| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
Mr. Hogg: What if the defects in this House are not essentially procedural, but stem from the fact that we do not have a separation of powers and that the Executive are Members of this place? Because the Executive, through the Whips Office, can control the majority party, this House is incapable of exercising proper control of the Executive. That is not procedure; it stems from an inherent characteristic of the constitutional settlement that is in place.
Mr. Sheldon: That has been the position for the past 250 years. It was a wonderful solution, because, as long as Members of Parliament had feelings of independence, they could form part of the Executive as well as holding the Executive to account. When we considered the problems in the United States, we used to congratulate ourselves on how well we had organised matters. What has happened during the past 30 years is that Members of Parliament have become much more full time and are looking to a career structure. It is that career structure that has tended to corrupt the system. That is the problem.
Mr. Andrew Rowe (Faversham and Mid-Kent): The right hon. Gentleman has made half the point that I was about to make. Is it not true that Members of Parliament were much more independent when they were of independent means?
Mr. Sheldon: Now, we have large numbers of Members of Parliament who have little in the way of outside interests and outside concerns. As a result, they look to the ordinary routes of promotion and envisage themselves forming part of the Government. In the past, many Members of substance and standing would come into the Chamber to listen to the debate; now, most Members come to the Chamber to speak in a debate. There is nothing wrong in that, but we should recognise that there was formerly an element that produced the sort of House of Commons that it was our privilege to inherit, but which we have, to a certain extent, distorted. That is the real problem.
We have been at this stage before in respect of House of Lords reform. I strongly opposed the proposals in 1968-69. At that time, there was an agreement between the two Front-Bench teams, but it was my good fortune and privilege to spot, right from the start, that there was a way to divide them in such a way as to ensure that they could never get the guillotine. By using one device or another, the opponents of the proposals ensured that that happened. The Government Back Benchers railed against Ministers and the Opposition Back Benchers railed against their Front Benchers, with the result that the legislation fell.
I could see that the legislation could not be revived, because a poll produced at the time showed that there was little support for the proposals. The House sat 14 days and nights--at that time, we had the Dick Crossman reforms, so we sat morning, afternoon, evening and night--but after those 14 days, we had reached only clause 6 of a 20-clause Bill, so the Bill was dropped.
The deficiencies in that legislation were far greater than the deficiencies in the current Bill. At least in the current Bill, we can see the first stage and what will happen during that period, whereas the 1968-69 legislation simply gave huge powers of patronage to two Front-Bench teams operating together. If it had been passed, not only would it have distorted the House of Lords, but, more important, it would have distorted the House of Commons by creating an aldermanic bench.
I have had some experience of an aldermanic bench. People who have been elected as councillors wait for a certain number of their colleagues to die off so that they can acquire a position in which they will never have to face another election. It is a tempting prospect: permanent positions that carry power, but no responsibility--lovely. I could foresee the result of the 1968 proposals: some Members of Parliament would have been anxious to obtain one of those aldermanic posts, so there would have been patronage in this place, because Front Benchers would have been able to offer an attractive combination of power with security and pay. We must concern ourselves with both powers and composition, even at the first stage.
Mr. Andrew Tyrie (Chichester):
The right hon. Gentleman has thoroughly described the shortcomings of the 1968 proposals. Does he take issue with the Labour party submission which states:
The whole point is that Back Benchers have been underappreciated. Back Benchers are not always wrong, even on the big issues. In my time, we have had devaluation, which should have occurred far sooner; we have had the east of Suez policy, when the Government said that this country's frontiers were on the Himalayas, which was a load of nonsense and I fought against it; we have had the poll tax, against which we should have fought harder. On those and many other issues, Back Benchers knew better than the Government of the day, but the House of Commons failed to turn that general feeling into decision making. It was not the House of Commons or the system that was weak; it was the individuals who failed to put right what was wrong.
What needs to be done? We must consider the scrutiny of legislation by the House of Commons, which is the backbone of its work. We perform two types of examination of legislation--one is examination to see whether it is efficient, economic and effective. That is the Public Accounts Committee work of ensuring that everything that is done is done in the best possible way. The other role concerns aspects of policy, and the role of Government Back Benchers is even more important when the Government have a large majority. Francis Pym, who lost his position for his pains, was right to point out the dangers of large majorities. I welcome the Labour party being in power, but we must be careful that we understand
the difficulties of a large majority and find a role for Members of Parliament so that they can use their abilities to the full.
What is the solution? We must use the House of Commons more effectively, as both a debating and a decision-making body. Some in the Government have always believed that, in the interests of party unity, different views should not be openly expressed, but should be conveyed quietly to the relevant Ministers for their reconsideration. With many Ministers that is an effective way to achieve change, as we have seen in the past day or so. What if it does not work? Should the alternative views not be put? Should Members of Parliament have to bite their lip, swallow their pride, grumble in private and await the next means of persuasion? That is not the way for a sovereign House of Commons to proceed. This is a national forum for debate and open discussion, and for argument that brings out issues openly for the people to see and decide. Anyone who believes in open government and open dissent must be a part of that.
Are Governments always right? Of course they are not. The question is whether we should exchange the pressure of Members of Parliament for pressure from the unelected peers in the House of Lords. Of course not. I have always believed in the need to maximise one's powers of persuasion. An opponent of a Government can find his or her views readily dismissed, but Government Back Benchers can have an enormous influence if they make use of their voice sensibly, moderately and sustainedly. The task of a Government Back Bencher is not to be considered outside the pale but to have it believed--including by the Whips--that one is redeemable and interested in looking for good solutions.
Mr. Gordon Prentice (Pendle):
What should the loyal Government Back Bencher do if they find themselves totally opposed to the Government's proposals, say, for example, on whether the upper House should be directly elected?
Mr. Sheldon:
I can only answer from my own experience. I was against the Government on devaluation and on the east of Suez policy. At the time of devaluation, I was the chairman of the economic and finance group. I spoke in the House in favour of devaluation, and nine other members of the economic and finance group of the parliamentary Labour party spoke in my support on devaluation, but there was nobody in the Press Gallery and it was never reported. It was all in Hansard, but not in the papers. The House of Commons must return to being the centre of debate and argument to convince the people what is right and what should be done.
Government Back Benchers should put the arguments sensibly and clearly. If they get the debate going, they may persuade their colleagues and the Government of the need for a change. Nothing is fixed irredeemably. However, one should make one's point with courtesy and persistence.
In the 1969 debates on House of Lords reform, I was concerned the proposals would make the position of Members of the House of Lords more attractive. It would have given them powers as well as salaries. I considered the revising powers of the House of Lords and I was impressed by the arguments of Professor Griffiths who showed that nearly all the substantive amendments in the Lords were the result of Government actions.
I accept that the position has changed in the past 30 years. Government legislation is now more hurried and requires more amendments. Nevertheless, the fault for defective legislation lies with the House of Commons. Legislation is defective not because it has not been examined properly in the House of Lords but because the 659 Members in this place have not highlighted the flaws. That is a problem of application and of principle.
The only legislation that requires amendment from an outside body is the quinquennial Act. We clearly cannot change that Act ourselves: we cannot legislate to continue as Members of Parliament without calling a general election. I am also concerned about the domination of this Chamber by the Executive. Reference has been made to that problem, which has existed for 30 or 40 years--although it was not such a powerful obstacle when I was first elected to this place. Today, almost all Members of Parliament are full-time Members and they want a career structure. That leads to dominance first by the Executive and then by central party organisations. That is a serious matter.
"There is a great deal of wisdom in these earlier proposals for House of Lords reform which would repay careful examination today"?
Mr. Sheldon:
Given that I spent a great deal of my political life fighting such proposals, I am not likely to change my mind 30 years on. Those proposals were flawed. At the time they were debated, the House could not get the guillotine--it could not even get 100 Members to move the closure; it got only 99, and that was the end of that.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |