House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Eighth Report

Memorandum and Supplementary Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Officeon Arms Control

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

The MTCR is a non-treaty arrangement of 29 states which seeks to prevent the proliferation of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, through export controls on complete missiles, as well as the materials, components and technology used in missile systems. The controls are focused on missiles with a range of over 300km. The MTCR Guidelines and Annex form the basis of case by case decisions on exports by the member states. In the absence of any international treaty norms for missile proliferation, the MTCR also acts to co-ordinate broader measures to tackle missile proliferation.

WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

States participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement exercise export controls over agreed lists of equipment and exchange information on transfers of this equipment to non-anticipating states. They also agree to co-operate to prevent the acquisition of arms and sensitive dual-use items for military end-use if the situation in a state is, or becomes, a cause for concern. The United Kingdom is at the forefront of efforts to develop the Arrangement. For example, we are working to increase the range of military equipment on which information is exchanged. We have played a leading role in the elaboration of criteria to determine what may make a particular transfer destabilising. We have volunteered to provide information on certain denials of licences for military equipment, the first country to do so. We hare also promoting exchanges of more general information, such as on end-users of concern.

UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

In 1991, the UN General Assembly voted to establish a universal and non-discriminatory Register of conventional arms transfers. This followed directly from the United Kingdom's initiative at the European Council in April of that year. In 1992, the Register came into effect, with the aim of introducing greater transparency in international arms transfers, building confidence and helping to identify excessive arms build-ups in any one country or region.

Under the Register, states are asked to record imports and exports in seven categories of major offensive conventional weapons which ave been assessed as being potentially most destabilising (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missile systems). Some 90 countries have so far participated in the scheme, including all major exporting countries.

The United Kingdom is committed to strengthening the Register in three ways: by encouraging more countries to submit returns; by extending the range of weaponry on which transfer information is requested; and by exploring the scope for states to submit additional information, such as on national holdings. The United Kingdom already provides additional information on procurement from national production and national military holdings in the seven Register categories. This year, for the first time, this information included details of the types of equipment.

In 1997 the United Kingdom was represented on a UN Panel of Government Experts which reviewed the operation and development of the Register. We were disappointed by the Panel's failure to reach agreement on the extension of the Register. But we decided to endorse its consensus report, which agreed to keep the operation of the Register under review, as a basis on which to build.

EU CODE OF CONDUCT

The Foreign Secretary's announcement on 28 July 1997 of the new arms export licensing criteria included an undertaking to work for an EU Code of Conduct to ensure that the United Kingdom's policy of seeking to prevent certain regimes from supplying certain equipment was not undermined by competitors seeking to supply them. We began discussions with France, the other major arms exporter in the EU, in September 1997 and in January 1998 circulated an agreed Anglo-French text to EU partners. After several rounds of discussion at official level, the text of the Code was agreed at the 25-26 May General Affairs Council (GAC) and formally adopted at the 8-9 June GAC.

The two key elements of the Code are:

— an elaboration of eight Common Criteria for arms exports agreed by the EU in 1991 and 1992, drawing on the United Kingdom's national criteria;

— a consultation mechanism. Member States will circulate to other partners information about denials of export licences. Partners are required to consult the denying Member State of States before coming to a decision on whether to issue an export licence for essentially the same goods to the same client. If they decide to "undercut" the denial, they will have to notify this decision to the denying Member State(s).

The Code also contains provisions for Member States to circulate annual reports on their arms exports and implementation of the Code, though these will be confidential, and for an annual review of and report on the Code's operation.

We regard the detailed elaboration of the eight Common Criteria as a major step forward. In addition, the consultation mechanism breaks important new ground in the regulation of the arms trade. Never before has a group of states agreed to apply such a mechanism to their conventional arms exports.

SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION/ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

The United Kingdom is concerned about the ready availability of small arms in certain regions of the world. Export licence applications for small arms are considered carefully under our national criteria for arms exports, with particular attention given to the likelihood of use for internal repression or intentional aggression and the risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user. HMG recognises and takes into account in its decision-making process the potentially destabilising effect of a cumulative flow of transfers of small arms. Through the recently agreed EU Code of Conduct we have sought to promote the responsible management of exports of all conventional weapons, including small arms.

It is estimated that over 50 per cent of small arms are transferred illicitly. The EU has adopted an EU programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. HMG hosted a seminar in February which addressed the problems of illicit arms trafficking within the EU. The seminar highlighted the need for further co-operation in this area between EU law enforcement agencies, possibly through a Joint Action.

Outside the EU, the United Kingdom sponsored a Saferworld/Institute for Security Studies seminar in South Africa in May which overlooked at "Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa". A number of practical ideas for co-operation within the Southern African region emerged as well as ways in which the EU might help. The United Kingdom has proposed to partners that small arms proliferation be considered at the EU/SADC Ministerial in Vienna in October 1998. In addition, we have welcomed the development of the Mali initiative of a proposed light weapons moratorium in West Africa. DFID has recently pledged $500,000 to support the implementation of the moratorium once it has been declared. DFID have also helped finance a seminar in Libreville to help train trainers in practical disarmament techniques.

We have endorsed the report and recommendations of the UN Panel of Experts on Small Arms. To this end, we are pleased that we were invited to participate on the follow-up group to the UN Small Arms Panel, which met for its first session between 26-29 May in New York.

The G8 has discussed the development of an international treaty on illicit firearms trafficking. At the G8 Summit in Birmingham, Heads endorsed a statement of principles and an action plan, based on the OAS Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other related materials. Foreign and Finance Ministers also concluded that the G8 would discuss the wider issue of small arms proliferation.

At the meeting, there were a number of points about which I promised to write with more detail. Three of these are set out below. Colleagues from the MOD are writing to you separately about the fourth question, on anti-personnel landmines.

CFE 1A

The Committee asked about the status of reserves and paramilitary forces, such as Gendarmes, under the CFE 1A agreement. The position is as follows:

(i) Reserves are covered by the agreement if they have completed their initial service/training and are called up for full-time service or training for a period of more than 90 days (Section I, Article 1H).

(ii) The provisions defining forces to be subject to limitation refer to "full-time military personnel". There is a specific exclusion (Section I, Article 2A) for "personnel serving with organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions", which would cover gendarmeries and most other Interior Ministry-type paramilitaries. There is also a provision (Section I, Article 3) allowing questions over specific formations to be raised in the Joint Consultative Group set up under the Treaty, which may then determine whether they should be subject to the agreement's limitations.

I enclose a copy of Section I of CFE 1A[10], which defines forces to be subject to limitations, including the provisions summarised above.