1.  The regulation of security in the civil nuclear industry is the responsibility of Ministers of the Department of Trade and Industry under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Acts 1954 and 1971 and the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. The attached diagram shows the various factors taken into account in the production of the written requirements (Minimum Standards[3]) which these companies must follow for the physical protection of their sites.

THE DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL NUCLEAR SECURITY

  2.  The Directorate of Civil Nuclear Security (DCNSy) advises on the physical security standards with which each site must comply and audits compliance with these standards. It is funded by the bodies to which it provides advice and physical and IT security audit services (UKAEA, BNFL and URENCO), as well as by the DTI on whose behalf it acts, both in the UK and in a number of roles overseas. The current Director of Civil Nuclear Security was appointed six months ago.

  3.  From 1971 through to the early 1990s, DCNSy's precursor, the UKAEA Security Directorate, while fully embedded in the UKAEA, acted on behalf of DTI to help set standards and audit security on both UKAEA and other civil nuclear licensed sites (ie those of BNFL and URENCO) which were subject to Ministerial Direction under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act. As a result of discussions during 1994 and 1995, in the light of DTI's increasingly active involvement in the sensitive area of nuclear security, the Directorate's position was modified by the previous Government to make more explicit its independence of action in nuclear security regulation, acting as the technical arm of the DTI, the statutory regulator. DCNSy remains tenuously linked to the UKAEA, reliant on UKAEA simply for pay and rations administration. Although the Director still reports formally to the Chairman of the Board, DCNSy is outside the Chief Executive's line of responsibility. In practice, DCNSy works for and to the DTI on a day to day basis.

MINIMUM STANDARDS

  4.  The Minimum Standards document, issued under Ministerial Authority, lays down the standards of physical protection for the different security categories of Special Nuclear Material (SNM), with which UKAEA, BNFL and URENCO sites must comply. These standards depend on the sensitivity and quantity of the particular type(s) of SNM on each site. Operators must notify DCNSy of any significant changes in SNM type and quantity, in order that the regular audits conducted by DCNSy are against the correct standards.

  5.  The requirements in Minimum Standards, as the attached diagram shows, stem from international requirements and guidelines for physical protection, requirements in UK law, and accepted good practice as laid down by central Government. DCNSy apply their technical expertise to audit nuclear sites' standards both against these requirements and against a background of advice on risks from a range of government sources.

  6.  DCNSy is responsible for advising DTI on the need to revise national standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials in the light of changes in the threat or in international recommendations or requirements. The last major revision of Minimum Standards was in 1990. There have been some very minor revisions since this text. However, much work was carried out during 1997 on a full scale updating and revision of Minimum Standards to incorporate a number of minor changes in international regulations, to reflect DCNSy's experience in audits over the last few years and the Government's view of future physical protection needs. One of the major improvements planned for the new version, details of which have been discussed extensively with industry, will be an annex which lays down clearly for the first time in Minimum Standards the formal minimum numbers of police required on each site at all times, to ensure that the relevant armed response requirement can be met. The protective marking of Minimum Standards is "Restricted", but the Annex is marked "Confidential" since it is particularly sensitive.^***[4]

  7.  The Government places great importance on the continuous review of the threat and to evaluate the effect any changes in that threat may have on the required levels and methods of physical protection. It is because of the potential hazards that could follow terrorism at a nuclear site, that high standards of protection are needed even when the threat is low, in order to deter potential terrorists and guard against an increase in the threat. Responsibility for assessing the threat lies with the Security Service whose remit includes the collection and collation of all intelligence on any terrorism affecting the interests of the UK. Its recommendations to the DTI on physical protection measures for reducing the vulnerability of the civil nuclear industry to those threats are taken into account when laying down the detailed standards to be met by the industry.

SITE SECURITY

  8.  Security on a nuclear site is the responsibility of the company operating the site. The policing of UKAEA, BNFL and URENCO nuclear sites is a vital part of the overall site security arrangements, which include physical protection measures such as access control, CCTV, intruder detection systems etc. DCNSy advises these companies on standards and audits their compliance with these standards on a regular basis.

  9.  The Department of Trade and Industry, the regulator in legal terms, steps in if issues cannot be resolved between DCNSy and the operating company. Ultimately, Ministers can issue a Ministerial Direction to force the companies to make any security arrangements deemed appropriate. This reserve power has not yet had to be used to resolve disagreements.

  10.  Security audits of both nuclear facilities and nuclear materials transportation by the State's designated physical protection authority—in the UK's case this is DCNSy—are recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 (the international agreed recommendation on physical protection of nuclear materials[5]), in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the physical protection measures and to identify necessary changes in measures so as to optimise their effectiveness. It is the responsibility of the operators to implement recommendations from DCNSy's audits, although DCNSy will monitor closely the progress in implementation, keeping DTI advised as necessary.

  11.  Security at all sites is kept under constant review to ensure that the balance between physical protection measures such as intruder detection systems, and the number of police posts, is appropriate to the perceived risk. The key point in deciding police staffing is to assess the appropriate number of officers required to provide an effective armed response in the unlikely event of a terrorist attack. (However unlikely an event, it is clearly vital to be properly prepared against a very small risk.) This, together with a control and communications staffing element, provides the basis for assessing the minimum number of police who must be on duty at any one time. Officers are deployed as necessary to meet changing circumstances. Clearly, more than the minimum number are needed on some occasions.

  12.  The operators are responsible, in close consultation with the UKAEA Constabulary and the local Home Office police force, for preparing and updating contingency plans for rapid and comprehensive response to hostile action involving nuclear material, whether at their facilities or in transit, until the point of transfer of responsibility. These plans are tested in exercises held from time to time with participation by the police response forces. The last major exercise at Dounreay was in May 1996.

UKAEA CONSTABULARY

  13.  The UKAEA Constabulary (UKAEAC) policies UKAEA, BNFL and URENCO facilities, and provides escorts for movements of SNM. (Nuclear power stations are not normally guarded by the UKAEAC, but by guard forces directly employed by Nuclear Electric, Scottish Nuclear or BNFL/Magnox Generation, and have armed response arrangements with their local Home Office police force.) In respect of nuclear material and other property belonging to UKAEA, BNFL and URENCO, the UKAEAC has jurisdiction within 15 miles of their facilities and also while nuclear materials are in transit. Its officers are armed when protecting significant quantities of nuclear material, in line with the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. At most sites, depending on local circumstances including site layout and quanitities of sensitive nuclear material, dog handling officers are deployed.

DEPLOYMENT OF UKAEAC ON LICENSED NUCLEAR SITES

  14.  In accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954, the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (as amended by the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971) and the Atomic Energy Authority (Special Constables) Act 1976, the UKAEAC policies the following licensed nuclear sites in the UK:

UKAEA

Harwell      Dounreay      Winfrith      Windscale

  NB: The site at Culham, where the UKAEAC Headquarters are situated, has never been licensed and is guarded by a commercial guard force.

BNFL

Sellafield      Springfields      Chapelcross      Capenhurst

  NB: At the Risley site (unlicensed) BNFL is not obliged to have UKAEAC officers to guard its buildings but has, however, chosen to do so.

URENCO

Capenhurst

  (Relations with the UKAEAC force at Capenhurst falls to BNFL, which also has operations on the site.)

  15.  On a licensed site, the police are required to provide policing on a 24 hours a days, 365 days a year basis, on a shift pattern. In accordance with normal Home Office Standards, therefore, 5.4 officers are required to cover each post that needs to be manned on a 24 hour basis. (This includes an extra allowance for training, sick leave etc for each post needing to be manned.) For operational security reasons, the total number of police on each site is not revealed publicly because of the information any potential terrorist could deduce from that as to the normal manning level on each shift.

  16.  Over recent years, there have been frequent discussions between the UKAEAC, site management, DCNSy and DTI about the minimum numbers of police required at several nuclear sites. However, in the case of the UKAEA, at no time was UKAEA inhibited from implementing necessary security measures through lack of resources. Specifically, since 1996, the two successive Chief Constables of the UKAEAC have argued successfully to obtain the levels of staffing they wanted at Winfrith and Springfields, as well as the increase in the complement at Dounreay implemented by 1 April this year.

  17.  At Dounreay, it took time to assess the risks and agree solutions to how protection should be enhanced to meet the perceived threat. Assessment had to be thorough, and had to take account of the considerable improvements in physical protection measures at the site, notably the state-of-the-art security fence round the Fuel Cycle Area. The DTI acted throughout the assessment and related discussions to ensure that management took proper account of security concerns.

  18.  The outcome was agreement at the end of January this year to the Chief Constable's request that six extra officers would be allocated to the Dounreay site. At the Police Authority meeting the following week, the Chief Constable expressed satisfaction with this agreement. Six extra officers had all arrived on site by1 April this year. One is an experienced firearms officer on transfer, while five are newly trained recruits^***[6]

  19.  Agreement to the extra six officers at Dounreay was reached before the decision to accept the Georgian uranium, and was independent of that decision. The Georgian material represents a tiny proportion of the existing inventory at Dounreay and makes no difference to the security needs of the site.

  20.  At Springfields, the agreed minimum numbers of police have been maintained, in line with the then Chief Constable's wishes and DCNSy advice, despite pressure from the BNFL site management to reduce them. Similarly, in on-going discussions between DTI, DCNSy and BNFL about physical protection improvements to be made at BNFL's Chapelcross site, DTI have told BNFL that they will not be permitted to reduce policing levels as a result of enhanced physical security measures being undertaken at the site.

  21.  At Capenhurst^***[7] .

  22.  Police numbers at Winfrith^***[8] .

POLICE AUTHORITY

  23.  The role of the Police Authority for the UKAEAC is to agree and monitor the budget for the UKAEAC and to assist the Chief Constable in achieving operational efficiency. The approval of minimum numbers of police officers operating at all times on a site is a matter for DCNSy acting on behalf of the DTI, not for the Police Authority, although it of course takes an interest in the budgetary implications.

  24.  The Police Authority members are drawn from the companies policed by the UKAEAC (UKAEA, BNFL and URENCO, who are the equivalent of funding local authorities in a Home Office force's Police Authority) and DTI (advised by DCNSy). The Police Authority also benefits from the advice of the Adviser to the Police Authority (Sir John Woodcock, formerly Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary) who attends Police Authority meetings. The Chief Constable also routinely attends. DTI has proposed informally to other members of the Police Authority that the Director of Civil Nuclear Security should also become a full member.

11 June 1998

  Following my appearance before the Trade and Industry Committee on Wednesday, 1 July, it occurred to me that some people may have misunderstood the scope of my responsibilities in respect of Dounreay (a suspicion borne out by some of the subsequent press reports).

  As I tried to explain, the Health and Safety Executive reports to Parliament on the regulation of nuclear safety in Scotland through the Secretary of State for Scotland. I enclose a copy of a letter sent to me following Wednesday's hearing by the Director General of the Health and Safety Executive which confirms this point and contains other information which may help your enquiry.

3 July 1998

  I see from reports of your appearance before the Select Committee yesterday that it is being suggested that you in some way put pressure on HSE not to publish our inspector's observations on safety management at Dounreay, in order to safeguard the commercial interests of Dounreay. I would like to set the record straight on that point; and more generally on the publication of such inspectors' reports and of this particular set of observations.

  First, the inspector's observations were just that: the observations were not the result of a special investigation, nor were they intended to be a full report to HSE management or Ministers. HSE inspectors produce tens of thousands of such "reports" each year: they are working tools which inform subsequent dialogue with duty-holders—employers or in this case licensees—about what action must be taken to comply with the law and maintain or improve standards of safety.

  For obvious reasons, it is not our normal practice to bring such reports to Ministers' attention. Nor in most cases do they come anywhere near senior management levels in HSE. It is also not our practice to put such working documents into the public domain. In part this is because they are working documents. But the more pressing reason is that Section 28 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 makes it a criminal offence to disclose information we have obtained using our powers, except with the consent of the person giving the information. The only exception to this is where we consider it necessary to disclose without consent for the purpose of our statutory functions—ie protecting health and safety. We did not feel that such an exception was justified in this case. Our statutory functions do not include keeping the public informed or related access to information purposes. Section 28 is of course being reviewed and amended as part of action on the Government's freedom of information legislation.

  In the case of the inspector's observations on Dounreay's safety management, the question of publication did not arise until well after the observations were written and we were satisfied that Dounreay management were addressing the problems. When disclosure was first requested, I understand that my inspectors declined to do so because of the Section 28 constraints. I was then asked by the Select Committee to provide them with the inspector's observations. I made clear to the Committee clerk that I wished to do so, but that I needed UKAEA's consent given that some of the information gathered by the inspector was commercially confidential. I agreed with the Clerk that—S.28 and legal advice to me notwithstanding—I would make the observations available to Committee members; I would also, if UKAEA did not consent to disclosure, provide a memorandum which could be made public (ie would exclude commercially sensitive information), and which would detail the main conclusions and recommendations in the inspector's observations together with the action subsequently taken to improve health and safety management at the site. In the event, UKAEA did, on consideration, agree to release of the document in full, and we published it on 15 June at the same time as it was given to the Select Committee members.

  As you and I both know, there was no question of your attempting to pressurise HSE into not disclosing the document. Your officials had the document but—like HSE—were constrained by Section 28 from considering its publication; I understand that it was not shown to you. They too did not suggest at any time to HSE that the document should not be published.

  I should like to make two other points clear. At no time has the question of commercial pressures affected action taken by HSE as regulator to secure improvements in safety at Dounreay. The "commercial sensitivity" issue relates solely to statutory restrictions on disclosure of information. Secondly, the Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations had not seen the inspector's observations at the time when he advised your Department on the Georgian fuel. But he assures me that his advice would not have been so different had he done so.

  The report of the audit which HSE is now conducting into safety management at Dounreay will of course be published in full. Should I be asked by the Select Committee for further clarification on the status and publication of our inspector's observations, I would intend to draw on the contents of this letter. But I should be very happy for you to pass it to the Select Committee if you wish.

  I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Scotland in view of his responsibility for safety at Dounreay; and to Angela Eagle at the Department of Environment Transport and the Regions in view of her responsibilities for the Health and Safety at Work legislation including S.28 and for HSE.

2 July 1998

^*** 4   indicates passages removed at the witnesses' request and agreed by the Committee.  Back

5   A copy of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, which is freely obtainable from the International Atomic Energy Agency, is being made available to the Committee. DISCUSSIONS ABOUT POLICING NUMBERS  Back

^*** 6   indicates passages removed at the witnesses' request and agreed by the Committee.  Back

^*** 7   indicates passages removed at the witnesses' request and agreed by the Committee.  Back

^*** 8   indicates passages removed at the witnesses' request and agreed by the Committee.  Back