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5.59 pm
Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South): History, constitutional law, political practice and the Executive orientation of our political system have determined that the House does not declare war, or initiate or terminate wars. Our role is to endorse, which we usually do, or to oppose, which we rarely do.
On occasions, opinion in the House and in the country is divided. Some would argue that the House is at its best when we are indulging in hysteria and displaying signs of being a legislature on heat, with the hurling of abuse and creative tension, but I would argue that, on national security issues, the House is at its best when it displays none of those characteristics, but exhibits a large degree of consensus. I suspect that when people analyse our proceedings today, they will appreciate that there has been a remarkable degree, if not of unanimity or consensus, of basic agreement. I cannot recall many occasions on which a Foreign Secretary's speech was largely approved by the Opposition spokesman, who made a similar and almost indistinguishable speech. A former Prime Minister, the Liberal Democrat spokesman on defence and foreign affairs and almost everyone else who has spoken have said that we do not want to go to war, that we are not being jingoistic and that we are speaking critically, not cynically. In most cases, we are speaking without emotion and telling the Government that they must negotiate hard, but that if the negotiations fail and we have been seen to be using our best endeavours to resolve the crisis by negotiation, regrettably, we may have to have recourse to physical force.
I deeply disagree with the imputation of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), whose views I do not agree with, but respect. He is part of our post-war history, although I disagree with his interpretation of that history. I do not believe that if I go into the Lobby in support of the Government--which I will--there will be blood on my hands. If I sit on my hands or oppose the Government, and if the House is foolish enough to dissent from their view, we shall have to accept responsibility for that action too. In supporting the Government--as we will do--we shall not be initiating the action, but endorsing it. We shall be saying that we must share a responsibility. If things go right, we shall claim some of the credit. If things go wrong, we may want to run and hide, but we must accept responsibility for our individual and collective action.
Having studied security issues for many years, I cannot say with absolute confidence what is going to happen tomorrow morning, let alone in one, two or three weeks. One politician is supposed to have said of another, "I wish I was as certain of some things as he is of everything." I do not approach the crisis with any absolute confidence that what our Government or the American Government are doing will inevitably turn out be right. The world is not like that. To accept the argument in terms of simplistic good and bad or right and wrong, is to delude oneself considerably.
The House has debated other wars. On one occasion, it was not even recalled to discuss a war because it was thought to be too insignificant. On occasions, the House
has been deeply divided--divided Houses and divided countries will almost inevitably lead to the failure of the military venture that has been reluctantly authorised. Jingoism has been absent from this debate. The House's sober approach reflects the fact that most people realise that the Government have proceeded cautiously and with good intent.
I do not like the phrase, "the just war". There are very few just wars. Even during the second world war, there was no unanimity. The fascists opposed what we were doing and until the Communist party in Moscow gave the British communists direction, there was considerable ambivalence among them. There were pacifists, whose views I respect, and those who believed that we should sit out the war and gain the advantage after it--a view that I do not respect. If ever there was a just war, it was the second world war.
People should not have a moral sense of superiority, saying, "My perception of history and events is so perfect and my moral perception so beyond criticism that anyone who dares disagree is per se immoral, his views should be deprecated and he or she bears blood on their hands." That is to reduce a complicated dilemma to such a trivial level as to be almost worthless.
What the Government are doing is right and just. The alliance of nations that George Bush was able to assemble in 1991 may not be so arrayed on this occasion, but let us remember that most of the coalition countries played a marginal role in providing military forces as their role was largely symbolic. The United States could have completed its military task without recourse to anyone else but, politically, the authorisation of the United Nations was necessary.
Are we to say that because France, Russia and China, which have their own agendas, do not endorse what Britain or the United States wants to be done, the whole institution should be paralysed? If necessary, we have an authorisation for the use of force, as lawyers have told us. Even if there were not that authorisation, we could argue strongly that it would be necessary to threaten or use physical force.
As everyone knows, even those who oppose physical force, Saddam Hussein has violated international law and United Nations resolutions, and has built up such a substantial and threatening arsenal of chemical and biological weapons that he has to be stopped. Those who argue against military force rely on the United Nations and its moral authority to undo the damage. However, the United Nations was unable to resolve the crisis in Bosnia by using purely its moral authority. Only when certain countries, notably the United States, decided to put more than moral authority into resolving the crisis was real success gained.
Saddam has repeatedly obstructed, prevaricated and done everything possible to elevate ducking and diving to a science. To argue, as he does, that he has been co-operative with UNSCOM inspectors is to stretch reality. If he is not stopped, he will be a threat to regional and international security. In pressurising him and taking him to the brink, up to the point of switching on the engines of the aircraft, he must be given the opportunity of accepting the United Nations resolutions. If he accepts them, it is imperative that we do not simply accept his
word because his word is worthless. If we accept a climbdown--there will be attempts to try to mask such a climbdown; certainly to his people whatever he does will be deemed a major diplomatic success--the armed forces should remain to ensure that he complies with United Nations resolutions. The moment the ships go over the horizon, he will be encouraged to return to his old habits.
The consequences of backing down now and withdrawing without achieving our justifiable objectives would be serious, although some will disagree with my reasons for saying that. As a great believer in the North Atlantic alliance, I think that if we leave the United States on its own, the alliance's future would be jeopardised. The United States would ask why it should bother to remain in the alliance. Senators may ask why they should ratify NATO enlargement or retain US forces in Bosnia if, in a time of crisis, their NATO partners are not prepared to stand by them. I believe in the special relationship with the United States; it would be in tatters in such asituation. European-American relations would degenerate worryingly. Above all, Saddam would be left alone. If the United States and other countries do not get together on this, he will be free to use his weapons at a time of his choosing. It is wise to get the lessons--the retaliation--in first.
As many have said, perhaps the United States should be more diligent in putting pressure on the Israeli Government. First, the limited success in putting together a coalition can be significantly attributed to the intransigence of the Israeli Government in implementing the middle east peace accords. Secondly, I believe that we should be more vigilant in controlling the export of arms. Few countries can be free of guilt in respect of exporting arms that can be used for immoral purposes.
Thirdly, I invite our good friends in the Treasury to realise that wars can begin when they are not anticipated. If we have forces that are as capable as ours are at present, we at least have a range of options that would not be available if defence expenditure were further reduced. Fourthly, hon. Members should not hold their breath, expecting a European defence policy to provide an alternative to our current alliance structure. It has been said that some of our allies in the previous Gulf crisis reached for their cheque books and dived into their cellars. It is important that European nations rely less on the United States or the United Kingdom and do more than offer moral support; many are not even offering that.
The Defence Select Committee this morning had a briefing in the Ministry of Defence from the Secretary of State for Defence and the Minister for the Armed Forces. The Committee will visit the United States next week. That does not reflect brilliant timing on my part, but it should be an interesting time to exchange views with our American colleagues.
Mr. Dalyell:
Did the Defence Select Committee hear the views or advice of the chiefs of staff? It may be unrealistic to think that their advice could be given to the entire House of Commons, but I have asked the Secretary of State for Defence to make it available to either the Intelligence and Security Committee or the Defence Select Committee. I am not a member of either, but has that been done?
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