WEDNESDAY 1 JULY 1998

MR JOHN BATTLE, DR ELAINE DRAGE AND DR MELVYN DRAPER

  165. Good morning, Mr Battle. Welcome to the Committee. Perhaps you would like to introduce your colleagues and I believe you have a short statement you would like to read out?

  (Mr Battle) Yes, please. With me is Dr Mel Draper, on my left, from the Nuclear Industry's Directorate in the DTI. He is the director responsible for our relationship and sponsorship of UKAEA and he is responsible for nuclear decommissioning and fusion research, and I would add has a first degree in nuclear engineering and a PhD in thermo-dynamics. With me also is Dr Elaine Drage. She is the Director from EURATOM, Nuclear Safety, Security and Emergency Planning at the DTI. So they are both colleagues within the Department. Can I say that I welcome this opportunity to set out the Government's decision on non-proliferation grounds to take the small quantity of remaining nuclear material from Georgia as the UK contribution to world peace and security. Let me emphasise from the outset that it got there safely and securely, the whole operation was carefully planned in detail with the Foreign Office, the Americans, the DTI and the rest. It was delivered in accordance with every regulation in the book, consulting the Nuclear Inspectorate, the environmental agencies, EURATOM, the whole lot, and it is now safely stored there. So the job was done and was done well and properly. To ensure we have a sense of perspective, this 14.329 kg of nuclear material actually represents, as I am sure the Committee know from their visit, less than one five thousandth, 0.02 per cent, of all the nuclear material currently at Dounreay, so it is not as if a whole load of the stuff was suddenly shipped in. It is a very tiny amount. Included in that is 4.125 kg of unirradiated highly enriched uranium, which is weapons-usable and a serious proliferation concern. The low enriched uranium, though of less proliferation concern, is safeguarded material in accordance with the EURATOM Treaty. The Georgians wanted to ensure that all remaining nuclear materials were taken from Georgia at the same time. That was, obviously, sensible given the political uncertainties there. There was the International Atomic Energy Authorities 1996 Security Report, and I am sure my colleague, the Minister in the Foreign Office, Doug Henderson, will explain the background reasons in Georgia and the risks which were there, so I do not need to go into that. I would only emphasise that all the bodies, including the environmental groups, would generally accept the consensus that the Georgian material is much safer and securer in the UK than it would have been if it had remained in Georgia. In other words, we were with that removal making a tangible contribution as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in reducing the risk from nuclear material which was not properly guarded. Can I also say with regard to Dounreay in general, in 1994 the prototype fast reactor for electricity generating was actually shut down, and that marked a crucial stage because that is the transition point between it being a research-based organised to one that then starts to focus on decommissioning, tackling the liabilities and problems which remain from the work done there in the past. When I arrived at the DTI, let me say one of the first problems I faced was that there were attempts by the UKAEA to sell off the engineering support group at Dounreay. That had been festering around for nearly two years, I wanted that sorted out because of morale at the site, and I was pleased that the UKAEA last September decided, when we put a deadline on it, to abandon that divestment and maintain those crucial skills in-house. There was a new chief executive appointed only last November who is strengthening his team at Dounreay with necessary changes in management and culture, and Dr Peter Walsh is to arrive in August as the deputy director to beef up the management there as well. If we tackled the immediate problem of the engineering group, we also faced up to the long-standing problem of the Dounreay waste shaft, which you may also have seen when you were visiting. Until recently it was thought it was impossible to retrieve waste from the shaft and put it in modern storage, so I was pleased when UKAEA reported that they considered they could do that based on the best possible scientific advice from independent specialists. I might say at some cost—£215-355 million—but I took the decision on behalf of the DTI that the work should be done to get on and clean up that shaft. A difficult legacy, but we did not shrink from doing that. Dounreay have operated a policy of greater openness. In 1996, before my time, they introduced what they called the Open Policy, putting briefings and the rest in the public domain. Back in 1990 the notion of self-regulation of the UKAEA, which had gone on for nearly 40 years, was actually jettisoned so the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate was brought in as a regulator to act as an independent judge on what went on. That was a major change in culture again after nearly 40 years of self-regulation and I think that also has to be welcomed. I also would say I do welcome the current Health and Safety Executive and SEPA inquiry which was announced on 11th May into the whole management of safety issues at Dounreay. I welcome the fact that their report will be published. I think that will be most important in the decisions we have to make in future about the possibilities of reprocessing the UKAEA's own substantial liabilities of spent fuel at Dounreay, and we will consider all the options with the best scientific advice, and we need to be sure that the reprocessing goes ahead only when the HSE have reported and given it a clean bill of health. I would emphasise that Dounreay is the only site in the UK with the expertise to deal with both unirradiated and irradiated highly enriched and low enriched uranium. It specialises, if you like, in dealing with those small quantities. It is tailor-made, it is a designer reprocessor in that sense to handle that material. There is additional benefit in that unirradiated highly enriched uranium has an obvious disposal route, it can be used to make targets which are then irradiated in other reactors, to make molybdenum 99 radio-isotopes. These decay to produce technetium, which can be used in medical diagnostic tests for cancer and other diseases. So that material is needed and the Georgian material will go to providing some 5 million cancer diagnosis treatments for use in hospitals throughout the world. I finally want to emphasise that Dounreay is a secure site. There has been improvement in the physical defences and in policing. The former Chief Constable at last February's meeting of the Police Authority (and I know there was dispute about this) actually recorded in the minutes of that meeting that he was "pleased that progress had been made and the solution [of the six extra staff] had been identified". I simply want to finally add that concern is expressed about lack of openness in this industry, and I want to ensure there is openness and a full effort to put as much information as we practically can in the public domain. Today I have announced via a PQ for the first time ever the figures for the UK's holdings of both highly enriched uranium—some 1.6 tonnes—and a total for the depleted natural and low enriched uranium—some 84,000 tonnes. The UK already has one of the most internationally transparent regimes for publishing figures of nuclear material, and we will take that even further. I hope that will enhance public confidence in the management of the UK's holdings, and it is an important, open step forward. In other words, I hope you might think we have made strong efforts to make the necessary management changes to get a grip on what is going on there, and to ensure that Dounreay is safe and secure into the 21st century.

  166. Thank you, Mr Battle. We will obviously have to read that and if there are any points that arise we will raise them in the form of questions, because it is about 1,500 words I would have thought that you rattled off there. That is not being in any way disrespectful and I understand the reasons why you wanted to get the record straight, but can I say for the record that we would appreciate, if you are going to do that sort of thing in the future, that you send us a copy of it in advance. I realise it might have been written up to the last minute and there was the reference to the PQ today, but I imagine it is a planted PQ and it could have been planted a little earlier. This does help us if we get long statements, which may well be supplementing the memorandum you sent. I understand why you did this but I want to make it clear that the exceptional and somewhat complicated circumstances in which we find ourselves today should not be taken as a precedent for trying to do this again before the Committee. I just make that point.
  (Mr Battle) I completely accept that. I am more than happy to let you have a copy of the notes I have made. I have not got a written, prepared statement.

  167. I understand why you did it but I want to make it clear that we discourage statements of this character before our proceedings, because it is rather difficult—
  (Mr Battle) I am happy to take questions.

  168. That is what you are here for and we are very pleased to hear that. Can I start rather pedantically and ask you what seem to be rather basic questions? The UK has shown a willingness to accept nuclear material, whether from the Soviet Union or elsewhere. Are you confident that there will be no further calls made on the UK's willingness to accept materials of this nature? For example, has the International Atomic Energy Authority carried out similar surveys in the former Soviet Union areas outside of what we would call Europe, that is to say Asia?
  (Mr Battle) I am sad Dougie Henderson cannot be here alongside me because to some extent the question of what happens elsewhere before it arrives on UK soil and at Dounreay is a matter for the Foreign Office to negotiate. They decide in the international context what comes from where and when. It is my job, as is commonly known now, to ask questions at the initial stages. I did that when the proposals were made to take the material from Georgia. I asked questions about costs and returnability, and that is part of the discussion in Government to come to a consensus and agreement to take this material. I know the IAEA review teams have looked at all civil research reactors in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and only at Tbilisi was the removal of material from out of the country the best solution, to the best of my knowledge from the Foreign Office. It was Tbilisi which was the problem, they wanted it all out because there was a small quantity remaining but they did not have any facilities at all to deal with spent fuel. There was the insecure situation at that site. So I know in the Tbilisi case there was really no option and in another case, Kazakstan, if I remember rightly, 600 kg of unirradiated HEU were taken by the Americans for example but not the whole, just part of. I am not sure about the return for the waste there either. Let me simply say that the Foreign Office will continue negotiations. We have to honour our commitments to international treaties, not least the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and not least our commitment as a G8 country to help clear up the legacy of the former Soviet Union. So I could not sit here and give a cast iron guarantee that there will be no more approaches from anybody anywhere. All the evidence I have received so far suggests this really is a one off; the Tbilisi fuel coming to Dounreay. A one off.

  169. Did the low enriched uranium also come from Tbilisi? Would you see our potential commitments extending to low enriched uranium as well? I noticed you said that was also proliferation material within EURATOM's specifications.
  (Mr Battle) The answer is yes. The low enriched did come, it was in a package, the whole together. There is no other material in Georgia—I am pretty well assured of that by the Foreign Office, by the Americans who were monitoring it, by IAEA inspection team and everybody else. Let me add this, sometimes people think the highly enriched is the problem and the lower enriched is not a problem. That is not exactly true, quite honestly, although that might be the common impression. In fact the low enriched uranium does pose a proliferation risk. It is at a lower level than the higher enriched and plutonium, accepted, but it is still subject to international safeguards and inspection though at a less intense level than the higher enriched uranium and plutonium. It cannot be used directly to make nuclear explosive devices, but it could be up-graded and enriched to produce higher enriched uranium. It can be irradiated in a nuclear reactor to produce plutonium. If that happened, there would be a risk, so it is still covered by the treaties. It came in a package from Georgia, the lot together if you like, and that is all the material out of Tbilisi in Georgia.

  170. Given that presumably there is a lot more LEU round about, could that not eventually lead to some further large commitment on our part?
  (Mr Battle) There is no reason why. This is really a question which would be better suited for the Minister of State at the Foreign Office who will have a grip on the international negotiations better than I. I deal with the material when it lands in Britain to make sure it is safely stored and used well here, securely, and everything is in order to receive it. Let me say that in terms of the international arrangements, yes, there is material around in the former Soviet Union but larger quantities of irradiated material can be handled within the country. That is the idea. If I recall rightly from the Foreign Office briefing, Russia effectively passed in 1991 a resolution saying they would not take any more nuclear material of Russian origin back from the former Soviet Union. The original arrangement was that it went to Russia, and they then handled it, but they took a decision not to any longer and that left the rest of the world with a problem. Russia was not going to handle it, the other countries in the former Soviet Union had not the capacity to handle particularly irradiated material. So, who will help them out? As far as I am aware, the efforts are to try and retain it in the country of origin wherever possible and work with it there with the facilities there. Some of our nuclear industry expertise, right across the industry not specifically at Dounreay, is provided to help people in the former Soviet Union countries to manage their legacies and liabilities. So, no, I do not see a sudden influx, if you like, of low enriched uranium to Dounreay at all. This is a one-off decision because we had to clear all the nuclear material out of Georgia because the quantities were so small, they had no means of handling any waste that would be sent back after reprocessing the irradiated material, and it would have been massively costly for them to have built a special store to receive such a small quantity of processed waste. They could not do that. Therefore for this one off, small amount, it was agreed it should go to Dounreay.

  171. In the event of there being disarmament or a settlement of the Indo-Pakistan problem in a nuclear context, do you think we would be a likely recipient of any high level waste they might wish to dispose of?
  (Mr Battle) This really is a matter for the Foreign Office and—

  172. I am sorry, I am talking about the technical expertise. We could be a potential repository if such an undertaking was—
  (Mr Battle) I will put it the other way round, we are not only a repository, we have the potential expertise to help other people handle their own Civil waste. We send nuclear experts to Japan, China, to the former Soviet Union countries, to Australia, to South Africa, to America now to advise them. There is not a world solution to this problem. Some say, "We can use nuclear energy now because it is clean and it will tackle the CO2 problems", well, there is a truth in that but, my God, have we got a clean up problem at the back end. The waste remains. The problem is, there is not an international solution to that problem. We have got people here who have been working at that problem and managing that for very many years who can offer that expertise elsewhere in the world. Top class technicians and scientists who can go and help elsewhere. So it is not the case that they all need to send their stuff here at all in my view but, again, I cannot speak for the Foreign Office about what might emerge in a conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. I could go into the Kashmir question, it is a great interest to some of my constituents in inner city Leeds who come from Kashmir, but I do not think it is appropriate for me to pre-empt any discussions which might take place between individual countries negotiating with the Foreign Office under our international treaties.

  173. The impression we have is that a number of other countries which have the capability are also constrained by legislation within the countries, which means that they could not take the materials which we have inherited. Do you think there is any possibility of restrictive legislation of this character being brought in in the UK?
  (Mr Battle) If I have understood the question, Chairman, I think it is an important question and one I asked very early on. When the first proposal came forward to me as a Minister, one of the first questions I asked was—

  174. When was that?
  (Mr Battle) It came through in the summer. I think the first approach was in August to the duty minister in fact and then I was brought back from holiday and looked through where we were up to with it. There were two questions I asked—and perhaps you will say one was a question I ought not to have asked—who will pay for it if we were to do it and where will the bill come from. The other question, more importantly, was the return of the waste. As I understood it, commercial material under normal UK policy would require a return-of-waste clause, but what I found out was, that was true where it was contractual, where it was a commercial contract, but there were no international agreements on return of waste. I thought there were. For more than 20 years the UK has been able to insert a return-of-waste clause in all the commercial reprocessing contracts but they are agreed bilaterally with the country whose spent fuel is being reprocessed, but they are bilateral and not international agreements. So when deciding whether to import material, which for the Georgians could be described as waste because they could not see any foreseeable use for it, officials applied the guidelines on importing waste which were given in the June 1995 Radioactive Waste Management White Paper, Command 2919 and expanded in a RWMAC paper of September 1997. Those guidelines set out 12 tests for actually receiving waste. They permit the import of radioactive waste, if you like, if they pass certain key tests. One of those (RWMAC, Test 9), is whether the quantities involved are too small for waste management—"process is to be practical in the country of origin"—in other words, could the country handle it themselves. Clearly in the case of Georgia the answer was no, they could not handle it no matter how much they thought about it. Another of the tests, Test 10, was whether the waste arising could be said to add materially to the waste needing to be disposed of in the UK. I would have to take the view, and this has been in the public domain right from the beginning, two drums of cemented intermediate level waste would not add significantly to the 14,000 drums already at Dounreay. So the tests were there under the Radioactive Waste Management White Paper and the September 1997 RWMAC paper which we have here in Britain, but they are not international treaties. I would prefer it—and it may be a question for Dougie Henderson and the Foreign Office—if there were international treaties in the light of the previous questions you have asked me, and that might be something the Select Committee may choose to focus on in its report.

  175. I realise this would appear to be the first decision you had to make of this character as far as the DTI is concerned, but—and you may have to send us this in writing—the White Paper refers to permitting imports of waste (or non-return) in "particular circumstances". Can you tell us if there have been other exceptions made in these particular circumstances?
  (Mr Battle) Yes, I can, I do not need to write to you on it. I know the answer is no because I asked that at a very early stage of the whole of this process of building up a policy of whether to receive this waste. In a sense, the answer is that non-return has always been permitted for small quantities from countries which do not have the financial or technological resources to deal with the material, providing they do not add significantly to our waste. This is the only occasion—this is a real one off.

  176. This is the only occasion at which you have been requested to take waste. Is that correct?
  (Mr Battle) Yes.

  177. And it is the only occasion therefore that you have accepted. So there has been one request and one acceptance and no others?
  (Mr Battle) Yes, unless, of course, Mr Henderson were to ask me tonight or something of that nature. To the best of my knowledge, today, now, there has been no other request at all. That was the only one.

  178. Minister, since the decision to accept the Georgian nuclear material a number of things have happened at Sellafield (sic). There was the electricity cable which was severed on 7th May, you announced on 5th June the cessation of seeking new commercial reprocessing contracts. If you had a similar request today from Georgia, or wherever, would your reaction be any different in the light of the announcement and recent circumstances?
  (Mr Battle) In some ways I would still ask the same questions. I would ask about returnability, and it is my responsibility to do that. I would ask who was going to pay for it and whether it was a contractual arrangement or not. We would then refer back to the Command White Paper which I referred to, and the RWMAC tests. I would say also, and I hinted at it in the rather long statement I made—and I apologise for that though I did think it was important to make—Health and Safety are undertaking an inquiry. The cable was not at Sellafield, it was at Dounreay. You did say Sellafield.

  179. Did I? I did not realise, I apologise. I meant Dounreay.
  (Mr Battle) Just to make sure the record is correct, Dounreay is at the north of Scotland and Sellafield is somewhere else!