It is the Trades Council's view that the decision to accept the Georgian nuclear material into the UK was correct from a non proliferation of nuclear weapons point of view, but also because it was of assistance to a foreign country and the material would be useful in the UK. There is, in general terms, a shortage of highly enriched uranium in the UK.

  The choice of Dounreay to receive the material was correct because Dounreay has the most experience in handling highly enriched uranium, because Dounreay is a civil facility subject to international safeguards and because Dounreay is in the best postion to put the material to good use.

  The way in which the decision was announced was, we feel, unfortunate. With the benefit of hindsight we believe that it would have been better if the principal of receiving the material into the UK had been announced in Parliament at an early stage, perhaps with some general indication of when the material would arrive. The actual transport operation could then have been carried out in secret in accordance with international convention. An announcement of the arrival of the material being made when the transport operation was complete.

  There are significant quantities of nuclear material and other radioactive material in a number of countries that do have the facilities necessary to process the material into a form that it can be stored, disposed of safely or re-cycled. In circumstances where the UK has suitable facilities to process material we feel that it is entirely appropriate that the UK should undertake the work, to the benefit of mankind as a whole. The work being paid for either by the country concerned or, if appropriate, by the UK governement. We are aware that UK funds are available to assist the former states of the Soviet Union in the management of their nuclear material.

  The reprocessing of irradiated fuel, belonging to Australia, at Dounreay is currently being discussed. We believe that Dounreay should undertake this work for both commercial and non-proliferation reasons, but particularly because we believe that the UK has a very special relationship with Australia in that the Australian Government and people allowed the UK to test nuclear weapons in Australia in the 1950s and 60s. The reprocessing of this material by the UK would be something of a quid pro quo for the contamination of large stretches of Australia with radioactive material from these weapons tests.

  We do not feel qualified to comment on the legal aspects of such operations.

  We believe that any foreign material that is reprocessed at Dounreay should be reused if that is appropriate and so long as the material is used only for peaceful purposes and is subject to international nuclear materials safeguards.

  We do not have any anxieties concerning the physical protection of nuclear material at Dounreay. If anything our anxieties are that resources that might more usefully be deployed elsewhere, for example in the Health Service or Education, are being spent in over protecting nuclear material. Recent events have shown that it very difficult to question a request by the Chief Constable of the Atomic Energy Constabulary (AEC). Our reasons for suggesting that nuclear material may be overprotected in the UK are as follows. There has been, since the beginnings of the nuclear industry following the Second World War, a steady increase in the degree of protection applied to nuclear material. Initially, constables of the AEC merely had access to revolvers that were normally kept locked away, then in the 1950s dogs were introduced. Later machine guns were made available and armed constables were available the whole time. In the 1970s barbed wire and a second ring of fencing appeared at Dounreay and a duplicate pass system was introduced. Last year, at significant cost, the second ring of fencing became denser, higher and was electrified. We do not believe that there has been a steady increase in the "threat" since the war, indeed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and peace in Northern Ireland we believe that there has been a decrease in the "threat" that should be reflected in a decrease expenditure on security. It may be suggested that the increases in physical protection are made merely to meet the needs of international convention and regulations. We would wish to question the interpretation of these conventions and regulations.

May 1998