IN-THEATRE DEFENCE

206. Expeditionary forces and their equipment may be threatened by missile or nuclear, chemical or biological attack, and could require defensive as well as deterrent cover. The risks from ballistic missiles are "currently small, but could become more serious",[567] and it is expected that in the next ten years, ballistic missiles with ranges of 3,000km or more will be available to several more states. The recent firing of a missile by North Korea which crossed Japanese airspace was a dramatic public confirmation of that country's possession of a significant ballistic missile capability. The Defence Committee has in the past taken an interest in ballistic missile defence, stating in 1994 that 'we would be dismayed were there no prospect of such defence being available by the turn of the century'.[568] In the USA we received a classified briefing from the CIA on the developing ballistic missile programmes in various parts of the world which made clear that this is a problem which is growing.

207. In the single paragraph of the White Paper devoted to this topic it is stated that—

... we do not need to procure a new ground-launched medium or long-range air-defence missile,

but that—

... we will monitor developments in both threat and capability closely...and [we] have established a development programme to keep this option open should the balance change significantly.[569]

Lord Vincent suggested to the Committee that while ballistic missile defence is not "an overriding defence priority, it is best addressed ... collectively through NATO",[570] and the SDR also suggests that the problem may be addressed with 'Allies and Partners'.[571] It is therefore still the case that 'Britain is some way from having an integrated or coherent policy on ballistic missile proliferation'.[572] Dr Eric Grove has called the 'silence' of the SDR on ballistic missile defence 'something of a missed opportunity'.[573] There is a single paragraph in the Supporting Essays on ground-based ballistic missile defences which states—

A number of systems intended to destroy ballistic missiles are under development, notably in the United States. These may play a role within a balanced spectrum of capabilities to counter the risks posed by chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. But techniques in this area are changing rapidly and it would, at this stage, be premature to decide on acquiring such a capability. We will, however, monitor developments in the risks posed by ballistic missiles and in the technology available to counter them, participate in NATO studies, and work closely with our Allies to inform future decisions.[574]

We do not consider this an adequate response. While we acknowledge that some consideration has been given in the Review to the generation of a ballistic missile defence capability, we conclude that the reticence of the SDR on the subject does indeed represent a missed opportunity. It may take a decade or more to develop and field a new air defence system. Policy in this area needs to be clear, kept under constant review, decisions on research on options for responses to these threats need to be made in the near future, and the research needs to be adequately funded.

208. The White Paper has only two paragraphs on Chemical and Biological Defence. They tell us—

We are responding urgently to the risks arising from the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons by significantly improving our defensive capabilities. The importance of this was underlined by Iraq's recent confrontation with the UN. We are building up stocks of existing vaccines and at the beginning of June 1998 we and the United States announced our agreement to co-operate closely in the development of new medical and other countermeasures.


Much of our specialist capability is provided by the Territorial Army. It cannot be deployed sufficiently quickly to meet the current range of possible operational requirements. We will therefore be creating a mainly regular joint Army/RAF nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance organisation for land-based operations. This will be accompanied by enhancements to our biological and chemical detection and decontamination equipment.[575]

Over a discrete area, chemical and some biological warfare agents can be detected and appropriate countermeasures taken—the use of protective clothing or nerve agent pre-treatment set tablets, for example. Where the risk of chemical and biological attack on a UK force is assessed as high, protective and passive countermeasures such as vaccination or the dispersal of target sites may be implemented. The UK's Army nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defence capability rested, pre-SDR, with the Royal Yeomanry, a Territorial Army NBC reconnaissance regiment. The rationale behind the proposal that a Regular Armoured Regiment returning from Germany is to be re-roled to replace the Reserves, as part of a joint Army and RAF NBC Defence Regiment, is the assessed need for higher readiness.[576] We return to the question of the removal of this role from the Reserves below. We welcome the SDR's commitment to improving nuclear, biological and chemical defence for deployed land-based forces. However, we do not consider what the White Paper has to say on these matters to be adequate, and we will be looking for a more detailed description of the development of measures to offer protection to our Armed Forces from these rapidly proliferating weapons.

Joint Rapid Reaction Forces

209. Perhaps the most significant development in response to the challenges of the new expeditionary concept—scales of effort, readiness, deployability and sustainability—is the proposed creation of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRFs): 'a pool of powerful and versatile units from all three Services which would be available for operations at short notice'.[577] The pool of JRRFs will consist of a high readiness first echelon for initial entry and a lower readiness second echelon to provide follow-on forces. The JRRFs are designed to be an improvement on the current Joint Rapid Deployment Force, which is ready but light, lacking self-protection and firepower: "high on symbolism but maybe a political gesture".[578]

210. The JRRFs pool will be composed of all deployable forces held at high readiness: all naval forces below readiness of 30 days,[579] the two brigades going through their 'high readiness' year of the formation readiness cycle[580] (described in more detail below), and high readiness RAF forces. Amphibious and airmobile forces will play a key role.[581] Forces are allocated, depending on capability and readiness levels, to the 'spearhead' first entry forces, the remainder of the first echelon or the second echelon.[582] For each operation a mix of capabilities can be drawn from the available units, some 20 major warships, 22 other vessels, four ground force brigades, 110 combat aircraft and over160 other aircraft,[583] providing a truly flexible force.[584] The aim is for the JRRF concept to be operational in 2001,[585] although this apparently should not be taken to mean that its capabilities will not be useable before that date.[586] Its first exercise will be the largest joint exercise for years.[587]

211. The JRRFs are intended to provide a force of up to brigade level or equivalent, and to provide the lead element of larger deployments.[588] Forces will be at very high or high readiness, providing a graduated response to a crisis. The first echelon forces, available at very high readiness, would be deployed by Armed Forces' strategic lift assets; the second echelon 'would probably use a combination of MoD and commercially contracted transport assets to deploy'.[589] We conclude that the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces will provide a coherent response to the challenge of the Armed Forces' expeditionary concept. They will enable a graduated but rapid response to be made to a crisis, with a wide choice of capabilities available to operational commanders. However, we note that it will be critical to the effectiveness of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces that the improvements in strategic lift, logistics and medical services outlined in the SDR are carried through and delivered on time.

212. The Secretary of State told us that the UK's contribution to NATO must

... make a contribution which helps to sustain NATO both as a politically and militarily effective Alliance,[590]

and that—

... our ability to carry weight in NATO's internal debate to ensure that its policies reinforce our security and retain its focus on military effectiveness ... must be protected.[591]

The JRRFs, unlike the predecessor Joint Rapid Deployment Force, will be available for NATO operations.[592] This will provide us with a wide capability to commit to NATO operations, as well as assuaging any concerns of our Allies that we might be re-nationalising our defence.[593] Our ability to both contribute to and influence NATO depends on our credibility as an Alliance member. This is turn depends on our capability. The Secretary of State has also said that—

If our forces are to remain contributors of quality to NATO and other multinational operations ... our capabilities must be firmly at the highest end of the technology spectrum.[594]

Technological interoperability with our Allies is also crucial—in particular command and control arrangement must be such that our forces can work effectively in combined operations.[595]

213. During our visit to Germany we visited the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Headquarters at Rheindalen. The UK is the framework nation of ARRC, contributing 60% of HQ staff, as well as the infrastructure and day to day running costs.[596] Command of the ARRC provides UK officers with command and staff experience at the operational level which would not otherwise be available. Of the ten assigned divisions to ARRC, the UK provides two, some 55,000 soldiers. The 1 (UK) Armoured Division, comprising three UK brigades and based in Herford in Germany, is an ARRC framework division with an additional assigned Danish brigade. The UK also contributes to Multinational Division Central (MND(C)). An armoured capability is crucial to the UK's ability to contribute to ARRC,[597] and our command of the ARRC is "a very important part of our national contribution to the Alliance".[598] The SDR has, as explained in greater detail below, announced a withdrawal of three armoured regiments plus supporting units from Germany.[599] However, after the balancing of political and military reasons for a presence in Germany,[600] it has been decided that the bulk of the Army there will remain. The Chief of General Staff told us—

... my German opposite numbers were very concerned that we should remain in Germany in some strength. They perfectly understood that we may need to make some adjustments for our own reasons, which is what we have done. I know that General Wilman is extremely pleased that we have produced a solution which maintains the division in Germany and the ARRC headquarters because I have talked to him about it ... I was ... making sure that the military arguments for staying there ... which of course include training areas and things of that sort ... were properly taken into account ... From the military point of view ... it maintains our very close relationship with the rest of our allies within NATO. Also it not only makes a political signal but enables us to carry out military training together ... I do have a feel for the fact that it is important for the United States to be involved in NATO and to have substantial weapons bases in Europe in order to be an effective member of NATO from the military point of view. If that is the case the fact Britain with the agreement of NATO and our German allies in particular stations a division in Germany is a very important part of that balance.[601]

214. The proposed Joint Rapid Reaction Forces provide a welcome enhancement of our ability to engage in out-of-area NATO operations, particularly those in which a rapid response is required. The major challenge in this area will be interoperability with the armed forces of our Allies, and we are pleased to see the SDR acknowledge this. While the main military rationale behind the stationing of UK troops in Germany—that their purpose was to defend territory during a sustained land war across Europe—may have disappeared, we support the decision taken that troops will remain there with the continuing agreement and support of the German authorities. Our presence in Germany provides an important political contribution to the NATO alliance. However, we should acknowledge clearly that this was principally a political trade-off, and is likely to have cost implications. These costs should be clearly identified in future Statements on the Defence

Estimates.

Regeneration to meet a Strategic Attack on NATO

215. The SDR has concluded that we no longer need to maintain forces specifically for that contingency of a strategic attack on NATO. We have discussed our reservations about this conclusion earlier, and will return to it when we come to discuss the Territorial Army.[602] Even if there is no likelihood that forces which could threaten NATO could be regenerated without at least a decade's warning[603], this does not mean that we can afford to be complacent about the risk. The SDR promises that we will—

... retain the ability, at much longer notice, to rebuild a bigger force as part of NATO's collective defence should a major threat re-emerge in Europe.[604]

Rear Admiral Essenhigh told us that such forces would be generated "at greater than 13 months' notice".[605] However, we remain unconvinced that the capability to rebuild forces to meet an Article 5 threat to NATO has been adequately demonstrated: the SDR does not explain how any such rebuilding would be achieved. Similarly, the UK's ability to regenerate appropriate technological and industrial bases during such a crisis remains unexplored in the SDR.

Joint Operations

216. The creation of a tri-Service Permanent Joint Headquarters for the UK's Armed Forces has increased their effectiveness on operations, as has the creation of the post of Chief of Joint Operations.[606] During the course of this inquiry we have been told countless times that future operations will be more 'joint'.[607] Cooperation between the three Armed Services will increase with, it is asserted, corresponding increases in military effectiveness, efficiency and economy. However, jointery is not new.[608] We were told that inter-service cooperation in the field was currently "superb" and that jointery was "overdone"[609]—that it was "a wonderful word that all modern people talk about a lot".[610] Jointery is indeed already a well-established concept. Dr Philip Sabin was of the view that—

Jointery has become something of a shibboleth in the 1990s. I think there are clear limits as to how far you can go in terms of joint structures. Clearly there are major opportunities for increasing not only cost-effectiveness but military efficiency by the forces co-operating much more closely together and in an integrated manner at the strategic level and almost certainly at the operational level, which many military analysts now consider to be the decisive level in warfare, the level at which the campaign will be fought. Having a single joint commander rather than commanders for each of the three services actually there in the field is a major bonus I think. At a lower tactical level, however, I do think that jointery has its limits there.[611]

217. The SDR has set out a Joint Vision Statement,[612] reaffirming the importance of jointery and joint command in future operations. Some welcome joint initiatives are outlined within the SDR; initiatives whose "whole raison d'être is ... operational efficiency".[613] We have discussed one of these, the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces in more detail above. The role of the Chief of Joint Operations is to be increased to give the postholder increased responsibility and authority, including budgetary accountability, and a new two star Chief of Joint Forces Operations and Training post will be created.

218. The MoD intends to develop a joint Navy/RAF fixed wing force, called Joint Force 2000. There is only 10% commonality between the RAF GR7 and the Sea Harrier, meaning that a joint carrier air wing is not feasible in the short term, but eventually all Harriers should be replaced by a single aircraft type supported by common operating procedures, maintenance practice and support facilities.[614] The force will be established 'from around the middle of the next decade'.[615] We were pleased to hear that the decision to establish the force had been taken on grounds of military effectiveness rather than cost.[616]

219. A Joint Helicopter Command will be set up to bring battlefield helicopters (that is, not including those normally based on warships or used for search and rescue) under the command of a two-star officer with a high level budget.[617] There had been thought of transferring battlefield helicopters into a single Service, which had been a stumbling block to the creation of such a command in the past.[618] We broadly approve the SDR's conclusion that 'any advantages would be outweighed by the damaging impact it would have on ethos, morale and operational effectiveness',[619] and note that, while the command will be overseen by the Commander-in-Chief (Land), the command's people will remain part of their parent Service.[620] The new joint command will be, we were told, "a much more efficient way of running things".[621]

220. Our witnesses were contradictory as to whether the post of commander of the joint helicopter command would rotate between the three Services or be awarded on merit.[622] There is an important principle at stake here. We regard it as important that tri-Service appointments should be made on merit, rather than on a rotational basis which may not mean that the best candidate for the job is selected.

221. The Army, Navy and Air Force will continue to perform different tasks; but this does not mean that they cannot cooperate effectively to achieve common goals. The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that—

... operating in the land and the sea and the air all require rather different approaches and different training and different qualities. It is very important to keep the single Service ethos ... it served us very well in the past and it will go on serving us,[623]

and the Secretary of State confirmed that—

The single Services have got very specific functions which they perform with enormous professionalism and distinction.[624]

Even though joint operations are a well-established element of our military doctrine, we conclude that the developments proposed in the SDR will, if realised, represent a real step forward in making jointery an ever present reality in the structure, doctrine and culture of the Armed Forces. We accordingly welcome the proposals.

222. However, we have a word of warning to sound. Joint operations may be a tactical necessity—but there is a risk that, in times of insistent budgetary pressure, they may provide cover for the three Services to conduct their customary horse trading over capabilities without the risk of exposing them to outside scrutiny and criticism. It is a danger that must be guarded against. In this context, we note with approval the Secretary of State's reassurance that the amalgamation of the three Services was ruled out at an early stage of the Review process.[625] The maintenance of the three separate Services not only recognises the need for different cultures and capabilities to reflect different tasks, it also retains a welcome and necessary edge of competition.

223. As part of the development of an infrastructure for the new level of joint operations, the White Paper announces—

... we need to have a clearer long term vision of the way in which we expect our forces and their methods of operation to develop. It is also essential that this is a truly Joint Service vision. We will therefore be creating a Joint Doctrine Centre as the focus for this work. In particular, it will be responsible for the development of defence doctrine, providing the joint framework for more specific single Service doctrine. We intend this to become an international centre of excellence and we see one of its main roles as leading Britain's contribution to the development of military doctrine for peace support operations ...[626]

The Chief of the Defence Staff told us—

The Joint Doctrine development centre, I think could be very important. Up until recently the single services have really had a bottom up approach to the doctrine ... They have been very much in stove pipes and that I do not think is the right way of doing it. What I think you have to do is to have something on top to say what defence wants as a whole ... It is going to do that. I think it will look also at the development, the way we are going, far ahead ... to work out the kind of forces we need, the kind of weapons we need ... There is one other thing which I think the Joint Defence Centre will do and that is it will link very well to defence diplomacy. I see it giving the opportunity to people from other parts of the world to come and learn how to peacekeep, for instance. We have probably been peacekeeping longer than almost anyone. We have an expertise which is recognised. We can run courses on proliferation. We can run courses on ordinary tactics and concepts.[627]

224. The SDR does not, however, represent the end of the process of creating more joint operational capability, but only a staging post. We will be looking for concrete evidence over the coming years of the added value created by new joint initiatives including the Joint Helicopter Command, Joint Force 2000, the New Joint Doctrine Centre, the enhanced Chief of Joint Operations and the new Chief of Defence Logistics.

568  Fourth Report, Session 1993-94, RAF Commitments and Resources, HC 252, para 20 Back

569  Cm 3999, para 145 Back

570  Q 406 Back

571  Cm 3999, para 41 Back

572  Jeremy Stocker, "Ballistic Missile Defence", RUSI International Security Review 1998 Back

573  Ev p537 Back

574  Essay 5, para 45 Back

575  Cm 3999, paras 101-2 Back

576  Essay 8, para 36 Back

577  Cm 3999 para 92 Back

578  Q 1704 Back

579  Q 2152 Back

580  Q 2359 Back

581  Factsheet: Commando Brigade and Amphibious Shipping Back

582  Factsheet: Joint Rapid Reaction Forces-Land Assigned Forces Back

583  Essay 8, para 16 Back

584  Q 2360 Back

585  Cm 3999, para 92 Back

586  Q 1704 Back

587  Factsheet: Joint Rapid Reaction Forces Back

588  Factsheet: Joint Rapid Reaction Forces Back

589  Essay 8, para 15 Back

590  Q 101 Back

591  Speech at the RUSI, 18 September 1997 Back

592  Essay 8, para 13 Back

593  Essay 8, para 11 Back

594  Speech at Chatham House, 12 March 1998 Back

595  Cm 3999, para 82 Back

596  www.arrcmedia.com Back

597  Briefings at ARRC HQ Back

598  Q 2472 Back

599  Essay 6, para 35 Back

600  Q 2475 Back

601  QQ 2473-6 Back

602  Essay 6, para 12 Back

603  See for example Dick, A Bear Without Claws: The Russian Army in the Nineties, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 1996; Goldman, Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse?, Congressional Research Service, September 1997 Back

604  Cm 3999, para 90 Back

605  Q 3007 Back

606  Private briefing Back

607  QQ 303, 394, 1324&c, private briefings, visits to ARRC, 5 Airborne Brigade and Royal Marines  Back

608  Q 371 Back

609  QQ 356-359 Back

610  Q 356 Back

611  Q 249 Back

612  Essay 8, para 1 Back

613  Q 1743 Back

614  Essay 8, para 24 Back

615  Factsheet: Joint Force 2000 Back

616  Q 2154 Back

617  Q 1859 Back

618  Q 1841 Back

619  Essay 8, para 29 Back

620  Factsheet: Joint Helicopter Command Back

621  Q 1716 Back

622  QQ 1721, 1857 Back

623  Q 1743 Back

624  Q 1602 Back

625  Q 1602 Back

626  Cm 3999, para 173 Back

627  Q 1744 Back