At the meeting of the Trade and Industry Committee on 1 July, I promised to provide the Committee with the figures I quoted for contributions to improve the physical security of nuclear material in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Those figures are attached. I should stress that they are indicative and should not be seen as a comprehensive list of international contributions, merely what the UK has been able to record from a range of sources.

  It is worth reiterating that, for most countries, where we have doubts about the security or safety of nuclear material, it makes more sense to assist in improving the standards on site. Hence the large sums of money spent on doing so. But Georgia's case was different. The material there included spent fuel which needs specialised storage conditions; and the total amount of nuclear material was so tiny as to make it uneconomic to do anything other than remove all the material to another country which already had the facilities to manage both spent and fresh nuclear material safely and securely.

  

USA	$330 million, spread over 6 years (mainly in Russia, for civil and military nuclear materials, and for safeguards, accountancy controls, environmental clean-up etc as well as physical protection)
Japan	$50 million
Sweden	$6 million
Germany	$1 million (in Russia)
UK	$680,000 (spread over three years, focussed on civil material only)
Finland	$460,000

  

USA	$827,000
Germany	$200,000
Japan	$22,000
UK	$20,000 (for training of staff in FSU and eastern Europe and IAEA's development of security guidance for these countries. In addition, the UK has funded since 1996 a UK expert on each of the five IPPAS missions to date. These advise on improving the receiving State's system of physical protection.)
7 July 1998