89. As outlined earlier in the report, not only the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, but also Slovenia and Romania were considered to be likely candidates for invitation to accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. Other countries, including the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, probably had good reason to suspect that they would not be in the first tranche of enlargement.

90. The decision on who to invite was not taken on the basis of a checklist, although there are certain fairly explicit pre-conditions which a country would be expected to meet before an invitation was extended. These include: a working democracy; a market economy; resolution of any border disputes; resolution of internal difficulties regarding ethnic minorities; democratic control of the armed forces; and acceptance of principles of human rights. However, meeting all these criteria has never been intended to be a guarantee of membership.[100]

91. Of the twelve aspirant countries which entered into negotiations with NATO post-

Brussels,[101] several clearly do not meet sufficiently all the pre-conditions for membership. In some cases working democracy or stability are not yet firmly established. We regard membership of the EAPC and involvement in PfP as excellent means by which these countries can be encouraged in their development efforts; the fact that their attainment in some areas is not yet high enough does not mean that this will always be the case-indeed, we hope it will not be the case for long.

92. The situation regarding the Balkan states of Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM is delicate; until there is stability in the whole of former Yugoslavia they are unlikely to be serious membership candidates. In presenting themselves as aspirant members they were perhaps optimistic in their assessment of how easily stability could be achieved and border disputes resolved. NATO's commitment to the region is unabated, which should offer aspirant Balkan states some encouragement.

93. The three Baltic states-Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania-present a different problem. Clearly they do meet many of the criteria which would be the first hurdle towards NATO membership[102], despite internal problems with Russian minorities. However, they suffer the geographical burden of shared borders with Russia and the historical burden of occupation by Soviet forces. Their accession to the Washington Treaty would be particularly difficult for Russia to accept.[103] While Russia has been relatively quiescent about this round of enlargement, it is not unreasonable to assume that this would not have been the case had the Baltic States been included. However, the US signed in January a 'Charter of Partnership' with each of the three Baltic States, which was widely interpreted as an endorsement of their chances of future NATO membership.

94. Referring to the post-neutral states of Austria, Finland and Sweden, our predecessor Committee pointed out that "it is a little observed peculiarity that those non-NATO nations from whom an application for membership would probably be most welcome show no enthusiasm for joining".[104] This is still broadly the case; although while there is ongoing debate in Austria about membership,[105] the leading party has decided that Austria will remain neutral for at least another five years.[106] Finland regards membership as "not currently on its agenda" but, like the other post-neutrals, is increasing political and military co-operation with NATO.[107] The position in Sweden, a nation firmly committed to strong defence, seems to be under review. The Republic of Ireland has not shown any interest in membership of NATO, though it has contributed to SFOR. However, we concur with the Secretary of State's view that NATO should not proselytise.[108] The accession of former neutrals would be a significant change in the security geometry of Europe.

95. Future contenders for NATO membership may include such countries as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the CIS nations of the Transcaucasus and even Russia. We were told by the Secretary of State for Defence that the world was changing so rapidly that nothing could be ruled out.[109] However, such changes, if they ever occurred, are so far in the future that little can be gained by discussing their possibility here.

96. The outlines above may lead the reader to believe that the choice of who to invite was an obvious one. This was not so; even couched in the most diplomatic of terms, the debate among NATO members as to who should be invited was "considerable".[110] In particular, the membership prospects of Slovenia were strongly advanced but rejected. Slovenia is regarded as nearly as prepared for membership as the three invitees[111]; in addition, without the membership of either Slovenia or Slovakia we have the curious situation in which Hungary has no common borders with the rest of NATO. While NATO's defence planners regard this as irrelevant, on the grounds that reinforcement by air would be affordable, we are concerned that fulfilling an Article 5 commitment to Hungary would of necessity involve crossing the land or airspace of a non-NATO country. However, the exclusion of Slovenia from this round of enlargement might be seen at least to provide credibility for a second round in the near future.

97. Romania was also considered to be among the leading contenders, despite only becoming a serious candidate for NATO membership after the election of its present government in November 1996. Since then it has improved relations with Hungary and Ukraine, put its military under civilian control and appointed a UK-trained officer as Chief of Staff. Great efforts are being made to maintain interest in continued modernisation and democratisation. It will continue to be a leading contender for the next round of accessions.

98. It may be that the decision to take three was taken on the grounds that it would be difficult for NATO to absorb four new members at once. This argument has not been seriously advanced by any of our witnesses; the Secretary of State for Defence acknowledged that taking on the three invitees was no small task in itself.[112] If this had been considered a problem, then two or even one country might have been invited. Not having been present during the decision making process, we can only surmise as to how the decision to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was taken. We acknowledge that frustration may be felt by those who considered their candidacies as strong. However, despite equal or nearly equal claims from a few other countries, we conclude that none of the three countries invited to accede to NATO was an inappropriate choice.

99. Aspirants to NATO membership are also applying for membership of the European Union and it should be noted that EU membership carries with it an implicit mutual security obligation, though not a guarantee. It is also the case that the EU had its genesis as a trading block where hostilities between trading partners would become unthinkable, and membership of the EU will therefore not only strengthen the economies of the CEE but also bring them within the provisions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, without the risk of antagonising Russia.

101  Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM), Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Back

102  Although questions have been raised over whether they would be able to provide enough international staff within NATO HQ. Back

103  In addition, the membership of Lithuania and Poland would effectively enclose the Russian oblast of Kaliningrad inside NATO. Back

104  Tenth Report Session 1994-95, HC 747, para 67 Back

105  Q 441 Back

106  Austria says no to NATO invitation, Daily Telegraph, 3.3.1998 Back

107  What comes after Madrid? A View from Helsinki, NATO Review, No. 5, Sep-Oct 1997 Back

108  Q 441 Back

109  Q 439 Back

110  Q 727 Back

111  The UK supported Slovenia's entry at the NATO ministerial meeting in Sintra in May 1997 Back

112  Q 433 Back