| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
Mr. Michael Howard (Folkestone and Hythe): The House will be grateful to the Foreign Secretary for his statement, and I hope that we shall have an opportunity to debate the situation in Iraq in full in the near future. As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and I have consistently made clear, we support the Government in their efforts to ensure that Saddam Hussein respects the will of the UN and the world community. We agree that he cannot be allowed to flout Security Council resolutions--to which he himself agreed--with impunity. We agree that every diplomatic avenue must be pursued, but that if diplomacy fails, it would be right to contemplate military action.
We have also said consistently that the military action must have a clear objective. Last Monday in this House--and again on the radio this morning--the Foreign Secretary said that the objective of any military action was to ensure that the UNSCOM inspectors could complete their task. Last Friday in Washington--with the Prime Minister beside him--President Clinton said that the objective was to reduce Saddam's ability to use weapons of mass destruction against his neighbours. On Sunday, the Secretary of State for Defence was talking about the risks to the survival of Saddam Hussein and his regime. Is there not a danger that those different descriptions of the objectives will lead to uncertainty and confusion? Do we not owe it to the British service men and women whose lives may be put at risk to spell out a clear objective and to stick to it?
On the Security Council resolution to which the Foreign Secretary referred, could he tell us a little more about what it is intended to achieve? Is it the Government's position that resolution 687 provides
sufficient authority for military action? What would be the effect on any such military action of the presence of Turkish troops in Iraq?
Finally, could the Foreign Secretary tell us a little more about the attempts that he has made, as President of the European Union Council of Foreign Ministers, to secure a consensus in the European Union on this question? Does not the complete absence of any such consensus illustrate yet again the emptiness of ambitions to develop a common foreign and defence policy in Europe?
Mr. Cook:
On the right hon. and learned Gentleman's first point, we are well aware of the acute interest in this matter in the House and of the importance of ensuring that the House has adequate opportunities to debate these issues. I am consulting the Leader of the House and the usual channels about what might be an appropriate day for such a debate.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is perfectly correct to draw attention to the fact that Saddam Hussein agreed to the UNSCOM regime, and accepted the inspection provided for in those resolutions. It was part of the ceasefire agreement to which he signed up. To take one of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's later points, there is therefore adequate authority already in that ceasefire agreement and in those resolutions.
It is nevertheless very important that we demonstrate that it is the international community that condemns Saddam Hussein's repeated violation of those resolutions. It is therefore important that the Security Council, on behalf of the international community, registers its criticism and rejection of Saddam Hussein's behaviour, and calls on him to abandon his plans to develop chemical and biological arsenals.
I see no conflict between what I have said and what the right hon. and learned Gentleman quotes from the Prime Minister. The objective is, indeed, to achieve compliance with the Security Council resolutions and to deny Saddam Hussein his ambition to develop weapons of mass destruction. Much the most effective way of doing that would be for the UNSCOM regime to be allowed to return to work. To increase the pressure for that to happen, we have made it perfectly plain that we have the resolve, if necessary, to use military force. If we cannot achieve an agreement by which UNSCOM can effectively hinder Saddam from developing chemical and biological weapons, military force will be applied to ensure that what UNSCOM inspectors cannot achieve can be achieved by direct action, so that Saddam is not left with arsenals of terror with which he could then seek to bully his neighbours.
I regret that the right hon. and learned Gentleman, at a time of immense international crisis, chose to make his own point about European policy. For the record, I have to say that he is behind the times. We are in close and continuous contact with the Government of France, and only this weekend Chancellor Kohl made it perfectly clear that he is willing to back and support us.
Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East):
May I avoid the textual analysis and the anti-European swipe by the right hon. Learned Member for Folkestone Hythe (Mr. Howard) and deal with the question of weapons inspectors? Clearly, the only real guarantee of the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 is
Mr. Cook:
The present teams cover a large number of countries. Indeed, the last team to which Saddam Hussein took particular exception consisted of 44 inspectors from 17 different countries. It is wrong to suggest that a team containing members from 17 UN countries is dominated by one or two countries. We would welcome additional inspectors from other countries if they chose to take part in the exercise, if only because Britain pays for its own inspectors and therefore carries a share of the direct financial burden of the exercise. Inspectors must be effective, knowledgeable and capable of communicating in the common language of UNSCOM, which is English. We have no difficulty constructing an UNSCOM-plus, but we shall not settle for any outcome that gives us an UNSCOM-minus.
Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife):
I commend the terms of the Secretary of State's statement, which was balanced, firm and inherently logical. When he was making it, did it occur to him that it is symptomatic of Saddam Hussein's deception and obstructionism that, seven years after the end of the Gulf war, he has not yet fulfilled the terms and conditions of the peace settlement that he undertook? Had he done so, the condition of the children in his country might have been much improved. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, says that the parties must not be purist in their attitude, and must be willing to be flexible. Could that approach be adopted, so long as it was applied to the practicalities of the implementation of the resolutions, and not to the principle?
Mr. Cook:
I wholly agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman that it is remarkable, and entirely down to Saddam's behaviour, that, seven years after the ceasefire, we are still debating whether he will comply with the terms of the ceasefire. Nobody at the time when the sanctions were first imposed foresaw that we would still be here seven years later. The only reason why we are here seven years later is that Saddam persistently attempts to obstruct, to conceal and to prevent the UNSCOM inspectors from going about their job.
It is important that we make it plain to the world and to the Iraqi people that, if Saddam Hussein complies with the terms of the ceasefire, and if he abandons his plans to develop weapons of mass destruction, sanctions can be lifted and the people of Iraq can return to their normal life.
As to flexibility, of course we are willing to consider any creative proposal that would help us to achieve a diplomatic solution. But we are absolutely resolute in our belief that there is no point in accepting flexibility if it means that UNSCOM cannot carry out effective inspections. The objective of the exercise is to ensure that we find and dismantle those weapons. Any flexibility that prevents us from doing that leaves us with an agreement that is not worth having.
Mr. Tony Benn (Chesterfield):
Is the Secretary of State aware that the most obvious gap in his strategy is that no diplomatic efforts have been made by the United States
Is the Secretary of State further aware that articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations charter make it clear that military action may be authorised only by the Security Council? If action were taken by Britain and America, it would be illegal in international law, and would undermine the authority of the United Nations. The moral responsibility for the deaths of civilians that could follow would rest with those who took that decision. For that reason, it would not be possible for those who believe in the rule of law and in the United Nations to support the military action that, in the view of the House, the Secretary of State clearly intends to take.
Mr. Cook:
There is no question of our merely playing for time, nor has any decision been taken that force will be used or will be used on any specific date. It is not a play: we are trying very hard to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein to ensure that he responds to the many diplomatic overtures that are being made, perhaps by people who are more likely to be heard in Baghdad than me or my United States counterpart.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |