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Mrs. Maria Fyfe (Glasgow, Maryhill): A firm in my constituency was involved in the sale of weapons of
torture, allowing their manufacture to go on in Mexico while the paperwork was done in Britain. How might the Government be able to tackle such a problem?
Mr. Lloyd: My hon. Friend raises a genuinely important point. As with the EU code of practice on conventional arms exports, we are trying initially to work towards a European framework for the banning of sales and exports of weapons of torture, but it is our ambition to internationalise those processes. My hon. Friend may be more aware than I am of the state of legal proceedings in the case to which she refers. I do not know what stage it has reached in the Scottish judicial process, but such prosecutions should have the support of the House. We are considering ways of preventing third-country traffic and the use by British firms of offshore activities as a means of avoiding the impact of British legislation. My hon. Friend will probably recognise that there are serious legal difficulties in enacting such a frame of reference, but she raises an important point.
Similarly, the Labour Government quickly delivered on their commitment to ban the export of anti-personnel land mines. Britain was among the first to sign theOttawa convention banning anti-personnel land mines internationally. As soon as the parliamentary schedule allows, we aim to introduce legislation that will allow us to ratify the convention.
Having spoken of national controls, I now want to turn to the reasons why the EU code of conduct represents a significant step forward. I note the points raised by the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife, but he will appreciate that, in trying to break new ground and internationalise a process for the first time, inevitably we have to work at a pace that is acceptable to all our partners and allies.
Our primary concern was to make sure that national action would not prevent certain regimes from acquiring certain equipment, as we experienced when Britain was undercut by other countries. That would do our own industry a disservice but, more importantly, it does a fundamental disservice to the human rights values in the national code of conduct. Our intention to work for a European code was another of our February 1997 policy pledges and it was reconfirmed by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary when he announced the new criteria.
Progress has been excellent. We started off by talking to the French. The hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife referred to the size of the European market, which accounts for some 40 per cent. of global exports. However, Britain and France account for some 80 per cent. of European exports. As nearly one third of global exports are from Britain and France, the House will understand the logic of beginning the process by talking to the French.
We have received enthusiastic responses from the rest of our European partners and that has been important in generating the will to take the process forward. We have been able to agree on a joint draft text with the French, and it is now being circulated among our other European partners. It is still our aim to achieve agreement during the United Kingdom presidency.
Mr. Harry Cohen (Leyton and Wanstead):
I am delighted that the code of practice has received a positive
Mr. Lloyd:
I am aware of the specific point to which the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife and my hon. Friend referred, but we do not believe that it is a loophole as we find it acceptable to provide protection for security forces. However, the sale of certain equipment is acceptable only when it does not infringe the more important criterion that the equipment is not used for the purpose of internal repression. We do not believe that internal repression should be permitted to pursue what might be described as legitimate security operations. We take the opposite view--that legitimate security operations should not take place if they involve internal repression. Our national criteria upon which the European code is based allow for no such loopholes. We shall always look at the form of words and the practice to see whether improvements are required, but it is not our view that there is such a loophole.
Mr. Corbyn:
I am glad that my hon. Friend has reached this point. Does he believe that the EU code, when it is fully operational, will prevent Britain from selling arms to Turkey? After all, we provide 10 per cent. of Turkey's armaments. Does my hon. Friend accept that the Turkish army is waging a civil war against the Kurdish people in eastern Turkey and that the most appalling violations of human rights are taking place using equipment manufactured and sold by Britain and almost every other EU country? Does he accept that an arms embargo on Turkey would have a dramatic effect on improving human rights there?
Mr. Lloyd:
Neither the national code nor the European code introduces the concept of arms embargoes. As my hon. Friend will be aware, arms embargoes apply to certain countries. For example, the United Nations Security Council recently announced a global ban on arms sales to the former Yugoslavia.
The EU code would not provide a blanket ban. However, it would make our national framework operate on an EU-wide basis that would prevent the sale of arms to any country that fell foul of the criteria in respect of internal repression or external aggression. That is a test which, properly brought to bear, has a material impact on the sale of arms. It already has an impact on the way in which Britain has been conducting such affairs internationally and it will have the same impact at a European level.
The code that will operate at a European level is an elaboration of the common criteria agreed in 1991 and 1992, in line with UK national criteria that are already well defined and well understood. It is also designed to prevent undercutting--the specific point raised by the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife. It includes a consultation mechanism providing for partners to circulate to other partners information about denials of export licences and requires a partner to consult the denying partner before deciding whether to issue an
export licence for essentially the same goods to the same client. That will bring pressure to bear to prevent undercutting in arms sales that has allowed would-be purchasers to shop around. It gives European defence sales new and increased strength.
Agreement on the code will be a major step forward in the effective international regulation of arms exports. The consultation mechanism that we have proposed breaks significant new ground. Never before has such a mechanism been applied to conventional arms exports and the Government deserve credit for initiating work on the code and pursuing it so vigorously.
Agreement on the code, however, is not the be all and end all. Many complex issues such as strengthening end-use controls cannot adequately be addressed in a document such as the code. We are continuing to work on them at national level as it is important that we get our national framework right. They arise out of the Scott inquiry and, as the House knows, we have not yet received its final report. We want to take those matters forward in international forums. No one is pretending that an EU code of conduct is the final wisdom. We want to internationalise all the processes in which we are engaged and include such issues as end-use control in that European framework. When we have experience of how the code works in practice, we shall to consider what further measures are needed to improve its operation.
We are continuing to work on issues wider than the European framework. A good example is what we are doing in respect of the Wassenaar arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. That international framework has the potential to make a valuable contribution to the promotion of responsibility and transparency in transfers of arms and dual-use equipment.
The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of efforts to develop the Wassenaar arrangement so that it can fulfil its potential. We continue to press for an expansion of the reporting categories for conventional arms transfers and we have volunteered to notify export licences denied on grounds of regional stability. Regional stability is an important criterion. It is a totally open reporting system and, in one case, we have already made such information available. We have played a leading role in work on what makes transfers destabilising. As a result, we have firmly established the United Kingdom as one of the most constructive and active players within the Wassenaar arrangement.
The United Kingdom remains determined to strengthen the UN register of conventional arms. That is not an easy process; last year, the UN panel of experts produced a disappointing report, although we endorsed it because we wanted to build on the consensus. The United Kingdom will continue to work individually and with European Union partners to persuade more countries to contribute to the register and to broaden the categories of weapons covered.
The biggest issue on which we want to make progress is illicit trafficking, especially in small arms and light weapons, which were the dominant weapons in virtually all the 49 large-scale conflicts that took place in 1995--the most recent reference point. It is estimated that over 55 per cent. of small arms are traded illicitly, and are often recirculated from one conflict to another. In southern
Africa in particular, there is no doubt that weapons were passed from one country to another and used in different conflicts at great human cost.
Graca Machel, widow of the former President of Mozambique, has campaigned on a range of issues, especially illicit arms. She recently told me that the effects of the glut of cheap, easily available small arms have been devastating, not only on her country, but throughout huge parts of the African continent and worldwide.
We are determined to play a role in the fight against small arms proliferation and illicit trafficking, and during our presidency of the EU we have taken forward vigorously work under the EU programme to combat illicit trafficking in conventional arms. The programme could achieve progress for the world.
In February, Britain hosted an international conference on the problems of arms trafficking within and into the EU. The United Kingdom believes that, outside the EU, the programme should focus initially on southern Africa. In May, the Department for International Development will fund a seminar in South Africa that will be run by Saferworld, a British non-governmental organisation, in co-operation with a South African NGO. It should identify practical ways of helping affected regions and, we hope, produce project ideas for funding by donors.
We are also supporting work outside the EU programme. We have previously expressed support for the work of the Government of Mali to secure a moratorium on the import, export and production of light weapons in the Sahara-Sahel region, and are putting money into the project.
At a conference in Oslo yesterday, £300,000 was pledged on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development to the United Nations Development Programme project to co-ordinate and assist security development for the implementation of the moratorium once it is agreed. Those are practical steps.
The hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife spoke about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programmes. The House was rapt in its attention to recent events, and there can be no doubt about the British Government's present commitment to ensure that the UN inspection system works. We demand the destruction of Iraq's capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction of any kind--nuclear, biological or chemical.
The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to ask how those programmes came about. He asked about a number of issues, but I cannot give him answers because events took place under the previous Government--we are as tied as Scott was in pursuing them. We must ensure that we move to a regime that stops such events happening again and staining the honour of this nation. That can be achieved in a number of ways--for example, by examining controls of dual-use technology. I shall look carefully into the transfer of equipment to the American Type Culture Collection. We have made inquiries, but I hope that he will forgive me for saying that there was not enough time to provide a substantive answer. We will look into the matter.
The control of dual-use technology is an importantand difficult issue, but although national controls are important, we can do better. The Government are
determined to make progress on a convention for biological weapons; it would mirror the convention for chemical weapons, which allows for challenge inspection, and could provide a framework within which biological weapons production would be controlled in the same way as chemical weapons production and would ensure that it could not take place. We are working on it, and already have agreement at EU level. We are determined to pursue the matter as far as we can and to bring to the world the benefits of a convention that would ban biological weapons.
I have discussed the matter with the Indian Government through their high commission, and we shall take every opportunity to move the agenda forward to rid the world of these vile chemical and biological weapons.
The handling of defence exports raises difficult questions for foreign, industrial and defence policy. Inevitably, passions are aroused, and there is controversy. Striking the right balance between protecting the United Kingdom's prosperity and ensuring that British exports can be used only for legitimate purposes is important to the Government, who have given a clear commitment that their foreign policy is based on humanitarian principles.
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