate the current situation, it is vital that the Minister begins to devise a long-term strategy in this area. We recommend that the Government consult the fishing industry on the merits and drawbacks of tradeable quotas and the most appropriate form for their introduction in the UK, including the future management role of the POs and the extent of safeguards, for example to protect fishing-dependent communities, and report on the outcome of these consultations within a year.

Discards

102. Closely connected to the issue of quota management is the problem of discards. The Highlands and Islands Fishermen's Association described discards as "the Achilles heel of the quota system" to which a solution must be found, while the North Sea Fishermen's Organisation warned that they were "a source of great bitterness ... [which] will continue to poison relations between some fishermen, scientists and fisheries management".[370] Fishermen have always discarded unwanted fish but there is strong evidence that this has increased as a result of the use of TACs and quotas. Fish are discarded for various reasons: because they are below minimum landing size, because their value is too low or because the fisherman has no quota left to land the fish. This is a particularly difficult problem in mixed fisheries because it is inevitable that fishermen will net by-catches which they cannot land legally. Their choice then is either to throw the fish back in which case it will die if it is not dead already or to land it illegally as "blackfish". Neither option is attractive to fishermen. The North Eastern Sea Fisheries Committee argued that "this renders the policy [of quotas] counter-productive and robs the policy of all credibility in the eyes of the industry".[371]

103. The practice of discarding is clearly contrary to the principles of conservation. It also has a detrimental effect on the accuracy of the statistics which creates a vicious circle in that the TACs for the following year will be set at an unrealistic level and could lead to discarding on an even worse scale. The information from which the scientists draw their conclusions as to the status of stocks comes primarily from landing statistics, backed by samples from the research vessels.[372] These official figures of course do not include fish caught but not put through the market but this fish has still been removed from the stocks. Estimates of the level of discarding in different fisheries vary greatly. Mr Wentworth of MAFF appeared to belittle the problem, claiming that it was not "possible to say what is happening in that area on a year-to-year basis" and cautioning us that "One should not assume that discards inevitably take place on a large scale because of the quota system".[373] He argued that the holdings of different quotas within a PO should make it unnecessary to discard over-quota or non-target fish. This position appears to us excessively optimistic. Others are more concerned. CEFAS stated baldly that "discarding is widespread",[374] and advised that for cod, over 50% is typically discarded, mainly because it is too small to land. The SFF also identified a problem with coley "because very few people actually target coley. You catch them in big quantities and if you have no quota for them you just have to let them go".[375]

104. Research on discards is needed in two areas, first on the numbers and causes and secondly on means of prevention. In the first case, the UK is at the forefront of research. The RSPB described the project run by the Scottish Office as "the best monitoring scheme for discards in the EU".[376] The EC echoed this, judging that "the data available on discards is better [than in other states] or even unique".[377] This research of course covers only one area of sea which may not be representative.[378] However, other projects are now being undertaken. For example, the CFPO is working with CEFAS and the SFIA on a European-funded discard survey which involves scientists teaching crews to measure the fish which would normally be thrown overboard for whatever reason. The acquisition of such data makes it possible to estimate stocks more accurately and to tell when a fisherman is filing false information.[379] CEFAS explained that from such programmes it now had data from Portugal to Scotland.[380] In June this year MAFF announced a further piece of research, part-funded by the European Commission and linked to parallel research in France and the Netherlands, which "will apply a new approach to investigating why fishermen discard fish at sea" and "consider options for reducing the amount of discards".[381] We support this work and note with particular approval the assurance that "a major element of the research will be the views and experience of working fishermen".[382] We look forward to receiving the results of the work which is expected to take eighteen months to complete.

105. Possible solutions to the problem include the use of selective devices and the introduction of multi-species quotas. There are a variety of technical conservation measures, as they are known, which could in theory reduce the bycatch and hence the discard rate. These include regulations on mesh size, the shape of the cod end and the insertion of escape panels or selection grids in the nets. We saw examples of the ongoing research into these devices at Aberdeen, and the call for more effort to be put into this area was supported by some POs and the Joint Nature Conservation Committee.[383] The North Eastern Sea Fisheries Committee agreed but considered that the use of selective devices such as square mesh panels would need "some form of compulsion".[384] Mr Wentworth of MAFF believed that the more problematic aspect of discards was the catching of undersized fish and that with "larger mesh nets it would be less of a problem".[385] Unfortunately, as he accepted, the simplicity of this solution is misleading as larger mesh sizes can lead to other difficulties.[386] CEFAS judged that "a general increase to much larger mesh sizes [was] ... probably not appropriate."[387] It also advised that selective fishing gears, while having the potential to be beneficial, "are complicated, and can be easily re-rigged to negate any selection, thus limiting their value".[388] This is tantamount to saying that they can be negated by cheating. It is not an argument against larger mesh sizes and particularly not one against square mesh panels which do not constrict in the same way as diamond mesh. There is, however, a difficulty with multi-species quotas in that, as North Sea Fishermen's Organisation told us, they could "lead to increased discarding of low value species in order to maximize return from a finite quota".[389]

106. There are also more radical proposals. Since a major concern about discarding is that it destroys the juvenile fish which are needed to replenish the stocks, some have suggested a greater use of closed areas to protect them. This was a popular option among conservation groups, as might be expected, but it was also proposed by representatives of the fishing industry. The Cornish Fish Producers' Organisation impressed us with its strong advocacy of a pilot scheme to test closed areas in the South West.[390] It believed that closed areas had "enormous potential in terms of fisheries management" and would appeal to fishermen since they could see the sense in "protecting everything from a star fish to a marlin".[391] Later, the Chief Executive of the CFPO sent us academic papers on the potential offered by closed areas in protecting stocks.[392] The CFPO regarded "this theory of closed areas [as] a radical departure",[393] although closed areas are already used in fisheries management for specific species, for example the Plaice Box or the Mackerel Box which have been successful in protecting juveniles from those species.[394] Closed areas offer less potential for protecting cod where, as CEFAS advised us, "juveniles do not congregate in large numbers in well-defined areas".[395] What is different about the CFPO suggestion is that it envisages a "no take zone" for all fish with no derogations. CEFAS believed that "the utility of any closed area needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis" and that the benefits of no take zones in particular "should be evaluated so they can be considered against any possible cost to the local fishing industry".[396] This is obviously the correct approach. We support the principle of no take zones and closed areas and we recommend that MAFF sympathetically consider and encourage research into specific proposals brought forward by the industry. However, we emphasise that under the CFP these measures would have to be non-discriminatory and apply to all vessels not just UK fishing. They would therefore have to be agreed on a European basis.

107. The examples of other countries show different approaches to the problem of discards. In Norway, the practice is banned and "every catch of an individual species should be registered and counted against the quota for that species".[397] We are grateful to the Norwegian Embassy in London for providing the Committee with a memorandum on how this system works and on other aspects of the fishing industry. The Norwegians told us that "the philosophy behind the discard ban is shared by everyone involved: politicians, scientists, administrators and fishermen."[398] The ban is backed up by the use of closed areas and the use of grid sorting systems. There is some cynicism among British fishermen about the effectiveness of the ban in Norway "because the vessels catching the fish just discard them and it is unenforceable".[399] CEFAS shared these doubts for three reasons: "First, it is difficult to police and enforce a discard ban. Second, accurate up-to-date information on the location of small fish would require intensive monitoring. Third, implementation relies upon the fleet being able to move to an area where there are not large numbers of young fish," which is difficult in the North Sea.[400] The SFF also argued that the fish in Norwegian waters tended to be bigger which made it hard to apply the lessons learnt there to the UK.[401]

108. We were told in Iceland of an aspect of their enforcement policy which although not directly aimed at preventing discarding might alleviate the bitterness many feel at throwing back into the sea fish for which they have no quota. All fish landed in Iceland is weighed electronically and the information passed back to the central management system. If any fisherman lands over-quota fish, he is sent a bill for the full market value of that fish. Thus, he is allowed to land it but makes no profit nor indeed recovers his costs. This system is aimed at reducing over-quota fishing and would not stop discarding where it involves a fisherman throwing back lower quality, lower value fish in order that the catch achieved the best possible price within the quota allowance. However, it would significantly reduce the incentive to discard fish where fishermen genuinely wished to conserve the stocks and ensure that their catch did not go to waste. The problem is that if fishermen believe that landing unwanted fish will involve a cost the disincentive to discard them will be reinforced, not diminished. Nevertheless, we recommend that MAFF examine the feasibility and effectiveness of introducing in the UK a similar system to the Icelandic arrangements for the non-profit sale of over-quota fish.

109. CEFAS concluded its discussion of the various attempts to end the practice of discarding with the dry comment that "as with many of the fisheries problems, discarding could be reduced by a reduction in fishing effort, and a restoration of the balance between fishing capacity and size of the resource".[402] However, while fishermen may catch only a limited amount of fish of a particular species, they are bound to catch fish they do not want because they are too small, the wrong species, poor quality or just in excess of the quota. It is essential that research effort is directed into addressing the difficulty. The EC praised the leading role played by the UK in recent developments as regards selectivity and in monitoring discards[403] and we are pleased that this latter work is being taken forward by MAFF. The continuing commitment of the UK industry to the more widespread adoption within Europe of square mesh panels as a solution is also to be welcomed and acted upon by the Government. There may be other measures which could be taken within the UK to deal with the problem, such as allowing quota management to be more flexible in adjusting monthly allocations or rolling over quota from one year to the next. We recommend that MAFF consider measures to reduce discards through more flexible quota management and that it continue to promote within Europe the use of more selective fishing gear.


320  Fisheries Management from a Property Rights Perspective: The New Zealand Experience, New Zealand High Commission. Back

321  Ev. p.335. Back

322  IbidBack

323  Ev. p.282. Back

324  Q 458. Back

325  Q 1022. Back

326  Qq 151, 189. Back

327  Q 190. Back

328  Ev. p.281. Back

329  Ev. p.248. Back

330  Qq 1042-3. Back

331  Q 154. Back

332  IbidBack

333  Q 771. Back

334  Q 190. Back

335  IbidBack

336  Q 1030. Back

337  Ev. p.149. Back

338  Q 782. Back

339  Ibid. Back

340  Q 192. Back

341  Ev. p.247. Back

342  Q 771. Back

343  Qq 373-6. Back

344  Q 152. Back

345  Q 190. Back

346  Q 795. Back

347  Q 770. Back

348  Q 189. Back

349  Q 1047. Back

350  Q 152. Back

351  Ev. p.315. Back

352  Q 1051. Back

353  Q 432. Back

354  Q 433. Back

355  Q 438. Back

356  Q 1049. Back

357  IbidBack

358  Q 1048. Back

359  Q 1046. Back

360  Q 1031. Back

361  IbidBack

362  Q 1030. Back

363  IbidBack

364  Q 437. Back

365  Q 946. Back

366  Q 1038. Back

367  Q 1036. Back

368  Q 1029. Back

369  Ev. p.156. Back

370  Ev. pp.289, 334. Back

371  Ev. p.245. Back

372  Ev. p.6, para 2.16. Back

373  Qq 96, 98.  Back

374  Ev. p.360. Back

375  Q 186. Back

376  Ev. p.254, para 2.2.3. Back

377  Ev. p.332. Back

378  Ev. p.254, para 2.2.4. Back

379  Q 447. Back

380  Ev. p.360. Back

381  MAFF PN 207/99, 21 June 1999. Back

382  IbidBack

383  Ev. pp.248, 289, 274. Back

384  Ev. p.245. Back

385  Q 98. Back

386  IbidBack

387  Ev. p.360. Back

388  IbidBack

389  Ev. p.334. Back

390  Qq 465-475. Back

391  Qq 472, 469. Back

392  Unprinted evidence. Back

393  Q 472. Back

394  Ev. p.360. Back

395  Ev. p.361. Back

396  IbidBack

397  Ev. p.336. Back

398  IbidBack

399  Q 186. Back

400  Ev. p.361 Back

401  Q 186. Back

402  Ev. p.361. Back

403  Ev. pp.332, 333. Back


 
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