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Mr. Corbyn: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Anderson: My hon. Friend did not give way to me when I was trying to put that case to him.

Mr. Corbyn: That was not me.

Mr. Anderson: I give way to my hon. Friend.

Mr. Corbyn: I thank my hon. Friend for giving way now that I have reminded him who I am.

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Does my hon. Friend not recall that, in the last few days before the launch of the strikes against Iraq by the allied forces to liberate Kuwait in 1991, President Gorbachev had indeed intervened, and successfully negotiated the principle of withdrawal from Kuwait? Does that not demonstrate that there was a serious attempt by the then Soviet Union to achieve a settlement, which the United States simply did not want?

Mr. Anderson: I suspect that my hon. Friend is rewriting history. Had those diplomatic efforts continued beyond six months, as some are suggesting now, without the option of a military strike, we would still be negotiating and Saddam would still be encamped in Kuwait City. That is the essential weakness of the argument of those who want a form of diplomacy without any military strike at the end to back it. That is the real problem.

Even those who are willing to give Saddam Hussein the benefit of many doubts must acknowledge his clear defiance of the United Nations resolution. What is now the proper response? Do we do nothing? That surely would be unthinkable. What a precedent for any other dictator who sought to defy the will of the United Nations and the world community. Do we rely simply on diplomacy? We know what might have happened if we had tried to do that without backing it with an ultimate military option in 1990-91.

A reasonable policy is surely diplomacy plus. Negotiation has a better chance of success if there is a military message behind it, but the military message can be credible and saleable to world opinion only if it can be shown that a serious process of diplomacy preceded it. The war drums may now be rolling and there may be a feeling of inevitability. I hope that we shall show by all our actions that we are serious about diplomacy, and that we are prepared to be flexible on some key details, such as what we learn about the package that is being discussed with Kofi Annan in respect of the weapons inspectors.

We must show to the people of Iraq and wider regional opinion that there is light at the end of the tunnel. There have been contrary indications from US spokesmen about sanctions. As a sign of good will, there should surely be a linkage between compliance and the gradual removal of sanctions.

Mr. Allan Rogers (Rhondda): My hon. Friend has invoked the strength of United Nations resolutions and the issue of sanctions. Is it not strange that we return to that argument, especially after listening to the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Clark)? When he was in power as Minister for Defence Procurement, and when he served at the Department of Trade and Industry, he flouted UN resolutions regarding the imposition of sanctions in the export of arms and conspired with British industrialists to feed Saddam Hussein's war machine. Part of the problem that we face now is that when people like him were in government, they ignored UN resolutions and broke them, when Lord Howe, who was then the Foreign Secretary--

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The intervention is far too long.

Mr. Anderson: I hear my hon. Friend. My aim tonight is to give a clear signal, along with all sections of the

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House, that if the reasonable diplomatic options have been exhausted, the military option exists. If diplomacy stands alone, it will have no effect. Of course any option is high risk and there are many uncertainties, but to do nothing would involve far greater uncertainties than the policy pursued by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, which I endorse.

Several hon. Members rose--

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. Before I call the next speaker, may I remind the House that Madam Speaker has placed a 10-minute limit on speeches from 7 pm until 9 pm.

7.3 pm

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden): May I say how much I agree with the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson). As I have only 10 minutes, and I know that many other hon. Members want to speak in the debate, I shall try not to repeat points that have already been made, although I may refer to the fact that I agree with them.

I have visited the United States a number of times, and I was there a few weeks ago with some colleagues. We went to the Senate, the House of Representatives, the National Security Council, the Pentagon and the State Department. I could not recognise the policies described by some hon. Members, as though there were some great devious plot on the part of the United States to continue to ram sanctions down the throats of the poor, suffering people of Iraq, to pave the way for bombing and to tear Iraq apart, thereby creating a disruptive situation in the middle east.

I have never found people in the United States more thoughtful than I did on my most recent visit, or more considerate about the repercussions of a policy that is devilishly difficult to deal with.

How does one ignore a country that has deliberately flouted United Nations resolutions? As the hon. Member for Swansea, East said, that is a matter for diplomacy. I agree with him that diplomacy is not an end in itself. There comes a time when it must be backed up with threats, and possibly the threat of military action, which can be be shown only by positioning troops. If our experience between the wars is anything to go by, we must recognise that reality.

The right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) went back to the past and spoke about his childhood. Let me say why, when it comes to upholding the United Nations, I subscribe so strongly to diplomacy plus military action if diplomacy fails. I remember the circumstances in which I grew up. My father had been gassed and wounded in the first world war, and recovered. My mother had the guts to get in a car and drive people round through zeppelin raids as a volunteer. As the shadow of that war began to recede, a new shadow loomed--the threat of another war.

That threat of that war got worse and worse, because we appeased and appeased. We never stopped appeasing. We tried to reckon that we could deal with Mussolini over sanctions. We failed, and a Foreign Secretary resigned. We tried to think that something could happen to stop a dictator moving his troops into a demilitarised zone, contrary to the treaty of Versailles, and we did not have the guts to go in and oppose him.

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We could not find allies, just as today it is difficult to find Arab allies. I understand why. Why should Arab states that got involved in the war when one of their fellow states was invaded stick their neck out now, especially in view of the difficulties that arise over Israel? They know that they would put their lives and kingdoms under threat, partly because of Israel, partly because of the lies that are told, partly because of Muslim fundamentalism, and partly because in the end there are some nations that cannot face up to the reality, just as happened between the two world wars.

What, then, are we to do? Are we to sit back and do nothing? I agree with the Foreign Secretary's speech. It is not in line with reality, realpolitik, decency, a sense of moral fibre or leadership if we wash our hands and say that we can do nothing. Of course we have compassion for the people of Iraq, although I am bound to say that, from the shots that I see on television, the people of Iraq look remarkably well fed, compared with pictures of people in the poor states of Africa, where we can see how badly fed they are. We hear of the destruction that was rained on Baghdad, but it is amazing how many new buildings one sees and the palaces that have been built.

I will not take moral lectures from anyone on either side of the House that the responsibility is mine. The initial responsibility lies with the regime in Iraq and with that dictator. I ended up as a soldier in the second world war because of the refusal of many countries between the two world wars to recognise that there are people who are intrinsically evil. We must stand up to them and their dictatorships, because, if we do not, our turn will come in the end. The second world war was unnecessary and would not have happened, if we had had the guts to stand up at the right time.

Opposition Members share similar experiences to mine with regard to the North Atlantic Assembly. We tried to back through parliamentary means the resolution of our Governments to stand up to Russian threats during the cold war. We did so, and we did not at the same time threaten the Russians with weapons or acts of aggression; we stood our ground. That, for me, is the real reason why today there is a generation throughout Europe that can look forward to years of peace--which goes for the Russians as well as everyone else.

In the end, those dictatorships tumbled because we faced them down. That, I think, is the root of the argument that we are having today. Obviously, if diplomacy is to succeed, we must convince those with whom we wish to enter into an agreement--those whom we wish to discard the reckless creation and use of weapons--that there is no future for them in such action. I believe that, by doing so, we shall do them a service, provided that we have the courage in the end to say that a lesson must be learned.

Mr. Mubarak, for example, knows very well where the danger lies. It does not lie in the United States--although it has made mistakes over Israel, as many hon. Members have pointed out. Mr. Mubarak knows that the threat to his country, and to other Arab countries, lies right there in Iraq. That is why he has said--it is on the record; I believe that it was quoted extensively in yesterday's Financial Times--that he would like the United Nations representative, be it the Secretary-General or whoever else is sent, to tell the Iraqi leader that he should submit to the conditions imposed by the Security Council resolution. He should allow the inspectors to return, without

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imposing any conditions. He could then hope that his friends outside--for he has friends outside--would put pressure on the United States and its fellow UN members to lift the sanctions that have imposed the hardship, and help his countrymen on their way. First and foremost, Saddam Hussein must renounce the weapons he has; but if he cannot respond to Mubarak, how much less likely is he to respond to us at present?

I hope that the Government will have our full support in the rest of the debate. Because we have experienced wars, we know how terrible they can be. I never want to see another, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Clark) has posed some important questions: the public out there need to be convinced.

Let me say one more thing about the United States. I observed no gung-ho attitude among Congressmen. I note that the President is taking the argument to the people, and so should we.


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