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Maze Prison (Narey Inquiry)
3.30 pm
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Marjorie Mowlam): With permission, Madam Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the report of the Narey inquiry into incidents at the Maze prison.
On l0 December, Provisional IRA prisoner Liam Averill escaped from the Maze prison. On the following day, we commissioned an independent inquiry to be undertaken by Martin Narey, the director of regimes in the Prison Service for England and Wales. He was asked to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the escape.
On 27 December, Loyalist Volunteer Force prisoner Billy Wright was killed within the Maze prison. We immediately asked Martin Narey to extend the scope of his inquiry to include the circumstances surrounding the murder.
In addition, Her Majesty's chief inspector of prisons, Sir David Ramsbotham, was asked immediately to bring forward a full inspection of the Maze.
Martin Narey's detailed and comprehensive report is now before the House. I am grateful to him and his team for completing his inquiry so promptly.
Before going on to consider important aspects of the report, I should like to comment on the third serious incident that has occurred in the Maze--the brutal and savage murder of Mr. David Keys, who was found dead in LVF accommodation on the morning of Sunday 15 March.
I very much regret any incident that leads to the loss of life within prison. I am committed to taking all viable steps to prevent a recurrence, but I must be honest and say emphatically that, even with the most rigorous and severe prison regimes, it is impossible for anyone to guarantee that serious incidents will not happen.
Mr. Keys's murder is, of course, the subject of a Royal Ulster Constabulary investigation and an internal investigation by the Prison Service. However, although Martin Narey had the safety of prisoners continually in mind, the murder raises issues that go beyond the scope of the Narey inquiry. I have, therefore, asked Sir David Ramsbotham, whose inspection of the Maze began on Monday 23 March, to look specifically at the way in which the regime at the Maze impacts on the safety of individual prisoners, and to make recommendations.
As a result of information received during the RUC's investigation, the governor has decided to place LVF prisoners under prison rule 32 for the maintenance of good order and discipline. That is not a punishment, but it does mean that prisoners are kept in cell for up to 23 hours of the day and have restricted association and privileges. Even that reasonable measure resulted in threats to staff, and a number of prisoners refusing prison food, in an effort to overturn the governor's decision.
It is important to bear in mind the fact that Mr. Keys applied to be transferred to the Maze in full knowledge of the conditions there. However, in future, remand prisoners will not move immediately to the Maze, but will be held for a longer period in Maghaberry for assessment. That will give the prison authorities more time to be assured about the safety of such a move.
Martin Narey has described very fully the unique difficulties faced by staff and management at the Maze prison. To quote from his report:
Given the small size of Northern Ireland and its small prison estate, the dispersal of paramilitary prisoners is not possible. The only prudent option is to hold them in one place. Although the concentration of prisoners has many security advantages, there is a price to be paid. It gives the prisoners the opportunity to take concerted action within the prison, including action against staff.
I know of no other prison that operates under such difficult circumstances, or where staff are under such continual threat and pressure. I share Martin Narey's admiration for those who work at the Maze. Despite the difficulties and dangers, for 14 years until last December, they had contained a difficult population without a single escape.
Martin Narey has also drawn attention to the support that paramilitary prisoners have outside prison. One important consequence of that has been faced by me and my predecessors: the danger that actions taken inside prison, for perfectly sound and defensible penological reasons, may result in disruption and unrest outside prison. Against that background, I am aware that staff and management at the Maze have created conditions of safety and humanity which compare favourably with other prisons in the United Kingdom and beyond, and have been entirely open to impartial observers from outside such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
In the aftermath of the escape and the murders, I am required to make decisions about the security of prisons and prisoners. Like all my predecessors, however, I must make decisions that balance the security of custody with the safety of our staff. I must also make decisions that balance the requirements of imprisonment with the wider requirements of public order and public safety.
The Government have already taken significant steps to improve security at the Maze prison. In March 1997, a tunnel was found in H block 7. It was the subject of an inquiry by the previous Government, carried out by John Steele. Following the election of the present Government, we have pursued the implementation of the Steele recommendations. Specifically, morning and evening head counts are being taken; each day, five randomly selected cells per block are being given a fabric check; and full block searches are now a weekly feature.
Material coming from stores is now exchanged on a new-for-old basis, and there is now an accurate picture of the amount and nature of the supplies in the blocks. All prisoners on inter-block movement are being searched.
In addition, a programme of physical security measures has been included in the existing block refurbishment programme. Five blocks have been upgraded to date, and work on the remainder is due for completion by mid-August.
Martin Narey has drawn attention to a number of important lapses in security at the Maze. He has made 59 recommendations that he considers will represent real improvements for staff and prisoners.
As Martin Narey said in his report, changes have already been made. In particular, the governor has taken the initiative to put in place regular random full block searches; regular security checks of H block fences; new arrangements for weekend coverage of staffing shortfalls on visits; new arrangements for searching prisoners on visits and for X-raying parcels; and new arrangements for counting visitors at parties.
Some of the remaining recommendations will be taken forward immediately, now that the report has been published. Other recommendations require some detailed consideration; the necessary project teams are being put in place, for instance, to look at security of the roofs of the buildings and improved processes for dealing with visitors.
Some of the issues to be considered vary in their complexity. However, as an assurance of our determination to act on the recommendations and to tighten security, I undertake to make available to Parliament, in three months' time, a progress report on implementation. In addition, and going beyond the recommendations, we have set up a security audit team, which will begin to work immediately and which will provide the chief executive of the Prison Service with the necessary assurance that changes have been made and are working effectively. That may seem to be a small item, but many changes have been recommended over the years in relation to the Maze, and holding a regular security audit will give us the information to know that the change is taking place.
Finally, I should like to deal with the on-going management of the Maze. Martin Narey has not only recorded a number of lapses in security, but dealt with wider matters to do with the safe and secure running of the prison. Those centre on improving the quality of general management and enhancing staff morale and confidence.
The report suggests that the shortcomings cannot be attributed to individuals, but are the result of a slow, but long-running, deterioration caused by staff fears of the consequences of managing paramilitary prisoners, and by the absence of effective middle management.
The shortcomings have also emerged because there is no easy way of dealing with the Maze and the difficult prisoners it contains. The simple truth, which Martin Narey acknowledges, is that the Maze is different, and the policies operated by successive Governments, which we inherited, have reflected exactly that fact.
I could continue with the status quo, but I consider that unacceptable, or I could turn the clock back at the Maze and reassert the sort of regime that operated during the
1980s. However, in my view, turning the clock back would be at a price within the prison and within the community that no reasonable person would be prepared to pay; certainly, no previous Government have taken a different view.
We recognise the problems, but that is not an excuse for complacency. One irony is that the shortcomings noted by Martin Narey had been noted by the Prison Service long before December of last year, and were beginning to be acted on. They were the reason why Martin Mogg, the most senior governor available within the Northern Ireland Prison Service, together with a new management team, was put in place in October 1997 to take over the running of the Maze. Martin Mogg's appointment is temporary, to ensure the vigorous implementation of the Steele recommendations. I am pleased to note Martin Narey's acknowledgement of the good progress that the team has been making.
However, the fact remains, as Martin Narey has concluded, that
"The Maze contains more than 500 paramilitary prisoners, from five different factions, some violently opposed to one another, living in segregated accommodation and enjoying the support of significant communities outside the prison. It is staffed by prison officers who live in the same communities."
Staff at all levels in the Prison Service and their families have been subjected to a campaign of intimidation and attack directed against them. Since the start of the troubles, 29 members of staff have been murdered by paramilitaries. In 1996-97 alone, there were 122 reported threats against staff, and a further 50 officers had to be given special protection. That campaign has been waged against staff in an effort by prisoners and their supporters to impose their will. The campaign continues. Last weekend, there was a live bomb attempt on the home of a female prison officer in Portadown and, in the early hours of Monday morning, a bomb exploded under the car of a retired prison officer living in Carrickfergus.
"the challenge of the Maze is greater than that of any other establishment in the United Kingdom".
I regard it as critical, therefore, that we act as quickly as possible on the Narey inquiry's recommendations. I assure the House that we will do so.
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