House of Commons - Trade and Industry

Select Committee on Trade and Industry Minutes of Evidence

Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

INTERNATIONAL AND NON-PROLIFERATION ASPECTS

1. THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ISSUE OF THE GEORGIAN URANIUM AROSE AS A RESULT OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. THE EXISTENCE IN GEORGIA OF POORLY-PROTECTED WEAPONS-USABLE URANIUM WAS, OF COURSE, AN ISSUE OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN.

SITUATION IN GEORGIA

2. Since independence Georgia has suffered from serious internal instability and violent ethnic conflicts. From 1995 President Sheverdnadze and his government have achieved an improvement in the stabilisation of the political situation, in the restoration of law and order, and in economic reconstruction. But Georgia still faces serious problems. At the time the UK decision to take the Georgian uranium was made, President Sheverdnadze had already survived one assassination attempt (in 1995). Shortly after the decision was made (February 1998) he survived another. These attempts have demonstrated that there are forces in Georgia prepared to go to extremes to undermine his efforts to consolidate economic and political reform. In addition, although there is a long-lasting cease-fire in the ethnic conflict over South Ossetia, progress towards a lasting political solution has been slow both there and in Abkhazia, where there has been a recent upsurge in fighting and the risk of a full-scale resumption of hostilities has increased.

3. It seems clear, therefore, that Georgia was always a particularly inappropriate location for poorly protected weapons-usable nuclear material.

BROADER INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

4. The UK has a key role to play in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. In particular, we are a founder member and one of the three Depositary states for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This role (together with our position as a member of the G8—see below) brings with it responsibilities in the non-proliferation field.

5. In 1996 the G8 Moscow Summit on nuclear safety and security agreed a series of measures to combat nuclear non-proliferation. In particular, the G8 agreed to look at how to deal with the large amounts of fissile material resulting from dismantled nuclear weapons (under, for example, the START treaties). As a result of that commitment several programmes are underway, including:

— a joint project by France, Germany and Russia on the conversion of Russian ex-weapons plutonium into fuel for power reactors;

— a parallel project by Canada which is working on the conversion of ex-weapons plutonium into fuel for its own "CANDU" reactors;

— bilateral cooperation between the US and Russia on the use of ex-weapons material in Russian reactors, and on "immobilisation" of ex-weapons plutonium.

6. The UK is not currently involved in any of the G8 projects for dealing with ex-weapons material. But the Georgian uranium, whilst being designed for use in a research reactor rather than a nuclear weapon, was certainly weapons-usable. Our action in taking the uranium was therefore complementary to and consistent with other G8 efforts in this area. It was also important in demonstrating the UK's own commitment to these G8 efforts.

15 June 1998

Text of Parliamentary Written Question and Answer

GEORGIAN HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) INSPIRED PQ

Question

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent actions the Government has taken to improve the security of nuclear materials in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Response

The United Kingdom today took delivery of approximately 5kg of fresh and spent Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel which has been held at a research reactor in Georgia. The Government's decision to accept the fuel was made on non-proliferation and safety grounds and is an indication of the UK's strong commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The material is now held by the UK Atomic Energy Authority at Dounreay. Most of it is fresh fuel and will be usable immediately by the Authority in its routine production of medical isotope targets. The spent fuel (only 0.8kg) will result, after reprocessing, in a small amount of intermediate level radioactive waste. As Georgia now has no other nuclear material and no facilities for storing waste, the UK is making a one-off exception to its long-standing policy that waste generated by reprocessing foreign spent fuel should be returned to the country of origin. This small quantity of waste will be retained in the UK. This exception, made on non-proliferation grounds, should not in any way be seen as setting a precedent.



© Parliamentary copyright 1998	Prepared 28 July 1998