House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Third Report

THE DEBATE ON ENLARGEMENT

19. Those within the Alliance who argue against any further NATO enlargement can be categorised into two broad camps.[22] Politicians and commentators who never approved of NATO feel that its purpose in the post-Cold War world is even more untenable, and wish to see it disbanded. Others, coming from an anti-NATO perspective recognise NATO's positive impact on security within the former Yugoslavia but are concerned at the prospect of antagonising Russia and the effect this might have on arms reduction: Russia has in the past threatened to withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe if enlargement goes ahead. The START II treaty to reduce nuclear arms has stalled in the Duma, and some are concerned that enlargement may impede its progress; the Russian Parliament contains many communist and anti-NATO politicians who may see START negotiations as a bargaining tool. These concerns about Russian reactions to enlargement are shared by others with pro-NATO views who oppose enlargement; one writer claims that enlargement violates the principle that one should treat former enemies magnanimously.[23]

20. The holders of these viewpoints hold an uneasy alliance with the so-called "Russophobes":[24] those who worry that enlargement will dilute NATO's effectiveness against what they perceive to be a continuing strong, though reduced, potential Russian threat. These are joined in the US by "isolationists" who are concerned about burden sharing and do not want the US to commit to greater spending in Europe.[25] Views against enlargement do not always appear to be internally consistent: one newspaper editorial encouraging the US Senate to throw out enlargement on the grounds that Russia would be antagonised later claims that enlargement is not necessary because "an increasingly democratic Russia poses no threat to its neighbors".[26]

21. On the other hand, those who are in favour of enlargement agree with the US Secretary of State that NATO enlargement would "make us safer by expanding the area of Europe where wars simply do not happen".[27] They refute earlier estimations of the potential cost of enlargement and believe that Russia's reactions to enlargement so far have been muted. They point out that, should enlargement appear to be delayed until Russian ratification of START II, "we likely would get neither".[28]

22. Within these very broad categories of those for and against enlargement there are, of course, many different views held. Sceptics who cite the problem of Russia as their main concern sometimes express the fear that enlargement will undermine reformers in that country who are trying to build a democratic, market-oriented society. They fear it will strengthen the hands of the nationalists already inclined to play on the sense of national indignity resulting from Russia's fall from superpower status. Some also doubt whether the current reluctant Russian acquiescence in enlargement would survive the departure of President Yeltsin.

23. Opponents also tend to emphasise the risks posed by political instability in Central and Eastern Europe. They suggest that NATO risks being drawn into conflicts amongst its own member states and hint that the main motive of the aspirant countries in seeking membership is for protection from their own neighbours. Fears have been expressed that the tangled web of bilateral defence agreements which heave been struck between countries in the region, including Russia, could result in NATO becoming involved in unforeseen ways.

24. Proponents of enlargement would seize on this point as evidence of the benefits of enlargement. They argue that it is precisely because allies cannot, by definition, go to war with each other that the stability of CEE will be enhanced by enlargement, thereby reducing the risk of NATO being drawn into wars. They contest that NATO could well become involved in any conflicts in CEE whether or not they involved Allies. Some opponents would counter that NATO is not the appropriate body through which to advance this essentially political aim-it was designed as a Cold War defence pact and is ill-suited to a conflict prevention role. Underlying this area of debate there is always an implicit or explicit acknowledgement of the different interpretations to be drawn from the fate of former Yugoslavia.

25. A further bone of contention has been the costs of enlargement. We discuss this debate in some detail below. The proponents and opponents of enlargement tend to seize on widely different analyses of the costs-ranging from $1.5 billion to $125 billion-to support their arguments. The debate on both the costs and the benefits of membership has dominated much of the argument in the US and elsewhere.

26. More radically, as we have commented before, the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have called into question the very existence of NATO. Many proponents of enlargement argue that to hold NATO to the Yalta borders would be to continue the Cold War long after it had ceased to be relevant: they are joined in an unconventional alliance with a more triumphalist tendency who urge the West to enlarge in order to reap the fruits of victory over the Soviet Union. Some opponents of enlargement tend to characterise it as a desperate attempt to renew an increasingly irrelevant alliance by giving it a new, but essentially bogus, purpose. They take seriously the slogan that NATO must either go 'out of area or out of business', and argue that the latter choice is more rational and less dangerous. Events in Bosnia and the Gulf are called in aid to support both sides of this argument.

27. Those who argue for a completely new configuration of our international alliances and for the downgrading or dismantling of NATO also tend to talk up the pace and potential of European integration. Some argue that it is EU membership which should be the primary means of supporting democracies and free markets, and that NATO membership is being used either as a sop to those countries which aspire to EU membership, or as a less politically and economically costly alternative. Occasionally, the provision of the Amsterdam Treaty for 'the progressive framing of a common defence policy ... which might lead to a common defence' is called in aid of this argument. In our evidence, however, Ministers gave a clear indication of a reluctance on the part of the UK government to countenance such arrangements as an alternative to NATO. This line of argument for greater European independence in defence tends to be supported by those elements in the US who see NATO as a system for Europe to get its security on the cheap from the US. Even some proponents within the US administration seem to lend credibility to this argument by portraying NATO enlargement as a kind of latter day Marshall Plan. This debate reflects many of the long-running arguments which have set transatlantic and European defence interests in opposition to each other.

28. Our predecessor committee gave a cautious welcome to the prospect of enlargement in its report published after the Brussels Summit,[29] concluding that any enlargement should be undertaken gradually and determined solely by the overall interests of security in Europe and beyond; and that NATO should remain manageable, decisive, coherent and all its members should be able to commit to Article 5 security guarantees.

29. Both sides of the argument, whatever their conclusions, tend to agree on one thing: that the time is overdue for a thorough reassessment of NATO's purpose and organisation. Should it continue at all? And if so, should it continue as the integrated defence organisation of the last 50 years, or as a looser and more traditional security pact? If it is to continue, are there any limits to its size? In this section we shall put this debate in the context of the present proposals.

The Security Context

30. It is a truism that the European security context has changed out of all recognition in the last ten years. NATO was configured to meet a threat that is widely regarded as no longer existing: "the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's fronts has effectively been removed".[30] But if NATO's main mission remains collective defence[31] how should this mission be best achieved in today's security climate? Or, as put by one expert[32], if Russia is no longer the question to which NATO is the answer, what is the question? And how does enlargement help answer the question?

31. NATO outlines one of its fundamental tasks as

The improved security environment has given NATO an opportunity to pursue its tasks politically in a way that would not previously have been possible. The establishment of PfP and the NACC opened up dialogue between NATO and non-NATO states; in this way NATO hoped to achieve stability and encourage emerging democracies. PfP can undoubtedly be said to have enhanced the security climate in Europe-we believe that increased dialogue can only reduce sources of potential conflict. Moreover, PfP contributes to security by facilitating transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes, and by ensuring steps are taken to effect the transition to democratic control of defence forces within Partner countries. Those Partners who have no aspiration to become members have closer links with NATO and have committed themselves to democratic principles. Those Partners who do aspire to membership have taken on greater responsibility within their Partnership Plans and have achieved greater interoperability. Notably, Hungary and Romania have resolved their border disputes, and Poland has made great progress in achieving democratic control of its military,[34] as have the Czech Republic and Hungary. We concur with the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who told us that "there is no doubt in my mind that the desire and ambition for NATO membership has conditioned the behaviour of a number of aspirant countries".[35]

32. But could these improvements have been made without offering full NATO membership to other European states? The aspirant nations emphasise different advantages to membership. The Polish Minister of State for National Defence described NATO as "a community of countries which in a spirit of solidarity wants not only to assist each other in case of ultimate need...but also to build their own common future".[36] The Czech government is explicit that "the new democratic states cannot feel totally secure without having security guarantees"[37]-PfP offers only "consultation" should a Partner feel threatened. Estonia, in contrast, stressed that "it is not fear that makes us seek NATO membership",[38] but rather a desire to be fully integrated into European institutions.

33. We conclude that the incentive to improve the structure and control of the military, to enhance democracy and to resolve border disputes and internal problems with ethnic minorities, which we have seen clearly exists within aspirant countries, would not have been as strong without the possibility of full membership. In this respect we agree with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs "the enlargement process, even before enlargement takes place, has had a positive impact upon the whole of Europe".[39]

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

34. There is no doubt that within Russia there are concerns about the effects of both the present round of enlargement and its implications for the future borders of NATO. In public, however, the attitude of current Russian leaders has varied from threatening the restructuring of its own forces and violation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in the early 1990s to, more recently, advising political leaders in aspirant countries that membership was their own concern. Many opponents of NATO enlargement cite as their main concern the risk of provoking Russia. We certainly recognise that the potential improvements to the security environment outlined above could be put at risk if enlargement caused Russia to adopt a posture which could bring about a resurgence of Cold War antagonism.

35. NATO has pursued several initiatives to assuage Russian fears about the current round of enlargement. Russia is a signatory to PfP as well as, in May 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which includes commitments to: respecting other states' sovereignty, independence and inherent right to choose the means to ensure their security; the peaceful settlement of disputes; the strengthening of the OSCE; the setting up of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; and mechanisms to foster closer military-to-military co-operation between NATO and Russia. The Permanent Joint Council gives Russia status "above and beyond that available to any other Partner".[40] On a more immediate level, the NATO-Russia relationship has also been enhanced by their joint peace-keeping work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We were told during our visit to Brussels that NATO attaches the highest priority to its relationship with Russia; but that more could be done to inform debate in Russia about NATO's aims.

36. Other, non-NATO driven, initiatives are being taken to increase Russia's confidence on the world stage. In 1997 Russia was offered a closer relationship with the G7 economic forum of the world's richest nations. The US has also embarked upon bilateral negotiations on a new nuclear arms control treaty, START III. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)[41] is currently being adapted to Europe's new security environment; the new treaty is scheduled for completion some time in the coming year. The revision offers the possibility of conciliating Russia to the prospect of enlargement,[42] by, as the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs put it, "build[ing] a framework that is non-threatening" in order to offer security assurances to Russia.[43]

37. If anyone should be worried by a resurgent Russian expansionism, it is the countries that border it. However, those aspirant countries appear less worried about Russia's attitude than most Western opponents of enlargement. The Polish Minister for National Defence told us that, while Russian politicians chose to contest enlargement, the Russian population is "absolutely indifferent".[44] He pointed out that there had been no reaction from Russia after either the Brussels or the Madrid Summit, implying that opposition to this wave of enlargement at least was mainly posturing. Russian relations with potential members have not soured as a result of the invitation: the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out that Hungarian-Russian bilateral economic relations had been reactivated since Madrid.[45] The Secretary of State for Defence stressed the advantages to Russia of enlargement if it increased the stability of central Europe.[46] It could be argued that this public display of indifference to the Russian threat is a diplomatic front to advance the chances of accession to NATO. We have seen no evidence to support this interpretation of the facts.

38. The populations of the aspirant countries are also broadly in favour of joining NATO, implying that they do not regard the risk of antagonising Russia as a large one. Polls in the Czech Republic in October 1997 showed support for membership ranging from 35-59%, and "observers expect public opinion to embrace NATO membership more firmly as the debate in the country progresses".[47] Surveys in 1996 found that 80% of Poles would vote for Polish membership of NATO in a referendum. In November 1997, Hungary held a referendum, the question being: "Do you agree that the Republic of Hungary should provide for the protection of the country by joining NATO?". With a turnout of just over 49%, the result was 85.33% in favour of Hungary joining NATO.[48]

39. Russia's concerns-that any enlargement of NATO will reduce its sphere of influence, and that a potential aggressor will encroach on its borders-are understandable but, we believe, misdirected. As a defensive alliance, NATO offers no threat to Russian security; indeed as its existence increases the security of the whole of Europe, so it increases Russia's. Moreover, NATO has announced that it has "no intention, no plan and no reason"[49] to situate nuclear weapons in the territory of its three new members, nor to forward site large permanent conventional forces.[50] Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's influence over neighbouring countries has changed in emphasis. It is no longer the premier country in a military alliance. But it still has great influence in CEE-as the Polish Minister for National Defence pointed out, Russia is Poland's second largest commercial partner, and up to six million Russians visit Poland each year.[51]

40. We understand that Russia's main concern is that a precedent is being set for future enlargement which might approach Russia's borders. In particular, the Baltic states might be seen as strong candidates for NATO membership were it not for Russia's anticipated reaction to their inclusion. The Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs told us that "the enlargement of NATO will certainly not play into the hands of the hardliners in Russia, just the contrary, because stability...next door to Russia will certainly contribute to the further democratisation of the country and will provide the best security environment for further reforms".[52] It is important that NATO continues to stress this point.

41. Given traditional Russian fears about encirclement, we do not dismiss the concerns expressed about the potential of enlargement to antagonise Russia. However, we conclude that the evidence probably points to a tacit acquiescence by the current Russian leadership in the present round of enlargement, which might well have been opposed much more vigorously than it has been. Developments in Russian policy since the Madrid summit have been encouraging, particularly with regard to relations with Chechnya and the Baltic states. There are also signs that reformists may have gained from these developments. Moreover, the Founding Act, we believe, represents an historic advance in the rapproachement between the old, Cold War adversaries. NATO, whether enlarged or not, presents no offensive, first strike threat to Russia, nor is there any evidence that any large section of the Russian population believe it to do so. Work done by individual NATO members to strengthen bilateral relations with Russia, including the UK's initiatives to enhance military and economic reform and democratisation, is essential and must continue.

42. While we should be sensitive to Russian anxieties, we cannot accept that Russia should have a veto over Alliance decisions. Nevertheless, we recognise the importance of continued consultation with Russia and gaining Russian confidence during the necessarily delicate process of enlargement. In the final analysis, the central question that must be addressed in deciding on enlargement is whether it will provide greater security for the Alliance, and for Europe as a whole.

Military Effectiveness

43. A fundamental question posed by critics of enlargement is whether NATO will retain its military effectiveness after its increase from 16 to 19 or more members. In the jigsaw of security organisations to which the UK contributes, NATO has a pre-eminent and unique status. The integrated military structure of NATO was designed and has been maintained as a potential fighting force in a state of permanent readiness. Its effectiveness has been recently demonstrated in Bosnia, and indeed in the Gulf War, although it was not formally a participant. It is this feature of NATO that makes it unique and uniquely valuable as a guarantor of security. There are those who argue that the enlargement of NATO's borders by a third, coupled with the absorption of relatively under-capitalised and under-trained armed forces can only, and inevitably, dilute the overall military effectiveness of the Alliance. They argue that the additional forces are not yet proportionate to the additional challenges for which the Alliance is taking responsibility. However, some NATO officials have noted that fulfilling Article 5 commitments towards longstanding allies like Turkey might present far more difficult problems for NATO than discharging the same commitments to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.[53]

44. We recognise the force of this argument against enlargement, while noting that it is not supported by the evidence of previous enlargements. Nonetheless, as we have previously demonstrated, to compare this enlargement with others is not to compare like with like. This round of enlargement may be viewed as being based far more on political considerations than on purely defence-related calculations, and it should be judged accordingly.

45. Considerations of military effectiveness cannot, however, be dismissed. The Secretary of State for Defence told us that "not only is [NATO's] military effectiveness going to be maintained, but I think it will be enhanced [by enlargement]".[54] We find the evidence on this point more equivocal. Although there is no suggestion that the addition of new members will actually reduce NATO's military power, we believe that NATO's military effectiveness can only, in the short term at least, be somewhat diluted by the addition of the three new countries. While the invitees have large amounts of troops and equipment-Poland has 222,000 troops and 1,700 tanks, Hungary 60,000 troops[55] and the Czech Republic 65,000[56]-there are some questions over their levels of training and maintenance. All three countries are hampered to an extent by the structure of their armed forces, which are not easily interoperable with NATO's, but great efforts are being made to counter this.

46. All three invitees have pledged to increase their spending on defence, based on optimistic, but not necessarily unrealistic, projections of future economic growth. Poland's defence spending is around 2.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) and should increase to 3% of GDP.[57] Hungary's defence spending was 1.8% of GDP in 1997, and it is intended that this will increase by 0.1% of GDP in each of the next five years. The Czech Republic has pledged to increase defence budgets annually by 0.1% of GDP, the aim being to have defence spending at 2% of GDP by 2000.[58]

47. The Czech Republic has a mechanised infantry battalion serving with SFOR, and has prioritised C³I (command, control, communication and intelligence) development. Hungary's priorities have been building a peacekeeping capability and creating a brigade which will be capable of interoperability with NATO. Efforts have also gone into restructuring the armed forces and language training. Hungary's contributions to SFOR consist of an engineering brigade and a transit base for US troops at Taszar. The Polish Minister for National Defence was keen to reassure us that "Poland will not be a net consumer of security but...will contribute to the common security".[59] Poland has served with NATO troops in SFOR and achieved a basic level of interoperability, and has set out 'Plan 2012', in consultation with NATO,[60] which looks at the development of its armed forces over the next fifteen years. Force reductions will be implemented, but the smaller remaining forces should be better supported and more highly trained so as to be fully interoperable with NATO. In the meantime, Poland hopes to put two brigades at NATO's disposal. Poland has particularly focussed on achieving air defence and communications interoperability, and on strengthening host nation support facilities. English-language training for officers has been provided, but the ability of those trained to communicate at high enough levels has been questioned by NATO sources. As we heard in the evidence relating to our Second Report of this session, there is a developing programme of joint exercises between the new members and the NATO states, including the UK.[61]

48. The Secretary of State for Defence told us that he was "confident that [new members] can all be brought up to the appropriate level [of military effectiveness] in a manageable time".[62] That statement leaves open what an appropriate level or a manageable timescale might be. There can be no doubt that the military standards of the invitees are lower than those of most current NATO members; but improvements are being made at a rapid pace. More can be done; for example, as the current NATO 16 modernise their forces, they could pass their old equipment to the new alliance members, just as the wealthier allies cascaded surplus equipment to Greece and Turkey as part of the reduction process associated with the CFE Treaty. Also, NATO's command structure is being extensively revised.[63]

49. This Committee would be unable to endorse the Panglossian view that enlargement will have no negative impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of NATO's military structure. The integration of the new members both at command level and on the ground will present formidable challenges. None of them are fully prepared for immediate integration. Should NATO need to fulfil an Article 5 commitment to one of the new members in the next few years, it would involve a disproportionate contribution from the current members.

50. Prediction of the point at which the new members will become net contributors to enhancement of NATO's defence capability is a question subject to so many unpredictable variables as to be incapable of any very definite answer. However, the organisation has never been a partnership of equals. The larger contributors have always recognised political advantage in broadening the base of the Alliance (for example by including Iceland, a nation with a zero defence budget but of great geostrategic importance) and should continue to do so. To freeze membership at sixteen would have no more political logic than to have done so at any other figure plucked from the air.

51. The UK's pursuit of national security has largely been achieved over the last 50 years through the medium of NATO. It is impossible to make a clear division between foreign affairs and defence, the two instruments of policy which have been used to attain the goal of security; the Alliance has been a very effective mechanism through which they may act in concert. As the Secretary of State for Defence remarked, NATO is not just a self-defence club.[64] Nor, however, is it just a political organisation. These two roles will always be in tension, and the relative priority accorded to each must inevitably be adjusted to international, and to an extent domestic, circumstances. The international circumstances have changed beyond all recognition in the last decade.

52. In deciding whether to endorse ratification of the accession protocols of the proposed new members, Parliament must weigh the potential political advantages of enlargement against any potential short-term costs in terms of military effectiveness. For our part, we are clear that the benefits of increased stability in central and eastern Europe outweigh any potential military costs.

22 British Views on NATO Enlargement, Jane M. O. Sharp, in NATO Enlargement: The National Debates over Ratification, Center for Strategic and International Studies Back

23 History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement, John Lewis Gaddis, in Survival, Spring 1998 Back

24 The Case Against NATO Enlargement: Clinton's Fateful Gamble, Sherle R. Schwenninger, available on the Internet at www.robusteast.net/Net/nation02.html Back

25 The argument that the US pays more than its fair share is not necessarily supported by the facts: the Secretary of State for Defence told us that Europe contributes 73% of NATO's budgets and has given aid to the CEE countries amounting to five times the US's contributions. Contributions to NATO's common budgets are determined by each country's ability to pay, but since NATO's inception the US contribution has been constrained below its strict share of NATO-wide GNP. On the basis of proportional shares of NATO GNP, the US's capacity to pay is approximately double its current contribution. The corollary to this is that all other Allies together must pay more than their proportionate share. The UK, for example, pays 18.8% of NATO's civil budget, compared to 23.4% from the US, which has a GDP more than six times as large. Back

26 Don't Enlarge NATO, International Herald Tribune, 2.3.1998 Back

27 In evidence to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations , 7.10.1997 Back

28 Questions and Answers on NATO Enlargement, US Department of Defense Back

29 Tenth Report Session 1994-95, HC 747 Back

30 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, available on the Internet at www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911107a.htm Back

31 Q 428 Back

32 Mr Ronald D Asmus, in conversation with the Committee Back

33 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept Back