House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Eighth Report

STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Naval Forces

225. Naval forces will, of course, be a crucial part of the UK's expeditionary capability: 'in almost all operations, maritime forces will be essential'[629]. The three core naval capabilities stem from carriers and airgroups; nuclear-powered submarines; and amphibious shipping, with other capabilities forming a 'supporting cast'.[630] These three capabilities contribute to the two essential and complementary applications of maritime power: sea control and power projection. As our account of past reviews demonstrates, the Navy's size has heretofore been determined as much by resource implications as by operational requirements. There has not been much slack in the system. Vice Admiral Sir Jonathan Tod explained that concurrency requirements are all-important to the determination of the size of the future fleet: "if you can tell me how concurrent I have to be then I can tell you how many ships".[631]

226. The strategy set out in the SDR involves a shift away from open-ocean capabilities towards a range of capabilities in littoral areas. In terms of force structure, this translates to a decreased emphasis on open ocean anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures in the UK region, with increased ability to project force. The Navy was not given as clear cut concurrency requirements as the other two Services: its new concept of operations is that it 'must be able to undertake operations away from home in conjunction with the other Services and in cooperation with our Allies'.[632] However, this must translate into an ability to fulfil its permanent tasks as well as to support either the two concurrent operations or one warfighting operation.

FRIGATES AND DESTROYERS

227. In 1988, our predecessors noted that the government's commitment to a frigate and destroyer flotilla of 'about 50' had in practice resulted in 36 fully operational ships, seven engaged in preparing for Service and six in refit.[633] The frigate and destroyer flotilla is now to be reduced from 35 to 32, and the SDR reassures us that 'the smaller force will be able to meet all operational commitments in the new strategic environment'.[634] However, Vice Admiral Sir Jonathan Tod had told us that—

635

Currently—

636

These commitments have not changed in the SDR, but we were told by the First Sea Lord that they would be achieved by the more "flexible" operation of the fleet—for example, operating an "Atlantic guard ship" which would cover West Africa and the South Atlantic. Some elements of the fleet will also be held on longer notice periods.[637] Whether or not the reduced fleet will be able to live up to its concurrency requirements depends on what is described as its 'flexibility'. The MoD gave us further details not outlined in the SDR, telling us that there would be no reductions in core ship training, although there would be some reduction in participation in some exercises; that the Falkland Islands Guardship would be placed on a increased notice period during the austral summer to enable it to carry out other tasks; that the West Indies Guardship would be deployed for nine months of the year, with a ship earmarked to deploy at short notice during other times; that the second ship of the Armilla patrol would be put at longer notice and would not routinely be East of Suez; and that greater use of other types of ship would relieve overstretch of the destroyer and frigate force.[638] The SDR contains no clear description of how 'flexibility' will combat the overstretch of the frigate and destroyer fleet that already exists while enabling the reduced fleet to carry out tasks which might well involve 'more rather than less distant'[639]deployment. We remain unconvinced by the proposed new flexible deployment of the frigate and destroyer fleet, and are not persuaded that this new flexibility has been devised for operational rather than cost-cutting reasons.

SUBMARINES

228. The SSN attack submarine flotilla is to be reduced from twelve to ten, for which the First Sea Lord expressed regret;[640] however all ten (as opposed to seven previously) will be fitted with Tomahawk land attack missiles which will increase their utility in force projection operations.[641] The future of the flotilla as a whole is said to be 'assured', because of its utility over a wide range of operations.[642] A decrease in peacetime commitment—presumably the requirement not to defend the SSBN submarines from hostile forces[643]—will, we were told, ensure that there is not an increase in workload for the remaining vessels.

229. The two attack submarines due to be scrapped are HMS Spartan and HMS Splendid.[644] A refit for Splendid, due to be decommissioned in 2003, has been cancelled; but the refit for Spartan, to be decommissioned in 2006, will go ahead,[645] although it will be "a reduced form of refit".[646] Costs associated with the cancellation of the Splendid refit are expected by the MoD to be 'minimal'.[647] The refit package for Spartan is still under consideration and costs have not been established;[648] the MoD anticipated costs of £60 million had the refit been cancelled.[649] The First Sea Lord told us that—

650

Yet he also said that—

The refit of nuclear submarines is hugely expensive.[651]

We remain unconvinced that a refit for HMS Spartan, to be completed only four years before her decommissioning, represents good value for money for the taxpayer.

TRIDENT

230. All four Trident submarines are to be retained,[652] and continuous at-sea deterrent patrols will be maintained.[653] As explained previously in this Report, the Trident submarines will carry fewer nuclear warheads and operate at a reduced alert state.[654] The SDR says, and the First Sea Lord reiterated, that—

This reduced state of alert will enable greater use of ballistic missile submarines for secondary tasks such as exercises with other vessels, equipment trials and hydrographic work.[655]

The MoD's Director of Policy told us that—

656

We might have hoped for clearer evidence that the allocation of secondary tasks to the nuclear submarine flotilla is due to strategic analysis rather than as a result of the cuts in the attack submarine fleet. The performance of such tasks should compromise neither the security of the Trident submarine force nor the UK's strategic deterrent. The SDR cannot be said to represent a new statement of the United Kingdom's nuclear strategy.

MINE COUNTERMEASURES

231. The mine countermeasure force will be modernised and increased from 19 to 22, rather than the 25 that had been planned. This results from the analysis that "the threat to the United Kingdom in mine warfare is most, most unlikely";[657] the emphasis will be on deployed mine countermeasures. The First Sea Lord told us that while "you will never be able to say 22 is right or 21 is wrong or 23 is too many",[658] he was "very relaxed" about the change in numbers.[659]

ROYAL MARINES

232. The Royal Marines Commando force is to be maintained, its necessity having been 'endorsed by the SDR'.[660] The First Sea Lord assured us that this had by no means been a forgone conclusion: "we started with a clean sheet of paper",[661] but that in order to save up to 12% of the Commando budget up to 65% of capability would be lost. We note with interest that, where the MoD had made a decision not to cut a capability, they were able to provide extraordinarily precise calculations about trade-offs—this unique example is not one which seems to have been possible to replicate in circumstances where the calculations led to a decision to remove a capability. This remarkable piece of operational analysis ruled out any options of reducing the force; so that the arguments for its preservation in the new strategic environment with its emphasis on the littoral, appear close to unassailable. We acknowledge the significant contribution the Royal Marines can make in a rapid reaction role. However, there is no evidence that the SDR process considered some of their more static roles. Our predecessors have taken a long interest in MoD guarding, policing and security roles,[662] and the level of forces committed to these roles is a subject we intend to re-examine in the future. To reinforce amphibious capabilities, the helicopter carrier, HMS Ocean, will be joined by Albion and Bulwark, the planned landing platform docks.

FUTURE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND CARRIER-BORNE AIRCRAFT

233. The SDR announces that 'we plan to replace our current carriers from around 2012 by two larger, more versatile carriers',[663] and the Supporting Essays tell us that 'present thinking suggests that they might be of the order of 30,000-40,000 tonnes and capable of deploying[664] up to fifty aircraft'.[665] The carriers' role is to change from 'cold war anti-submarine operations' to 'deploy[ment of] air power in support of joint operations'.[666] The key to the size of the new carriers is the air group they will embark: Navy and RAF fixed wing aircraft and helicopters from all three Services. We were told that "it will be that mix of about 50 aircraft which will determine at the end of the day the size of the carrier".[667] We were also told that decisions on the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft have not yet been taken,[668] and the size of the future carriers is similarly still open.[669] Invitations to tender for the feasibility study will be issued later this year, and will be complete by 2001 when further decisions will be taken.[670]

234. These new carriers should be fully operational not later than 2018.[671] In the meantime, the UK will have to undertake the SDR-defined tasks for its carrier groups with the current three Invincible class carriers (one of which is, in a charming euphemism, 'on very long readiness'), a much lesser capability than that planned for. Although the current carriers will be updated "where the money is available",[672] a capability gap will exist until the new carriers are operational. We recommend that the MoD examine how the capabilities and capacities of the existing carriers could be upgraded before the new carriers are delivered and produce costings of the various options.

235. The First Sea Lord told us that two 30,000-40,000 tonne carriers was "the right answer set against the assumptions we made about what their tasks will be".[673] Currently we have three carriers yet can only have two operating simultaneously. Despite the two simultaneous operations scenario, another helicopter carrier to join Ocean is not in the picture; and the carriers may be further pressured by being used in the helicopter carrier role.[674] The First Sea Lord also admitted that where two carriers had been operated "back to back" in the Adriatic he was worried about "our operational capability for contingency tasks which arise at short notice."[675] The implications of the decision to procure two rather than three carriers will be that our capability for contingency tasks may be significantly reduced. It is clear from the tables annexed to the SDR's Supporting Essays[676] that two carriers may be required simultaneously under the SDR's concurrency requirements. The ability of the proposed two carrier fleet to be able always to supply both carriers for simultaneous operations has not been adequately demonstrated.

236. We were repeatedly told that the UK's possession of two carriers was central to the SDR's expeditionary strategy,[677] and were assured that the decision to procure such carriers would not be reversed.[678] As the carrier programme is such a vital part of the coherence of the package outlined in the SDR, we intend to monitor closely on an annual basis the progress of the procurement process for the carriers and their associated air groups over the coming years commencing in Spring 1999.

THE NAVY 'PACKAGE'

237. The First Sea Lord told us that "if I lose platforms, whether they are destroyers and frigates or nuclear submarines or helicopters, then I am less than happy".[679] Specifically he told us that "if I had a chance I would have an attack helicopter squadron dedicated to the Royal Marines", but conceded that "there is a limit to how much we are prepared to spend".[680] Dr Eric Grove has called the decision to accept cuts in the attack submarine, destroyer and frigate force and the mine countermeasures flotilla 'a distinct tradeoff in order to allow other increases in capability'.[681] Such trade-offs include, for example, the reduction in the SSN fleet from 12 to 10 but with the accompanying increase in capabilities from the fitting of the Tomahawk missiles to all of them. The re-roling of the Trident submarines is also part of this trade-off. And although the frigate and destroyer fleet is to be reduced, the First Sea Lord said—

There are great advantages in being able to operate the fleet more flexibly.[682]

Overall, the First Sea Lord's told us, one has to look at "defence in the round".[683] He also told us that—

If one looks at the package and providing that package is delivered, then I was content to accept reductions in certain areas.[684]

The Navy package represents a complex series of trade-offs resulting in a smaller but more capable future fleet. It appears to us to have been constrained by affordability as much as derived from the 'troops to task' plans. We share the First Sea Lord's concern that if the whole package outlined in the SDR is not delivered, capability will be compromised and the entire expeditionary strategy will be adversely affected. We shall be monitoring the impact of the reductions in the submarine and frigate and destroyer flotillas, and will be keeping a close watch on the progress of the carrier procurement programme and its associated aircraft group procurement programme, as well as planned refits and upgrades for current elements of the fleet. All these will have to be kept to a tight timetable which we will monitor annually.

Land Forces

238. The concurrency requirements for the Armed Forces distil to the following requirement for the Army: in addition to meeting its permanent commitments in the United Kingdom, Cyprus and elsewhere, it must be able to—

maintain a brigade employed indefinitely on a peace keeping mission such as SFOR, and at the same time deploy an armoured or mechanised brigade for warfighting for a period up to six months; or

be capable of deploying a warfighting division.[685]

The Review has concluded that 'the Army's current structure will not meet post-SDR requirements without overstretch'.[686]

239. Consequently, in order to meet these requirements, the structure of the Army has been significantly revamped in the SDR. The stated overall purpose of the changes made is to 'make existing forces more usable and to address overstretch' while retaining 'a balanced, combined arms, high capability structure of two deployable divisions'.[687] At present the Army has three armoured brigades, two mechanised brigades, an airborne brigade and an airmobile brigade. Post-SDR, the airborne brigade will be re-roled as a mechanised brigade, with its airborne role transferred, along with the airmobile brigade, to a new air manoeuvre brigade.

240. A new formation readiness cycle has been designed for the two deployable divisions. Under the new training cycle, each of the six brigades (excluding the air manouevre brigade) will adhere to a three year activity cycle with a year of in-role training, followed by a year at high readiness (mostly at thirty days' notice to move[688]) as part of the JRRF pool and a year preparing for, deployed on, or recovering from, a six-month tour of peace support or "operations other than war",[689] such as Northern Ireland[690] or training support in Canada.[691] This cycle is designed specifically to provide at any one time an armoured and mechanised brigade at high readiness for warfighting; two brigades to meet an indefinite non-warfighting commitment such as SFOR; and two brigades able to 'train coherently'. Each division will have its three brigades at graduated readiness.[692] The new formation readiness cycle, could provide the potential to fulfil the concurrency requirements for the Army derived from the overall concurrency strategy. That will only happen if it is implemented thoroughly in the form described in the SDR.

241. We were told that the new formation readiness cycle will have the added advantage of improving retention by both relieving overstretch and "providing a better balanced way of life for soldiers and their families".[693] Soldiers should feel that their training has greater purpose, and will not suffer the boredom of the training support year, about which we heard many complaints during our visit to Germany; training support will be provided by those held at high-readiness in the theatre in which they are based.[694] The "frustration" of being sent on operations other than war immediately after high readiness training should no longer occur.[695] The coherence of the Army will also be enhanced by reinforcements to any warfighting division occurring on a

sub-unit basis rather than trickle posting.[696] We are somewhat concerned by the Chief of the General Staff's statement that the formation readiness cycle "may well be broken up by some of the things that may happen in the future".[697] We would have hoped that the very purpose of the structure was that it would be robust under any demands placed upon it with the Army's concurrency requirements; however we concede that futurology is an imperfect science. We were strenuously told that the new structure "was not designed to save money" but "was designed to be more operationally effective", [698] which we wholeheartedly welcome. We are hopeful that improvements in the lives of individual soldiers will ensue from the implementation of the new readiness cycle; and that retention in the Army will be enhanced as a result. However, the proposed new cycle is at present a paper exercise—sustaining it in practice will be a formidable challenge. We recommend that future statements on the Defence Estimates provide a clear statistical analysis of the actual training times and operational deployments of the Army's new structure. They should also identify causes for significant deviations and shortfalls and set out proposals to remedy them.

ROYAL ARMOURED CORPS

242. Instead of eight armoured regiments each with 38 tanks and 470 personnel, the SDR proposes six larger regiments with 58 tanks and 600 personnel each; however regiments will each hold only 30 tanks for peacetime training,[699] with the balance required for larger scale training and operations provided prior to deployment.[700] This formation "achieves the depth" required in different phases of war[701] and is said to be more 'doctrinally robust'.[702] Each regiment is to have fewer tanks for training which is supposed to reflect the increased reliability of the Challenger 2, a tank which was highly praised by the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards when we visited them in Germany.[703] It is also designed as a solution to the problem of constraints on training areas. Three armoured regiments, one from each armoured brigade, will return from Germany to the UK and two of these will be re-roled; one as an nuclear, biological and chemical defence unit and one as an armoured reconnaissance regiment.[704] However, there will be no increase in the number of armoured reconnaissance squadrons.[705] The move to four regiments of three squadrons from three regiments of four squadrons is to be regretted on account of the disruption to the regiments concerned and the reduced military utility of the new regiments. There has been a trade-off between the strengthening of the armoured regiments and the opportunity to strengthen an operational capability (armoured reconnaissance) that has been seriously overstretched in the post-Cold War world due to its inherent flexibility. This will 'de-square' the brigades (ie. each brigade will have only three regiments) during peacetime, although they will become square again for warfighting purposes.[706] The Chief of the General Staff told us that this was the hardest trade-off he had to make when agreeing the SDR package.[707] While the reasons behind this decision, in terms of personnel retention, are well understood, having to resquare the brigades for operational deployments could have the effect of making the readiness targets for the Army hard to attain.

243. The return of these regiments from Germany inevitably arouses concern about the increased pressure on UK army housing and training areas, in particular Salisbury Plain, that might result. We were told, however, that because each armoured regiment will now only have two squadrons' worth of tanks for local training[708], it would not have a "very dramatic effect".[709] The Secretary of State made the same point.[710] We remain somewhat doubtful about the reliability of assurances about the sustainability of training areas in the UK.

AIR MANOEUVRE BRIGADE

244. Another major change to the structure of the Army announced in the SDR is the formation of a new Air Manoeuvre Brigade. This brigade will be based on the current 24 Airmobile Brigade, and will consist eventually of at least three attack helicopter regiments and two airborne infantry battalions, together with combat support and combat service support units.[711] This will involve the re-roling of 5 Airborne Brigade into a mechanised brigade; three infantry battalions will take on necessary additional capabilities—one as armoured infantry and two as mechanised infantry.[712] Two airmobile infantry battalions currently in 24 Airmobile Brigade will be replaced by two battalions of the Parachute Regiment.

245. This change will involve a reduction in parachute capability from two battalion groups to one. While the Review concludes that 'we can no longer identify circumstances in which Britain would need to undertake parachute operations at greater than battalion level group',[713] it seems to us that there is some dissonance between the decision to make this particular trade-off in capability and the declared strategy of more mobile and flexible forces, since it will reduce the unique capability that a parachute group provides for forces that are rapidly deployable over long distances. The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that parachuting "is a very necessary skill".[714] In particular parachute troops may be invaluable for operations such as the evacuation of UK nationals from trouble-spots.

246. The present two battalion group capability consists of two of the three regular parachute infantry battalions 'in role' at any one time, supported by two TA parachute infantry battalions to provide individual reinforcements or fourth companies for them because of the difficulties in using regular reservists in a parachute role . The supporting elements—the gunner regiment, sapper squadron, logistic battalion and medical unit—are structured in such a way that at least two full battalion groups can be mounted. In addition, there are integral TA battery and medical units. All of these troops are parachute trained. Under the SDR's proposals two of the Regular Parachute battalion groups will continue to be in role, but there will be a reduction in the parachute trained supporting elements. The MoD has told us that the logistic and medical units will not be transferred as a whole to the new brigade.[715] The fate of the TA elements and reinforcing units has not been specified.

247. While the Chief of the General Staff assured us that sufficient specialist supporting elements for the one battalion group will be maintained,[716] we note that in fact there will be a loss of capability within the units and sub-units concerned that could severely damage the morale of our airborne troops. One of the major assets of the airborne brigade remains the unique ethos of an elite force. We would urge that the unique ethos of airborne forces is preserved during their integration into the new Air Manouevre Brigade.

248. A decision has not yet been taken as to the location of the new Air Manouevre Brigade,[717] and we are aware that the choice between Aldershot and Colchester will be controversial, not least because the Parachute Regiment has been based in Aldershot since its inception. We would urge the Government to weigh very carefully the balance between military and other factors in reaching its decision on where to base the Brigade, and to make the balance of these factors explicit when announcing its decision.

249. We are concerned that the new Air Manouevre Brigade may not be as deployable as airborne troops, particularly with the large logistic trail required to support the attack helicopter. (The first line supporting establishment for a regiment including 16 attack helicopters is likely to consist of some 220 vehicles; a single squadron of attack helicopters could require between 70 and 110 supporting vehicles.[718]) Furthermore, the range of a helicopter-based formation cannot be as great as that of a fixed-wing based formation,[719] another area of concern about the capacity for rapid deployment of the new Brigade. For these reasons we cannot share the Chief of the Defence Staff's conviction that it was entirely appropriate[720] that 5 Airborne and 24 Airmobile Brigade be merged.