APPENDIX 2
Memorandum submitted by Greenpeace
1. SEPA completed a public consultation
exercise of the UKAEA's application to dispose of radioactive
wastes for Dounreay, on 23 February 1998. This was the second
public consultation. The first consultation was run by SEPA's
predecessor body Her Majesty's Industrial Pollution Inspectorate,
and ended in February 1996. SEPA also held a public meeting in
Inverness at which presentations were invited on 26 February 1997.
The Scottish Office has yet to decide whether or not to "call
in" the application.
2. The import of foreign spent fuel is highly
controversial in Scotland. When the people of Caithness voted
in a referendum in December 1995, 65.5 per cent of voters opposed
foreign reprocessing. An opinion poll commissioned by Friends
of the Earth Scotland, also in December 1995, found 94 per cent
of Scots opposed to reprocessing of foreign spent fuel at Dounreay.
3. SEPA accepts that "there should
be a clear economic justification for reprocessing overseas material"
(Minutes of SEPA North Regional Board Meeting 24 January 1997,
SEPA Volume 1, Annexe 6, p89).
4. Some of the discharges for which the
UKAEA requested authorisation were planned to come from the reprocessing
of overseas spent nuclear fuel. Greenpeace along with two other
Non-Governmental Organisations requested of SEPA, the UKAEA and
the Department of Trade and Industry, economic information on
the proposed overseas spent research reactor fuel reprocessing
contracts, in order to appraise the economic justification. The
reply from the Dti did not arrive until 16 March, after the closing
date of the public consultation exercise.
5. Dti failed to provide answers to several
crucial questions, either because it does not have the information
or because of commercial confidentiality. In fact no new information
was given to Greenpeace which makes it possible to appraise the
economic justification given to SEPA for the discharge of radioactivity
to the environment. (See Appendix 1.Mike Sadnicki's letter
and Appendix 2Dti reply)[1].
6. SEPA replied to Greenpeace on 27 January
1998 indicating that "SEPA does not have the information
that you requested." (See Appendix 3).2 It is worth noting
that SEPA did not say, although they have the information, they
are unable to release it for reasons of commercial confidentiality.
There must therefore be some doubt about whether SEPA has been
able to properly appraise the economic case for foreign reprocessing
at Dounreay, to be able to decide whether the discharges of radioactivity
which would result are justified.
7. Clearly the lack of an economic justification
case for foreign spent fuel reprocessing at Dounreay would increase
the chances that the Secretary of State for Scotland would decide
to "call in" the applications, and call a public inquiry.
8. Dounreay told the Observer (26
April 1998first edition only. See Appendix 41)that
it was hoping to use the consignment of waste from Georgia to
persuade the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate to lift its ban
on reprocessing. Managers at Dounreay said the shipment was "vital,
timely support" for their case. "To fulfil the Government's
aim of reprocessing it, we need to get a licence from the NII"
said one official. "If you can do the Georgian stuff, you
can do other overseas contracts as well".
9. Before any of the latest problems at
Dounreay, such as the accidental damage to the power cable, the
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate had announced that Dounreay
should not be allowed to import and store nuclear waste for reprocessing
when it has no operative reprocessing plant and no proper place
to store it. ("Nuclear Worries" Herald 17 April
1998Appendix 51. The NII had also said that there should
be no importation of spent fuel to Dounreay until the NII had
approved storage and reprocessing arrangements for the fuel.
10. The NII safety review had already raised
the possibility of expensive repairs to both reprocessing plants,
which would clearly have an impact on the economic justification
for any future reprocessing.
11. SEPA had in the past expressed concern
that waste dumping rather than reprocessing is the main reason
overseas research reactor operators sought contracts with UKAEA.
Their concern was also shared by the Radioactive Waste Management
Advisory Committee, and Michael Meacher (See Appendix 6quoted
in Greenpeace submission to SEPA 23 February 1989 page 4) 2. SEPA
proposed to resolve this situation by insisting that waste from
reprocessing contracts be returned to the country of origin within
10 yearsthe current situation allows waste to remain in
store at Dounreay for up to 29 years.
12. It is clear from the Government's 5
June announcement that Ministers have been advised that reprocessing
the spent fuel currently at the Dounreay site is a "necessary
part of the decommissioning process". This is not true. In
fact the UKAEA carried out a study of the Prototype Fast Reactor
spent fuel management options for the Dti to determine the preferred
management strategy on technical and economic grounds (PFR Fuel
Management OptionsIssue 1FWTF(95)P43 September 1995).
Dry storage options are costed in that document at anywhere between
£188 million to £241 million. On the other hand reprocessing
is expected to cost anything up to £206 million. However,
that was before the cost of repairing the fast reactor reprocessing
plant was included in the calculation. It is quite likely, therefore,
that dry storage would turn out to be cheaper. Not only that but
Dounreay would be able to develop a new expertise in dry storage
to add to its expertise in decommissioning to preserve jobs on
the site. Of the spent fuel currently at the Dounreay site, around
15 tonnes is fast reactor spent fuel and only one tonne research
reactor spent fuel. There is no reason to think that research
reactor spent fuel could not be dry stored along with the fast
reactor spent fuel.
13. CONCLUSION
By secretly ordering the import of the Georgian
uranium to Dounreay the Government has undermined the efforts
of the regulators to control the growing problem of radioactive
discharges from Dounreay; concern about nuclear waste in storage
at Dounreay; concern about the safety of the reprocessing plants.
The Government also went against the wishes
of the vast majority of people in Scotland, and undermined the
democratic process including the consultation of the public on
proposals for revised discharge authorisations.
The Government announcement on 5 June implied
that the Dti will now be willing to fund any modifications that
have to be made to the research reactor reprocessing plant, because
of the overriding pressure created by the importation of the waste
from Georgia. However it is doubtful that this expenditure can
be economically justified. This in turn will place pressure on
SEPA to agree to the UKAEA's application for revised discharge
authorisation, irrespective of the economic justification. The
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate will also be under pressure
to approve the safety case made by UKAEA for the research reactor
reprocessing plant.
Although there will be these pressures on the
Government and its regulators to now approve the re-opening of
both reprocessing plants at Dounreay, Greenpeace would strongly
oppose such a course of action. It is not inevitable. The waste
from Georgia could still be stored, as could the rest of the 16
tonnes of spent fuel at Dounreay, rather than reprocessed. Long-term
dry storage would prevent the extraction of unused bomb-grade
uranium, which if extracted would re-enter the world market place.
Re-opening either the research reactor reprocessing
plant or the fast reactor reprocessing plant, without proper economic
justification might well be unlawful and open to challenge following
the ruling made byMr Justice Potts during the judicial review
of the Government's decision to authorise discharges from Sellafield
in 1994.
Any increase in radioactive discharges as a
result of reprocessing any of the spent fuel already on the Dounreay
site, including the Georgian uranium would also be against the
commitments that the UK Government has signed up to under the
OSPAR convention.
11 June 1998
1 Not printed.
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