51. The previous section examined the biological research necessary to manage fisheries through control on catches. However, it is generally agreed that conservation policy can only be successful where catching capacity is matched to the available resources. This leads to management policies based on the control of fishing effort. Two of the most important aspects of such policies are the restructuring of the fleet and developments in the trade in licences and quota.

RESTRUCTURING OF THE FLEET

52. Since 1983 reduction in the capacity of the fleet has been managed within the CFP through a series of Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGP). There have been four such programmes so far. The first two (1983-1986 and 1987-1991) had only indicative targets for fleet reduction which most Member States failed to meet. As a result, in what the NFFO regarded "as a measure reached for in desperation" after the CFP had signally failed to protect fish stocks,[180] first MAGP III and then in December 1997 MAGP IV were introduced with mandatory targets. Under MAGP IV, the current programme, fishing by Member States for high risk stocks has to be reduced by 30% and for lower risk stocks by 20% in four equal annual stages, achievable either by reducing capacity or restricting time at sea.[181] The Joint Nature Conservation Council cited independent reports to support their contention that MAGP targets had not been sufficiently ambitious and therefore could not achieve the objective of balancing capacity and resources.[182] However, some sections of the UK fishing industry argued that, in this country at least, fleet reduction had gone far enough. The SFF, for example, did "not accept the need for further substantial, capacity reductions",[183] while the Anglo-North Irish Fishermen's Organisation believed that having decommissioned 35% of the fleet in the province between 1992-97, the fleet was now at its optimum level.[184] Fleetwood also felt that it had "more than met its decommissioning targets" and that there was no further room for reductions. Indeed, the port planned to increase its fleet.[185]

53. There is in fact only a very limited decommissioning scheme planned for the UK at the moment. This involves £10.5m of public money targeted on specific, smaller segments, while the UK has introduced effort controls in the pelagic and beam trawl sectors, objected to by the NFFO,[186] to meet its other immediate targets.[187] Previous decommissioning schemes removed approximately ten per cent of the fishing fleet tonnage in the UK from 1993 to 1998.[188] In the last three years 385 vessels have been decommissioned, representing some 11,800 tonnes or 5.5 per cent of the fleet in capacity terms.[189] According to the MAGP targets, there is still excess capacity in some segments, particularly the pelagic vessels, but in April this year the EC judged the UK fleet to be "within the intermediate objective of the programme in terms of power ... marginally outside it in terms of tonnage (by approximately 0.5%)" (see table 7 below).[190]

Note: a minus sign indicates that the fleet segment is within the objective.

Source: DG XIV, European Commission, Ev. p.349.

54. The EC's figures indicate that on one basis at least the decommissioning schemes introduced by the UK have been successful in that they have reduced fleet capacity. An independent report, cited by MAFF, the EC and the SFIA, concluded that the competitive tendering scheme, which ran between 1993 and 1998, had also proved cost-effective. The consultants calculated that "nearly 90 per cent of the capacity removed would have remained in the fleet in the absence of a scheme and that the capital value of the assets withdrawn ... was more than twice the cost of the decommissioning programme".[191] However, there are doubts about the scheme's effectiveness in relieving pressures on stocks. There is also a particular issue concerning the lack of targeting in the programme. The 1993 to 1998 scheme applied to all sectors of the fleet over 10m because there was perceived to be overcapacity in most categories.[192] It is not surprising then that, as Mr Wentworth of MAFF confirmed,"the decommissioning scheme has tended to take out the older vessels".[193] These also tend to be the less efficient vessels, rather than those with high catching capacity,[194] as is implicitly recognised in the fact that the scheme had "virtually no impact on the pelagic and beam trawl segments" which are highly profitable.[195] MAGP IV attempted to correct this balance but there are further problems if the money used for decommissioning is invested in new licences or vessels. The overall capacity and effort will not decrease because the fishermen may just move into other segments of the fleet. The South Wales Sea Fisheries Committee argued that any policy had to "take full account of the redistribution effect",[196] but the UK Fisheries Departments expressed approval of the findings of the independent report that "many vessels owners applied for the scheme with the intention of using their decommissioning payments to make further investments in the fishing fleet".[197]

55. Modernisation can also increase effort through efficiency gains. Several witnesses referred to the effect of "technological creep", the phenomenon whereby "newer vessels catch more each day than their older counterparts of the same size (capacity) and tend to spend more time at sea".[198] The Joint Nature Conservation Committee cited estimates of the effect of new technology as the equivalent of a 2% increase in efficiency per year, which compares with the average reduction in capacity in every round of the UK decommissioning scheme of approximately 2%.[199] Thus, while formal EU requirements have been complied with and capacity has fallen, "there has probably been little or no overall reduction in the overall rate of exploitation".[200] The RSPB told us that the EC was intending to undertake a study into technological creep.[201] We welcome this initiative as an important addition to the knowledge needed for fisheries management since these efficiency gains are going on in every European fleet.

56. It is clear that although much has been achieved towards restructuring through the MAGPs and decommissioning, there remains a danger that technological advances could outstrip the gains. To be successful in the long term, decommissioning has to be targeted on the sectors of the fleet where there is the greatest capacity and the greatest threat to vulnerable stocks. Witnesses suggested to us variously that decommissioning should be applied on a more regional basis or that it should be used to encourage low impact, sustainable methods of fishing.[202] There were also fears that it would lead "towards a fleet dominated by larger more efficient vessels" at the expense of small local industries.[203] We are pleased to note the sectoral targets built into the current MAGP programme but work still remains to be done on deciding the future size and shape of the industry.

57. The attitude of the industry towards decommissioning is coloured, as in so many other instances, by perceptions of discriminatory treatment in other Member States. Other fishing fleets had earlier and larger decommissioning schemes though it is difficult to compare the UK scheme with that adopted by other countries. MAFF explained that "because different Member States fish different mixtures of stocks with different types of vessels, rates of reduction required vary quite significantly from case to case".[204] Meaningful comparisons were further complicated by the different methods of implementation adopted.[205] The NFFO argued that these difficulties in making comparisons and ensuring fairness would be exacerbated under MAGP IV and claimed that the change in approach to targeting sectors and relying on effort control "has meant that any hope of transparency or equivalency of impact between different member states has been surrendered."[206] There have been attempts to improve this situation. For example, the EC produces annual reports on the operation of the MAGPs which describe how individual states intend to meet their targets although they do not reveal the costs involved in taking such measures. The EC report for 1997 gives some support to the UK industry's grievances in its repetition of the conclusion from previous reports that the degree to which the programmes have been respected varies enormously from Member State to Member State. This is an issue which has been taken up by the European Parliament. The stronger measures it urged to ensure compliance with the MAGPs may be incorporated in the new Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, which is now due to be agreed in October this year. We recommend that the Government fully support any proposals for stronger sanctions on Member States to ensure compliance with MAGP targets and for greater transparency as to the cost of restructuring measures to public funds in the different Member States.

AID FOR RESTRUCTURING

58. The NFFO characterised the UK's fleet structure policy as "a slow and reluctant compliance with EU fleet reduction obligations and complete disregard for the progressive ageing of the fleet".[207] This reflects the anger and resentment of many in the industry at the failure of the UK to provide financial assistance for modernisation or new boats. Supporters of such grants argue that the age profile is deteriorating and that providing more public money is justified on the grounds of safety and competitiveness. There are therefore four questions which must be addressed - is the fleet ageing; if so, does this affect safety; what impact does it have on competitiveness; and what is the legitimate role of Government action in respect of any of these?

The age of the fleet

59. Figure 2 illustrates the age profile of the UK fishing fleet. The UK Fisheries Departments interpreted this as showing that about half the UK fishing fleet was built between 10 and 25 years ago, while about a quarter is less than ten years old.[208] On the other hand, the SFIA produced figures which showed "the considerable proportion of elderly vessels - 28 per cent of the fleet as a whole is over 25 years old, this proportion rising to 42 per cent of those over 24 metres."[209] The two statements are not incompatible but the difference in emphasis is significant. From its statistics, the SFIA observed that "the expected average life of a British fishing vessel is now some 28, 36 and 40 years in each of the length bands respectively [under 10m, 10 to 24m, over 24m]" and that in order to maintain this level the industry needed to build "an average of around 180 under 10 metre boats, 57 10 metre to 24 metre vessels and 6.5 over 24 metre ships each year" whereas "the average over the last five years (1993 to 1997) has been only some 64, 13, 4.4 vessels per year respectively". Therefore, the fleet is not only elderly, but still ageing.[210]

Source: UK Fisheries Departments, Ev. p.15.

60. The NFFO regarded the reversal of the ageing profile of the fleet as "the central dilemma facing the United Kingdom fishing industry", claiming that "the UK fleet is geriatric in relation to other European fleets".[211] However, the Minister denied that this was the case. He argued that "if you look at the age profile of our fleet it does compare fairly favourably with other nations, it is not quite as bad as some would have you believe."[212] He later supplied figures to support this claim.[213] This accords with information gathered on our visit to Spain where we were told that the average age of their fleet was also 25 years old. It appears, though, that there has also been much more new build in Spain, which has been concentrated in the larger vessel sector. We also note that there has been some degree of regeneration in the fleet in recent years, particularly in Scotland but also in parts of England, which alters the figures. On balance, we conclude that, although the fleet age structure in the UK is not overall too far out of line with the EU average, it is deteriorating. We move on to the arguments for investing public money to reverse this trend.

Safety

61. Mr de Rozarieux of the CFPO told us that "the first and biggest reason for public money going in to [fleet restructuring] is safety".[214] This was also the primary concern of the SFIA which pointed out that "the fishing industry's accident statistics, especially those relating to deaths - which are particularly associated with vessel loss - are the worst of any British industry (eg 29 lives lost last year [1997])."[215] It cited "analyses which show that older vessels are more likely to be lost at sea"[216] and provided extracts from a 1989 SFIA report which concluded "generally older vessels are more likely to be lost" and from a 1983 academic study which proposed that "the assumption that vessels become less safe as they get older provides a reasonable explanation for the near-linear trend" produced when plotting the rate of loss against the age of the vessel.[217] The NFFO also cited official figures to support their case. These came from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch report for 1997 which indicated that "of the 23 fishing vessel losses in that year, over half were over 20 years old and in four cases over thirty years old".[218] The NFFO concluded from this data that "the age of a fishing vessel is a central factor in the industry's casualty rate", although it accepted that more work needed to be done on identifying particular reasons.[219]

62. It seems commonsense that an older vessel is likely to be less safe than a newer one, which will be fitted with modern safety equipment and in better repair. However, other evidence suggests that this may not always be the case. The Minister was adamant that "in relation to the issue of fleet age and accident rates, there is no simple correlation".[220] In this he was supported by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) which supplied us with the results of an exercise undertaken by the Shipping Policy Division of DETR and MAFF to "identify whether any correlation exists between the age of vessels in UK fishing fleet and the incidence of accidents".[221] Using data from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch, the group analysed the age of vessels involved in accidents against the composition of the fleet to produce the table below.

Source: Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Ev. p.319.

This indicates that in each case the average age of vessels involved in accidents was below the corresponding average age for the UK fleet. The same information presented as a bar chart showed that the age distribution of vessels over 12m involved in accidents was very close to that of the UK fleet in general. The group observed that "had older vessels been less safe, then the proportion of vessels recording incidents would have exceeded that for the UK fleet for the age bands from say 25 years onward".[222] It therefore reached the preliminary view that there was no such correlation between age and safety.[223]

63. The MCA is investigating why vessels over 12m which are subject to a more stringent safety regime have a higher accident rate than smaller vessels.[224] We support such research and would like to see further investigations into the factors which affect safety at sea. From the conflicting evidence, we conclude that the linkage between an ageing fleet and an unsafe fleet is unproven but we recommend that further research be conducted in this area and the results published and distributed to the fishing industry. Safety at sea is vitally important. The existing data do not sustain a case for the industry to be given public money for building new vessels on safety grounds alone. However, there could be a separate argument that grants for particular safety improvements would be justified so that the safety of fishermen on board vessels is not compromised. We return to this subject below.

Competitiveness

64. The relative competitiveness of the UK fleet was raised by witnesses at least as frequently as the issue of safety in making a plea for financial assistance. There were various aspects to this. First, there is the effect of the lack of modernisation on the efficiency of the fleet. The Grimsby Fish Producers' Organisation claimed that "unless steps are taken in the near future [the fleet] will become incapable of catching the quota in its possession".[225] The NFFO made a similar point in more moderate terms about this "competitive imperative": "If our vessels do not modernise, they are put at a disadvantage in terms of viability. Their catches are limited by quota but the cost of obtaining that fish will vary according to the economics and whether there is modern capacity involved or not".[226] The SFF raised the interesting question of the impact of the failure to build new vessels on new entrants to the industry and hence its ultimate viability. Young fishermen aiming to become vessel owners are likely to buy second-hand vessels but "because of the lack of new investment in anything other than a trickle, the good second-hand vessels are not working their way down the line."[227] This means no movement within or into the industry. It is a good point but as Mr Smith of the SFF himself recognised, it is linked to the "excessive" cost of licences and quota, which cost far more than the vessel itself and for that reason we discuss the difficulties of encouraging new entrants in the context of the trade in licences.

65. However, when most witnesses referred to the issue of competitiveness what was meant was the position of the UK industry in relation to the fleets of other Member States in their access to grants for modernisation and new build. The SFIA wrote that "there has to be concern over the UK's competitive position vis-à-vis our European Union partners - we have no readily available data on the situation in their fleets, but it is reasonable to surmise that at least those Member States which are meeting their Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes and are providing subventions for vessel construction, are attempting at least to maintain their position".[228] Mr Morley queried this disadvantage since "in terms of the catching capacity we are not competing with other Member States because we have our guaranteed national quota."[229] We agree with the Minister that the industry may not be competing directly against rivals in other fleets in terms of catching specific quotas but there are wider issues here of the costs placed on the industry and of the perception of fairness.

66. Fishermen's organisations clearly feel that they have been discriminated against by the refusal of the UK Government to offer grants for new build which were available in other countries. The most commonly cited example was Spain where a substantial modernisation programme has been put in place,[230] but France also has renewed its fleet with the help of European funding. The EC provided us with figures showing the amount and proportion of EU structural aid provided to the fisheries sector between 1994 and 1999 under various headings. From this it is clear that the UK has spent a far smaller proportion of its available funding on renewal and modernisation of the fleet than the average of the EU Member States (16% to 25%) and much less in absolute terms than France, Denmark, Germany, Spain or Italy.[231] These figures should be treated with some caution as it is not easy to compare statistics directly on this basis but it is true that no construction grants have been available in the UK since 1991,[232] which makes the industry view the revitalisation of the fleet in other countries with some bitterness and conclude that "the unpalatable fact that the UK fleet is increasingly obsolete and as a consequence increasingly at competitive disadvantage with other Member States' fleets, must primarily be laid at the door of successive British Governments."[233]

181  Ev. p. 16. Back

182  Ev. p.274. Back

183  Ev. p.294. Back

184  Ev. p.249. Back

185  Ev. p.261. Back

186  Ev. p.295. Back

187  Ibid. Back

188  Ev. p.197, para 63. Back

189  HC Debates, 11 January 1999, c.117w. Back

190  Ev. p.349. Back

191  Ev. p.198, para 67. Back

192  Ev. p.197, para 63. Back

193  Q 63. Back

194  Ev. pp.38, 257, 274. Back

195  Ev. p.197, para 66. Back

196  Ev. p.270; see also Ev. p.274. Back

197  Ev. p.198, para 67. Back

198  Ev. p. 65. Back

199  Ev. p.274. Back

200  Ibid. Back

201  Ev. p.257, para 3.2.3. Back

202  Ev. pp.274, 261. Back

203  Ev. p.257, para 3.1.1. Back

204  Ev. p.197, para 58. Back

205  Ev. p.197, para 59. Back

206  Ev. p.295. Back

207  Ev. p. 38. Back

208  Ev. p. 15. Back

209  Ev. p. 65. Back

210  Ibid. Back

211  Ev. p.38. Back

212  Q 1053. Back

213  Ev. p.242. Back

214  Q 456. Back

215  Ev. p.65. Back

216  Ibid. Back

217  Seafish Report N.350 (March 1989), para 3.1.4; UK Fishing Fleet Restructuring Model: Vessel Group Structure, Jim Shalliker, University of Birmingham, 1983, p.157. Back

218  Ev. p.297, Annex 1. Back

219  Ibid; Q 153. Back

220  Q 987. Back

221  Ev. p.317, para 5. Back

222  Ev. p.319, annex A. Back

223  Ev. p.317, para 6. Back

224  Ev. p.318, para 9. Back

225  Ev. p.309. Back

226  Q 150. Back

227  Q 173. Back

228  Ev. p.65. Back

229  Q 1057. Back

230  Eg, Ev. p. 53; Ev. p.259. Back

231  Ev. p.328. Back

232  Ev. p. 16, para 3.13. Back

233  Ev. p. 42. Back