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9.40 pm
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. George Robertson): We have had a good, appropriate debate about the joint decision by the United Kingdom and the United States of America to take military action to reduce the threat from Saddam Hussein's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capability and ambition. We have had speeches of passion and conviction, and of substance and gravity, but all of some considerable and appropriate sobriety, too.
It is invidious often at the beginning of winding-up speeches to single out hon. Members who have spoken, and I should like to deal with some of the points raised. Nevertheless, my hon. Friends the Members for Walsall, South (Mr. George) and for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson), the Chairmen of the Select Committees on Defence and on Foreign Affairs respectively, made valuable contributions. We heard moving and outstanding speeches from my hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd), who has had a long, consistent
interest in this subject, and my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Mr. Home Robertson), who spoke with passion and experience. We heard speeches from my hon. Friends the Members for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) and for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook). The hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell) made an interesting contribution before he departed to the outer limits of the House. My hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours), who has been involved in the campaign against Saddam Hussein for far longer than many others, contributed well.
The hon. Member for Romsey (Mr. Colvin), the former chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, made a valuable contribution, not of all of which I agreed with, but some of his points were pertinent. The right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King), who held my position when Saddam Hussein last threatened not only his neighbours but international stability, made several perceptive points which have been useful to me in my detailed consideration of these affairs. I shall deal with some of the points as I go through my speech, although it is physically and verbally impossible to deal with the plethora of questions from hon. Members.
My right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary clearly explained why we decided that we had to take military action this week. No one should imagine that that decision was taken lightly or without deep and careful thought. As the Prime Minister said, there can be no greater responsibility for any politician than to ask British service men and women to go out and risk their lives for their country and for international law and order.
I have listened, as we all have, carefully to the views of those opposed to the use of force. Perhaps some of us have sympathy for some of the feelings expressed. Military action inevitably has direct human consequences. Nobody involved in authorising or taking military action should ever close his or her eyes to that fact. Those who oppose the use of force must ask what alternative there could have been in the present circumstances.
Mr. Canavan:
Earlier this year, I asked the Foreign Secretary specifically, whether he could rule out the possibility of a nuclear attack on Iraq. He replied:
Mr. Robertson:
The hon. Gentleman is perfectly well aware of what the position of Governments in this country has consistently been on that subject. If there is any question of this country's existence being under threat, the position is quite clear. Those who oppose the use of force--
Mr. Canavan:
It is not clear at all--the statements are contradictory.
Mr. Robertson:
Those who, in the debate today, have opposed the use of force have to answer the simple question of what the alternative would be. I contend that
It may sound far-fetched to some people to suggest that Saddam would actually use chemical and biological weapons, and to those who are normal that is indeed true. However, he has already done so. He used chemical agents extensively against Iran and even against his own people at Halabja in March 1988, when he killed thousands of Iraqi Kurds with mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun. I have met the refugees from Halabja and spoken to some of those who survived. They talked of what they called the bombs with no voices. The effects of that attack were indescribably horrible, and left physical and psychological scars on the survivors which will never heal. However, that was using only chemical weapons; the potential devastation that he could wreak with biological weapons--the biological weapons that have been uncovered by the UNSCOM inspectors--is many times more serious.
Mr. Cohen:
I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way. Will he clear up one point that was raised during the debate? He has referred to chemical weapons. During the Foreign Secretary's speech, it was pointed out that we would not be targeting chemical weapons in the bomb and missile attacks, yet the Prime Minister and other Ministers have talked of degrading them. Will the Secretary of State for Defence square that apparent contradiction?
Mr. Robertson:
There is absolutely no contradiction. We are targeting the machinery through which the chemical weapons could be used. I am not prepared to go into detailed operational issues for understandable reasons, but I can assure the House that all relevant factors were taken into account in selecting the targets for the operations and only precision-guided weaponry is being used.
We are united in agreeing that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and his capability in that respect must be dismantled. That is a sentiment that unites the international community and all members of the UN Security Council. We would all prefer that to have been achieved peacefully and diplomatically. Some believed that that was still possible. The Government and, I believe, the majority of those in the House did not. Saddam has had seven years in which to comply with his obligation to the UN to give up his weapons of mass destruction. He has been given chance after chance after chance to co-operate and on every occasion he has lied, cheated and obstructed. The time for diplomacy has passed.
The Prime Minister and the President of the United States gave the clearest possible warning on 16 November that if there were any further obstruction we would strike without warning. True to form, Saddam Hussein not only
obstructed UNSCOM yet again, but made its whole job impossible. The conclusion of Ambassador Butler's report is inescapable to anyone who has concerns about the subject.
The campaign is limited but intensive; we have chosen targets that are connected to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction capability, with other capabilities which pose a threat to his neighbours, such as command and control capabilities, and with air defence systems which could pose a threat to coalition aircraft involved in the operation. That operation is on-going, and United Kingdom aircraft are in the air as we speak. It will continue for as long as is necessary.
Saddam Hussein's record of non-compliance is considerable. His non-compliance with resolution 687 is not confined to his disavowal of the regime of the UNSCOM inspectors. He has not complied with practically every point that he accepted as part of the ceasefire settlement. I shall outline just one. At the time of the ceasefire, Saddam Hussein was called upon, and agreed to, repatriate the Kuwaiti prisoners of war. They have never been repatriated, and that is a disgrace and a continuing stain on Saddam Hussein. We will not forget those who were captured and remain in detention.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary explained fully and clearly how Saddam has failed to comply on the weapons of mass destruction front. The fact is that that non-compliance has continued on and off throughout the period since the end of the war. Saddam Hussein attacked the Iraqi Kurds in April 1991 and we introduced the northern no-fly zone. He threatened Kuwait again in 1994. In 1992, he attacked the Shia in the marshlands of southern Iraq and we were obliged to establish no-fly zones in southern Iraq as well. In 1996, Saddam Hussein again attacked his own countrymen and women in the Kurdish north of Iraq. Throughout those years, he obstructed and deceived the UNSCOM inspectors. He said at first that he had no chemical or biological weapons. As those weapons were disclosed and discovered, he continued to lie about the weapons that he retained and failed to disclose.
Several hon. Members--including the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Maples)--asked an important question during the debate. As the military action continues, I think that it deserves an answer in my winding-up speech. That question is: what is the long-term strategy after this military operation has ended? First, Saddam Hussein's obligations to disarm will remain and, come what may, he must one day comply fully with the resolutions agreed at the end of the Gulf war. Secondly, as a result of this military action, his capability to build and use chemical and biological weapons, and therefore his ability to threaten his neighbours, will be severely damaged and diminished.
Thirdly, the sanctions regime will remain in place and enforcement will be tightened so that the funding of the soft life of the Iraqi elite and the military superstructure of Iraq will become increasingly difficult. Saddam Hussein will eventually have to take back the UNSCOM inspectors if he wants the sanctions to end. Fourthly, until Saddam Hussein complies fully with the United Nations Security Council resolutions, we will not withdraw the threat of renewed military action without warning. If he tries once again to regain his capability to develop
weapons of mass destruction and his ambition to intimidate and threaten his neighbours, he will have to face the consequences. We will not go away.
"Yes, I can rule that out straight away."--[Official Report, 10 February 1998; Vol. 306, c. 154.]
More recently, he said that nothing could be ruled out. Which of his statements does the Defence Secretary agree with?
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