Thank you for inviting me to comment on the possible consequences that the proposed closure of the HM Coastguard Maritime Rescue Sub Centre at Liverpool, may have on emergency planning arrangements in Merseyside.

  My main concerns about the proposed closure are:

(a) The loss of local knowledge; and

(b) The possible loss of local liaison with senior Coastguard staff

  Both local knowledge and liaison are essential ingredients for effective emergency planning, and any possible reduction in either could have tremendous ramifications on public safety.

  With regard to the loss of local knowledge, it was publicly stated that the proposed closure of the HM Coastguard Maritime Rescue Sub Centre at Liverpool will not affect the Senior Control arrangements in existence. It has to be assumed that this means that there will still be coastguard officers carrying out duties within Merseyside who will be available to respond to incidents. Such assurances are encouraging, as should an incident occur off the Merseyside coastline, it is important that the wealth of expertise within the service will continue to be available to integrate with that made available by the other agencies responding, be it at the scene or at the tactical or strategic level.

  However the moving of the HM Coastguard Maritime Rescue Sub Centre at Liverpool to a location remote from the area will undoubtedly result in the loss of the local Merseyside knowledge at the new location. That knowledge is imperative as more often than not, initial reports of incidents to the emergency services include locally acceptable references. For example in reporting an incident of a person in difficulties off the Wirral coastline, reference could be made to Victoria Road slip, New Brighton slip, Golden Goose slip, the Old Pier slip, Chelsea Reach slip or Casino Royale slip. All of these names refer, in fact, to the same point on the coastline. Local officers in receiving such a call would recognise any of the named locations, be aware of any peculiar conditions appertaining to the location and determine with accuracy and expertise the resources needed to respond. What is more important is the fact that the local knowledge would ensure the most appropriate response is activated without delay or the need to incur the loss of valuable time in clarifying the information available.

  It has been suggested that Coastguard Officers on watch at the HM Coastguard Maritime Rescue Sub Centre at Holyhead would have a database to assist them to deal with incidents in localities of which they have a limited local knowledge. I would question the ability of a database to take the place of local knowledge and experience in overcoming such problems without resulting in the loss of vital seconds which could be so important in a life threatening incident.

  Liaison has proved to be of paramount importance in integrated emergency planning. On Merseyside the HM Coastguard District Controller is a serving member on the Senior Co-ordinating Group (SCG) of the Merseyside Emergency Services Joint Planning Committee (ESJPC). The members of the ESJPC need to be of sufficient seniority to be able to make immediate decisions affecting the deployment of the resources and expertise of their own service. The Standing Working Group of the ESJPC requires its membership to comprise senior operational officers appointed by its constituent organisations. Such officers must have a thorough understanding of the working arrangements of their own and all other organisations involved coupled with local knowledge if the group is to prove an effective emergency planning tool. Again, the HM Coastguard service is represented on this group.

  The Coastguard service can provide expertise in areas other than maritime matters and this should not be overlooked. I am concerned that under the proposed new arrangement HM Coastguard representation on these groups would be severely reduced in number and in seniority levels as the proposed reduced manning levels at Holyhead would actually be required to serve on several other ESJPCs within their sphere of influence. This would undoubtedly be a costly exercise in terms of travel and demanding in terms of manpower. It is however imperative that such liaison is maintained otherwise emergency planning would lose its integrated management approach, an approach promoted by central government through the Home Office.

  You may be aware that following the statement on the proposed closure of the Liverpool Maritime Rescue Sub Centre, I did submit a report on the matter through the committee process to the Merseyside Fire and Civil Defence Authority. A copy of the report and resolution thereon is enclosed. (EP/26/97 refers). You will note that in the report mention is made of intended closure in 1989 of the Maritime Rescue Sub Centre in the Isle of Man and the proposed transfer of responsibilities of that centre to Liverpool. That action did come to fruition and I understand resulted in one additional member of staff being employed at Liverpool. This is a matter of importance in the proposed latest reorganisation as it emphasises the magnitude of responsibilities proposed to be transferred to Holyhead.

  I should also mention that to close the Maritime Rescue Sub Centre at Liverpool will effectively mean that there is no Coastguard Station on the North West Coast of England, yet there will be three such stations on the Welsh coastline.

  In view of:

(a) the Port of Liverpool increasing its tonnage throughput annually,

(b) the increased leisure activity in Liverpool Bay,

(c) the construction of two Ro-Ro terminals in Merseyside,

(d) Liverpool airport, adjacent to the coastline, increasing passenger movements and

(e) oil refinery and terminals on the banks of the River

  I can only reiterate my concerns that the closure of the Liverpool Maritime Rescue Sub Centre will be a retrograde step, which is influenced for reasons of finance rather than public safety.

  I have discovered that a consultation document will shortly be published on this matter which will be distributed to interested organisations. The address to write to for a copy is

    Mr K Shears
    HM Coastguard
    Bay 1/7 Spring Place
    105 Commercial Road
    Southampton
    SO15 1EG

  Finally may I express the concern of Merseyside Fire and Civil Defence Authority that the current reviews being undertaken or planned of the Fire Service, the Police, the Coastguard and the local authority emergency planning function all seem to be taking place in isolation from one another. Separate questionnaires on each service are not conducive to improved integrated emergency planning arrangements.

CHIEF EMERGENCY PLANNING OFFICER
Merseyside Fire & Civil Defence Authority

May 1998

Aim

  1.  To advise the Authority of proposals by HM Government to close the Liverpool Maritime Rescue Sub Centre, HM Coastguard Station at Crosby and the implications to emergency planning on Merseyside.

Recommendation

  2.  That:

(a) The Chief Coastguard, Regional Controller Western Region and the District Controller (Liverpool Coastguard), be invited to address the next meeting of the Authority regarding HM Governments proposal to close the HM Coastguard station in Crosby.

(b) Written assurances be sought from the Minister for Aviation and Shipping that the resultant transfer of resources to Holyhead will not reduce the level of liaison and participation by the Coastguard Agency in emergency planning and response arrangements on Merseyside.

Background

  3.  On 17th November 1997, in a written response to a Parliamentary question, regarding sea and coastline search and rescue co-ordination, the Minister of Aviation and Shipping, Ms Glenda Jackson, MP advised of HM Government's intention to cease operations from a number of Coastguard Stations in Britain by the year 2000. One of those stations is the Liverpool Maritime Rescue Sub Centre at Crosby. A copy of the question and written answer is attached as Appendix A to this report.

  4.  Currently the Liverpool Maritime Rescue Sub Centre manages the Coastguard Agency responsibilities from Point of Ayr in North Wales to the Mull of Galloway, in Scotland, a coastline of some 700 miles. This includes all the Coastline in Merseyside (100 miles) and a major portion of the Irish Sea. The prime responsibility of the Coastguard Service is to co-ordinate civil maritime search and rescue at sea and along the coastline.

  5.  Members should be aware that the Coastguard Service within Merseyside was the subject of a report by the Chief Emergency Planning Officer to the Authority in 1989 (EP/71/89 refers). The purpose of that report was to inform Members that the Coastguard Service intended to close its Maritime Rescue Sub Centre in Ramsey, Isle of Man and transfer the communications operations for co- ordinating rescue incidents in the Irish Sea to the Liverpool Centre. Discussions by officers of the Authority which ensued with the Chief Coastguard resulted in assurances being received that the transfer of the operations would have no detrimental affect on the emergency planning and response arrangements then enjoyed by Merseyside, and in fact that additional staff would be employed at the Liverpool Centre to cope with any resultant additional workload.

  6.  In 1994 the HM Coastguard Service was given Agency status. In effect this devolved the management responsibilities indirectly to each Maritime Rescue Sub Centre from the then Department of Transport (now Department of Environment Transport and Regions). This was an internal arrangement and has not affected the working relationships with the statutory agencies on Merseyside, although it has, in effect, resulted in the levels of staffing being reduced. Officer availability to participate in planning meetings has not always been possible.

  7.  The Merseyside organisations involved in emergency planning enjoy an excellent relationship with the Coastguard Agency. With the large mileage of coastline in the Merseyside area, the proliferation of commercial oil and gas speculation in Liverpool Bay, the increased leisure activity taking place along the coastline and the increase in commercial passenger and cargo sea traffic to Liverpool Docks such a working relationship has proved vital. The Agency has therefore ensured full commitment to Emergency Planning on Merseyside and officers from the Liverpool Sub Centre have been actively involved in the integrated emergency management approach that has been adopted in the area. The Coastguard officers have played a major part in emergency preparedness, planning and exercising. They have made significant contributions towards the preparation of the River Mersey Rescue Plan (Runcorn Bridge to Aigburth) which includes the immediate area of Liverpool Airport. The officers expertise in co-ordinating search and rescue, combined with their local knowledge of the area could prove invaluable. The availability of that same knowledge has similarly been vital in responding to oil and chemical pollution incidents which have, over the years, affected the shoreline.

Current Situation

  8.  The written response to the parliamentary question does state that the closure of the Coastguard station at Liverpool is part of a strategy to further improve the high level of service provided by HM Coastguard. It further suggests that the key to the strategy is the introduction of digital communications technology. It has been suggested that the co-ordination role will be transferred to the HM Coastguard Station at Holyhead. That station is one of three in Wales. It is currently responsible for approximately 300 miles of coastline and has a medium sized port facility in its area. The written response does not indicate to what level if any the staffing levels at Holyhead would be increased to accommodate the additional area of responsibility it would assume.

  9.  Whilst new technology will be an asset to the Coastguard Service the Chief Emergency Planning Officer is concerned that the proposed changes do not appear to take into account the local human input into emergency preparedness, and in particular the vital local knowledge that is paramount in the initial stages of a response to any incident. He believes therefore that the Authority should seek an assurance that the integrated emergency planning which has proved so effective on Merseyside is not compromised by such technology.

  10.  It is understood that the views of the Chief Emergency Planning Officer contained within this report are similarly echoed in Cumbria and Lancashire. It may therefore be appropriate should the Chief Coastguard accede to the request to address this Authority, to consider inviting representatives of the emergency preparedness organisations within those areas to attend the relevant meeting.

Costs and Equal Opportunities

  11.  This report presents no cost or equal opportunities implications to the Authority.

Emergency Planning Committee

4 December 1997