Towards the Washington Summit

107. The 50^th anniversary of the signing of the Washington Treaty falls on 4 April 1999. It will be marked by a NATO Summit to be held once again in Washington. That Summit will provide an opportunity to take stock of the first round of enlargement, and to lay out a vision of NATO's future. It is anticipated that NATO's new Strategic Concept will be agreed at Washington. It is inevitable that expectations will be raised of a further round of accessions on that occasion.

108. Many uncertainties surround the future of the enlarged NATO, and we cannot say that the evidence points unequivocally to guaranteed success. We believe that we should approach any further enlargement after this round with caution. It is certainly appropriate that NATO's future Strategic Concept should be thoroughly debated and agreed before any further commitments to enlargement are made. The current round has, we feel, been surrounded by more than the inevitable degree of fudge and compromise that must characterise any international treaty negotiation. That is not to say that further enlargement should be off the agenda.

109. Nonetheless, we conclude that the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland marks the beginning of a new phase in NATO's development, rather than the conclusion. There would be as many risks attached to stopping enlargement at three as there would be to continuing: the Alliance has committed itself to enlargement as an open process designed to stabilise the whole continent. Instability in central Europe has triggered two world wars in this century. The rationale of NATO enlargement is largely about the continued prevention of a third. Opponents of enlargement may have to accept a certain inevitable political logic to further enlargement and, like King Canute, we acknowledge that to attempt to turn the tide back could prove to be a stubborn waste of political energy.

110. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs told us that "if there was a suggestion that a future enlargement of NATO did cause any compromise of NATO's core functions, then Britain would oppose that enlargement".[123] This round of enlargement will not by any means paralyse NATO into inaction. However, we must acknowledge that there may be a limit beyond which NATO cannot function at all, let alone effectively. The Minister of State hinted at this when he told us that "we would be blind and stupid if we did not recognise that as we increase numbers we test the process of consensus building more than with small numbers".[124] This should be kept in mind when NATO planners consider future waves of enlargement. We believe that consensus decisions are required where military operations may be employed, and we would not wish to see NATO operating with a 'Security Council'.

111. In our projected report on the Strategic Defence Review we hope to consider the wider strategic context which the UK and NATO will face in the next century. NATO will have to confront issues such as: the impact of the IT revolution on warfare and the future battlefield; the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons; peacekeeping and conflict prevention; terrorism, organised crime and sub-state conflict; the potential impact of environmental catastrophe; and the vulnerability of international communications and trading systems to novel forms of attack. For our part, we intend over the next year to monitor the development of NATO's new Strategic Concept and review the early impact of enlargement on its effectiveness.

112. In formulating its new Strategic Concept, NATO will have to address key questions about its future shape and purpose, some of which we have set out in this report in relation to the current round of enlargement. Fundamental to all these questions is the central problem of what the role of the Alliance is in the post-Cold War world. Should territorial defence under Article 5 remain central to the Treaty in unamended form? Or should the Alliance be more prepared, as provided for under Article 4 of the Treaty, to defend the security interests of its members? What are those interests? If it is to commit itself in principle to out-of-area operations, what will be the basis in international law for its actions? To what extent can it clarify its relationship with the UN and OSCE and the means by which those bodies can give a mandate to military action by NATO? If it is to enlarge further, can it continue to operate by consensus, or will there have to be a move towards more ad hoc multilateral operations under the broad umbrella of the Alliance? How far can partnership with Russia be taken? Can NATO really be reconfigured to become a crisis management and conflict prevention organisation, or is its structure simply too heavily invested in conventional war? Can these two models of operation be effectively integrated? If the new Strategic Concept provides convincing answers to these questions, it will provide a clear framework within which the debate over future enlargement can be conducted.

113. We shall aim to produce a report before the Washington Summit which we hope will inform debate on the key decisions to be made there on the future direction of the Alliance. The Summit will have to address, amongst other issues, the future direction and pace of any further enlargement, and we trust that these decisions will be taken in a clearer context than that which, perhaps inevitably, surrounded the Madrid Summit.

Conclusion

114. Earlier in the report, we asked "if Russia is no longer the question to which NATO is the answer, what is that question, and how does enlargement help to answer it?". We hope this report has provided some answers, and we shall hazard a summary. There is no one question in the new Europe to which NATO is the answer, but the main mission of NATO in the post-Cold War world is to seek to ensure peace in a world in which the risks we face are more unpredictable than at any period from the early stages of the Cold War to the fall of the Berlin Wall. We believe the key to achieving this aim is support for the emerging democracies, including Russia, and the projection of stability and democracy eastward.

115. As to the current round of enlargement, were any NATO member to decline to ratify the necessary protocols, we believe the effect on the countries of CEE would now be overwhelmingly negative. Aspirant members have taken great steps towards democracy and stability. The time at which the current round of enlargement could be stopped without incurring incalculable diplomatic damage has passed.

116. In reaching this conclusion we recognise that enlargement carries certain risks. It is likely to be more expensive than the most optimistic estimates suggest. Nevertheless, the costs are unlikely to be unmanageable and will, in any event represent a modest proportion of the overall cost of NATO. Enlargement may also incur a short-term penalty in respect of NATO's overall military capability, but we are confident that any such effect will be reversed before the emergence of any foreseeable threat. Enlargement will produce a sense of exclusion amongst the aspirant countries who were not accepted in this round-this cannot be allowed to fester. Russia may have doubts about enlargement, but all reasonable steps have been taken to reassure her. The task of reassurance now needs to be addressed to Russia's potential reaction to further enlargement. We believe the Founding Act provides a firm basis for developing the rapprochement between Russia and a changing NATO-a rapprochement which has already developed to a stage beyond which anyone might have predicted ten years ago.

117. We should embark upon this new era in NATO's development with our eyes open. A long period of debate has culminated in the current proposals which the NATO governments have put before us. The solution they have proposed to the question of NATO's future is not without risks and will involve costs. However, we conclude that if we want, as the US Secretary of State put it, to extend the area of Europe where wars simply do not happen, the UK and its NATO partners have to respond positively to the desire of the countries of central and eastern Europe to bind their future security to that of western Europe. Those who wish to see the continuation of this most successful Alliance should lend their support to the proposals for enlargement, and we recommend that the House endorse the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the North Atlantic Alliance.

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