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33. Mr. Alan Clark (Kensington and Chelsea): What discussions he has had with the Secretary of State for Home Affairs concerning declarations of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998. [63019]
The Solicitor-General (Mr. Ross Cranston): The contents of the Human Rights Act were discussed extensively among Ministers in the preparation of the Government's White Paper, in the process of drafting the Bill and during debates in Parliament. The provisions relating to declarations of incompatibility, although complex, are an important and central part of the legislation. Ministers are satisfied with the Act and in particular with the provisions relating to declarations of incompatibility.
Mr. Clark: That does not really take the matter any further. One of the primary functions of the Attorney-General is to ensure that Ministers and the Government stay within the law. The Home Secretary only recently told the House that a declaration of incompatibility does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given and is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made. Leaving aside the implicit contradiction between two senior Ministers, what advice would the Solicitor-General give to successful or potential litigants?
The Solicitor-General: This country has been an adherent to the European convention on human rights since 1951. All Governments have complied with their international obligations. The legislation that they have introduced has in their view been compliant with the law. Occasionally, courts may decide that there is non-compliance and in future there may be declarations
of incompatibility under the provision but, on the whole, we take the view--as did the Government in which the right hon. Gentleman served--that we comply with our international obligations and so does our legislation.
Sir Nicholas Lyell (North-East Bedfordshire): Do the Solicitor-General and the Attorney-General realise that there is a serious problem and unfinished business under the Human Rights Act 1998? Where the courts have declared our law to be incompatible with the convention, the Act provides under section 4(6) that the law none the less remains the same until it is changed by Parliament. However, supposing the Government disagree with the House of Lords and wish the matter to be resolved by Strasbourg so that our law is not out of kilter with that which applies in the rest of the Council of Europe. What would happen then? Which law would apply? Would it be the law before the ruling of the court or after the ruling of the court? Technically, it would be the law that applied before the ruling but, unless the Government make their position clear, neither the citizen nor our courts will know where they stand.
We suggested a mechanism so that citizens and courts would know whether the Government would take the matter on to Strasbourg or force the other party to take it on to Strasbourg. Will the law officers and the Home Secretary find a sensible mechanism to resolve that serious potential problem, and will they or the Home Secretary announce it to the House?
The Solicitor-General:
That section was a neat solution to the problem of parliamentary sovereignty--it retains parliamentary sovereignty. The courts cannot strike down legislation under section 4. Obviously, we are still obliged to comply with our international obligations under the convention, and we shall do so.
34. Miss Anne McIntosh (Vale of York):
What representations he has received on the extension of the rights of audience of barristers and solicitors employed by the Crown Prosecution Service. [63021]
The Attorney-General:
The Solicitor-General and I have discussed the matter with the Director of Public Prosecutions, others in the Crown Prosecution Service and members of both professions. My noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor has recently introduced in the other place a Bill that will reform rights of audience and permit Crown Prosecution Service lawyers to exercise full rights of audience in the higher courts. I support his proposals and welcome the introduction of his Bill.
Miss McIntosh:
I am grateful for that reply. Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman considered extending the same rights of audience that he has just explained to the House to in-house barristers working for companies in parallel with the Crown Prosecution Service, so that they can enjoy the same rights of audience under the Bill?
The Attorney-General:
Before the Bill comes into effect--if it is approved by both Houses--the position of
Mr. John Burnett (Torridge and West Devon):
Does the Attorney-General really believe that having the state as both prosecutor and defender is in the interests of a fair and independent criminal justice system?
The Attorney-General:
I do not think that there is any difficulty. The state has been the paymaster of the prosecution from time immemorial. Since a Labour Government in the 1940s set up the legal aid system, the state has also been the paymaster of the independent Bar and solicitors who have appeared in court on behalf of defendants. I see no difficulty in extending that principle if it becomes appropriate.
35. Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham):
If he will make a statement on his assessment of the effectiveness of the Crown Prosecution Service. [63023]
The Attorney-General:
Sir Iain Glidewell's report on the Crown Prosecution Service made a number of recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness of the CPS. On 30 November, I placed in the Library of the House a chart setting out the action that the CPS has taken to consider and implement those recommendations. I am pleased with the progress that the CPS is making under its new Director of Public Prosecutions and chief executive. I am confident that that provides a sound basis for the CPS to proceed as a national but decentralised service with effect from April 1999, obtaining maximum benefit from the "fresh start" advocated in the Glidewell report.
Mr. Bercow:
I thank the Attorney-General for that helpful reply. Is it not crucial to improved performance by the Crown Prosecution Service that the administrative support units that help to prepare cases for it are led and guided by the highest-calibre lawyers and police officers? Should not the emphasis of their work be on the expeditious handling of paperwork and on ensuring that they get it right the first time? What specific measures are being taken to facilitate that important objective?
The Attorney-General:
I am happy to tell the House that, as regards the necessary priorities, the hon. Gentleman has got it right too. What he has described was one of the fundamental recommendations of the Glidewell report that is now being considered. I hope to report to the House later on the new unit appropriate for ensuring that prosecutions are handled effectively. As a major step in that direction, the advertisement has now gone out for the appointment of chief Crown prosecutors in each area. That is an important plank in building the type of system that both the hon. Gentleman and I agree is necessary.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Tony Blair): With permission, I will make a statement on Iraq.
Yesterday, I authorised the participation of British forces in a substantial US-UK military strike against targets in Iraq. As the House knows, this attack began last night, to maximise surprise through the use of sea-launched cruise missiles and precision bombing by navy-based manned aircraft. The operation is now continuing and, as I speak, British Tornado aircraft are engaged in action. I spoke to their commander last night and congratulated him on the bravery and professionalism of his forces. I know that the whole House will join with me in wishing them well as they risk their lives to help ensure peace and stability in the middle east and more widely. We are proud of them.
The objectives of this military operation are clear and simple: to degrade the ability of Saddam Hussein to build and use weapons of mass destruction, including command and control and delivery systems, and to diminish the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to his neighbours by weakening his military capability.
Those objectives are achievable and the action is proportionate to the serious dangers Saddam Hussein poses to his immediate neighbours, the middle east region and the international community more widely. The targets, throughout Iraq, have been very carefully selected to reflect these objectives. We are taking every possible care to avoid civilian casualties or damage to ordinary civilian infrastructure.
The House will forgive me, I hope, if I say no more about operational details at this stage. To go further could endanger the lives of those involved. However, first reports from last night's operations suggest that they were successful and inflicted the kind of military damage we were seeking.
When I spoke to the House on 16 November, after we and the Americans had stayed our hand because of a written Iraqi promise of full co-operation with the UN weapons inspectors, I set out in some detail why we had come to the brink of military action. The House, I hope, will forgive me if I once again set current events in their proper context, because it is vital that people understand that the threat from Saddam is not theoretical--it is real.
Our policy has always been to seek genuine Iraqi compliance with the demands of the Security Council. After the Gulf war had revealed the extent of Saddam's arsenal, Iraq agreed in April 1991 to accept the destruction of all its weapons of mass destruction and not to develop such weapons in the future. Iraq also agreed to a special commission to monitor and oversee the process. That was the price that Iraq was made to pay for the cessation of hostilities. The capability that Saddam had at the outset of the Gulf war included a nuclear weapons programme only two years away from producing an effective bomb; long-range missile stocks able to threaten all his neighbours; a chemical weapons arsenal of huge proportions, which he had already used on the Iranians in the 10-year war that he started on Iran, and on his own people; and a biological weapons programme capable of producing enough deadly toxins to destroy the population of the globe several times over.
It was then expected that the special commission, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, would complete this process in a few months, but it was not to be. What no one fully foresaw at that time was the huge effort that Iraq would put into blocking it. The inspectors have been constantly harassed, threatened, deceived and lied to. A special and elaborate mechanism to conceal Iraqi capability was put in place involving organisations close to Saddam, in particular his Special Republican Guard.
Despite that, the United Nations Special Commission achieved a huge amount, particularly after the defection of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, later murdered by Saddam. UNSCOM destroyed, for example, more than 38,000 chemical weapons munitions, 48 Scud missiles and a biological weapons factory designed to produce up to 50,000 litres of anthrax, botulism toxin and other deadly agents. But much--too much--remains unaccounted for. Iraq has consistently sought to frustrate attempts to look at the records and destroy the remaining capability--and let us again be clear: Saddam still has capability in this area, not least to develop more weapons in the future. Let me give just one example: more than 610 tonnes of precursor chemicals for the nerve gas VX have not yet been found or accounted for.
Meanwhile, Saddam's conventional military capabilities remain at a very high level. He has more than 1 million men under arms, including 75,000 in the Republican Guard and 15,000 members of the Special Republican Guard. Saddam attaches importance to only one thing: his ability to dominate his people and his neighbours by military force. He wants to retain all the weapons that he can, including weapons of mass destruction. He has used them before, and I am in no doubt of his readiness to use them again if he has any opportunity. His brutality and ruthlessness are too well documented for there to be any doubt of that. The UN special rapporteur on human rights issued a new report on Iraq in October; it bears studying. He documented massive and extremely grave violations of human rights, including the widespread and systematic use of torture, a new policy of penal mutilation and amputations introduced by Saddam's son, Uday, and innumerable and illegal political executions.
After the full extent of the weapons programme was uncovered in 1996 and early 1997, Saddam began to obstruct in real earnest. He cast doubt on the independence of the inspectors. He sought to exclude US and British members of UNSCOM. He sought to declare certain sites out of bounds, on the ground that they were personal palaces. That led to a series of crises with the Security Council and the international community, and a recurring threat of force, first in October 1997--when he eventually backed down--and then in February this year. The House will recall that that was eventually resolved by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, going to Baghdad and concluding a binding memorandum of understanding with the Iraqis. In it, Saddam undertook to co-operate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA, and confirmed that that meant
President Clinton also set out what Saddam had to do: allow unfettered access for UNSCOM and the IAEA and abide by all the relevant Security Council resolutions; otherwise, he said, the US stood ready to act without further warning.
Saddam Hussein is a man to whom a last chance to do right is just a further opportunity to do wrong. He is blind to reason. We were not unconscious of that, but we wanted to show for our part that reason, not vengeance, motivated us. So, acting on that promise of unconditional access, Richard Butler was asked to put his inspectors back in immediately and carry out the full range of his tasks, and then to report back to the Security Council. He said that he would do so within a month. On Monday, a month later, he did so. That report was clear anddamning. Copies were placed in the House yesterday. Butler summarises UNSCOM's experiences: limited co-operation in some areas, yes, but otherwise a clear pattern of obstruction--over documents, access to Iraqi personnel and, above all, the surprise inspections of suspect sites so vital to UNSCOM's completion of its task. Co-operation, as the report says, has indeed been less good in some areas even than in the difficult times of the past.
The evidence is clear, as set out by Butler. Important and relevant documents have not been handed over. Their existence has even been denied in many cases, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The documents are vital because they would reveal how many weapons Iraq had and has and where they are or may be located.
We know that the Iraqis have deliberately destroyed as many of these documents as they can, including in the second half of this November as UNSCOM was resuming its work.
The Iraqis have also blocked legitimate inspections including one to the Ba'ath party headquarters. This visit was not an idle provocation, but because there was reliable evidence of relevant material at that site. In another case, an inspection of the former headquarters of the Special Security Organisation was eventually allowed to go ahead, but only after the building had been emptied, not only of any relevant material, but of its furniture and all equipment of any kind.
Butler's conclusion is clear and unequivocal:
In those circumstances, we had a stark choice. Either we could let this process continue further, with UNSCOM more and more emasculated, including its monitoring capability, Saddam correspondingly free to pursue his weapon-making ambitions, and this one-sided, unjustified bargaining over sanctions continuing, or, having tried every possible diplomatic avenue and shown endless patience despite all Saddam's deception, we could decide that, if UNSCOM could not do its work, we should tackle Saddam's remaining capability through direct action of our own. In the circumstances, there was only one responsible choice to make.
We are acting now because Butler's report--delivered on time--was so clear and because, if we were going to act, it was obviously better that we should do so without giving Saddam unnecessary time to prepare his defences and disperse whatever he could to new locations. In particular, we were immensely sensitive to the imminence of Ramadan and very reluctant to have to start a military campaign during Ramadan, out of our respect for Muslim sentiments. On the other hand, waiting until after Ramadan would have given Saddam a month to prepare. It would have been highly risky in military terms and likely to reduce significantly the effect of our attacks.
I want to deal with one thing straight on. There are suggestions that the timing of military action is somehow linked to the internal affairs of the United States. I refute this entirely. I have no doubt at all that action is fully justified now. That is my own strong, personal view. I know that President Clinton reached the same conclusion for the same reasons. Had he acted differently, out of regard to internal matters of US politics, that would have
been a dereliction of his duty as President of the United States. Instead, not for the first time, he has shown the courage to do the right thing, and he has my full support.
Other questions arise about this military operation. Let me deal with them as briefly as I can. Is it a specific objective to remove Saddam Hussein? The answer is: it cannot be. No one would be better pleased if his evil regime disappeared as a direct or indirect result of our action, but our military objectives are precisely those that we have set out. Even if there were legal authority to do so, removing Saddam through military action would require the insertion of ground troops on a massive scale--hundreds of thousands, as the British Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Charles Guthrie, made clear this morning. Even then, there would be no absolute guarantee of success. I cannot make that commitment responsibly.
What will happen once the military operation is over? The answer to that depends at least as much on Saddam as it does on us. I hope that he will finally come to his senses and recognise that the only way to find support in the international community and light at the end of the tunnel is full compliance with the Security Council's requirements. UNSCOM must remain ready to resume its work and to accomplish the task set by the Security Council and agreed to by the Iraqis.
Alternatively, if, as is likely, Saddam will not see reason, then after this military operation is concluded, we will ensure that Saddam's weakened military capability cannot be rebuilt and that the threat he poses is fully contained. We have the ability to do so, even without UNSCOM, if necessary. We will certainly be better placed after this military strike than if we had to go on dealing with a Saddam Hussein whose military capability had not been weakened and with an UNSCOM increasingly impeded from doing any serious work. We will maintain and enforce rigorously the existing sanctions. If necessary, and if we have serious evidence from our intensive surveillance or from intelligence that his capability is being rebuilt, we will be ready to take further military action. Saddam should have no doubt whatever of our continuing resolve on that point.
We shall in any case do all we can to ensure that the present arrangements of oil sales for food and medicine can continue. I trust that, this time, Saddam will allow the mechanism to work properly, for the benefit of his people, rather than continue to spread lies about the effect of sanctions. He has the means to care for his people, if he chooses to use them.
Again, let us be clear: the Iraqi authorities can import as much food and medicines as they need. If there are nutritional problems in Iraq, they are not the result of sanctions. Let us not forget that Iraq is continuing to export food to her neighbours. We also constantly look at ways in which we can do more to help alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people, for example, whenever we review the workings of the sanctions and oil for food regimes, and through our own aid effort.
The decision to take military action against Iraq was taken with great regret. It is a heavy responsibility. There will be casualties in Iraq, despite all our efforts, although I hope that all concerned will be fully alert to Saddam's very well-documented modus operandi of fabrication of evidence.
I am encouraged by the international reaction: most of our allies have offered full support, and others who have felt unable to do so have shown their understanding. I believe that, among the Arab countries, the view expressed at their meeting in Doha in November, that Saddam must bear the responsibility for what happens, holds good.
"immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access in conformity with Security Council Resolutions."
But the pattern continued. Then Saddam broke altogether the agreement with Kofi Annan. In August he suspended co-operation, and on 31 October he ended it. That was why, on 14 November, I gave authority for
British forces to participate in a United States-United Kingdom strike against Iraq, which, as we know, was averted only by another offer from Saddam. The Iraqis again agreed, in terms that spoke of a
"clear and unconditional decision of the Iraqi government to resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA".
They said:
"UNSCOM and the IAEA could immediately resume all their activities according to the relevant Resolutions of the Security Council."
I remind the House that those resolutions call on Iraq to comply unconditionally with the demands of the Security Council to give up all weapons of mass destruction, and to co-operate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Resolution 707 of 15 August 1991, for example, passed after the first evidence of Iraqi non-compliance, demanded that Iraq should
"provide full, final and complete disclosure . . . of aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction",
and that it should allow UNSCOM and the IAEA
"immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records, and means of transportation which they wish to inspect".
There were some who thought that we should have taken military action on 14 November. But, despite our severe doubts, we went that extra mile. We gave Saddam that last chance. Even at the risk to our own credibility, we were determined to avoid, if we responsibly could, the use of force. At the same time, we and the Americans also gave the clearest possible warning that, should Saddam break his word once more, there would be no further warnings or diplomatic arguments. I told the House on 16 November that, if he again obstructed the work of the inspectors, we would strike. No warnings. No wrangling. No negotiation. No last-minute letters.
"in the light of this experience, that is, the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded again that the Commission is not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security Council and, thus, to give the Council the assurances it requires with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes."
Anyone who has followed at all the pattern of events in Iraq in recent years must come to the same inescapable conclusion. Whatever the arguments about particular incidents, Saddam's attitude to the inspectors and their work cannot remotely be described as full co-operation. It has instead been as much deliberate obstruction as he thought he could get away with. Moreover, he has also consistently sought in the past 18 months to use this obstruction deliberately to try to blackmail the international community into lifting sanctions--a step which we support when he has complied with his obligations but which is quite unacceptable before he has done so, and while the threat remains.
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