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Mr. Nicholas Winterton: The hon. Gentleman is advancing an extremely good case, and I agree with much of what he says. However, does he agree that reconciliation, which should feature far more positively in the Bill--I must point out to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary that it is glaringly absent from it--would be much more likely, and that there would be more time for it, if the time limit was increased to 18 months or two years? Having said that, and perhaps put the Opposition spokesman on the spot, I agree that the resources must be available to ensure meaningful reconciliation.
Mr. Boateng: My fear is that such evidence as there is on the nature of the counselling process and the dynamics of the break-up of marriage suggests that
They are the words of Janet Walker, director of the Relate centre for family studies at the university of Newcastle upon Tyne. However, nothing in the Bill suggests that there is any intention whatsoever on the part of the Government to have co-ordinated intervention whose purpose is to save marriages.
Dame Elaine Kellett-Bowman:
Does the hon. Gentleman think--this is something at which my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton) half hinted--that, once the dust had settled and a couple had got the problems relating to the children and the financial arrangements out of the way, they could perhaps relax, and, with the extra year, might just manage to come together, having seen the difficulties that they set themselves in trying to make one budget do two families?
Mr. Boateng:
I very much wish that the hon. Lady was right. It is my experience that so much dust will have been kicked up by then that the couple will be blinded by it, and, what is worse, the children will be affected by it. I fear that so much bitterness will have been engendered by then that any hope of reconciliation will be highly unlikely. Intervention--
Mr. Boateng:
I cannot give way any more.
Intervention has to be at an earlier stage. That is why we tabled our amendments, although I greatly welcome those tabled by the hon. Member for Gainsborough and
Horncastle. Our amendments seek to provide for a dedicated space for reconciliation at the outset before the statement is made. It should be a requirement, not a wish, that such intervention take place at that stage.
We must have a response from the Minister. We look to him to assure us that the Government accept in principle the notion of early intervention, that they will make available the resources for that intervention and, if the right messages are to be sent, they accept the need to strengthen the support that has to be seen in the Bill for the institution of marriage.
Mr. Boateng:
If not, the following. The Opposition supported the Bill on Second Reading on the basis that we support its main thrust. If the Bill is not amended along the lines possible so that we can arrive at a consensus across the House that the Bill aims to save marriages that can be saved and supports the institution of marriage, the Government cannot rely on our support on Third Reading. Let that be made absolutely clear. We are not in the business of presiding over something on our statute book that does nothing to save, support and preserve the institution of marriage.
Mr. Jonathan Evans:
I should begin by thanking all hon. Members who have participated in the debate. Sadly, many parts of it have been thinly attended, but that in no sense gives the Committee a conception of the quality and intelligence of virtually all the speeches made--both by my right hon. and hon. Friends and by Opposition Members.
We are faced today with a very heavy burden. The decisions we take this evening will have implications for many thousands of people and their children in years to come. We must therefore--I am sure that I, too, shall receive applause from my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Dame E. Kellett-Bowman) for saying this--get it right.
Dame Elaine Kellett-Bowman:
Hear, hear.
Mr. Evans:
In developing the policy underlining the Bill, the Lord Chancellor gave scrupulous attention to the responses that he received during the consultation. I should make it very clear to my right hon. and hon. Friends and Opposition Members that there is a lack of empirical research on what the most suitable minimum period for reflection and consideration may be. We are faced with forming a judgment--a personal judgment. That is why it is quite right that there should be a free vote in exercising that judgment.
It is worth while reminding the House of the function of the minimum period for reflection and consideration. It has been said that, by introducing this period, we are in some way reducing from two or five years to one year the time in which parties can divorce. Those arguments have even been presented in Committee.
I am bound to say that I do not think that there are accurate comparisons between the minimum 12-month period for reflection and consideration and the current time requirements for separation in divorce cases where,
for instance, no fault is alleged. The system proposed in the Bill is wholly different, and the period for reflection and consideration is in fact an entirely new legal concept.
Under the current system, the two and five-year periods of separation require the act of living apart. It is determined by the parties themselves, and the divorce is applied for on the basis of the parties' evidence of how long they have lived apart. My right hon. and hon. Friends have rightly expressed the damage that is done to children--not by the mechanisms of law that are involved in divorce, but by the departure of one of the parents.
So much in this debate has been quoted about the Exeter study. I was very glad to have a rather private word with my right hon. Friend the Member for Mitcham and Morden (Dame A. Rumbold) about it. The study says that there is clear damage to children who are in a relationship where there is argument between the parents, but that there is more damage to children when one or other party leaves. The point I make to some of my hon. Friends is that that is not the same as talking about the mechanisms of the divorce legislation.
At the moment, during the separation period, parties simply have to wait out their legal time. It is a passive time, for which there are no clear objectives and there is no encouragement to consider the consequences of divorce or the possibility of reconciliation. That is the structure of the current law, and that is why, as I said on Second Reading, I believe so passionately that it is important to address the matter.
Lady Olga Maitland:
Does my hon. Friend accept that, even as the law stands today, 30,000 couples who place their petition then withdraw it on reflection? If there is only one year in which to consider, reflect and mediate, there simply will not be time for proper reflection. We shall not, therefore, get the same number of people having second thoughts.
Mr. Evans:
I point out to my hon. Friend--we shall discuss the dynamics of this in due course--that we are talking about a minimum period. The current median time for granting a divorce absolute, as I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough and Horncastle (Mr. Leigh), is just under seven months. Yet we know that, even within that period, between 25,000 and 30,000 petitions do not proceed to divorce. Is that not a further reason why the introduction of a minimum period of 12 months is a constructive step?
By contrast with the current position, under the Bill, once the divorce process is started, there will be a court-monitored period, with clear objectives. That period will not begin until a notice is served to the court, and that cannot take place until somebody has attended the information session.
Deciding future arrangements is vital. It focuses on the obligations of marriage and the special responsibilities that those who enter into it have to each other and to their children. The introduction of a fixed minimum period for reflection and consideration is therefore vital. There may have been occasions when my hon. Friends and I have not seen altogether eye to eye on every aspect of the Bill, but I hope that we are all agreed on the introduction of a fixed minimum period for reflection and consideration.
The length of the period is a question on which hon. Members have more difficulty agreeing. The views held on the length of the period are many, and, I am bound to
say, equally valid. The hon. Member for Brent, South (Mr. Boateng) reminded the Committee of the Catholic bishops' conference statement on 15 November last year. Indeed, I quoted it myself on Second Reading. I pointed out then that the bishops were of the view that differing judgments could be made about the predictable effects of such legislation, but that those judgments were made sincerely, honestly and legitimately. I am pleased to say that that has been the character of our debate this evening.
However, we are here to make law, so, however much we respect each other's views, we must settle on one of the propositions before us. The amendments fall into two main categories. There is the extension of the minimum period in the Bill, which currently stands at 12 months, where there are children aged under 16 and where one of the parties does not consent to divorce. For each of the amendments designed to lengthen the minimum period, we have a choice between extending it by six months or by 12 months. That would make the minimum period either 18 months or two years.
I shall discuss first whether the minimum period we decide on should be fixed, without the possibility of an extension if particular circumstances exist. I shall then go on to discuss differing lengths of the minimum period, depending on whether there is consent or whether there are children. The principal aim of a fixed minimum period is to establish, as far as we can, that the breakdown in the marriage is irretrievable. A fixed minimum period is also a clear, unambiguous and absolute statement about the importance of marriage and its obligations. It may be argued that introducing exceptions of any kind to the rule would weaken the way in which the period is regarded.
We should ensure that irretrievable breakdown can be clearly demonstrated by a simple test that avoids scope for pressure by one party against the other to give in and to decide arrangements that will not necessarily be in the best interests of the children--pressure that may abuse the system.
I suggest that we need to emphasise the importance of the full minimum period as the core test of whether a ground for dissolution exists. There is a strong argument against making any exceptions to the requirement that parties can apply for divorce only after some time spent reflecting and considering--and, indeed, only when they have been married for at least two years.
In that context, it might be said that there is some merit in having a definite period that is clear, unequivocal and without any exceptions. My hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough and Horncastle said earlier that one of his colleagues who shared his views on such matters thought that there should be no exceptions.
Now I turn to the subject of providing for differing periods when the divorce is not consented to by both parties, or when there are children under the age of 16 in the family. Many, including several of my right hon. and hon. Friends, have asked why one party should be able to obtain a divorce in the same time, regardless of whether his or her spouse agrees to the divorce.
There is a strong view that, if one party to a marriage is hostile to divorce and believes that the marriage can be saved, every opportunity should be given to save the marriage. It is thought that time might help. Many might also think that it is different if neither party believes at
the outset that there is any hope left for the marriage, and that the length of the period for reflection and consideration should represent that view. Most seem to think the period should be shorter in such cases.
However, it could certainly be argued that, where neither party believes that a marriage can be saved, the people concerned will actually need more time to work on saving their marriage than they would if only one party held that view. Contrary to the thrust of the amendments, that could be said to point to the need for a longer rather than a shorter period where there is consent. But there does not appear to be much support for that view in the Committee--although, of course, there are those who say that, where there are children under 16, the period should be longer even where both parties agree to divorce.
Some argue that the period should be automatically extended where one party objects to divorce. However, in those circumstances, the withholding or granting of consent could become a powerful bargaining chip in negotiating about children and financial arrangements for the future. In such circumstances, it is important that children are not put at greater risk as arrangements for them become part of the bargain.
It may also be felt that the potential for hostility between the parties would be greatly increased if a longer period were required where one party withheld consent, because the parties would enter a power struggle to get the best deal, and would keep at it, each trying to wear the other down. Again, that could significantly detract from the value of the period in encouraging reconciliation between the parties and getting them to focus on the future of their children.
My hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) has tabled an amendment designed to extend the absolute bar on divorce from one year to two years. If it were accepted, no divorce could be applied for on the basis of a statement made before the second anniversary of a marriage. The overall effect of my hon. Friend's amendment, as he told us, would be to provide that no divorces would be allowed during the first three years of marriage--that is, there would be two years' absolute bar, and then the minimum period for reflection and consideration.
I fully understand the sentiment behind the amendment. I have discussed the matter with my hon. Friend several times, and I have much sympathy with the arguments that he has put to the Committee. It is to send out to the world at large the message that marriage is an important institution, and that it should not be devalued by a precipitate divorce.
However, others have said that disallowing divorce for a period of that length may reintroduce the demand, which my hon. Friend will recall, under the old law that, in cases of exceptional hardship or depravity, access to a quicker divorce should be granted. My hon. Friend's amendments would allow no exceptions whatsoever.
Therefore, I should make it clear to the Committee that, if they are carried, it is likely that the argument on abridgement will be raised at a later stage. If couples cannot get divorced in such situations, my hon. Friend will be interested to know that there is some evidence that suggests, surprisingly, that they may forum shop in other jurisdictions to obtain their divorce. I was surprised to learn that but I am told that that was what happened under the previous legislation during the 1980s.
There is clear evidence that the number of divorces that are granted in the early years of marriage--
It being Ten o'clock, The Chairman left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.
9.45 pm
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