House of Commons - Trade and Industry - Minutes of Evidence

Select Committee on Trade and Industry Minutes of Evidence

Memorandum submitted by the Department of Trade and Industry

1. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is responsible with the UK Government for most aspects of domestic and international policy relating to the management of civil (but not military) special nuclear material (SNM): its security; the materials accountancy and control (safeguards) re«gime; sponsorship of the industry, both public and private; safety policy, on which it is advised by the Health and Safety Commission and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) through, in particular, its Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (the Scottish Office is responsible for nuclear safety policy in Scotland); and the UK's contributions to international work to improve the safety and security of civil nuclear facilites in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, including Georgia.

2. Removing the 4.1 kg of unirradiated weapons-usable Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), along with similarly small quantities of other nuclear material from the Tbilisi research reactor in Georgia, brought the last remaining SNM (totalling 14.3 kg in all) out from this currently politically unstable country to the UK. Accepting this material enabled the UK to demonstrate in practical terms its commitment to the international non-proliferation re«gime. This relatively small quantity of material was thereby brought into the civil safeguards re«gime and onto a secure site at Dounreay which has considerable prior experience of handling in particular HEU and is under a rigorous and accountable safety re«gime. The unirradiated HEU will be made into targets for the production of medical radioisotopes, but only after the HSE is satisfied that the UKAEA have submitted a suitable safety case for the Fuel Cycle Area's (FCA) elecrical system. All the other SNM from Georgia will be down blended to make civil research reactor fuel.

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

3. The collapse of the USSR left political instability and lower levels of protection for much SNM in many countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In response to this situation, the US airlifted 600 kg of HEU from Kazakstan to safe storage in the USA. Russia, which has the technical expertise to deal with both fresh and spent fuel, had repatriated much of the SNM, both civil and military, from these countries. However the Duma in 1991 passed a law prohibiting the import of any spent fuel, unless the waste resulting from reprocessing were returned to the country of origin. For countries without or any expertise in handling waste, this posed a problem which was acute when quantities of irradiated fuel were small. In Georgia's case, the vast majority of both the unirradiated (fresh) and irradiated (spent) fuel at its Tbilisi facility—all of Russian origin—had been returned to Russia before 1991. What was to become of the rest?

4. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), concerned to minimise the risk of proliferation and illicit nuclear trafficking, began in 1993 a programme of Coordinated Technical Support Plans giving security advice and technical assistance with physical protection to states in the Newly Independent States (NIS). The IAEA also coordinates the International Physical Protection Advisory Service which, at a state's request, organises missions of IAEA Member State experts to advise on national physical protection arrangements from legislation down to physical protection at site level. Specialists from countries such as UK, USA, France, Germany, Sweden, Japan and Canada have taken part in one or both of these programmes. The UK (through the Directorate of Civil Nuclear Security—DCNSy) has played a prominent role.

5. The security surveys carried out under the aegis of the IAEA have given valuable insight into physical protection of nuclear materials across eastern Europe and the NIS. Only at Tbilisi in Georgia—surveyed in January 1996 by a member of DCNSy and a US expert—was removal of the material from the country judged to be the only feasible way to ensure the security and safety of the SNM at a site where poor physical protection made this material extremely vulnerable. The Georgian authorities were prepared to let all the SNM go, but made it clear that the irradiated fuel must go with the 4.1 kg of unirradiated HEU fuel which was the main proliferation threat. When after protracted negotiations the Russians still declined to take this Georgian material, the US Government, which was prepared to pay the Georgians for the HEU and for its safe transport to a Western country, approached the UK and French Governments for possible assistance.

6. The US Government has legislation banning import of spent fuel unless it is of US origin; it has taken back sufficient quantities of US obligated spent fuel, for long term storage, but does not reprocess spent fuel. The French Government has a statutory bar on importing any spent fuel unless the resultant waste from reprocessing is returned to the country of origin. Although for more than 20 years the UK Government has adopted a similar policy on return of waste from nuclear material being reprocessed under commercial contract, this is not enshrined in legislation. Due to the fact that this transfer was not a commercial contract, but was being carried out on non-proliferation grounds, an exception was made to the general policy in this case. In the circumstances, a decision was made to consider the waste resulting from reprocessing the imported spent fuel as if it were itself the subject of an application for import. In respect of such material, the 1995 White Paper, Cm. 2919 (Review of Radioactive Waste Management Policy: Final Conclusions) states that radioactive waste should not be imported into the UK, except in particular circumstances. These include most relevantly waste from small users in developing countries, which cannot reasonably be expected to acquire suitable disposal facilities.

7. The UK's role as a member of the G8 had also to be taken into account. At their nuclear safety and security summit in Moscow in 1996, the G8 committed themselves to take action in support of nuclear non-proliferation and international security. As mentioned above, the US had contributed by taking material from Kazakstan. Russia had taken fissile material from Iraq since the Gulf War. France, Germany and Canada were involved in projects to convert stocks of excess plutonium from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons into fuel for reactors. It was important for the UK also to demonstrate its commitment to the problems posed by inadequately protected weapons-usable material.

DISCUSSIONS IN THE UK

8. The US request arrived in late July 1997. It was then the subject of detailed discussions at Ministerial and official level between those Departments and Agencies with an interest—FCO, DTI, DETR (for waste policy), HSE, Scottish Office, SEPA and MOD. Discussions covered: the Georgian situation; the potential, if any, for similar requests in the future; means of transport and route; the practical feasibility and costs for the UK in accepting this material; any other alternatives for it; and the political advantages/disadvantages of accepting it.

9. A potential UK venue was debated. Dounreay, rather than Sellafield, was the preferred venue because of its much greater experience in dealing with Highly enriched uranium. Dounreay had an operating processing line for unirradiated HEU, which meant that the 4.1 kg of Georgian material which was of greatest proliferation concern would fairly rapidly be turned into targets for medical isotopes. It also had the ability to deal with the irradiated material, if the HSE were to approve the UKAEA's safety case for re-opening the reprocessing facilities. Sellafield, experienced in large volume reprocessing of irradiated low enriched uranium fuel, had neither of these advantages. The ultimate conclusion, reached by relevant Cabinet Ministers in correspondence was that the UK ought, on non-proliferation grounds, to accept the Georgian material (then believed to consist only of HEU) as an exception to normal UK policy and practice. It clearly did not make sense to leave any material subject to Safeguards—and this includes LEU as well as HEU—in Georgia. No further such shipments were invisaged as needed or are proposed. The US Government were informed of this decision during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in February 1998.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT

10. A senior DTI official and the Director of Civil Nuclear Security then met US officials to decide when the Georgian material could be removed to the UK (the second half of April was deemed an achievable timescale)—and to plan the project in outline. The US Government were to buy the material from the Georgian Government, load it into US safety approved transport containers and transport it to a UK airport at no cost to the UK. The UK Government wished to ensure that all our international obligations and national statutory requirements were complied with. For example, the two different types of US approved container (for unirradiated and irradated material) had to be submitted to the normal processes of safety container approval undertaken by DETR arrangements made with the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate to place the material into safeguards on its arrival in the UK; the transport security plans approved by DCNSy; appropriate arrangements made with UK Customs authorities; and practical arrangements for the material's arrival made with MOD since the US Air Force were flying the Georgian material here. DTI maintained close contact with Dounreay, the receiving facility. SEPA were consulted at senior level and on 21 April issued a Press Release accepting the government's decison that the material should, be transferred in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation. HSE had specified in December 1997 that no irradiated fuel could be brought onto the site without the agreement of the Executive. This restriction was intended to ensure that HSE would have an opportunity to disucss the safety implications with UKAEA before receipt of any further fuel. In view of the small quantity of irradiated fuel in this particular consignment and the non-commercial circumstances, HSE issued a further licence instrument, agreeing to the receipt of this particular consignment.

11. A Transfer Agreement (already deposited in the Library of the House) also had to be negotiated with the US authorities to provide a sound legal basis for the transfer of this material to UK ownership on its arrival, and to give suitable liability cover for the UK during transit (since the US Government is not a signatory of the Paris Convention); to state publicly our peaceful use commitment, and ensure free movement within the EURATOM Community. Technically, EURATOM owns all SNM within the Community, with use rights pertaining to firms in specific Member States approved by the EURATOM Supply Agency, who therefore were a party to the transfer agreement. (This Agreement was couched in terms of an item inventory, so it was not obvious to officials that the uranium content was both Highly Enriched and Low Enriched.)

12. The assassination attempt on President Sheverdnadze in February served to confirm the acknowledged need for a relatively short timescale for the project. All these discussions had to proceed with a high degree of confidentiality in view of the sensitivity of the Georgian situation, the confidentiality obligations of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which both the UK and the US have ratified, and the internationally agreed recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. These recommendations, followed by States engaged in international transportation of nuclear materials, state that knowledge of moves of SNM should be restricted on a "need to know'"basis. Since it had always been the Government's intention to inform Parliament just after the material had been received at Dounreay, an announcement had been drafted and detailed press briefing was prepared well in advance of the exact movement date which remained uncertain till about 48 hours in advance.

ARRIVAL OF THE MATERIAL

13. The story broke in The New York Times on 21 April, bathing the final stages of the transfer in Georgia and the arrival in the UK in publicity. The loading, transport by military plane on a route which minimised overland flight, unloading at Kinloss and road transfer under UK Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary (UKAEAC) escort to Dounreay proceeded safely and securely. All the material, both HEU and LEU was put under safeguards for the first time within a couple of hours of its arrival at Dounreay on Friday 24 April.

14. The unirradiated fuel was unloaded into the appropriate areas of Dounreay safeguarded unirradiated fuel store in the presence of the EURATOM inspector and verified early the following week. It was planned to process the unirradiated HEU into uranium powder, and thence into targets for medical isotopes, within a few weeks—now delayed because of problems on site. The targets then go to the European Joint Research Centre reactor at Pettan in the Netherlands for irradiating and subsequent separation of the molybdenum 99 isotope which is sold to hospitals within the UK and the rest of Europe for creation of the short-lived form of the isotope technetium 99 for the diagnosis of cancer. Some 5 million diagnostic doses should result from this 4.1 kg of fresh HEU.

15. US experts and appropriate equipment were at the Dounreay site to assist with unloading the small quantity of irradidated fuel from the large transport flask. The unloading of the irradiated fuel container was deemed by the UKAEA to require a Safety Approved Modification approval as it was a new type of container for UKAEA to handle. HSE were notified of this need in a letter dated 29 April, with documentation following and, after due study, declared they were content with the proposal on 15 May. Meanwhile, following an incident on 7 May involving a severed electrical cable which appeared to indicate problems with the Fuel Cycle Area's electrical system, HSE had issued a formal Direction forbidding all activities other than necessary maintenance and safety work in the Fuel Cycle Area. (All activities on site outside the Fuel Cycle Area—primarily decommissioning—may continue as normal). Thus HSE had to issue a formal Consent to allow the irradiated fuel to be unloaded from its container into the appropriate spent fuel pond at Dounreay where its condition can be more safely monitored. This unloading was done on Tuesday 19 May.

16. It is planned that the irradiated HEU, and both the unirradiated and irradiated LEU will be downblended to make LEU fuel for (civil) research reactors. The irradiated fuel will be reprocessed in accordance with standards and processes that are approved by the HSE and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. This will only happen if and when the UKAEA has satisfied these independent regulators that this can be done in accordance with current stringent UK safety and environmental standards. This is the normal way in which the UKAEA expect to treat all such material. The two barrels of Intermediate Level Waste which would result from reprocessing all the Georgian irradiated fuel should be compared with the equivalent of 14,000 at Dounreay.

17. The Government is fully committed to caring for the environment and to taking action to deal safely with the difficult legacies from the past operations at Dounreay. Taking these factors into account, as well as recent UKAEA advice that there are no economic grounds on which to support the long term viability of the commercial reprocessing business, DTI and Scottish Office announced on 5 June that they had decided to bring commercial reprocessing to an end. UKAEA will now concentrate on reprocessing UK government liabilities, the 4.3 kg of Georgian irradiated fuel and existing commited commercial work. The expectation is that this will all be completed by 2006.

CLARIFICATION ON THE QUANTITIES OF SNM RECEIVED FROM GEORGIA

18. Discussion about the SNM in Georgia prior to the Government's decision being taken had focused on the need to remove all material of proliferation concern from Georgia and the quantities of HEU were specifically mentioned. After the decision had been reached, a technical document from the Georgian authorities was passed by the US authorities to UK officials, who passed it on to technical specialists at Dounreay who were having to make the necessary arrangements for the receipt of the Georgian material. This document, which included for the first time details of all of the nuclear material at the Tbilisi site, indicated that in all probability there would be LEU in the consignment which was due to arrive some weeks later. A breakdown of communication between technical specialists and policy officials meant that, neither at this time nor for some weeks after the material's arrival, did policy officials realise that there would be, and then was, LEU in the shipment. Nor, since the Transfer Agreement had been negotiated in terms of an itemised inventory of rods and pellets, did this Agreement serve to alert officials briefing Ministers that there was LEU either expected or arrived.

19. The shipment arrived safely. The unirradiated material, both HEU and LEU, was subsequently verified by the on-site Euratom inspector and the results passed back to their Luxembourg headquarters via the Safeguards Office in the DTI. On 19 May all the irradiated material was unloaded from its transport flask and the inventory check could finally be completed. (The irradiated material has not been verified by Euratom—they rarely do verify such material and for such small quantities it would be particularly exceptional.) A few days earlier a query from the Euratom Supply Agency about a seeming difference between the verified figures and what officials had explained to them of the shipment at the time of its arrival, led policy officials to check and then double-check the figures of what had arrived and the waste arising from any reprocessing. Once officials were certain in the last week of May that the new figures were accurate—and there were some minor downward adjustments to all four categories of material on the original technical Georgian list—a draft written Parliamentary Statement was prepared. It was not put up immediately for Ministerial approval. Ministers were first told on 5 June that the information they had given was incomplete in respect of the quantities of material that had arrived. Ministers made clear that steps should be taken to ensure that an addendum containing the additional information was put in the public domain as soon as possible. This was done on 10 June.

SECURITY AT THE DOUNREAY SITE

20. Security at the site consists of a combination of: (a) physical, technical and personnel security measures such as fences, CCTV, passes, document security, vetting etc in accordance with Government requirements and (b) policing by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Constabulary (UKAEAC) whose statutory remit is to guard the SNM on UKAEA's, BNFL's and URENCO's licensed nuclear sites and in transit. This guarding is 24 hours a day, 365 days a year with an agreed minimum number of police on the site's complement. This is kept under constant review depending on:

(i) recommendations from the Directorate of Civil Nuclear Security (DCNSy), often as part of their regular security audits;

(ii) the approximately four yearly inspections by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies;

(iii) specialist risk assessments at varying intervals; and

(iv) changes to and improvements in the physical protection of the site. The most recent improvement at Dounreay was security fence costing well over £1 million installed last year round the Fuel Cycle Area.

21. The former Chief Constable of the UKAEAC had recommended an increase of six in police numbers at Dounreay and detailed discussions on this with the UKAEA were nearing completion when he resigned in late January. The UKAEA agreed to six extra staff shortly thereafter—an agreement reported to the Police Authority's scheduled early February meeting. All six extra police have been at Dounreay since the beginning of April. The last physical protection audit of Dounreay was undertaken in April 1997 by DCNSy. The UKAEA's implementation of their recommendations was reviewed on site in October 1997 by the Deputy Director of DCNSy and a senior official of the DTI. All recommendations except one had already been implemented and the outstanding one was completed by the end of 1997. The Director of Civil Nuclear Security has declared himself satisfied with the standard of security on site. However, as for all nuclear sites, security is kept under constant review.

11 June 1998

© Parliamentary copyright 1998
Prepared 28 July 1998