SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) We certainly recognise the success of
the PfP programme, which has also enabled prospective members
to demonstrate their NATO-worthiness. However, we also recognise
that most of the CEE states were not prepared to accept indefinitely
this 'associate status' (paragraph 15).
(b) We must concur with our predecessor Committee
which commented, "the vital question has since January 1994
been, not whether there will be an extension of NATO, but its
pace and manner" (paragraph 15).
(c) We conclude that the incentive to improve
the structure and control of the military, to enhance democracy
and to resolve border disputes and internal problems with ethnic
minorities, which we have seen clearly exists within aspirant
countries, would not have been as strong without the possibility
of full membership of NATO (paragraph 33).
(d) We recognise that potential improvements
to the security environment could be put at risk if enlargement
caused Russia to adopt a posture which could bring about a resurgence
of Cold War antagonism (paragraph 34).
(e) While we should be sensitive to Russian
anxieties, we cannot accept that Russia should have a veto over
Alliance decisions. Nevertheless, we recognise the importance
of continued consultation with Russia and gaining Russian confidence
during the necessarily delicate process of enlargement. In the
final analysis, the central question that must be addressed in
deciding on enlargement is whether it will provide greater security
for the Alliance, and for Europe as a whole (paragraph 42).
(f) In deciding whether to endorse ratification
of the accession protocols of the proposed new members, Parliament
must weigh the potential political advantages of enlargement against
any potential short-term costs in terms of military effectiveness.
For our part, we are clear that the benefits of increased stability
in central and eastern Europe outweigh any potential military
costs (paragraph 52).
(g) We conclude that the actual shared costs
of enlargement may well be greater than the $1.5 billion over
ten years projected by NATO, but at this stage it is not possible
to estimate how much with any great certainty (paragraph 77).
(h) We conclude, that it would be as well,
in choosing to endorse the process of enlargement, to be prepared
for the costs shared among the 19 members of NATO to drift up
at least towards the mid-range between NATO's $1.5 billion over
ten years and the US DoD's $5-6 billion over thirteen years (Paragraph
79).
(i) We conclude that the weight of informal
opinion and the evidence we have heard supports the RAND Corporation
and DoD in the assumption that the threat of a direct conventional
war in Europe is insignificant in the near term-and that should
such a threat re-arise, NATO would have sufficient time to adjust
its defensive posture. We accept, therefore, that the permanent
forward positioning of NATO forces in the new members' territories
is unnecessary. To do so when the risk does not justify it will
in any case be interpreted as an action deliberately antagonistic
to Russian concerns. The highest estimates-the CBO's more expensive
options, at costs of up to $125 billion-can accordingly be disregarded
(Paragraph 82).
(j) We concur with the view of one of
our Members that "countries can generally achieve a higher
degree of security at lower cost when operating within an Alliance
than would be the case were states to pursue purely national defence
strategies" (paragraph 83).
(k) We cannot share the Secretary of State's
confidence that $1.5 billion represents the probable limit on
the true costs of enlargement (paragraph 86).
(l) The question that remains is: even
if the costs increase, are the benefits still likely to be worth
it? Even if the UK's estimated contribution of £110 million
over ten years were to double to the equivalent of half of the
purchase price of a Eurofighter every year we would still consider
that enlargement offers excellent value for money (Paragraph 88).
(m) Despite equal or nearly equal claims
from a few other countries, we conclude that none of the three
countries invited to accede to NATO was an inappropriate choice
(paragraph 98).
(n) We welcome the commitment made by the
Government for a debate in Parliament on NATO enlargement before
ratification (paragraph 102).
(o) We express the hope that the Committee
on the Modernisation of the House of Commons will turn its attention
to the current unsatisfactory arrangements for Parliamentary examination
of international treaties and other aspects of the exercise of
the royal prerogative in relation to ratification (paragraph 106).
(p) We believe that we should approach any
further enlargement after this round with caution (paragraph 108).
(q) We believe that consensus decisions are
required where military operations may be employed, and we would
not wish to see NATO operating with a 'Security Council' (paragraph
110).
(r) We recommend that the House endorse
the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the
North Atlantic Alliance (paragraph 117).
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