Select Committee on Defence Third Report


THE ROAD TO ENLARGEMENT

5. The North Atlantic Alliance was established by the Washington Treaty[7] in April 1949 during the first years of the Cold War. It was founded to counter the power and influence of the Soviet Union. In the eyes of its founders it also had the purpose of preventing any resurgence of German power, but within six years the Federal Republic of Germany had in fact joined the Alliance. The events which triggered the formation of the Alliance included the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948 and the imposition by Stalin of Communist governments in those central European countries which now want to join the Alliance. Ernest Bevin, the UK's Foreign Secretary, was one of the leading players in the drive for a transatlantic alliance. The 12 founding members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. NATO, the organisation which serves the Alliance, became permanent in 1952.

6. The Washington Treaty created an Alliance with as its primary purpose the preservation of peace and its member states' security through political solidarity, mutual guarantees and stable relations with non-Alliance countries. NATO's collective security guarantee is outlined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states:

    The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

7. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty allows for the accession of other states to NATO. It states:

    The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Other European states joined the twelve founding members at irregular intervals after 1949-Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.

8. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation finally collapsed along with the Soviet Union in 1991. Following this cataclysm the former non-Soviet WTO allies, including the three Baltic states, expressed a desire to join western institutions, especially NATO and the European Union. Concurrently, however, many politicians, academics, pressure groups and members of the public were questioning the need to maintain NATO in this radically transfigured Europe. For a period the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)[8] was promoted from some quarters as a potential replacement for NATO as the primary organisation for the management of European security.

9. Such radical views did not find support within NATO governments, who were not in favour of disbanding the Alliance. However, at the end of the Cold War they recognised the need for a new strategic concept and a more conciliatory approach to Russia and the former WTO countries. The London Declaration issued from the NATO Summit in July 1990 stated that NATO ministers no longer considered the then member states of the WTO as adversaries. They were not prepared at that stage to allow NATO to be enlarged. The former WTO countries did not yet have solid democracies or free market economies, and there were fears that any enlargement would antagonise Russia.

10. The Alliance's formal public response to the end of the Cold War came when NATO's new missions were set out in the 1991 Strategic Concept. The document reaffirmed many of the Alliance's core functions, and stated that the Alliance's future security policy would be based on three elements: dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. At the same time NATO's forces were to be reduced but to become more flexible and there was to be reduced reliance on nuclear forces. The 1991 Strategic Concept is now out-of-date; an updated Strategic Concept is currently being prepared and is expected to be presented at the April 1999 ministerial meeting.

11. In 1991, several central European states sought to join NATO, but none of the 16 NATO governments indicated that they were yet ready to open up the Alliance to new members. However, in December 1991 NATO invited all the former WTO states and all the former Soviet republics to join a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Its declared purpose was to help establish relations between NATO and these countries; its aim was to offer co-operation and dialogue in areas such as training for peacekeeping, security aspects of economic developments and regional security issues, and so to project security eastward without offering collective security guarantees. The NACC's final meeting was held in May 1997, followed by the inaugural meeting of its replacement, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

12. During 1991 and 1992 the three central European states in the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia)[9] expressed growing dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in the NACC. They appeared to resent being placed in the same category as the former Soviet republics and continued to seek full membership of the Alliance. The desire of these and other states to become full Allies had many drivers, including the memory of Soviet domination, the fear of instability within Russia, and the recognition that membership of NATO also provides mechanisms to resolve problems within the Alliance and thus would provide a means of settling problems with their neighbours.

The 1994 Brussels Summit

13. The Summit held at Brussels in January 1994 can be seen to have marked a turning point in NATO's development. The voices questioning NATO's continued existence had become more muted since the late 1980s-NATO's crisis management operations in the former Yugoslavia were perceived to have given the Alliance a new raison d'être; and the war in Chechnya added credence to fears in some quarters that Russia might still pose a threat to European stability and security. As outlined in our predecessor Committee's report,[10] the main challenge to which the Summit sought to respond was the security vacuum in central and eastern Europe (CEE)[11] created by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. The reform process in NATO, including the creation of the NACC and existence of the CSCE (now the OSCE) had not done enough to assuage the fears of CEE states about Russia's assertiveness towards its neighbours. The Summit, at which the Allies reaffirmed NATO's core functions and supported the development of a European Security and Defence Identity, led to two main initiatives-Partnership for Peace and the commitment that the Alliance would eventually accept new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

Partnership for Peace

14. The purpose of Partnership for Peace (PfP) was officially stated as "to expand and intensify political and military co-operation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical co-operation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance".[12] PfP was opened to all European states who were not members of NATO. It aims to offer participation in co-operation and strengthened relations with NATO to those who accept certain principles, including democracy; democratic control of the armed forces; adherence to the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights; acceptance of existing borders; and commitment to dispute resolution by peaceful means. Since PfP offers bilateral agreements between NATO and each Partner, different levels of co-operation can be chosen for each individual partnership programme. While PfP is not intended to provide security guarantees, NATO has undertaken to "consult" with any Partner country which considered itself threatened[13]. Twenty-seven countries have signed PfP agreements to date;[14] some obviously regarded their participation as a precursor to full membership (at the time, as our predecessor Committee noted "for those desirous of joining NATO there is nothing else on offer"[15]), others, as a convenient means of establishing a relationship with NATO.

15. At the time, there were those who argued that PfP provided an adequate alternative to full membership of NATO. We certainly recognise the success of the PfP programme, which has also enabled prospective members to demonstrate their NATO-worthiness. However, we also recognise that most of the CEE states were not prepared to accept indefinitely this 'associate status'. Although certain of the CEE states were concerned that PfP was a mechanism to postpone consideration of the enlargement of NATO, the concluding declaration of the Brussels Summit went some way to put this fear to rest:

    We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our east, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

Therefore, we must concur with our predecessor Committee which commented, "the vital question has since January 1994 been, not whether there will be an extension of NATO, but its pace and manner".[16]

The Run-up to the Madrid Summit

16. NATO Foreign Ministers initiated a Study on NATO Enlargement[17] in December 1994, published in September 1995. Although the study addressed the 'why and how' of enlargement, it did not address the problems of 'who and when'. It described the end of the Cold War as giving rise to "a unique opportunity to build an improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro­Atlantic area", and concluded that NATO could be strengthened, and its aim of enhancing security in the whole of this area furthered, by enlargement. It also argued that enlargement under the terms of Article 10 would offer benefits to the whole of this area in the forms of increased democracy, security and co-operation. In December 1995, NATO Foreign Ministers decided, on the basis of the study, that the next phase of enlargement would consist of individual dialogue with interested Partners; further consideration of what NATO needed to do internally to ensure that enlargement preserved the effectiveness of the Alliance; and further enhancement of the Partnership for Peace Programme to help those interested Partners to prepare to assume the responsibilities of membership.

17. Between the study's publication and the Madrid Summit in July 1997, bilateral dialogue between NATO and twelve partner countries interested in accession took place, and all twelve[18] stated their wish to join NATO at the earliest opportunity. Originally, the four Visegrad states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia were considered to be the strongest candidates, but developments in their governments increased the credibility of the applications of Romania and Slovenia, while Slovakia fell behind. In 1997 each of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia appeared to fulfil the apparent pre-conditions for membership, which included a working democracy and market economy[19]; additionally, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were among the countries which had contributed forces to IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and were recognised as the strongest candidates for membership.

The 1997 Madrid Summit

18. At the Madrid Summit in September 1997, amongst other decisions taken, it was agreed to:[20]

  • invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession negotiations with the Alliance;

  • direct the Council in Permanent Session to bring to an early conclusion the analysis of the resource implications of the forthcoming enlargement;

  • commit NATO to an 'open door' policy regarding further accessions, and to continue intensive dialogue with aspirant members;[21]

  • enhance Partnership for Peace by strengthening political consultation and increasing the role that Partners play in decision-making;

  • examine the Strategic Concept, which had been adopted in 1991, to ensure that it was fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges.



7  Also known as the North Atlantic Treaty Back

8  Since December 1994, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Back

9  Since the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Visegrad group has consisted of four states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Back

10  Tenth Report Session 1994-95, HC 747 Back

11  In this report we use the commonly accepted designation of Central and Eastern Europe to indicate broadly the area encompassing Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro and (sometimes) Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine. Back

12  NATO fact sheet: Partnership for Peace Back

13  This was recently invoked by Albania, leading to an emergency North Atlantic Council meeting on 11.3.98 to discuss the security situation in Kosovo. Back

14  Signatories to PfP at 17.12.96 were: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, FYROM, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.  Back

15  Tenth Report Session 1994-95, HC 747, para 26 Back

16  Ibid, para 47 Back

17  The Study on NATO Enlargement, available on the Internet at www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl­9502.htm Back

18  Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM), Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia Back

19  See also para 90 Back

20  Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, and NATO Review, Volume 45 Back

21  The Madrid Declaration drew attention to "the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia".  Back


 
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