House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development First Report

AID FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM (continued)

Housing

49. The confusion plaguing the delivery of aid is also evident from a detailed examination of the provision of emergency housing. Mr Brandt said that housing in the north was his most urgent priority.[96] He estimated that about 300 persons had been in the emergency shelters in the north for over two years,[97] many having left their homes with only an overnight bag. The total population of the shelters was put at about 1,100.[98] There were others living in the homes of relatives or friends. The Government of Montserrat had asked for 250 housing units to house 1000 persons,[99] though Mr Brandt thought that more would be needed.

50. The Calman Report considers the current shelters in the north to be a serious danger to health and recommends that the matter be urgently addressed. The Report describes serious overcrowding in shelters due to the shortage of housing; inadequate shelters for the elderly and the young, with the risk of fires and other accidents; poor sanitation systems; water supply systems dependent on springs in the unsafe central zone.[100] This accords with the observations of the Committee when we visited Montserrat. The conditions in the shelters were appalling. With the resources and expertise at the disposal of the United Kingdom Government we must ask why, nearly two and a half years after the eruption began, there is not a single person in emergency housing.

51. A closer study of the history of the crisis gives some of the answers. All discussion of responses to the crisis must take account of its peculiar character. First, it was not an emergency with a clearly defined and limited duration followed by an aftermath which could then be addressed. The volcano was an ongoing disaster, unpredictable and atypical even when compared with other volcanos, in which the planning of a response to the current emergency had to attempt to foresee the volcano's future activity. As the Secretary of State put it, "We have been dealing with a cumulating emergency rather than a stable situation where we can plan for the future".[101] There was thus a necessary dependence on scientific advice.

52. The first period in which to consider action on housing is from July 1995 to November 1996. During this period Mr Reuben Meade was the Chief Minister of Montserrat and Mr Frank Savage the Governor. The Government of Montserrat has a responsibility to ensure that there is adequate housing for the population. From October 1995 scientists were saying that the volcanic activity could last for a number of years. Mr Savage told the Committee that "the Governor, in my opinion unfortunately, is not central to decision-making on the delivery of developmental aid".[102] This was a matter of regret to him since he had had different priorities to those of the Government of Montserrat. He had written as early as September 1995 of minimum requirements to improve the infrastructure in the north of the island, including accommodation for 100 persons, a new hospital, a jetty, police station and government facilities. As Governor, with the protection of Montserratians as his priority, he was being ultra-cautious. The Government of Montserrat preferred to develop Salem and this was consistent with the then advice of scientists that the Salem area should be safe. He summarised, "In retrospect, had I got what I asked for (and I do feel strongly as Governor that not sufficient weight was given to my views) we would have had what we needed at the northern end of the island, but had the volcano not gone that far I would have looked very foolish".[103] Throughout the crisis when Governor he sent over 400 telegrams to London, many emphasising the need to speed up the delivery of aid.[104]

53. Housing was not, however, a priority for the Government of Montserrat, and the FCO and ODA in London did not appear to respond to the Governor's concerns. There were temporary evacuations of Plymouth in August and October 1995. The third evacuation of Plymouth in April 1996 has turned out to be permanent, though few perhaps expected that at the time. It was clear with the evacuation of Plymouth and much of the south, and the continuing escalation in volcanic activity, that significant development aid from HMG was necessary. On 22 August 1996 a £25 million development aid programme was announced and the Government of Montserrat was invited to submit proposals. These proposals excluded housing, the Government of Montserrat being confident of raising the funds elsewhere. This proved not to be possible. It was to be a year later before significant funds for housing were made available by HMG for Montserrat. It is clear that the provision of housing was not sufficiently urgent for the Reuben Meade Government that it warranted a request for assistance to HMG. The decision of the Government of Montserrat in August 1996 not to apply for aid to construct housing is a significant cause of the delay in the provision of adequate accommodation.

54. Elections were held in Montserrat in November 1996, which resulted in the defeat of Reuben Meade's Government. The new Chief Minister was Mr Bertrand Osborne who had the provision of housing as a priority for his administration. We were told that there were discussions between HMG and the Government of Montserrat as to where to build the houses. HMG said that the Government of Montserrat should in the first instance use crown land at Little Bay, or rent or lease land, rather than purchase land with DFID funds. The Government of Montserrat was against the use of Little Bay for housing because it was the only place in the north where, if it proved necessary, one could put a new capital[105]. Nevertheless within two months of his election Mr Osborne had put a proposal to London. Funding was agreed for 50 houses at Judy Peace (not proceeded with, being overtaken by the later emergency housing programme) and a programme was begun called 'material build' which provided funds for persons to build on land they owned. When Baroness Symons visited in June 1997 she announced £1 million for a further 50 houses which were to be built at Little Bay.[106] In July 1997, following the pyroclastic flows on 25 June which resulted in the permanent closure of Plymouth followed by the evacuation of Salem and the central area, HMG announced an emergency housing scheme of £6.5 million. Mr Savage concluded, however, "it was not enough and it was too late".[107]

55. One problem for development in the north is that much of the little land there is in private hands. Thus to build houses it has proved necessary to acquire land through compulsory purchase. The law allows building to begin on such land while arbitration continues on a fair price. It is for the Government of Montserrat to exercise powers of compulsory purchase. It cannot do so, however, without some assurance that at the end of the arbitration process DFID will be willing to fund the purchase. Mr Ireton explained that DFID had not been prepared to finance a land bank, in other words finance the compulsory purchase of land in the north in advance of an identified need. They had agreed specific finance projects which involved the acquisition of land, such as the school at Lookout.[108] DFID had not acceded to the Government of Montserrat's request to buy up part of the north on a contingent basis.

56. Between November 1996 and July 1997 there were "long discussions between the offices on Barbados and the Government of Montserrat about exactly what these [housing] projects would consist of. At that stage they were not asking for the sort of emergency housing that has been put up at Davy Hill and Lookout, they were talking about other designs of projects, about where they would go, what the physical planning parameters would be, etc....It was because they had not produced housing that [DFID] started the emergency housing programme in July".[109]

57. Mr Savage also gave an account of this decision-making process in a more general discussion of the delivery of aid. The DTRS would come to Montserrat periodically to agree priorities with the Chief Minister-"the British Government did not at any time put something in for which there was not agreement. There were times when the Government of Montserrat was asking for something which was not agreed, such as the new hospital. In Bridgetown, in DTRS, they reported indirectly through BDDC ... The head of BDDC reported back to a senior officer at the ODA, now DFID ... My view, which was accepted, was that those lines of communication were far too long, particularly as every project ... in order to meet Treasury criteria had to have proper consultants to look at the requirement and see if there was a need for it. I argued we had to get development aid on to a fast track; we had to dispense it almost as rapidly as emergency aid".[110] This "cumbersome procedure", though appropriate for the generality of DFID's development work, was wholly inappropriate to the situation in Montserrat. Mr Savage concluded, "One of the problems during this crisis is I think this might have been the first time that development aid was to have been used on an emergency basis".[111] The same point was made with reference to assistance to scientists on the island by the British Geological Survey[112] and by Professor Sparks.[113]

58. Between November 1996 and July 1997 it is clear that discussion of housing projects took place within overly bureaucratic procedures and with little sense of urgency. Responsibility for this must be shared between HMG and the Government of Montserrat. It was no doubt hoped by all involved that Salem and the central area of the island would remain safe. This was in accord with scientific advice at the time. All such advice was, however, on the understanding that volcanology is not an exact science and the volcano in the Soufrière Hills is an atypical volcano. Greater and more urgent contingency planning was called for from the early stages of the volcano's activity, as the Governor had attempted to make clear.

59. It was clear from 25 June that housing needed to be constructed as a matter of urgency. After the agreement of the £6.5 million package in July there were discussions between DFID and HMG from late July to early August on the use of government land at Little Bay. This was HMG's preferred option because of the expense of the alternatives. The Government of Montserrat, supported by Brown and Root,[114] the DFID-appointed contractors, suggested that only half the houses be built at the Davy Hill site at Little Bay, the others at Lookout Yard. There were discussions as to the type of housing and also on the valuation of the land. It proved impossible to reach an agreement on purchase with the landowner at Lookout, Dr Lee, who was demanding a price which was about three times the value. At the end of August the necessary paper was signed to commence compulsory purchase proceedings and begin work at Lookout. We were told at the end of October that the first tranche of houses were ready for occupation. There does not seem on the basis of this evidence to be any appreciable or culpable delay since the announcement of the £6.5 million in July this year. Since the authorisation of funds by the Secretary of State in July, fifty houses have been completed and a further fifty are under construction.

60. Housing aid has also been offered by CARICOM. A CARICOM village has been suggested of 50 houses, to be supplied in kits from Cuba. The houses would be constructed by soldiers from Jamaica. The CARICOM village would be next to one of HMG's own housing projects at Davy Hill. It had therefore been suggested that HMG extend the infrastructure, electricity and water supplies for the benefit of the CARICOM village also. Mr Brandt referred to a letter from the United Kingdom Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of Jamaica, Chairman of CARICOM, which said "Our officials are having difficulty in getting the project together for the infrastructure", the implication, according to Mr Brandt, being "Delay the project".[115] We have seen a copy of the letter. It says nothing of the sort. In fact, the letter reads, "Our experts are studying the practical aspects of your offer. We will be in touch with CARICOM shortly about this".[116]

61. Ms Short told the Committee that there had been delay in considering the CARICOM proposal, "partly because the Government of Montserrat has had varying views about the kind of design and the kind of arrangements, and that has taken a bit of time".[117] They would shortly be in a position where a ministerial decision could be taken. We recommend that all possible assistance be given at the earliest opportunity to the CARICOM project and that a decision on the extension of the Davy Hill infrastructure be made and communicated without further delay.

Education

62. The question of housing in inextricably linked to that of education, since newly built schools at Lookout and Brades are currently being used as emergency shelters. This has meant that primary school children are receiving no education at the moment. Secondary school children have to cope with extremely inadequate makeshift classrooms and equipment. We congratulate the secondary school teachers and pupils alike for their efforts under such difficult circumstances.

63. We understand temporary accommodation for the primary school classes will be available in the very near future. We recommend urgent action to ensure that the schools are properly supplied with resources and equipment. We also recommend that once emergency housing is available the Government of Montserrat make it their priority to return the school buildings to their intended use. Before July 1995 Montserrat had an enviable reputation for the quality of its education system and, despite obvious difficulties since then, great effort has been made by teachers and pupils to maintain such high standards. That tradition must not be threatened by a lack of government support.

Emergency Aid

64. Emergency aid, as has been stated above, is spent directly and quickly by HMG. Mr Savage explained, "The Government of Montserrat knew what we were planning, did not always approve of all the projects, but it was essentially a first aid operation".[118] The Government of Montserrat remains unhappy at some of the purchasing decisions made with the emergency aid budget. In particular, Mr Brandt's evidence stated that the first sludge wagon purchased by DFID was nineteen years old and never functioned as it was supposed to, nor did the second sludge wagon which was twelve years old and whose gear ratios were inadequate for the hilly terrain in the north of Montserrat.[119] We were also told that tents purchased as an immediate response when the volcano became active again in 1995 were of such poor quality that most had to be destroyed, and that school buses purchased were too long to negotiate Montserrat's roads.

65. These points were put to the Secretary of State. With regard to the sludge wagons Mr Bearpark explained that they were an emergency response to warnings from the Governor and the Government of Montserrat that the sewage system in the north was wholly inadequate to deal with the numbers now living there. He did not deny the age of the first two vehicles but claimed that they did work. When it became clear that the sewage problem was going to continue as further evacuations occurred it was decided to buy a third sludge wagon with an acceptable life expectancy. It was chosen with the help of the Government of Montserrat and works well.[120] Ms Short defended these actions, "If there is an absolute emergency then to get something very quickly from a neighbouring island that will make do while you get something better I think is a sensible way of proceeding".[121]

66. Early in 1996 the Government of Montserrat and the Governor asked for school buses to be provided to assist in the evacuation of schoolchildren in the event of a volcanic alert in the south east of the island. 42 seater buses were specified to the Montserratian vehicle importer employed, but 72 seaters arrived. Despite DFID's initial view that they should be returned as unsuitable, the Government of Montserrat accepted the vehicles.[122] As for the tents, at the outset of the crisis in 1995 EMAD was asked to provide immediate shelter if people had to leave Plymouth. Tents were provided by and to some extent purchased from the United States, which turned out, however, to be secondhand, many of them in poor condition.[123]

67. The accounts of the Government of Montserrat and HMG differ in some of the details. It is clear, however, that with the best of intentions emergency aid was used to purchase equipment which, particularly in the case of the buses and tents, was seriously substandard. It will of course be the case in emergency aid that equipment is bought which is not up to the standard of fully considered development projects. There must, however, be some minimum standards even for the provision of immediate assistance. We criticise DFID for the fact that these purchases fell below such a minimum. We recommend that EMAD consider how emergency purchasing of equipment might be improved on the basis of their experience in Montserrat and report their conclusions to the Committee.

The Sustainable Development Plan

68. Many other development needs have been brought to our attention during the inquiry. We have concentrated on the history of aid to housing projects because it is such an important issue and because it illustrates very well some of the problems that have arisen in the delivery of aid. We cannot mention all the other issues which must be addressed. They include the refurbishment of the hospital, the improvement of the currently fragile transport links with the outside world, schools, a prison, administrative buildings. The Sustainable Development Plan currently under consideration is an attempt to move discussion away from a 'shopping list' towards a more cohesive and developmental approach. Ms Short told us, "We have always wanted it to be the Sustainable Development Plan, when we know how many people are seeking to stay and provide all the facilities that are needed together and consider the long term but we have had this problem of a piecemeal set of demands for individual projects that I think would be better considered together. The pressure has been on that rather than immediate action to make things better for the people who are living in very bad conditions".[124] We welcome the move to produce a Sustainable Development Plan. Evidence suggests there has up until now been a continuing clash between DFID's desire to act quickly to address urgent needs and the Government of Montserrat's concern to secure facilities which will ensure the continuing viability of the island.

Conclusions on the delivery of aid

69. We have come to the following conclusions on the delivery of aid to Montserrat:

i. There were too many decision makers involved in the delivery of aid to Montserrat. ODA/DFID attempted to combine emergency and development aid in its response to events. This was a mistake. The volcano had not ceased to be active. The emergency was, and is, cumulative. Thus the use of accounting procedures and administrative structures designed for other circumstances was cumbersome and resulted in some delay and confusion. The recent removal of DTRS and BDDC from the decision-making process is a tacit admission of former errors.

ii. The Government of Montserrat has consistently acted, with the admirable intention of preserving the community on Montserrat, to minimise disruption and project as optimistic a view of Montserrat's future as possible. This is evident even if we confine ourselves to two undisputed facts-that the Government of Montserrat opposed for some time an assisted passage scheme and a relocation grant to assist Montserratians who wished to leave the island, and that until November 1996 the provision of emergency housing in the north was not a priority. Conversely, when assistance was obviously necessary the Government of Montserrat has tended to use discussions with DFID to pursue longer term developmental goals rather than deal immediately and provisionally with urgent needs.

iii. The constitutional arrangements for Montserrat did not lend themselves to an effective response to the crisis. Throughout this crisis power, responsibility and resources have rarely been found in the same pair of hands. We consider it would have been more effective to have used the Treasury's Contingency Reserve to respond to the emergency, placing the allocation of resources and the development of policy under a single minister and team of officials. Even now DFID has the money, but responsibility is divided between the Government of Montserrat, the Governor, the FCO and EMAD. The result is that action is delayed.

iv. Many of the imperfections and difficulties in the delivery of aid are simply due to the complicated, ongoing and unpredictable nature of the volcanic activity. Professor Sparks has made clear that there will be future volcanic eruptions elsewhere in the Caribbean.[125] There are numerous lessons to be learned from events in Montserrat both from the viewpoint of science and emergency planning. We recommend that a frank and impartial report be prepared by HMG on the basis of experience in Montserrat which can enable not only HMG but other governments in the area to be prepared for such emergencies in the future.

96 Q.238. Back

97 Q.248. Back

98 Q.249. Back

99 Q.339. Back

100 Calman Report para. 6.4. Back

101 Q.27. Back

102 Q.459. Back

103 Q.465. Back

104 Q.463. Back

105 Q.466. Back

106 Q.466. Back