With the apparent ending of the Cold War the UK exists within a very different strategic environment. "The Strategic Defence Review" writes of new risks:

"Instability inside Europe as in Bosnia, and now Kosovo, threatens our security. Instability elsewhere for example in Africa—may not always appear to threaten us directly. But it can do indirectly, and we cannot stand aside when it leads to massive human suffering".[49]

  Western strategies have identified a new enemy of the West: "Political Islam". But among those strategists knowledge of Islam is minimal. What is the Challenge? How powerful is it? Do Western policies help or hurt? How those questions are answered will determine to a significant degree the international agenda for the rest of this decade. This paper will briefly examine:

(1)  Political significance of Islamic movements;

(2)  Relationship between democracy and Islamic movements;

(3)  Reasons of popularity for Islamic Movements;

(4)  Methodology of Islamic Movements;

(5)  Strategies to deal with Islamic resurgence.

INTRODUCTION

  In recent years "Islamic fundamentalism" has had a bigger impact on the West. This is partly because many of the countries experiencing the impact, are situated in the strategically important Middle East and partly because several of these states are rich in oil, a commodity upon which Western economies are heavily dependent. Popular belief in the West usually associates "Islamic fundamentalism" with the Iranian revolution of 1979, and sees it as a movement of fanatics committed to harm Western interests.

  "Fundamentalism" is the term used for the effort to define the fundamentals of religious systems and adhere to them. One of the major elements of Islamic fundamentalism is to protect the purity of Islamic concepts for the adulteration of speculative exercises. Behind all this is a drive to purify Islam in order to release all its vital force. In medieval times this drive for purification meant ridding Islam of superstition or scholastic legalism. This implied that the fundamentalist response was purely internal. Today, the response is both internal and external, with the objective to release Islam from its scholastic cobwebs as well as to rid it of ideas gained from the West.

  Islamic extremism will increasingly be seen as threatening the stability of traditionally pro-Western regimes and Islamic movements are representing a major challenge to the West and the Muslim World. The relations between Europe and Northern Africa in the field of security are now full of misunderstandings, and are characterised by distorted images of Political Islam, which are often confused, by the threat or reality of terrorism.

  Therefore, a growing concern has been felt in the Western world about Islamic extremism. This is reflected by many statements of Western officials. The United States former Secretary of Defence, William Perry stated in 1995 that the spread of "Islamic Fundamentalism" in the Middle East was threatening Western interests. Many reasons were given for this. Firstly, fundamentalism is damaging the stability of countries with whom the Western world had warm relations; secondly there is the possibility of terrorist attacks of on Western interests and culture both in the European Community and elsewhere; thirdly there is the major issue of weapons of mass destruction and the possession of these by countries which may not be perceived as "democratic". In light of these factors the Defence Secretary supported the view that efforts were needed to contain this new Islamic terrorism.[50]

  The existence of Islam as a world-wide religion and a ideological force embracing one-fifth of the worlds population, spreading to parts of the world with strategically, economic and political powers, will continue to raise the fear of an "Islamic threat". Muslims control much of the oil and gas reserves of the world; Muslims live in the West in large numbers as permanent citizens. The challenge to Western-backed Israel from Islamic organisations like "Hamas", there resurgence of Islam in countries that matter strategically to the West like Turkey, Egypt and Algeria, and the nuclear ambitions of several Muslim countries make Islam important.

  Western images of Islamic movements are characterised by the terrible images of terrorism. Such as; the recent attacks on embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam for which Osama bin Laden has been blamed. After the US attacked sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, in retaliation to the embassy bombings, President Clinton laid out the case behind the bombings; "We have convincing evidence that these groups played the key role in the embassy bombings".[51]

  Aggression is often made out to be a characteristic of Islam and its followers. Islam as a whole is perceived as the aggressor against the West. It embodies a theology of conquest and victory, but not a theology of defeat. This fear is further increased in light of the fact, that many Muslim countries now have access to Weapons of Mass destruction, which are referred to as the "Islamic Bomb".

  In this atmosphere of suspicion, even scholarly exercises providing global explanations of our times—Professor Samuel Huntington's essay "The Clash of Civilisations", Francis Fukuyama's "The end of History and the Last Man", as seen as part of the conspiracy against Islam. Huntington's Essay "The Clash of Civilisations" was influential because it struck a responsive chord in the West. The key issue in his article is that in the post-Cold War era, cultures or civilisations consisting of groups of countries will replace the nation states as the primary units of international relations and as the main source of tensions and conflicts. The reason is that various cultures hold various values and views which would put them on a collision course with one another. He therefore, claims that Western value systems and Western Interests are threatened not by internal factors but by external ones, namely by other non-Western cultures which possess different value systems. Although he cited eight civilisations as a potential threat to Euro-American culture, his emphasis is on Islam as a chief enemy to the West. Huntington, predicts that there would be an inevitable clash or confrontation between the Muslim World and the West because Islam does not conform to the West's Cherished beliefs and values.[52]

  The current wave of "Islamic threat" writings in the West is seen as a further sign of its deep-rooted hostility. Many Islamist publications follow these writings with interest and print sections which are judged to demonise Islam by equating it with extremism, violence and terrorism. For example, then NATO secretary-General Will Claes reportedly claims in 1995 that Islamic movements were the inheritors of Communism in terms of the threat they posed to Western Interests. Claes apparently held the view that NATO should open dialogue with North African states to combat "Islamic fundamentalism".[53]

  The rise of political Islam as a force in global politics has led to numerous depiction's of it as a threat to the continued dominance of Western liberal democratic norms in shaping the political, economic, social and cultural life in many regions of the world. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR has given added salience to such assessments and led to claims that the spread of "Political Islam" marks the onset of a new Cold War where the West's liberal democratic norms are pitted against the religious revivalist norms of Political Islam. As Leon Hadar states: "The Fear of Islam could embroil Washington in a second Cold war".[54]

  Such claims have led to intense debate over the varying methodologies and assumptions used by many academics in making such statements. However, the challenge today is to analyse the contingent nature of the factors behind political Islam. As John Esposito comments:

"The challenge today is to appreciate the diversity of Islamic actors and movements to ascertain the reasons behind confrontations and conflicts, and thus to react to specific events and situations with informed, reasoned responses rather than predetermined presumptions and reactions".[55]

  Much has been written in the West about the possible threat Islamic Movements pose to Western interests. Some of these movements have been associated with acts of violence: attacking buildings in New York; bombing Western embassies, taking hostages and assassinating leaders friendly to the West, such as Sadat. Associating Political Islam with all this violence has led analysts to ask where the roots of this apparent rage lie; why movements adopt extremist methods and what strategies should states develop to stem militancy.

ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS THE KEY PLAYERS

  Islamic movements have been the key players behind the dynamic spread of the Islamic resurgence. They also have been the focal point or embodiment of the Islamic threat in the eyes of Western Governments as well as many governments in the Muslim world. The violence, and terrorism, associated with these groups is reflected by their names like the "Party of God", "Holy War", "Army of God" and "Party of Liberation" which all create images of religious fanatics with a thirst for vengeance and violence who will stop at little. Islamic movements play a crucial role in the politics of the Muslim world, and influence Western foreign policy, therefore, it is important to understand their nature, goals, and activities, when assessing whether Political Islam is a source of concern?

DEMOCRACY AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

  Islam is a major force within the spectrum of political advancement in the Muslim world today. However, in recent years a debate has emerged over the role played by Islamic organisations and the extent to which Islam is compatible with pluralist democracy. One strand of Islamic thought associates democracy with secularism, with the consequence that democracy becomes a deliberate violation of divine law. Democracy in this respect, is seen as a foolish, absurd notion in that there can only be one essential relationship: "that between God and man" Islam it is argued has a totality of view, exclusive of other beliefs, which militates against full participation in multi-party politics. Other Islamic thinkers suggest on the contrary, that in traditional Islamic discourse, tolerance, justice, fair play and universal brotherhood, were prominent features.

ELECTIONS AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

  An interesting point about Islamic movements is that they contest elections, perform political functions and more, recently have produced political programmes committed to freedom and pluralism. The Muslim Brotherhood has contested elections since 1941. On the other hand King Fahd of Saudi Arabia has proclaimed that the existence of the Quran precludes the need for a separate constitution. He argues that Islam is a social, political and economic system with the Shariah (Islamic law) providing a comprehensive constitution, which comprises social and economic justice with a judicial structure.[56] The Islamic Republic of Iran relies less on the Quran and more on the principles it has enshrined within its constitution. Key articles of the constitution support voter-participation through national and regular elections, to be conducted within the framework of an Islamic state.

  Some commentators, contend that inevitable differences between the political dynamics of East and West are rooted in their wholly different cultures. For instance, Professor Akbar Ahmed asserts that the central difference between the West and Islam lies in their two "opposed philosophies: one based in secular materialism, the other in faith". Islamic movements may reject the democratic option because of where it comes from rather than what it contains. It is perhaps inevitable that the Muslim states should resent the West and not wish to emulate liberal democratic political structures, but this ambivalence toward liberal democracy has not inhibited the current discussion of democratisation. As Esposito points out that modes of political expression are not static:

"It is difficult to ascertain or to predict whether the evolution of Muslim thinking about democracy will lead them to convert their views into action and what particular form democratisation might take in diverse Muslim cultures. It is clear, however, that in the new Muslim world order, Muslim political traditions and institutions are evolving, just as social conditions and class structures are changing. Both are important for the future of democracy in the Middle East".[57]

METHODOLOGY OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

  Islamic Movements pursue two key strategies to achieve their aim of an Islamic state: they establish socio-economic institutions, such as: schools, clinics, and day-care centres, and also take part in elections whenever possible, even when no change in a country's political leadership is in prospect. Islamic groups use social work to exploit inadequate welfare provision to increase popular support, particularly in cities. Islamic movements involved in military actions against Israel in Lebanon, such as "Hizbollah", compete in local and national elections and have established welfare projects, including shops, schools and hospitals, in an attempt to mobilise mass support.[58] This approach has been adopted by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, delivering services not only to the urban poor, but also to members of professional organisations. The aim is to provide basic services at significantly lower cost than the private sector. By engaging in such activities they try to demonstrate their capabilities and seek to undermine the political legitimacy of the state.

  States now face a third generation of militants, fostered by the spread of mass education and disenchantment with current regimes. The new wave consists of well educated cadres who had some access to a Western-style education and see that political Islam has a chance to repeal the nationalist monopoly on power, as was demonstrated in Iran, Sudan and nearly won in Algeria. These activists are more patient than their predecessors about attaining power; they intend to pressure governments to gradually implement the Shariah (Islamic law) before directly challenging a regimes rule. However, such concessions do not prevent the Islamic Movements from attempting to control professional unions (such as those of engineers, lawyers, physicians and academics) or from creating "Islamic Zones" where state control is phased out and replaced by direct management of public order and provision of social services by the Islamic militants themselves.[59]

  The basic issue that splits Islamic groups and governments centres on whether one undisputed interpretation of Quranic text should be imposed. Hasan at-Turabi calls for the introduction of one fundamentalist paradigm (minhaj-e-usuli) based on one view of Islamic laws.[60] In Saudi Arabia and Sudan, it is obligatory for Muslim citizens to follow the particular interpretations of Sharia (Islamic law) that are endorsed by the governments. For Islamic groups, all those Muslims who do not share their view of Islamic laws are dismissed as infidels. Those Muslims who favour secular governments are called apostates by radical Muslims, who urge the classical Islamic punishment of death for apostasy.

  Much of the ideological arsenal of modern-and-past Islamic movements centres on the references to authority (hukam) in the Quran. Contemporary Islamic groups insist that "hukam" in the Quran clearly establishes the totality of the Islamic obligation. They stress that the separation between the realm of God and the earthly realm is impossible in Islam, because the Quran covers all aspects of life, including the realms of politics and governments. This makes it impossible to separate the "Church" from the "State". Such views have a special appeal to Muslims throughout the world, but especially the Arab world. To understand why such ideas receive popular support, it is important to look at the reasons and causes for this popularity.

CAUSES OF POPULARITY FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

  Primarily, there are two main factors which explain the continued support for the Islamic movements in the Muslim world. Firstly, Western values are penetrating most Muslim countries, and they are also undergoing cultural alienation. This can be seen through increased secularisation, widespread moral corruption in society and the threat of fragmentation or even a breakdown of traditional political institutions. Therefore, many are looking towards Islam as a solution to all these problems. Secondly, in many Muslim countries there is growing social and economic deprivation. There is an increasing gap in income between rich and poor due to; the failure to provide adequate economic growth, declining legitimacy of existing political systems because of corruption within the state structures and public sector, the failure to counter Western influence, and the loss of Palestine to Zionism.[61]

  The combination of these factors has led to frustration, alienation, and an identity crisis, thus, creating a fertile ground for Islamic movements, to gain support and popularity among various social strata. Islamic movements, stress that the Muslim world is facing major problems because their rulers have strayed from the right path of Islam, and that greed, corruption and atheism are threatening to fragment society and prevent it from effectively confronting its external enemies. To alter the situation, they emphasise the need for a recreation of the unity and integrity of the Muslim society which was envisaged in the Quran and the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet).

  As a result, Muslims are increasingly turning away from secular ideologies and are moving towards "Political Islam". Secular ideologies have been viewed as foreign, alien and unsuccessful imports. It is important to mention that "turning towards Islam" can take many forms. On the one hand, people may turn to Islam as a refuge which offers comfort and peace. On the other, Islam may become a symbol for socio-political protest. Internally, this protest may be sanctioned against the corruption or injustice of the political system, externally it may be channelled against foreign influences, which represent a cultural, economic, political or strategic threat to the Muslim community.[62]

  Islamic Movements tend mainly to centre on urban areas to be the preserve of the young, whose sense of betrayal by their rulers is often more acute than that of their elders. The traditional tales of battles against colonial powers no longer have any meanings for many young people seeking employment, education and adequate housing. Failure of existing regimes to provide these services has found political expression in protest movements, the most effective has been those with an Islamist orientation. The appeal of Islamic movements reflects a prolonged and many-sided crisis which extends to all the conditions, not just the economic, that erode the legitimacy of the existing order.[63]

  However, when assessing whether Islamic movements have achieved their objectives, one is driven to the conclusion that the movement has not been able to achieve its goals at the political level, despite the fact that Islam is an important source of national solidarity. In fact the movements have suffered major setbacks in Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, this may be attributed to the fact that it has no sense of cohesion. It is fragmented, lacking a clearly-defined common goal and a charismatic leader who could provide it with a sense of confidence, let alone one who could help overcome the factionalism which has so far distracted the movement from focusing on the important issues. Finally, Islamic movements have not been able to produce comprehensive programmes which can offer radical changes or constitute a viable alternative to the current social, economic and political vacuum in the Muslim world.

FUTURE PROSPECTS: STRATEGIES

  The conditions which determine the ability of Islamic movements to gain political dominance vary from country to country. The heritage of a strong state tradition and the subordination of Islamic religious elite's to state bureaucracy has given enormous advantages to nationalist secular influences in the former regions of the Ottoman empire-in Turkey, the Arab fertile crescent countries, Egypt and parts of North Africa. While these countries have Islamic movements, military elite's and secular ideologies remain in control. By contrast, the weakness of central states and the pluralism of organised religious life in the Indian subcontinent means that in Pakistan both state elite's and religious opposition movements must appeal to Islamic values. Thus in any given context the potential power of an Islamic movement is constrained by the basic political structures of the society and of course by the opposition they engender.

  Despite the general success of Islamic movements in the Middle East, they are far from being a united force. Indeed, what divides them is in many way as important as what unites them. Ideologies and strategies vary greatly, just as much as the kind and the range of the support they enjoy and the nature of their relations with states across the region. The Muslim Brotherhood on Jordan, for example, is considerably more closer to the regime than are their Egyptian counter parts to that in Egypt. Any generalisations, based on either case, let alone the more dramatic and turbulent circumstances in Algeria, about the nature and role of Islamic movements within the Muslim world at large are likely to be flawed and misleading.

  Broadly speaking, Islamic movements belong to two types: radical (militant) and legalist (political). Although the declared objective of each is the establishment of an "Islamic state" and society, they differ greatly over strategy and tactics. The radical groups usually identified with "militant Islam", combine a strong emphasis on the necessity of ideological purity for Islamic activists with a keen sense of urgency deriving from what they consider to be conditions under which true Muslims have become a "minute minority". In such circumstances, they feel an obligation to act as dedicated fighters against state systems which do not implement Islamic law, to assassinate their leaders and attack their institutions.

  The legalist groups which are linked with Political Islam, renounce both individual and collective violence as counter-productive. They emphasise the logic of a gradualist Islamic programme, and reject the assumptions of urgency by the militants. They focus on propagating their religion and on "purifying" individuals and societies against secularism. Such groups also participate in the political process within the official parameters of permissible action while working to extract concessions from the state to allow them greater access to the masses and through them, to power.

  Both Western governments and Muslims should consider a few guidelines in order to improve relations:

(1)  They should seek to know who the Islamic movements are and what they are doing. This cannot be achieved if the west views the Islamic challenge simply from the perspective of a "security threat". Most often, Islamic groups are lumped together as a single threat to Western interests. This is both unfair and self-deluding; it ignores the diversity among these groups and assumes that they are the only anti-Western force in their societies.

(2)  To help find reasonable solutions for the Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, and in other parts of the World where Muslims are facing oppression. In other words, to bridge the gap between the rhetoric and policy, especially when dealing with issues which are sensitive to the Muslim world such as; human rights, democracy, nuclear weapons and terrorism. A successful Western policy can only be achieved when there is no ambiguity on these matters.

(3)  Muslims need to rebuild an idea of Islam which includes justice, integrity, tolerance and the quest for knowledge—the classic Islamic civilisation, not just the insistence on the rituals; not just the five pillars of Islam but the entire building. Reducing a sophisticated civilisation to simple rituals encourages simple answers; reaching for guns and explosives, for instance. Today, piety and virtue are reflected in political action, often equated with violence—not sustained spirituality.[64]

(4)  The West should encourage the present Muslim states to gradually associate "moderate" Islamist forces with their governments. The Islamist ideological trend can no longer by ignored. (State policies, for example in Jordan in the 1950s and Egypt in the early 1970s, contributed directly to the growth of Islamic movements as regimes sought to weaken the nationalist or leftist opposition. However, since the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, the extent to which regimes in the region have retained power—even without much political legitimacy—is remarkable). Islamists should take part in state legislative bodies and later in the executive branches. Pre-electoral pacts should be negotiated between the government and other political parties, including the Islamists, which should guarantee that the democratic process, though gradual, will not be reversed by any party.

  Whatever their methodologies one of the main obstacles in assessing the future impact of Islamic movements and the extent to which they will be a "challenge" or a "threat", is their lack of a well structured political agenda. Theoretical or ideological statements are often lacking specific models for change. Many Islamic movements may speak of an Islamic order but the details which are provided are often vague. This is the case for The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic movements.

  How to respond to "Islamic fundamentalism" is an issue which information is seriously lacking and which has led to many misunderstandings between European countries, the United States and Islamic countries. While Islamic forces are already influential in countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Sudan and Central Asia, Islamic movements are trying to impose fundamentalist regimes elsewhere by violent means, particularly in Algeria and Egypt, with some degree of support from Iran (in Algeria's case) and Sudan (in Egypt's case). Other countries, such as Tunisia and Morocco, have adopted a programme of improving the status of women which now makes them less vulnerable to the threats inherent in Islamic fundamentalism.

  However, it would be a mistake to claim that Muslims constitute a homogenous force determined to act as part of a universal conspiracy against the existing political order. The fact is that Islam is made up of many diverse groups. As explained earlier, some Islamic movements advocate violence in the name of Islam and are roundly condemned by most Muslim political leaders who consider that this does not conform to the basic teachings of Islam and merely brings it into discredit throughout the World.

  It is clear that if the West wishes to intervene in Muslim countries to protect sympathetic governments against their domestic opponents, their support must be tempered by the realisation that states which are undergoing intense economic changes and social stresses are inherently vulnerable, and the regimes which have failed to achieve significant and fairly distributed economic gains, have suffered international political defeats, or are repressive of domestic opposition or are corrupt in domestic administration, are all the more vulnerable to internal resistance articulated in religious terms. Any policy towards Muslim countries will have to tread a delicate line, sensitive to changes in public opinion, between effective support and compromising association.

  American and Western attitudes towards Islamic movements must be similarly nuanced. The West may be antagonised by the uncertainties and anti-Western elements of Islamic Movements, but experience shows that the behaviour of states and powerful political movements is strong affected by tactical considerations. They must contravene our values, but they cannot be taken as intrinsically hostile to our interests. Furthermore, it is crucial in dealing with such movements to distinguish between opposing political objectives which are threatening to Western interests and hostility to Islam as such. Any suggestion that American or European powers are hostile to Islam as a "religion" will create further support for radical Islamic Movements.

  In any case, the objective is not to define to a policy, for none can be defined to cope with so many varied situations, but to build up a background of understanding which will help us understand the rhetorical position, their cultural strength, their active organisation, and their place in the political system of their own societies, and to develop a mental posture of anticipation and readiness to cope with specific international complications as they arise. The policy questions which arise from the Islamic movements are not questions of manipulating or controlling a particular situation, or of managing a crisis, they are questions about how to live with a long-term situation which has the potential of being vitally important in the political life of many Muslim countries and Western countries in unexpected ways.

50   Middle East International, 3 March 1995, p. 16. Back

51   President Clinton speech Thursday 20 August 1998. Back

52   Huntington, Samuel, "The Clash of Civilisations". Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993 p. 49.  Back

53   Adrian Hamilton. "Fundamental NATO Flaws". Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 49. Back

54   Leon Hadar. "What Green Peril", Foreign Policy, 72(2). 1993. p. 27. Back

55   Esposito John, "Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality" Oxford University Press 1992, p. 169. Back

56   Halfa Jawad. "The Middle East In The New World Order" Macmillan Press LTD. 1994, p. 108. Back

57   Esposito John "Islam and Politics. Syracuse University Press p. 440. Back

58   See Fouad Ajami, "The Vanished Imam" Cornell University Press 1986, Chapters 1-2. Back

59   Ghasson Salame, "Islam And The West" Foreign Policy No. 90. Spring 1993, pp. 25-26. Back

60   Hasan at-Turabi "Tajdid Usul-al-Figh-Islami: "Renewal of The Fundamentals of Islamic Jurisprudence". Jeddah 1984, pp. 10-13. Back

61   Halfa Jawad. "The Middle East In The New World Order" Macmillan Press LTD 1994, p. 108. Back

62   Nazim, Ayubi. "The Political Revival of Islam", The Case of Egypt., International Journal of the Middle East, 1980, p. 486. Back

63   Ibrahim A Karawan, "The Islamist Impasse" (Adelphi Paper 314 Oxford University Press 1997, pp. 15-16. Back

64   Akbar S Ahmed, "Towards The Global Millennium: The Challenge of Islam" The World Today, August/September 1996, p. 216. Back